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Notwithstanding the apparent lack of success of international emission trading under 
the Kyoto Protocol, numerous jurisdictions are implementing mitigation mechanisms 
that put a price on carbon, whether by taxing activities that cause release of carbon 
to the atmosphere, or by creating markets through which the cost of atmospheric 
release of carbon is internalised to the relevant activities by way of emission trading 
schemes. Carbon pricing is integral as a tool of global climate policy for achieving 
greenhouse gas emission mitigation.  
 
The Paris Agreement and related decisions recognise and embrace the diversity of 
approaches taken by jurisdictions, moving away from the previous approach under 
the Kyoto Protocol. All the same, these diverse and heterogeneous mechanisms – 
in particular emission trading schemes – might achieve greater efficiency, larger 
scale and stimulate essential private sector engagement and other benefits, were 
they to be connected.  
 
There is a body of academic literature on the subject of linking emissions trading 
schemes, but surprisingly few examples. Linking entails jurisdictions achieving a 
certain level of convergence and homogeneity, which means parties negotiating out 
their differences. An alternative model is networking of emission trading schemes, 
which recognises and places a value on those differences, while maintaining the 
autonomy of the individual schemes. 
 
This thesis proposes a conceptual model of networking built on a distributed ledger 
technology (DLT) platform. DLT is one of a suite of new, so-called disruptive 
technologies impacting how services, especially financial services, will be provided 
into the future. As the carbon market network model is essentially a supra-
jurisdictional financial market, the impact of these disruptive technologies must be 
taken into account. Even more so, DLT introduces features potentially making 
networking more feasible and effective within the policy framework of the Paris 
Agreement.  
 
New technologies come with their own issues, not least the fact that existing 
regulatory regimes may not be able to account for the changes they bring. 
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Implementation of applications should be managed so that, on the one hand, they 
do not simply become means for circumventing current laws, but on the other, are 
not regulated in such a manner as to stifle innovation. 
 
In proposing an institutional and regulatory framework to enable the operation of the 
conceptual model proposed, this thesis analyses the literature and existing 
regulation of DLT applications in the financial markets. In so doing, the analysis 
draws together the applicable elements of climate change law, financial regulation 
and developing regulation of the technology. It aims to arrive at a position on the 
extent to which the proposal can overcome delays, inefficiencies and other 
problems that currently beset the carbon market, so as to maximise the 
opportunities for emissions trading to make a difference in achieving the objectives 
of climate policy. 
 
The thesis contributes to the extant academic literature in a number of respects, for 
instance, arguing that it is applications of new distributed ledger technology that 
should be the focus of regulation, not the technology itself; and by a novel 
application of theory concerning fragmentation of international environmental law 
and climate law to illustrate why it is postulated international emissions trading 
under the Kyoto Protocol was less effective than hoped. Equally importantly, the 
thesis contributes by examining networking as a means for connecting carbon 
markets, in contrast to the current linking approach; and by proposing a model for 
such networking, then analysing a governance structure for such connected 
markets, both areas that have received little previous academic attention. Key 
implications for policymakers arising from the thesis include issues such as the need 
for an assessment methodology to value diverse mitigation outcomes; and how to 





Lay Summary  
 
Scientific and political consensus is that global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
need to be drastically reduced in the short to medium term if the impact of 
dangerous, human-induced climate change is to be ameliorated. Mitigation of GHG 
emissions means changing behaviour, thus changing the way many economic 
activities, such as energy generation, transportation, industrial and agricultural 
production, and waste management, are carried out.  
 
Putting a price on GHG emissions can do this, either by taxing activities that give 
rise to them, or by creating a market (in conjunction with regulation) in the form of 
emissions trading schemes to achieve mitigation in a cost-effective manner. GHG 
emissions are not geographically fixed, but pervade the atmosphere, hence the logic 
of international emissions trading is that mitigation action occurs where it is most 
cost effective. 
 
For a number of reasons, international emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol 
was less effective than it might have been. The Paris Agreement and related 
decisions move away from the previous approach, recognising and embracing the 
diversity of approaches taken by jurisdictions. All the same, these diverse and 
heterogeneous mechanisms – in particular emission trading schemes – might 
achieve greater efficiency, larger scale and stimulate essential private sector 
engagement and other benefits, were they to be connected.  The current approach 
to connecting carbon-pricing mechanisms (that is, carbon markets), by linking, is 
time-consuming and fraught with political issues that engender legal and practical 
issues, rendering it somewhat inflexible. Linking entails jurisdictions achieving a 
certain level of convergence by negotiating away their differences. An alternative 
approach is for networking, which recognises and places a value on those 
differences, while maintaining the autonomy of the jurisdictions’ individual 
approaches. 
 
This thesis proposes a model for networking carbon markets using distributed 
ledger technology (DLT) as a platform. DLT is one of a suite of new, so-called 
disruptive technologies impacting how services, especially financial services, will be 
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provided into the future. As the carbon market network model proposed is 
essentially a supra-jurisdictional financial market, the impact of these disruptive 
technologies must be taken into account. Even more so, DLT introduces features 
that potentially make networking more feasible and effective within the policy 
framework of the Paris Agreement. New technologies come with their own issues, 
not least the fact that existing regulatory regimes may not be able to account for the 
changes they bring. Implementation of applications should be managed so that, on 
the one hand, they do not simply become means for circumventing current laws, but 
on the other, are not regulated in such a manner as to stifle innovation. 
 
In proposing an institutional and regulatory framework to enable the operation of the 
conceptual model proposed, this thesis analyses the literature and existing 
regulation of DLT applications in the financial markets. In so doing, the analysis 
draws together the applicable elements of climate change law, financial regulation 
and developing regulation of the technology. It aims to arrive at a position on the 
extent to which the proposal can overcome delays, inefficiencies and other 
problems that currently beset the carbon market, so as to maximise the 
opportunities for emissions trading to make a difference in achieving the objectives 
of climate policy. 
 
The thesis contributes to the extant academic literature in a number of respects, for 
instance, arguing that it is applications of new distributed ledger technology that 
should be the focus of regulation, not the technology itself; and by a novel 
application of theory concerning fragmentation of international environmental law 
and climate law to illustrate why it is postulated international emissions trading 
under the Kyoto Protocol was less effective than hoped. Equally importantly, the 
thesis contributes by examining networking as a means for connecting carbon 
markets, in contrast to the current linking approach; and by proposing a model for 
such networking, then analysing a governance structure for such connected 
markets, both areas that have received little previous academic attention. Key 
implications for policymakers arising from the thesis include issues such as the need 
for an assessment methodology to value diverse mitigation outcomes; and how to 
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PART 1 – Introductory matters and background 
 
 
The purpose, objective, theory and themes of the thesis are introduced; the 
methodological approach and structure are set out and some important concepts 
and definitions introduced. A number of research questions are elaborated, certain 
qualifications and clarifications, as well as the contributions made by the thesis, are 
set out (chapter I).  
 
A concise background to the thesis, including scientific origins, and the 
intergovernmental response leading to the Convention and Kyoto Protocol are 
introduced. The policies and measures put in place are considered, as is 







Chapter I Introduction 
 
 
This thesis proposes a conceptual model for networking carbon markets on 
distributed ledger technology (DLT) architecture and then examines the institutional 
and regulatory frameworks that might apply to such a market. My hypothesis is that 
networking can address issues that have made international emissions trading less 
effective as a tool of climate policy than it should have been, and that application of 
the technology can facilitate a better outcome. The thesis investigates this from the 
perspective of the necessary regulatory and institutional frameworks. My interest in 
this subject derives from my contribution over a number of years to conceptual 
development of the World Bank’s networked carbon market initiative. Prior 
involvement in the carbon market together with my experience consulting to the 
World Bank has highlighted for me the need to dig deeper into this field, where there 
has been little in the way of academic research to date.  
 
To begin, a short story: as part of my research, I contacted the UK Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) to discuss the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), since the FCA chairs the IOSCO Fintech Network and thus 
is relevant to two aspects of my research – financial market governance and 
application of the technology. Even though my call concerned potential financial 
supervisory governance by IOSCO in relation to a networking of markets on 
distributed ledger technology, the FCA began by proudly announcing they had their 
‘ESG person’1 on the call and, in our discussion, made a point of emphasising how 
important ESG was in their IOSCO work. It was not the financial market governance 
element, nor even the technology being applied to market operation that grabbed 
attention, but the mere mention of climate and carbon pigeonholed my call in the 
ESG box.  
 
                                                      
1 Their staff member responsible for environment, social and governance matters.  
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The point of this story is to underscore two important aspects of this thesis, one 
substantive and one methodological: first, a substantive theme is that climate 
change is not just an environmental concern, but (inter alia) an economic and 
financial issue and, as such, needs to be treated as part of the mainstream political-
economy debate, rather than as a separate side issue.2 It is not just (or sometimes, 
even) an issue for the ‘ESG person’. The operation of carbon markets, domestically 
and networked globally, should be core business for financial regulators and 
supervisory bodies.  
 
From the methodological perspective, the experience of this call highlights the 
difficulty of getting real-world engagement on a conceptual model being proposed to 
operate on a new, innovative technology, for which there are few currently 
operational applications. Thus my research has been primarily desktop, as opposed 
to empirical. Moreover, the conceptual and technological basis requires elaboration 
and explanation, necessitating a certain level of descriptive material to facilitate the 
analysis. For instance, background on what is networking of carbon markets, what it 
entails, how could it come about, and its viability as an alternative to linking in 
connecting carbon markets needs to be presented before examining research 
questions:  
Could a networked carbon market operate within the ambit of the Paris 
Agreement and, if so, how?  
What existing institutional and regulatory frameworks provide models for a 
future networked carbon market?  
 
Similarly, background information on what DLT is and why it will facilitate networking 
of carbon markets needed to be elaborated before considering: 
What the legal issues are to which DLT architecture, as applied to a network 
of carbon markets, gives rise? 
How might those issues be researched, analysed and addressed?  
 
Before setting out that research, however, it is important to first explain briefly where 
this thesis sits in the universe of climate change research and writing.  
 
                                                      
2 “It needs to be released from a compartmentalized framing.” Cinnamon Carlarne, ‘Delinking 
International Environmental Law & Climate Change’ (2014) 4 Michigan Journal of 
Environmental & Administrative Law 1.  
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A Context of research 
 
Societal responses to climate change are often categorised as either mitigation, 
which involves combatting the causes of climate change, and adaptation, which 
denotes adapting to the impacts of climate change. This thesis is looking only at 
mitigation, measures for which can include regulation, voluntary reductions, 
subsidies, and education. In turn, regulation can include command and control 
measures, which prohibit or limit activities, and pricing mechanisms, which aim to 
influence behaviour via price signals. Pricing mechanisms will need to work in 
conjunction with a regulatory structure, and taxation and emissions trading are two 
such pricing mechanisms that sit within this overall framework.  
 
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are not geographically fixed, but pervade the 
atmosphere, so the logic of international emissions trading is that mitigation action 
can occur where it is more cost effective to do so. Thus, if country A and country B 
both require emitters to reduce emissions below a threshold, or otherwise offset any 
excess above that level, then an emitter in country A that can reduce more cheaply 
can sell its over-achieved reductions to an emitter in country B for which it is more 
expensive to reduce than to offset. In this way, both achieve their respective 
prescribed emission reductions, but with greater overall economic efficiency. This 
thesis is about how opportunities for emissions trading to make a difference, in 
effecting mitigation outcomes, might be maximised. 
 
B Purpose, objective, theory and themes 
1. Purpose and objective 
 
The overriding purpose of this thesis is to propose the design and operation of a 
market, as a mechanism for implementing the policy of mitigating GHG emissions to 
help achieve the objective of global climate change policy, being stabilisation of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.3 The objective is to 
arrive at a suitable design for regulatory and institutional frameworks for trading 
                                                      
3 Article 2 (Objective), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 
1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (1994); also see recitals, Paris Agreement (fn.4); 
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emissions in the context of the Paris Agreement4 and wider governing structures, 
treating emissions trading as a financial market and using distributed ledger 
technology (DLT) architecture to connect different markets in a network. In broad 
terms, the thesis proceeds to this objective by: 
 
• examining current arrangements for emissions trading, taking account of 
emissions trading’s dual functions as both GHG mitigation policy measure 
and trading market, from three perspectives, being a high-level macro-
perspective (compartmentalisation of international emissions trading under 
the Kyoto Protocol5 in the climate regime); secondly, taking a more granular 
perspective (looking at the nature of what is traded); then thirdly, considering 
the current state of the carbon market and how it might develop going 
forward in the context of the Paris Agreement; 
• proposing a model for networking carbon markets on a distributed ledger 
architecture that addresses both the identified shortcomings and future 
requirements if the carbon market is to be effective as an instrument of GHG 
mitigation policy; and  
• proposing a framework for analysis of the regulatory and institutional 
frameworks for such a market, then applying that framework to analyse the 
proposed governance structure, including by mapping it against the current 
regulatory frameworks and identifying any legal issues around 
implementation arising from the context (for example, necessary reforms). 
2. Theory and themes 
 
This research looks into a future where there may be trading between the 
heterogeneous emissions trading schemes (ETSs) and other pricing mechanisms 
being implemented by jurisdictions, under Article 6, Paris Agreement. It proceeds on 
the basis that such trading across schemes and jurisdictions can foster larger, 
deeper, and more liquid markets, less susceptible to manipulation and that more 
effectively price carbon emissions. The networking approach proposed in this thesis 
to achieve such inter-jurisdictional trading is not only a mechanism for implementing 
the policy of mitigating GHG emissions, but also can be seen as an opportunity for 
                                                      
4 Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf> accessed 13/03/17. 
5 Kyoto Protocol to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 
December 1997, 2303UNTS162 (2005). 
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addressing the need for better integration and mainstreaming of international 
climate change law and practice in economic planning globally. The networked 
market – if well-designed – should operate as a global financial market, with as little 
intervention as possible to facilitate its efficient operation and effectiveness, but 
should do so within an equally well-designed boundary framework of climate change 
rules that give effect to the intention of the parties to the Paris Agreement. If this can 
be achieved, it is postulated opportunities for emissions trading markets to make an 
impact on GHG emissions in an expeditious manner will be greatly enhanced. 
 
A number of themes are pursued throughout the thesis: firstly, that cocooning the 
carbon market in the climate regime has only perpetuated and, unless changed, will 
continue to perpetuate a perception that climate change is an issue to be 
addressed, regulated and managed separately from, and outside the mainstream of 
national and international economic and financial activity; secondly, the theme of 
heterogeneity as opposed to homogeneity – the need for acceptance and 
recognition of diversity of national approaches according to circumstances and 
capacities and, consequently, of the units traded in different schemes and the need 
for placing a value on differences, rather than attempting to coerce homogeneity 
across jurisdictions and schemes; thirdly, the need for any policy or measure 
involving the carbon market to engage the private (financial) sector at scale to 
achieve the best possible outcome, there being a role for both public policymakers 
and the private sector, it being critical to create an appropriate environment in which 
each seeks to optimise outcomes;6 and fourthly, that as such there is a need for 
appropriate design of the regulatory and institutional frameworks to promote such 
outcomes, this not being something that can be left just to multilateral 
intergovernmental negotiations to draw out to a sub-optimal outcome.  
 
C Methodological approach and structure 
 
This thesis begins with a concise review of the background to the problem of 
anthropogenic climate change from growth in scientific awareness to the response 
at an intergovernmental level (chapter II), referencing resolutions of the United 
                                                      
6 See, for instance: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
Operationalising Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Perspectives of developers and investors 
on scaling-up private sector investment, May 2017 <www.ebrd.com> accessed 21/09/17.  
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Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), Kyoto Protocol, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) reports, reports of other international organisations such as the 
World Bank, and academic literature, as well as other writings and commentators. 
Part 2 sets out an examination of the carbon market from three perspectives, 
comprised of chapters III (Compartmentalisation of the carbon market), IV (The 
nature of what is traded in the carbon market) and V (Carbon market diversity and 
reasons to connect). This part frames the problem by making an examination of 
emissions trading, both retrospectively and prospectively. Materials include the 
International Law Commission report on fragmentation of international law, and 
academic literature on fragmentation, with particular consideration on the work of 
van Asselt and colleagues, including adaptation of van Asselt’s analytical 
methodology7 to the circumstances of international emissions trading under the 
Kyoto Protocol; legislation of various jurisdictions, English common law decisions, 
intergovernmental agreements, related academic literature and other materials from 
sources such as the UNFCCC, IPCC, World Bank and national regulatory 
authorities. 
 
Following that analysis, Part 3 sets out the model proposed by this thesis for how 
diverse jurisdictional emissions trading schemes might connect, by networking. The 
proposal encompasses the digital infrastructure needed to provide the connection 
between these markets, as well as the legal and administrative structures that will 
operate, manage and oversee the network. Both chapters VI (The proposed market 
– concept and theory) and VII (Practical implementation of the proposed market) 
elaborate a new technology and a particular application of it, meaning that many of 
the sources referenced are from beyond the traditional, peer-reviewed academic 
literature. This range of sources provides a valuable contribution to an immature 
academic field, thus contributing to the current state of academic knowledge in the 
field. It reflects also the inter-disciplinary elements of my research, which brings 
together materials from heterogeneous fields. 
 
Part 4 establishes the governance structure for the proposed market model and a 
framework for its analysis, which is then applied. Chapter VIII (Analysis of the 
                                                      
7 Harro van Asselt, The Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance, Consequences and 
Management of Regime Interactions, (Edward Elgar, 2014). 
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governance structure for the proposed market) explores how the governance 
structure relates to the three areas of law (climate, financial markets, technology), 
while chapter IX (Analysis of the governance structure – legal issues) focuses more 
on the regulatory frameworks, with both chapters addressing climate change law, 
financial markets regulation and regulation of distributed ledger technology 
applications and how these three areas interact in the proposal. As with Part 3, a 
rich and varied range of materials are drawn upon and considered from primary 
sources through to sources outside the normal academic literature. Part 5 (chapter 
X) sets out my conclusions. The three areas of climate change law, financial 
markets regulation and regulation of distributed ledger technology applications that 
coalesce in the model and are addressed by the governance structure are 
constantly evolving and developing. Accordingly, this thesis takes account of 
meetings and events occurring, and sources and materials published, up to a cut off 
date of 31 December 2018.  
 
D  Introduction to concepts and definitions 
 
Concepts, technologies and terms are described or defined as appropriate where 
they are used throughout the text. Nevertheless, there are some of fundamental 
importance that need to be elaborated at the outset, as a proper understanding of 
their meaning and use is integral to the thesis. Thus, ‘carbon market’ and 
‘distributed ledger technology’ are introduced, and uses of some other terms 
explained.  
 
The carbon market, at present, is profiled in chapter V, section A, but the expression 
‘carbon market’ is used in places in the thesis as a broad collective description of 
the various different forms of carbon pricing. It is acknowledged this usage is 
somewhat loose, since there are forms of carbon pricing, such as carbon taxes, or 
renewable energy credits (RECs), which would not automatically be associated with 
a market. The thinking behind this usage is that, if an acceptable methodology could 
be devised to standardise the mitigation values of all the different types of units, 
whether allowances, carbon credits, tax credits, RECs, and so on, then (for the 
moment leaving to one side how this might work in practice) they might all, in future, 
be capable of being part of a trading mechanism. So, in this broadest, idealised 
sense, the carbon market might encompass ETSs, carbon credit generating 
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projects, carbon taxes, both the voluntary emission reduction market and 
compliance market, industry-based schemes (such as that for international civil 
aviation), and even internal carbon pricing undertaken by corporations.  
 
Notwithstanding this occasionally generalised usage, in the sense used in chapters 
II and III, carbon market is referring principally to international emission trading (IET) 
under the Kyoto Protocol, including trading in assigned amount units (AAUs) and 
project-generated credits, mainly certified emission reductions (CERs); and to the 
European Union ETS (EUETS). Chapter IV examines the debate about the nature of 
what is traded and in this sense focuses on allowances in ETSs, as distinct from, for 
example, credits generated by projects.8 Chapter V, sections B and C, clearly focus 
on ETSs in relation to connecting across jurisdictions. The proposed model market 
(Part 3) and analysis of the governance structure (Part 4) deal only in terms of 
networking ETSs. This is to reduce complexity and for clarity in explaining the 
model. Finally, in relation to this expression, ‘carbon’ market is used to delineate the 
market described as relating solely to units of GHG mitigation and (at least for 
present purposes) these would be limited to the six GHGs listed in Annex A of the 
Kyoto Protocol. This does not mean that the market model proposed could not also 
eventually accommodate units relating to other GHGs or even units of co-benefits,9 
especially once there is methodology to provide for credits (such as pursuant to 
Article 6.4 Paris Agreement) to be traded.    
 
‘Distributed ledger technology (DLT)’, or ‘blockchain’, as it is known in common 
parlance, is essentially a bringing together of developments in several digital 
research fields, such as cryptography and decentralised computer networks. It 
covers a wide range of potential functionality, so it is useful to identify key features 
that define what is usually thought of as a DLT system. First, it will be decentralised, 
meaning that it is made up of multiple computers (also referred to as nodes)10 and it 
will be a distributed infrastructure, meaning that instead of there being a central 
                                                      
8 An ETS allowance – issued either for free or auctioned – permits emission of a unit of GHG 
and entities with obligations in the ETS will be required to acquit their emissions by 
surrendering an equivalent number of allowances, whereas a credit is generated by effecting 
mitigation, removal or avoidance of the equivalent amount of emissions that would otherwise 
occur. Allowances are capped and theoretically reducing over time, whereas the number of 
credits generated depends on the project. 
9 Co-benefits include related benefits that may flow from mitigation actions, such as access 
to clean water, access to electricity, employment opportunities and so on. 
10 Obviously, the computers will all need to be on a network, e.g., connected with each other 
via the internet. 
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ledger holder through which transactions must pass and where information is 
recorded, the ledger is held by multiple, or even all nodes in the network. Secondly, 
the participants will use encryption to interact with transactions in the system, so 
there will not need to be a trusted central counterparty. Thirdly, there will be a 
mechanism by which the nodes reach consensus on the valid entries to add to the 
ledger. Finally, the ledger entries will be accumulative, so that once they are entered 
they cannot be altered or removed unless all participants agree, thus the ledger is 
frequently described as immutable.11  
 
There are also elements that are configurable to suit the desired design, including 
who has permission to view the ledger or parts thereof and who has permission to 
alter (add transactions to) the ledger; the transactional terms and conditions 
embedded in computer code (referred to as ‘smart contracts’); and also the 
arrangements for settlement, exchanges and payment systems. Configuration of all 
the elements can result in very different outcomes, all of which could be a DLT 
system. Blockchain is, in fact, just one type of DLT implementation in which 
transactions are collected in blocks of information and, once there is consensus, the 
block is cryptographically linked to the preceding block in the chain of blocks that 
makes up the ledger. 
 
The term ‘fragmentation’ is used in two contexts in this thesis. Firstly, in chapter III 
fragmentation refers to the phenomenon of fragmentation in international law and 
especially international environmental law that stems from the specialised rules, 
institutions and spheres of practice that have grown up over time. Then, in chapter 
V, the nature of the global carbon market is described as being fragmented, 
referring to the diverse and heterogeneous carbon pricing mechanisms (including 
emission trading schemes) that are being implemented in jurisdictions around the 
world. 
 
A further clarification relates to the meaning of references made to international 
emissions trading/the carbon market ‘operating as a global financial market’: 
broadly, this is intended to suggest that the market be regulated along the same 
lines as financial markets, for instance, by the assets traded being defined as 
financial instruments so as to invoke investor protection, anti-fraud, anti-market 
                                                      
11 It is not quite accurate to call it immutable, as explained in chapter VI. 
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manipulation, counter terrorism financing, anti-money laundering and systemic risk 
management provisions, and as an element of these measures, that trading should 
take place on a regulated trading platform, or platforms.   
  
The final conceptual/definitional point to introduce here relates to governance and 
regulation. As explained in chapter VIII, governance (and thus, the expression 
‘governance structure’) is used in a very broad sense. It includes regulatory and 
institutional frameworks, but also more informal rules and actors, for instance, 
market discipline as a corrective influence on inaccurate market information (i.e., 
mitigation value assessments), is included as one of the tiers of the governance 
structure. Regulation is also used in a generalised sense, referring to laws generally 
that constrain behaviour of market participants, rather than in the stricter sense of 
meaning secondary or subordinate legislation that implements primary legislation, 
unless the context indicates otherwise.  
 
E Qualifications and clarifications 
 
This thesis does not analyse the effectiveness of emissions trading as a mitigation 
policy measure in comparison to other mitigation measures, nor as a climate policy 
in relation to climate policies and measures more generally. Nor is it argued that 
emissions trading is the only mitigation policy measure that should be pursued or 
even the primary mitigation measure. 
   
Climate change is of its nature multi-disciplinary, but just as this does not require 
this thesis to engage in atmospheric physics and chemistry proofs to establish the 
existence of the phenomenon, nor does it require revisiting the economic theory of 
emissions trading from first principles. Thus a number of assumptions are relied 
upon, including for instance, in relation to the economic theory, that regulation with 
emissions trading can bring about emission reductions more cost effectively and 
economically efficiently than regulation without emissions trading; and that smaller, 
separate markets operate more efficiently and derive other benefits by connecting 
with each other to form larger markets. In relation to the technology, it is assumed 
also that the DLT application proposed is technically viable. 
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Although it may touch on a number of these subjects, the thesis is not about the 
global financial regime or global environmental governance, per se, but rather only 
in so far as emissions trading as a climate change mitigation policy measure 
touches on them; nor (as noted above) is it about the economic theory of emissions 
trading; or why connecting markets is more efficient. It is not about trade (in the 
sense of the World Trade Organisation) and environment, but it is about using a 
trading mechanism as a policy measure to achieve the objectives of climate policy. 
The multi-disciplinary nature of climate change as a global problem, and of the 
measures to address it, means that it is not possible to avoid touching on political, 
economic, scientific, technological, social, and developmental aspects, as well as 
legal. Yet this thesis is about the law and thus focuses on regulatory and institutional 
frameworks that may be appropriate to facilitate maximisation of the opportunities 
for emissions trading to make a difference. Notwithstanding, it is noted that areas 
touched upon by the thesis include public international law and related institutions, 
treaties including the UNFCCC, and the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement 
thereunder; fragmentation in international law, international environmental law and 
climate law, including compartmentalisation; domestic climate change law, 
particularly in the EU; domestic financial market regulation, particularly that in the 
EU; economic theories of emissions trading, and of connecting markets; the global 
financial regime and its governance; emerging technology and applications – DLT – 
regulation of the technology or regulation of the applications of that technology; legal 
theory concerning transparency and global environmental governance.  
 
F  Original contribution 
 
This thesis builds on and extends my earlier work in this field of networking carbon 
markets. In so doing, it probes solutions to the issues flagged, evaluating objections, 
before arriving at valid, workable answers. It is forward looking and theoretical in the 
sense that networking of carbon markets is only conceptual at present. Even more 
so, distributed ledger technology is in its infancy, and regulators are still cautious on 
whether and, if so, how to regulate the technology and its increasing number of 
applications. The examination of the potential application of DLT to a future possible 
networked carbon market is a novel and innovative contribution made by this thesis. 
The analysis made of regulatory approaches to DLT and consideration of 
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illustrations from the literature of analytical techniques,12 (in particular, rejection of 
Reyes’ endogenous theory of DLT regulation in favour of the regulation of 
applications of the technology) and the consideration of the DLT architecture for 
NCM in terms of these techniques, are also novel and key contributions of the 
thesis. In addition, nowhere in the emissions markets literature to date has there 
been an examination of networking and how it might work, especially in direct 
comparison to proposals for jurisdictions to link.  
 
Publications considering the architecture that might arise for the purposes of giving 
effect to the international transfer of mitigation outcomes in conformity with the Paris 
Agreement at present only see international transfers happening through a 
centralised registry structure like the International Transaction Log (ITL), or peer-to-
peer but linked to a centralised registry structure. This thesis aims to take 
consideration of the issue beyond those boundaries. If networking were to be 
considered a viable mechanism for the international transfer of mitigation outcomes, 
then this thesis posits that the network of carbon markets should be treated more 
distinctly as a financial market. Accordingly, the application of technologies 
influencing financial markets needs to be considered. The thesis does so, analysing 
the theory and practice to date of applications of distributed ledger technologies in 
the financial sector and the regulation of those applications. It proposes application 
of this technology to the networked market and examines what this might mean in 
terms of institutional and regulatory frameworks. To date there has been little 
consideration given to institutional or regulatory frameworks for linked ETSs: this is 
all the more so the case for a cross-jurisdictional market that would be based on the 
concept of networking. 
 
Thus the original contribution of this thesis includes proposing and elaborating the 
market model for optimising effectiveness of emissions trading markets, where there 
is none at present; and a further original contribution of the thesis is the governance 
structure arrived at for this market and the framework for analysis applied by the 
                                                      
12 For example, those proposed in: Carla L. Reyes, ‘Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an 
Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal’, 
(2016) 61 Vill. L. Rev 191; Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Financial Change: A Functional 
Approach’, [2016] 100 Minnesota Law Review 1441; World Economic Forum, ‘The future of 
financial infrastructure: An ambitious look at how blockchain can reshape financial services’, 
(WEF, New York USA, August 2016) <www.wef.org> accessed 02/11/16. 
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thesis to that governance structure. As part of that analysis, examination of the 
intersection point of three areas of law – climate change law, financial regulation 
and regulation of the technology application – in a single element of the model 
design, namely, the unit traded as mitigation outcome (transaction unit), financial 
instrument and token and, generally, the argument in relation to the need to place a 
mitigation value on the unit traded in carbon markets, is an original contribution of 
this thesis.   
 
Finally, in arguing that compartmentalisation of international emissions trading (IET) 
under the Kyoto Protocol in the climate regime has had a negative consequence the 
reasoning of the academic writers on the subject of fragmentation of international 
environmental law is extended, by application in two ways: first, by looking not at the 
effect of fragmentation on international law generally, or on the climate regime as a 
whole, but rather having accepted that the climate regime is fragmented, by 
considering the impact of compartmentalisation on a single element in that 
fragmented climate regime; and secondly, by applying that reasoning in the inverse, 
considering not how fragmentation of the climate regime has led to either conflicting 
or synergistic interactions between different regimes or components, but rather by 
considering how compartmentalisation of IET in the climate regime has limited 
interaction, thereby preventing beneficial synergies which may otherwise have 
developed and enabled that component of the climate regime to better achieve the 







Chapter II Background: the problem of and 
response to climate change 
 
 
A Growth in anthropogenic emissions causing dangerous 
climate change 
 
The question of whether heat absorption by atmospheric gases leads to higher earth 
surface temperatures was a topic of scientific research from the early nineteenth 
century. While Svante Arrhenius is sometimes credited with first identifying this so-
called greenhouse effect,13 Arrhenius himself noted that in the 1820s Joseph Fourier 
had maintained that the atmosphere acts like the glass of a hothouse14 (thus, 
suggesting the source of the analogy). In his paper of 1896, Arrhenius also 
acknowledged the work of John Tyndall in this respect (identifying water vapour, 
H2O, being of the greatest influence, but also the role of carbonic acid gas – now 
known as carbon dioxide, CO2) and the research of many others over the course of 
that century.15 
 
Like Tyndall, Arrhenius was interested in what had caused the ice ages, but his 
focus was on CO2. His calculations led him to an estimate of the probable effect of a 
variation in atmospheric CO2 on the temperature of the earth, that ‘if the quantity of 
carbonic acid increases in geometric progression, the augmentation of temperature 
will increase nearly in arithmetic progression.’16 Doubling carbonic acid would 
                                                      
13 See, for instance, David Freestone, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change – the Basis for the Climate Change Regime’, in C Carlarne, K Gray, and R 
Tarasofsky, (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law, (OUP, 2016) at 
98. 
14 Svante A. Arrhenius, ‘On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature 
of the Ground’, (1896) Series 5, Volume 41 The London, Edinburgh, and Dublin 
Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, 237-276 
<http://www.rsc.org/images/Arrhenius1896_tcm18-173546.pdf> accessed 30/01/19. 
15 Ibid 238-9. 
16 Ibid 267. 
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increase the temperature by 5-6°C.17 Thus, he posited that during the ice ages the 
concentration must have been about half its value at the time of his research. As to 
whether such was probable, Arrhenius cited Arvid Högbom, whose work identified 
processes by which carbonic acid was supplied to the atmosphere and was 
consumed from it. Although he focused on other geological and geochemical 
processes, interestingly, Högbom mentioned both the role of ‘modern industry’ in 
supplying carbonic acid (although he considered this all consumed in the formation 
of limestone or other mineral carbonates) and the moderating role of the oceans 
through absorption and evaporation.18 It would be another half century before these 
two elements of the cycle were more thoroughly and accurately examined.      
 
In the 1950s, the Cold War provided the impetus and atmospheric nuclear tests the 
opportunity to redress analytical and data shortcomings that had abetted scepticism 
of Arrhenius’s theory and calculations: Cold War research into atmospheric 
absorption of infrared radiation confirmed the role of CO2, as distinct from water 
vapour, in the upper atmosphere;19 analysis of tree rings for the ratio of carbon-14 
(the radioactive isotope present due to nuclear testing) to other carbon isotopes 
showed increasing percentages of non-radioactive isotopes, indicating the carbon 
added in newer rings came from fossil carbon sources.20  
 
Other research in the late 1950s identified more clearly the role of ocean absorption 
and evaporation in the carbon cycle; the steady rise of atmospheric CO2 (evidenced 
by the Keeling curve); and the consistent rise in baseline temperatures, while by the 
late 1950s/early 1960s scientists were beginning to sound warnings about the rate 
of industrial production emissions.21 Further evidence came from Antarctic ice core 
measurements going back 400,000 years – through four complete glacial cycles – 
                                                      
17 Ibid Table VII, 266. This estimate was revised to around 4°C in a later paper: S A 
Arrhenius ‘The Probable Cause of Climate Fluctuations’, 1906, Meddelanden från K. 
Vetenskapsakademiens Nobelinstitut Band 1 No 2., (Friends of Science Translation) 
<https://www.friendsofscience.org/assets/documents/Arrhenius%201906,%20final.pdf> 
accessed 30/01/19. 
18 Fn.14 (Arrhenius) 268-273. 
19 Spencer Weart, The Discovery of Global Warming, (Harvard University Press, 2008), 
chapter 1, 2. 
20 Ibid. Although more potent greenhouse gases have since been identified, such as 
methane, CH4. 
21 Ibid. ‘Keeling curve’ named after Charles David Keeling who was largely responsible for 
the CO2 data available today. 
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showing a CO2 range of 180 parts per million (ppm) to 280ppm over all that period:  
at the time of this analysis, atmospheric CO2 concentrations had reached 350ppm.22 
 
Returning to Arrhenius and Tyndall, fluctuations in atmospheric CO2, it transpires, 
were not the cause of the ice ages, rather part of a feedback loop leading to the 
glacial cycles. The trigger is tiny shifts in the Earth’s orbit of the Sun affecting the 
amount of sunlight arriving at certain latitudes, initiating changes to the carbon 
cycle. Atmospheric CO2 and other greenhouse gases have an amplifying effect on 
the feedback loops that make up the climate system.23 Part of the problem is that 
the dangerous climate changes due to these amplifications – rising sea-levels, 
retreating glaciers and polar ice caps, loss of the Greenland ice sheet, more 
extreme heat waves and droughts, more excessive floods and more powerful 
storms – are not only taking the global climate system into uncharted territory, but 
because of the in-built time lag for changes in the climate system, will continue to be 
experienced centuries after emissions are reduced: ‘The risk of abrupt or irreversible 
changes increases with the magnitude of the warming.’24  
 
In October 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) presented 
key findings from its assessment of the available scientific, technical and socio-
economic literature relevant to global warming of 1.5°C and for the comparison 
between global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C above pre-industrial levels.25 Climate 
models predict robust differences in regional climate characteristics between the 
present and warming of 1.5°C, and between 1.5°C and 2°C.26 Modelling indicates 
that for pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic 
CO2 must decline by 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 and reach net zero by about 
2050.27  
 
                                                      
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fifth Assessment Report, Climate 
Change 2014 Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers, 73 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf> accessed 
20/04/17. 
25 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Global warming of 1.5°C, Special 
Report, 2018, <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/> accessed 08/10/18. 
26 Ibid, B.1. 
27 Ibid, C.1. 
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B Policy responses to address dangerous climate change 
 
1.  Intergovernmental responses  
 
Identification of climate change as an urgent world problem at an intergovernmental 
level can be traced to the First World Climate Conference in 1979, which called ‘on 
governments to anticipate and guard against potential climate hazards.’28 
International recognition in the 1980s of the potential problem developing due to 
growth in anthropogenic emissions causing dangerous climate-altering impacts is 
reflected in numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). 
For example, in 1987, it was agreed that the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) ‘should attach importance to the problem of global climate 
change’ and cooperate ‘closely with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 
and the International Council of Scientific Unions.’29 Then, in 1988, the General 
Assembly,30 reaffirming its earlier resolution that UNEP should attach importance to 
the problem of global climate change,31 endorsed the WMO and UNEP jointly 
establishing the IPCC ‘…to provide internationally coordinated scientific 
assessments of the magnitude, timing and potential environmental and socio-
economic impact of climate change and realistic response strategies…’32  
 
To this end, in its fifth Assessment Report, the IPCC states that ‘… human influence 
on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases are the highest in history … … Warming of the climate system is 
unequivocal…’33 As to the causes: ‘Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have 
increased since the pre-industrial era, driven largely by economic and population 
                                                      
28 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook, 2006, Bonn, 
Germany: Climate Change Secretariat, 17. 
29 UNGA A/RES/42/184, 11 December 1987 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/42/184> accessed 05/06/17. 
30 UNGA A/RES/43/53, 6 December 1988 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/43/53> accessed 05/06/17. 
31 Ibid, paragraph 3. 
32 Ibid, paragraph 6. 
33 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fifth Assessment Report, Climate 




growth, and are now higher than ever... … and are extremely likely to have been the 
dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.’34  
 
The UNGA supported the UNEP and WMO request in 1989 to ‘begin preparations 
for negotiations on a framework convention on climate.’35 In 1990, a single 
intergovernmental negotiating process was established under the auspices of the 
UNGA, for the preparation of ‘an effective framework convention on climate 
change’36 and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro adopted the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC)37 on 9 May 1992.38 
 
2. Institutions and other bodies 
 
The UNFCCC provides for a number of institutions and other bodies, with the 
Conference of Parties (COP) as the supreme body of the Convention.39 The COP is 
responsible for reviewing implementation of the Convention and any related legal 
instruments (for instance, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement) and for 
making decisions necessary to promote the effectiveness of that implementation 
and to that end, a list of roles and functions are set out.40 A secretariat is established 
and its functions elaborated.41 The secretariat’s role includes making arrangements 
for the COP and other Convention bodies, assisting parties, supporting negotiations 
and coordinating with secretariats of other relevant international organizations, for 
instance, the Global Environment Facility (GEF).42 It also has specific 
responsibilities including, for example, maintaining the international transaction log 
under the Kyoto Protocol.  
                                                      
34 Ibid 4. 
35 UNGA A/RES/44/207, 22 December 1989, paragraph 10 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/44/207> accessed 05/06/17. 
36 UNGA A/RES/45/212, 21 December 1990, paragraph 1 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/45/212> accessed 05/06/17. 
37 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107. 
38 UNFCCC website 
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php> 
accessed 05/06/17. 
39 Article 7(2) UNFCCC. 
40 Ibid, (a)-(m).  
41 Article 8 UNFCCC. 
42 The GEF was established in 1991 by the World Bank, UNEP and United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) to fund projects in developing countries that provide 
global environmental benefits <http://www.gef.org/> 
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There is provision in the Convention also for two subsidiary bodies to the COP, the 
subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice (SBSTA)43 and the subsidiary 
body for implementation (SBI)44 and their respective roles set out. The role of the 
SBSTA is considered in more detail later in this thesis in relation to 
operationalization of the Paris Agreement. The UNFCCC provides also for a 
financial mechanism, the operation of which is to be entrusted to one or more 
existing international bodies.45 The GEF was mandated to be this entity on an 
interim basis,46 since formalized pursuant to subsequent decisions of the COP and 
understandings entered with the GEF.47 The COP can also establish interim and ad 
hoc bodies to undertake specific tasks.48 
 
3. Principles and measures 
 
Parties, in acting to achieve the objective of the Convention and implementing its 
provisions, are to be guided by the principles set out in Article 3, UNFCCC. These 
include the principles of inter- and intra-generational equity and of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities;49 the precautionary 
principle and need for cost effectiveness in policies and measures;50 promotion of 
sustainable development;51 and that measures should not constitute a means of 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on free trade.52 For the purposes of this 
thesis, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities is most significant: developed country parties are called on to take the 
lead in combating climate change and the principle carries through not only in the 
chapeau to Article 4 and the differentiated commitments of developed and 
developing country parties, but through the measures elaborated in the Convention, 
notably in relation to mitigation. This is most apparent in the Kyoto Protocol 
                                                      
43 Article 9. 
44 Article 10. 
45 Article 11(1). 
46 Article 21(3). 
47 Fn.28 (UNFCCC Handbook) 117. 
48 Article 7(2)(i). Examples include, for instance, the Ad hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate 
(AGBM). 
49 Article 3(1). 
50 Article 3(3). 
51 Article 3(4). 
52 Article 3(5). 
 41 
(discussed in subsection 4, below) and notwithstanding the fundamentally changed 
approach to mitigation obligations taken in it, the Paris Agreement is required to be 
implemented to reflect, inter alia, the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national 
circumstances.53 Differentiation between developed and developing country parties 
remains a source of friction in negotiations for the Paris Agreement’s 
operationalization.54  
(i)  Mitigation 
 
The call from the First World Climate Conference in 1979 had been for governments 
to anticipate and guard against potential climate hazards, suggesting a focus on 
adaptation, however, the emphasis in the UNFCCC is clearly on mitigation.55 The 
ultimate objective of the UNFCCC and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of Parties (COP) may adopt is set out as being ‘… to achieve, in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’56 All parties 
undertake commitments to ‘… formulate, implement, publish and regularly update 
national and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to 
mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol.’57 
 
Parties listed in Annex I, broadly the developed country parties, each also undertake 
more specific commitments to ‘…adopt national policies and take corresponding 
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas 
                                                      
53 Article 2(2) Paris Agreement. 
54 Daniel Bodansky and Lavanya Rajamani, The Issues that Never Die, (2018) 12(3) CCLR 
184, 189. As to the distinction between the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement in relation to 
this principle, see also chapter IV following. 
55 Fn.28 (UNFCCC Handbook)17, 74:“Mitigating climate change and its impact lies at the 
heart of the Convention’s objective”; “The main concern of the Convention is clearly 
mitigation; adaptation has been widely seen as the ‘poor relation’”: fn.13 (Freestone) 100; 
also Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate Change 
Law, (1st edn., Oxford University Press, 2017) 12-13. 
56 Article 2 UNFCCC. 
57 Article 4(1)(b). 
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sinks and reservoirs.’58 These parties undertake further, in order to promote 
progress, to communicate periodically detailed information on their policies and 
measures, as well as on resulting projected anthropogenic emissions by sources 




Notwithstanding this emphasis on mitigation, there are other measures including 
provisions relating to adaptation, provision of financial resources (mentioned above), 
developing and transferring technologies, building capacity, and promoting 
education, training and public awareness. Adaptation is referenced in a number of 
articles, including the overall objective that stabilisation of GHG emissions should be 
at such a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system within a timeframe that will allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change.60 All parties are to implement measures, inter alia, to facilitate 
adequate adaptation to climate change;61 cooperate in preparing for adaptation to 
the impacts of climate change;62 and employ appropriate methods to minimise 
adverse effects on the economy, public health or the environment from projects or 
measures to (mitigate or) adapt to climate change.63 Annex II-listed parties 
(developed countries, excluding economies in transition) are required to assist 
particularly vulnerable developing countries to meet the costs of adaptation.64  
(iii) Other measures 
 
All parties must develop, update and publish national inventories of anthropogenic 
GHG emissions by sources and removals by sinks.65 This must be in accordance 
with Article 12, which defines national communications in greater detail. Parties are 
called on also to promote and cooperate in the development, application and 
diffusion, including transfer, of technologies that control, reduce or prevent 
emissions of GHGs in the relevant sectors, including energy, transport, industry, 
                                                      
58 Article 4(2)(a).  
59 Article 4(2)(b). 
60 Fn.56 (Art. 2). 
61 Fn.57 (Art.4(1)(b)). 
62 Article 4(1)(e). 
63 Article 4(1)(f).  
64 Article 4(4). 
65 Article 4(1)(a). 
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agriculture, forestry and waste management.66 Annex II-listed parties are called on 
to provide financial resources for technology transfer67 and all developed country 
parties are urged to take all practical steps to facilitate and finance the transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies, especially to developing country parties.68 
 
Related to technology transfer, capacity building is explicitly addressed in terms of 
developed countries supporting development and enhancement of endogenous 
capacities of developing countries.69 All parties are called on to strengthen 
systematic observation and scientific and technical capacities70 and, in doing so, to 
cooperate in improving developing countries’ endogenous capacities.71  
 
4. Further elaboration of commitments  
 
Notwithstanding the elements outlined above, as the name indicates, the UNFCCC 
remains very much a framework agreement and, to address the concerns of some 
parties, included provision for review of the commitments undertaken by Annex I-
listed parties in Articles 4(2)(a) and (b).72 The first such review was carried out at the 
first Conference of Parties (COP 1) in Berlin. The decision resulting from this 
review,73 known as the ‘Berlin Mandate’, agreed to strengthen the commitments of 
Annex I-listed parties. Pursuant to the process to review Article 4(2)(a) and (b), in 
carrying out the Berlin Mandate, the COP decided, at its third meeting, to adopt the 
Kyoto Protocol.74 
 
The strengthening of commitments, referred to in the Berlin Mandate, translated into 
agreement by UNFCCC Annex I-listed parties, that were also parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (the Annex B Parties), to be bound by specific commitments on GHG 
                                                      
66 Article 4(1)(c). 
67 Article 4(3). 
68 Article 4(5). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Articles 4(1)(g), 5(a) and (b).  
71 Article 5(c). 
72 Article 4(2)(d).  
73 Decision 1/CP.1, FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf> accessed 05/06/17. 
74 Decision 1/CP.3, FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop3/07a01.pdf> accessed 05/06/17. 
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limitation or reduction, as listed in Annex B of the Protocol.75 The Protocol also 
contains a range of provisions for flexibility, including three so-called flexibility 
mechanisms, being joint implementation,76 the clean development mechanism77 and 
international emissions trading.78 Each Annex B Party’s commitment, expressed as 
its assigned amount,79 was divided into assigned amount units (AAUs), defined in 
the modalities, rules and guidelines for emissions trading under Article 17,80 as 
being “… equal to one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent, calculated using 
global warming potentials defined by decision 2/CP.3 or as subsequently revised in 
accordance with Article 5.”81 Also set out in that decision are the modalities for the 
accounting of assigned amounts under Article 7, paragraph 4 of the Protocol.82 
Paragraph 13 of that decision provides “Each Party included in Annex I shall retire 
ERUs, CERs, AAUs and/or RMUs for the purpose of demonstrating its compliance 
with its commitment under Article 3, paragraph 1.”83 
 
Emissions trading, or tradable permit schemes, have been implemented ‘to deal 
with various environmental or resource problems since the 1970s,’ including 
different types of air pollution, fisheries management, water management, waste 
management and land-use.84 While these earlier illustrations seem to have been 
successful,85 there are fundamental differences between these schemes and an 
                                                      
75 Article 3, Kyoto Protocol to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 
December 1997, 2303UNTS162 (2005). 
76 Article 6. 
77 Article 12. 
78 Article 17. The principal focus of this thesis is on international emissions trading (IET), 
although, for these purposes consideration also needs to include how the clean development 
mechanism (CDM) has performed. This is necessary due to the significant volume of trading 
in CDM project-generated certified emission reductions, as part of the IET market – far more 
than for the other tradable units created. 
79 Calculated as per Article 3(7), Kyoto Protocol. 
80 Decision 11/CMP.1, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2, 17 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a02.pdf#page=17> accessed 06/06/17. 
81 Ibid at paragraph 3; similar definitions are set out for the other tradable units, certified 
emission reductions (CERs) under the Clean Development Mechanism, emission reduction 
units (ERUs) under joint implementation and removal units (RMUs) from land use, land-use 
change and forestry activities (LULUCF). 
82 Decision 13/CMP.1, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2, 23 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a02.pdf#page=23> accessed 06/06/17. 
83 Ibid 27. 
84 Cédric Philibert and Julia Reinaud ‘Emissions Trading: Taking Stock and Looking Forward’ 
OECD Environment Directorate/International Energy Agency, COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SL 
T(2004)3, 8. 
85 See, for instance, Tom Tietenberg et al., International Rules for Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Trading, Defining the principles, modalities, rules and guidelines for verification, 
reporting and accountability, (1999), UNCTAD, 6 <UNCTAD/GDS/MDP/G24/2008/4 - 
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international emissions trading scheme. For instance, the earlier schemes being 
domestic, the market mechanism would function as part of a licensing regime (thus, 
invoking compliance and potential enforcement) for participating entities. 
Furthermore, in an operational sense, schemes such as the US Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (USEPA) Acid Rain Program86 benefitted from real-time 
monitoring of (smoke stack) emissions,87 which is unlikely for international carbon 
emissions trading.  
 
Nevertheless, the basic underlying logic for emissions trading remains valid, relying 
on the ‘fundamental tenet [of] the exploitation of cost heterogeneity to minimise 
overall compliance costs,’88 or as explained in chapter I, achieving emission 
reductions in the most cost efficient location first. Mitigation of GHG emissions 
means changing behaviour across a range of vectors, thus changing the way many 
economic activities are carried out and so, it is assumed, their effects. Imposing a 
climate-change related price on atmospheric carbon is one way to do this, in 
conjunction with environmental regulation, creating a market by means of which the 
environmental cost of atmospheric carbon becomes internalised in the relevant 
economic activities by way of emissions trading schemes (ETSs).89 The larger the 
market, the greater the efficiency benefits it might be expected to yield.90 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
gdsmdpg2420084_en.pdf> accessed 10/05/17; A Ellerman et al., ‘Emissions Trading in the 
U.S., Experience, Lessons and Considerations for Greenhouse Gases’, May, 2003, Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change <https://www.c2es.org/publications/emissions-trading-us-
experience-lessons-and-considerations-greenhouse-gases> accessed 09/05/17. 
86 42 U.S.C. United States Code, 2011 Edition, Title 42 - The Public Health and Welfare, 
Chapter 85 - Air Pollution Prevention and Control, Subchapter IV-A - Acid Deposition Control 
<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title42/html/USCODE-2011-title42-chap85-
subchapIV-A-sec7651b.htm> accessed 06/07/17. 
87 Known as CEMS – the continuous emissions monitoring system, it added about 7% to 
total compliance costs, whereas materials balancing could have produced equally accurate 
estimates at less cost: fn.85 (Ellerman et al.) 17.  
88 Shi-Ling Hsu, ‘International Market Mechanisms’, in C Carlarne, K Gray and R Tarasofsky 
(eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law, (OUP, 2016) 241, citing 
William J Baumol and Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy, pp.21-3 
(Cambridge University press, 2nd edn, 1988) and Tom Tietenberg and Lynne Lewis, 
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, 357 (Pearson, 10th edn, 2014). 
89 Justin Macinante, ‘A Conceptual Model for Networking of Carbon Markets on Distributed 
Ledger Technology Architecture’ [2017] CCLR 243. There is an extensive body of academic 
literature on tradable permit schemes and emissions trading. See fn.84 (Philibert and 
Reinaud (2004)) for a useful review of the origins; also see Richard Schmalensee and 
Robert N. Stavins “Lessons Learned from Three Decades of Experience with Cap-and-
Trade.” Discussion Paper 2015-80. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Project on Climate 
Agreements, November 2015. 
90 Fn.88 (Hsu). 
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It is not the purpose of, nor essential to this thesis to explore the economic 
reasoning that underpins emissions trading in greater detail than already set out. 
Rather, this thesis proceeds on the basis that economic theory supporting emissions 
trading is settled, at least to the extent that emissions trading has become the 
mitigation policy measure of choice, adopted by many jurisdictions. 91 The focus in 
considering implementation of emissions trading as a policy mechanism is on IET, 
pursuant to Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. The carbon market that developed 
through IET and is considered here consists of trading in AAUs, certified emission 
reductions (CERs) pursuant to Article 12 Kyoto Protocol and EU Allowances (EUAs) 
pursuant to the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EUETS).  
 
5. Issues encountered with the Kyoto Protocol    
 
In 2014, the IPCC observed: ‘… mechanisms that set a carbon price… have been 
implemented with diverse effects due in part to national circumstances as well as 
policy design. The short-run environmental effects of cap and trade systems have 
been limited as a result of loose caps or caps that have not proved to be 
constraining…’92 The Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms were intended to make 
the task of mitigating global GHG emissions more cost effective and economically 
efficient. Derived from a process of negotiation between 197 parties, however, it 
was probably inevitable that there would be issues with the design outcome and, in 
particular, political issues.  
 
In a political sense, the fate of the Kyoto Protocol flexible mechanisms was tied to 
some extent to the domestic situation in the United States. At the time of the Third 
Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-3), the US was still the largest emitter, 
accounting for approximately 15.5% of global emissions of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2e) GHG emissions, with the European Union at 12.26% and the 
                                                      
91 Richard Baron, Cedric Philibert, ‘Act Locally, Trade Globally Emissions Trading for Climate 
Policy’, © OECD/IEA, 2005, 22 
<https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/act_locally.pdf> accessed 
14/05/17. 
92 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis 
Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 4.4.2.2 Mitigation, 107 [Core Writing Team, 
R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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People’s Republic of China (PRC) not far behind at 11.79%.93 However, PRC 
emissions were rapidly increasing and, in other respects, the dynamics of the 
respective emissions were changing: at the time of the Kyoto Protocol signing, ‘EU 
emissions remained at 1990 volumes, while North America’s had grown 14%, and 
those of Russia and Ukraine had dropped 30%.’94 
 
As outlined at the Eighth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate 
(AGBM-8) just weeks before COP-3, the US was clear that it would not assume 
binding obligations unless key developing countries participated meaningfully.95 In 
response, the negotiating group of 77 developing countries with China (G-77/China) 
‘used every opportunity to distance itself from attempts to draw developing countries 
into … new commitments.’96 Twelve months later, at the corresponding meeting of 
the Subsidiary Bodies prior to COP-4 in Buenos Aires, the issue remained 
unresolved97 and COP-4 itself, in November 1998, provided the backdrop to a 
dramatic development, when US President Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol 
despite strong domestic political opposition.98 Then in March 2001, the new Bush 
Administration ‘declared its opposition to the Protocol, stating that it believed it to be 
“fatally flawed”, as it would damage its economy and exempted developing countries 
from fully participating.’99 The US withdrawal, after the failed COP-6 at The Hague, 
                                                      
93 In 1997, the US emissions were 6,724,414.4 kt CO2e gas; the EU emissions were 
5,318,851.567 kt CO2e gas; and PRC emissions were 5,113,706,854 kt CO2-eq gas, out of 
the world total of 43,375,207.968 kt CO2e gas: World Bank data 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.GHGT.KT.CE> accessed 15/06/17. 
94 Fn.91(Baron, Philibert) 43. 
95 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol.12, 
No.66, Report of the Meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies to the FCCC: 21-30 October 1997, 3 
November 1997, 3 <http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb1266e.pdf> accessed 06/06/17. 
96 Ibid 16. The ‘G-77/China’ is the negotiating group of 77 developing countries together with 
China. 
97 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol.12, 
No.86, Report of the Meetings of the FCCC Subsidiary Bodies: 2–12 June 1998, 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, 15 June 1998, 12 
<http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb1286e.pdf > accessed 06/06/17. 
98 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol.12, 
No.97, Report of the Fourth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change: 2-13 November 1998, 13 December 1997, 13 
<http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb1297e.pdf> accessed 06/06/17. 
99 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol.12, 
No.176, Summary of the Resumed Sixth Session of the Conference of Parties to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change: 16-27 July 2001, 30 July 2001, 2 
<http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12176e.pdf> accessed 06/06/17. 
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meant that to take effect, the Protocol became dependent on ratification by the 
Russian Federation.100 
  
This left the EU and 37 Annex B Parties, of which 13 were economies in transition 
(EITs), with commitments, out of 197 UNFCCC signatories. Taking OECD countries 
as a proxy for the Annex B Parties (thus excluding EITs), with the US included, 
would still have represented only approximately 37.95% of 1997 global emissions. 
Without the US, they represented only about 22.45% of global emissions,101 and as 
noted earlier, of this amount, the EU represented 12.26%. Hence, the limited extent 
of coverage for international emission trading raised questions whether, from the 
outset, the regime could have had any significant impact in mitigating global 
emissions. 
 
Two other problems encountered were the inflexibility of the Kyoto Protocol, a 
reflection on the treaty process itself, and the lack of support, in the end, that it 
received. Demonstrative of inflexibility were attempts made by Kazakhstan, 
beginning at COP-4, to become an Annex B Party and voluntarily to take on 
QELRCs, so that it might engage in emissions trading and thereby gain access to 
financing for low-carbon development.102 Ten COPs and a decade after initiating the 
process, Kazakhstan would still require a 75% majority vote and even then, the 
change would only enter into force for those state parties that were to ratify the 
amendment.103 It is difficult to disagree with the description of this situation as a 
‘dysfunction’ of the UNFCCC monopoly, an inflexibility that does not encourage 
much additional effort by governments.104 
 
The lack of support the Kyoto Protocol has received is epitomized, not only in terms 
of the direct physical consequences, but also perhaps more significantly in terms of 
the political message conveyed, by the withdrawal of the US in 2001. In an on-going 
sense, it is evidenced most notably in the absence of state parties willing to sign up 
                                                      
100 Ibid 13. 
101 World Bank data <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.GHGT.KT.CE> accessed 
15/06/17. 
102 Annie Petsonk ‘Docking Stations: Designing a More Open Legal and Policy Architecture 
for A Post-2012 Framework to Combat Climate Change’, (2009) 19(3) Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law 433, 441-3; also Robert O Keohane and David G Victor, 
‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2011) 9(1) Perspectives on Politics 7, 15. 
103 Ibid (Petsonk) 443. 
104 Fn.102 (Keohane and Victor) 15. 
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for the second commitment period (CP.2), which covers only 12% of global GHG 
emissions and, as of May 2014, only nine countries had ratified the Doha 
Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol by which CP.2 was agreed, a long way short of 
the 144 countries required.105 By February 2019, there had been 126 ratifications, 
still insufficient for it to take effect.106 
 
Notwithstanding these considerations, all of the Annex B countries that fully 
participated in the first commitment period (CP.1) complied with their commitments 
and only nine needed to resort to the flexible mechanisms in order to do so.107 
Shishlov and colleagues ascribe this overachievement to four factors: hot air from 
the EITs (see next section); non-participation of the US and Canada; the global 
financial and economic crisis; and policies and measures put in place by the 
signatory countries. While hardly a ringing endorsement, there are both positive and 
negative lessons,108 one of these being that ‘compliance does not of itself equate to 
impact,’109 highlighting a point about mitigation policy architecture, that ‘…trade-offs 
between breadth of participation and depth of commitments are central to the design 
of international instruments.’110 However, the evidence seems to indicate that while 
there was compliance with the CP.1 commitments, the Kyoto Protocol has not 
achieved either breadth or depth in terms of outcome. 
 
C Operational implementation   
1. What reductions do allowances represent? 
 
The issue referred to as hot air is an early indicator of the fundamental conceptual 
problem of the nature of what is traded.111 Initially considered a red line for the EU, 
as negotiations developed the hot air issue seemed to recede in significance for 
                                                      
105 World Bank, Ecofys, 2014, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014, Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 14. 
106 UNFCCC website <https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol/the-doha-amendment> 
accessed 04/02/19. 
107 Igor Shishlov, Romain Morel & Valentin Bellassen ‘Compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol in the first commitment period’, (2016) 16:6 Climate Policy 768, 770. 
108 Michael Grubb ‘Full legal compliance with the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period – 
some lessons’, (2016) 16:6 Climate Policy 673.  
109 Ibid 674. 
110 Fn.55 (Bodansky, Brunnée, Rajamani) 26. 
111 Considered in chapter IV and later chapters. 
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IET. Nonetheless, it provides important background to the issues considered later in 
this thesis.  
 
Former Iron Curtain states, whose economies collapsed in the late 1990s, included 
states that had agreed to be bound by specific commitments on GHG limitation or 
reduction (economies in transition, EITs), as listed in Annex B of the Kyoto 
Protocol.112 The commitments, in the case of these now collapsed economies, far 
exceeded their actual emission levels. As a result, the quantified emission limitation 
and reduction obligations (QELROs) for these Annex B Parties, and hence the 
assigned amount for each calculated on the basis of its QELRO, far exceeded their 
requirements for compliance over the commitment period,113 thereby providing them 
with immediate surpluses of AAUs that they could sell. Thus ‘At AGBM 7 … the 
problem that became dubbed “hot air” was first raised. The EU expressed concern 
that the buying up of past emission reductions, notably in EITs, could mean that 
commitments were fulfilled without further emission reductions being achieved.’114  
 
A technical workshop on the flexible mechanisms in 1999 demonstrates the 
difficulties for negotiators that this issue posed: ‘Regarding “hot air,” one Party 
questioned how one would verify that these units were obtained by additional 
measures. Another participant said the question was not whether the action is 
additional to any that would have occurred otherwise, but whether it reduces 
emissions through a domestic effort.’115 This issue would have been more 
problematic had there been significant transfers of AAUs, but there were not, 
purchasers being limited to only a few countries. Data compiled by UNEP indicates 
that the main country purchasers of AAUs were Japan (mainly through firms with 
domestic commitments), Spain and Austria, while the World Bank was also a 
                                                      
112 This paragraph draws on author’s previous publication ‘From Homogeneity to 
Heterogeneity and the fundamental question – what is being traded?’ University of 
Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper Series No.2017/15 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3015798> 
113 Pursuant to Article 3, Kyoto Protocol. 
114 Joanna Depledge, ‘Tracing the Origins of the Kyoto Protocol: An Article-by-Article Textual 
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purchaser (for its funds), the main sellers were Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia and Poland.116 
 
Nevertheless, this issue demonstrates a structural shortcoming in the design of IET 
that goes to the credibility of what it seeks to achieve. Additionally, while AAUs 
could not be used for compliance by installations with obligations under the EUETS, 
EU countries would be able use AAUs to fulfill their obligations more generally.117 
Further, provided the Japanese government agreed, Japanese companies were 
able to purchase AAUs to meet commitments under the domestic Japanese 
voluntary scheme,118 private firms (intermediaries) generally could purchase AAUs, 
as did World Bank funds.119 As these transactions were usually bilateral, they are 
not recorded on any public exchange, so price and other market information would 
not be readily accessible.120 AAU trading is tracked by the International Transaction 
Log (ITL), but while this is hosted by the UN and publicly available, the ITL only 
records transactions between countries.121 
 
2. Clean Development Mechanism implementation 
 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has been the most successful tool for 
mobilising mitigation finance in less developed countries, accounting for most of the 
project-based market activity.122 All the same, at the commencement of the Kyoto 
Protocol first commitment period in March 2008, it was reported that the CDM was 
suffering from procedural inefficiencies and regulatory bottlenecks.123 These 
                                                      
116 Matthew Ranson and Robert N. Stavins “Linkage of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading 
Systems: Learning from Experience.” Discussion Paper ES 2013-2. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, November 2013 in Table 2, based on data from 
UNEP Risø Centre (2013), 23.  
117 Elizabeth L Aldrich, Cassandra L Koerner ‘Unveiling Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) 
Trades: Current Market Impacts and Prospects for the Future’, [2012] Atmoshpere, 3, 229-
245. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid 232. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid 233. 
122 In 2007, 87% by volume, 91% by value transacted: Jolene Lin ‘Private Actors in 
International and Domestic Emissions Trading Schemes’, in David Freestone, and Charlotte 
Streck (eds.), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and beyond, (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) 139, citing World Bank, 2008, State and Trends of the Carbon 
Market 2008, Washington, DC: World Bank. May 2008, 19. 
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included a substantial backlog of projects awaiting validation; market participants 
taking up to six months to engage a Designated Operational Entity (DOE) due to 
lack of capacity in the market; an average delay of eighty days for projects to 
become registered; and projects taking between one and two years in the pipeline 
before achieving their first issuance.124  
 
One illustration of difficulties experienced by CDM participants relates to the 
problematic tripartite process structure, involving the Executive Board, DOE and 
project proponent. The DOE was answerable to the Executive Board, in a regulatory 
sense, but was contractually retained and paid by the project developer. A shortage 
of DOEs accentuated the dysfunctionality caused by this structure, allowing the 
DOEs in the market to dictate terms minimising or effectively excluding liability, 
which did nothing to encourage better performance.125  
 
Despite the difficulties, at its peak in 2012 over 3400 projects and Programs of 
Activities (PoAs) (an average of over nine per day) were registered and 
approximately 339 Mt CO2-eq GHGs reduced.126 In total, over the ten years of 
operation to 2014, more than 7,700 projects and PoAs were registered and US$130 
billion invested in GHG reducing activities.127 All the same, the CDM has been beset 
by numerous design issues and has been in a constantly evolutionary state. In 
broad terms, these issues have included the complexity of its procedures, leading to 
delays and high transaction costs; registration of ineligible (non-additional) projects; 
projects (especially industrial gases, for example, elimination of HFC-23) which 
gamed the system; and projects being concentrated in particular countries, 
especially China and India, which benefited from the majority of projects.128 
 
3. Operationalization of the European carbon market   
 
                                                      
124 Ibid. 
125 Personal experience of the author as legal counsel for a CDM project developer, 2007-
2015. Problems included, for example, Executive Board rejecting documentation for minor 
issues such as typographical errors, resulting in long delays. 
126 World Bank, Ecofys, 2014, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014, Washington, DC: 
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127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. The percentages of registered projects by host country show China 50% and India 
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It is not intended to drill down into the experience of domestic (or regional) 
emissions trading schemes generally, however, the European Union Emission 
Trading Scheme (EUETS) warrants individual consideration simply because it is, by 
far, the largest component of what might be described as the global carbon market. 
As such, it can be seen as illustrative of how the global carbon market has operated 
since its inception.  
 
The EUETS has grown ‘… from what was initially perceived as a ‘policy experiment’ 
into the flagship of EU climate policy.’129 This is despite the fact that, originally, the 
European Commission (EC) had favoured a carbon tax rather than emissions 
trading.130 The scheme’s growth has not been without problems, commencing with 
the decentralised system that evolved in which crucial policy aspects were left to 
individual member states.131 In the case of cap setting for the first phase of the 
scheme, for instance, the outcome was that various member states over-allocated. 
The ‘uncoordinated leak and release of verified emissions’, in April 2006, revealing 
this over-allocation, caused the EUA price (and, consequently, the CER price) to 
plummet.132  
 
Since that time there have been moves to ‘a more centralized and harmonized 
approach,’133 however, over-supply issues continue to dog the EUETS. A 
combination of the economic downturn, compounded by an excess of CERs being 
available, led to a significant surplus in the scheme, which has depressed prices.134 
Rule changes relating to the use of CERs and ‘backloading’ to postpone the auction 
of 900 million EUAs, have stabilized prices. The introduction of the market stability 
reserve allows greater flexibility in managing the market.135    
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beyond, (Oxford University Press, 2009), 339. 
130 Marjan Peeters ‘Greenhouse gas emissions trading in the EU’ in D A Farber and M 
Peeters (eds) Encyclopedia of environmental law: volume 1 climate change law, (Edward 
Elgar, 2016), 378. 
131 Fn.129 (Pohlmann) 343. 
132 Ibid 354; World Bank, 2007, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2007, Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 12. 
133 Fn.129 (Pohlmann) 344; also fn.130 (Peeters) 381. 
134 World Bank, 2014, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014, Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 17. The author acknowledges that this generalized statement glosses over the 
complex set of factors that influences movements in market price in the EUETS. However, 
over-supply is probably the most influential of those factors.  
135 Ibid 55.  
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Apart from these structural issues, the EUETS has also suffered operational issues, 
being a target of VAT fraud and thefts from registries. In August 2009, it was 
reported that the UK had arrested nine individuals as part of an investigation into a 
suspected £38 million VAT fraud. The technique usually employed by fraudsters 
involved purchase and on-sale of emissions allowances, charging VAT to their 
buyer, but not remitting it to the tax authorities.136 In September 2009, the EC 
announced that member states could temporarily apply a reverse charging 
mechanism, so that VAT liability would be with the seller, while other states applied 
a zero-rating to EUAs.137 
 
The theft of almost four million EUAs, leading to the closure of emissions registries 
in 2010, was reported as having a major effect on trading.138 Although fifteen of the 
thirty registries had reopened by March 2011, the matter was complicated by the 
fact that laws relating to the purchase by a bona fide buyer, in good faith, of stolen 
goods, vary from one EU country to another. For instance, in the Netherlands and 
Germany, unwitting buyers would be afforded greater protection than in the UK, with 
the consequence that some traders began favouring registries in the former states 
as security against the risk of inadvertently purchasing stolen EUAs,139 while others 
were reported to be pulling out of the spot market altogether.140  
 
Experts were quoted as ascribing the problem to the fact that the legal nature of 
EUAs has never been defined,141 calling for them to be treated in the same way as 
cash, giving the bearer title.142 However, the problem was seen also as being due, 
at least in part, to the fact that while derivatives contracts relating to emission 
allowances were captured by the EU’s financial markets regulation, the spot market 
where the thefts had taken place, was unregulated.143  
                                                      
136 Carbon Finance, ‘EC proposes VAT changes to address carbon fraud’, Carbon Finance, 
October 2009, Vol.6, Issue 10, 8. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Carbon Finance, ‘Half of EU’s Registries reopen’, Carbon Finance, March 2011, Vol.8, 
Issue 2, 1. 
139 Carbon Finance, ‘Stolen EUAs spread chill through carbon market’, Carbon Finance, 
December 2010-January 2011, Vol.7, Issue 12, 1-2. 
140 Carbon Finance, ‘Commission disappoints with response to EUA scandal’, Carbon 
Finance, March 2011, Vol.8, Issue 2, 7. 
141 This issue is discussed in detail in chapter IV. 
142 Fn.138 (Carbon Finance) 2. 
143 Fn.139 (Carbon Finance). 
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This was one theme, amongst a number, picked up by the European Court of 
Auditors (ECA), which in 2015 reported on the integrity and implementation of the 
EUETS.144 The ECA, noting that emissions markets need sufficient liquidity to 
function well, suggested the EUETS ‘could improve if there were more certainty over 
an EU-wide definition of allowances, and if allowances were more commercially 
interesting to voluntary market participants, for example, by supporting the ability to 
create and protect secure and enforceable security interests’ however, the ‘EUETS 
Directive did not define legal status’, only explaining ways in which allowances could 
be used.145 Other ECA themes included the role of the EUETS as a financial market, 
emissions derivatives constituting more than 90% of the market, and need for on-
going and effective cooperation between carbon markets and financial markets 





                                                      
144 European Court of Auditors, Special Report ‘The integrity and implementation of the EU 
ETS’ No.06, 2015 
<http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR15_06/SR15_06_EN.pdf> accessed 
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145 Ibid paragraphs 25-28. 
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PART 2 – The carbon market from three perspectives  
 
 
Reasons were outlined in chapter II as to why international emissions trading (IET) 
can be seen to have failed to achieve its promise. IET – the carbon market that 
developed under the Kyoto Protocol – is both an environmental policy measure for 
mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and a financial market, operating at an 
international level.  
 
This Part picks up on the duality of functions performed by IET and on themes 
including its role as financial market, cooperation between regulators, and the 
nature of allowances. It examines the carbon market from three perspectives firstly, 
considering the dual functions from a broad, macro-perspective (chapter III); 
secondly, the carbon market is examined at a granular level, by focusing on the 
nature of what is traded (chapter IV) – both these analyses being in terms of how 
the carbon market has evolved. Thirdly, the carbon market is examined as it stands 











It is posited that the duality of functions performed by international emissions trading 
(IET) under the Kyoto Protocol – environmental and financial – has resulted in it, as 
a financial market, being functionally compartmentalized in the climate policy 
regime. This chapter examines whether such compartmentalisation has resulted in 
impairment of the effectiveness of the carbon market.147 To better frame this 
problem and its analysis, it is proposed to draw on a technique from the field of 
study of fragmentation in international law. In borrowing this analytical approach, it is 
appropriate to begin by briefly explaining its genesis, consequently, this chapter 
proceeds, firstly, by considering what is fragmentation in international law; secondly, 
it examines the analytical approach, which is normally applied to the interaction 
between regimes and the consequences of such interactions; then thirdly, that 
analytical approach is applied as a way of examining the effects of the perceived 
functional compartmentalisation of IET in the climate regime. 
 
A Fragmentation in international environmental law  
 
The phenomenon of fragmentation in international law derives from the ‘specialized 
and (relatively) autonomous rules and rule-complexes, legal institutions and spheres 
of legal practice’ in international law that have grown up over time in response to 
social changes.148 Thus, in a field once seen as being governed by general 
                                                      
147 See chapter I for elaboration on use of the expression ‘carbon market’. 
148 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission, United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 
2006, para.8; this report notes at para.5 that “the background of fragmentation was sketched 
already half a century ago”, referring to an article published in 1953: with the growth in 
treaty-making over the intervening period, it has clearly become more of an issue. Also see 
Cinnamon Carlarne ‘International treaty fragmentation and climate change’ in D A Farber 
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international law, the operation of specialist systems has developed, and continues 
to develop, in areas such as trade law, environmental law, human rights law and 
many others.149 As a result: 
    
The problem, as lawyers have seen it, is that such specialized law-making 
and institution-building tends to take place with relative ignorance of 
legislative and institutional activities in the adjoining fields and of the general 
principles and practices of international law. The result is conflicts between 
rules or rule-systems, deviating institutional practices and, possibly, the loss 
of an overall perspective on the law.150  
 
In its 2006 report, International Law Commission (ILC) saw these developments in 
both a positive and a negative light. On one hand, fragmentation reflected ‘the rapid 
expansion of international legal activity into new fields and the diversification of its 
objects and techniques’, while on the other, it created ‘the danger of conflicting and 
incompatible rules, principles, rules-systems and institutional practices.’ 151  
 
The background to concern about fragmentation of international law was ‘the rise of 
specialized rules and rule-systems that have no clear relationship to each other.’152 
This is especially the case with environmental treaties, it has been observed, ‘as 
most matters bear a relationship to the environment.’153 International environmental 
law can be described, on the one hand, ‘as a special regime of international law that 
emerged in response to the growing concern about a number of shared 
environmental problems’, or on the other, as the aggregation of elements of ‘public 
and private international law that are relevant to dealing with environmental 
challenges.’154 Whichever of these ways it is perceived, it consists of ‘a set of 
specialized treaties … which contain diverse environmental objectives and create a 
series of disparate law-making and implementation organs.’155  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
and M Peeters (eds) Encyclopedia of environmental law: volume 1 climate change law,  
(Edward Elgar, 2016), 261-272. 
149 Ibid (ILC). 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid paragraph 14. 
152 Ibid paragraph 483. 
153 Fn.148 (Carlarne) 264, citing ILC (Fn.148 (ILC) para 273, note 358). 
154 Ibid, citing Birnie P, Boyle A and Redgwell C, International Law and the Environment 
(Oxford University Press 2009).  
155 Ibid. 
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The ILC report is concerned with techniques for dealing with tensions or conflicts 
between legal rules and principles, in the substance of international law.156 It deals, 
therefore, as a preliminary matter, with the question of what is a conflict,157 adopting 
a ‘wide notion of conflict as a situation where two rules or principles suggest 
different ways of dealing with a problem.’158 However, fragmentation in international 
law gives rise to a broader suite of issues than just substantive conflict between 
treaties. For instance, ‘it is increasingly evident that not only treaties can be in 
conflict, but conflicts may also emanate from the decisions of treaty bodies … 
international rules on norm conflicts cannot be applied without asking whether – and 
to what extent – the decisions adopted by these bodies constitute international law-
making in the traditional sense…’159  
 
De jure, however, if the decisions by treaty bodies are not regarded as 
international lawmaking, the regime of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT 1969) does not apply, thus limiting the usefulness of 
international law in addressing this consequence of fragmentation arising 
from the climate regime.160 
 
One of the conclusions these authors reach is that climate change, reflecting ‘an 
increasingly fragmented body of international environmental norms, poses 
challenges that urge international lawyers and policymakers to rethink the extent to 
which international law provides the proper tools to deal with fragmentation, or 
whether it lies in the realm of politics, negotiation, cooperation and coordination to 
address interactions between environmental treaties.’161 Climate change law ‘is 
more complex and requires more complex solutions than merely looking at the 
relationship between specific treaty regimes.’162 The nature of this complexity is 
explored in the next sub-section. 
 
B Interaction other than conflict 
 
                                                      
156 Fn.148 (ILC) paragraph 21. 
157 Ibid paragraphs 21–26. 
158 Ibid paragraph 25. 
159 Harro van Asselt, Francesco Sindico, Michael Mehling, ‘Global Climate Change and the 
Fragmentation of International Law’, (2008) vol.30 iss.4 Law & Policy 423, 430. 
160 Ibid 
161 Ibid 440 
162 Fn.148 (Carlarne) 269. 
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It has been argued that, while the ILC report makes an ‘in-depth assessment of the 
difficulties’ of fragmentation in international law, it confines itself to analysis of ‘the 
significance of fragmentation for substantive international law’, without considering 
the many ‘implications for international institutions and governance structures.’163 
‘Fragmentation means different things to different people’ and a variety of examples 
can be identified in the literature.164 Some clarification, van Asselt proposes, could 
be achieved by: 
  
• distinguishing between substantive and institutional (where by ‘institutions’, 
is meant international judicial bodies) fragmentation;  
• further dividing into ‘fragmentation along the lines of issue areas and 
fragmentation along geographical boundaries’;  
• considering whether the fragmentation referred to ‘the relationship between 
different interpretations of general international law, the relationship between 
general international law and specialized regimes’, or ‘among two or more 
overlapping specialized regimes’;   
• differentiation could be made between fragmentation of primary norms 
(principal rules of obligation) or that of secondary norms (rules about rules – 
that is, rules governing the creation, interpretation and enforcement of 
primary norms); or 
• fragmentation in terms of sites of ‘governance’, which broadly takes account 
of the roles of non-state actors.165 
 
After reviewing effects and potential benefits, van Asselt concludes, in this respect, 
that ‘the consequences of fragmentation do not necessarily depend on the existence 
of overlapping regimes as such, but rather on how their interrelationships are 
managed.’166 As this thesis focuses on a particular measure in the climate regime, 
and on its interaction, it is helpful to retrace the steps taken by van Asselt in 
considering types of regime interaction.167 The first points he makes are that there is 
a dearth of classifications and typologies in the literature on interactions and that 
                                                      
163 Fn.159 (van Asselt et al) 427. 
164 Harro van Asselt The Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance, Consequences and 
Management of Regime Interactions, (Edward Elgar, 2014) 35. 
165 Ibid 35-38. 
166 Ibid 43. 
167 Ibid chp.4. 
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there is confusion over the terms that might be used to describe it.168 While these 
points are noted, they do not directly impact on the argument propounded here, 
except that this thesis might add a further category to any classification devised, 
being one describing an absence of interaction due to fragmentation, rather than the 
converse.169  
 
Surveying the approaches of scholars to identifying different types of interactions,170 
van Asselt notes a distinction drawn by several scholars between interactions that 
have ‘synergistic, conflicting (disruptive) or neutral/indeterminate effects on the 
target institution’.171  However, before considering further the consequences of 
interactions, van Asselt reviews two other points. First, what is it that ‘interacts’? In 
other words, what is the object of these academic studies? Secondly, he addresses 
the need to consider both hard and soft law.  
 
In relation to the first of these points, van Asselt observes that different disciplines 
have taken different approaches: international relations scholars have ‘focused on 
how institutions and regimes affect each other’s development and performance’, 
whereas ‘international lawyers have primarily analysed international legal 
instruments such as treaties’.172 He notes that the concept of ‘regime’ has been the 
object of analysis in studies from both disciplines and that the ILC report frequently 
uses the term. He adopts a definition that ‘… regimes are sets of norms, decision-
making procedures and organisations coalescing around functional issue-areas and 
dominated by particular modes of behaviour, assumption and biases.’173 In relation 
                                                      
168 Ibid 45: such as ‘interactions’, ‘interlinkages’, ‘interplay’, ‘linkages’, ‘overlap’. 
169 While the main point being made in this respect in this thesis is that compartmentalisation 
in the case of international emissions trading has caused an absence of interaction that 
might otherwise have been beneficial to the effectiveness of that mechanism, nevertheless, 
it is acknowledged that the operation of emissions trading in the climate regime also has the 
potential to interact in a negative way with other regimes as well, thereby giving rise to a 
conflict situation. The academic literature notes some instances such as interaction with the 
international trade regime, however, this issue is not considered as it falls outside the scope 
of the approach discussed here. 
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171 Ibid 47, citing Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring, (2006), ‘Conceptual Foundations 
of Institutional Interaction’, in Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring (eds.), Institutional 
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173 Ibid 49; from Margaret A Young ‘Introduction: The Productive Friction Between Regimes’, 
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Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
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to the second point, he notes that ‘[M]ost studies on regime interactions … focus on 
traditional, negotiated treaty-based regimes, which constitute hard law’, but that 
‘interactions may also involve regimes not based on legally binding instruments’, or 
soft law.174  
 
It is useful to keep in mind the distinction between hard and soft law when 
considering the approaches that have been taken by policymakers and 
governments to the application of the market mechanism in international climate 
law. Even though Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol sought to introduce international 
emissions trading as a so-called ‘flexible mechanism’, it was done so in the context 
of a compliance regime, which included conditions on such trading, for example, in 
terms of commitment period reserves and the other eligibility requirements.175 Under 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement,176 parties might have recourse to cooperative 
approaches involving the international transfer of mitigation outcomes. While the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) is developing 
guidance to ensure that robust accounting and the other terms in which Article 6 is 
expressed are met,177 unlike the Kyoto Protocol there is no compliance regime 
sitting over and above the use of these cooperative measures.178 It might be 
concluded that, on a continuum with hard law at one end and soft law at the other, 
international emission trading, to the extent that it takes place under the Paris 
Agreement, will be more an example of soft law than was the case under the Kyoto 
Protocol. However, the main point drawn from van Asselt’s review, in this context, is 
that interactions between hard and soft law regimes can take place, and that in 
global climate governance they are, perhaps, more likely. 
 
Returning to consider the consequences of these interactions, van Asselt 
distinguishes between conflicting, synergistic and neutral effects. Addressing 
conflicts, his first step is to review definitions of what constitutes ‘conflict’, since it 
                                                      
174 Ibid 49. 
175 Decision 11/CMP.1, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2, 30 March 2006 
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needs to be established at the outset whether it actually exists.179 In order also to 
cover policy conflicts, he settles on the ‘ILC’s broad conceptualisation of conflict “as 
a situation where two rules or principles suggest different ways of dealing with a 
problem”’, subject to the qualification that those ‘”different ways” lead to 
contradictory outcomes’.180 As to when these interactions could lead to conflicts, van 
Asselt proposes a list of indicators, comprising: incompatible norms (the clearest 
such indicator, but also the least likely); diverging objectives; the use of different 
principles and concepts; opposing economic incentives; and negative diffusion and 
learning (that is, lessons being learned that undermine the effectiveness of a 
regime). He flags also that, apart from a distinction between normative and policy 
conflicts, a distinction also needs to be drawn between actual and potential 
conflicts.181 
 
The term synergy is considered to mean when the interaction produces a combined 
effect greater than the sum of the separate effects.182 However, this leads to the 
more difficult matter of determining the effectiveness of a regime and even more so, 
the aggregate effectiveness of several regimes influencing each other.183 In the best 
case, van Asselt states, assessing regime effectiveness is a highly complex task, 
involving relating ‘stated or implicit objectives to observed or anticipated’ outcomes, 
while in the worst case, trying to ‘infer any unambiguous regime objective’ might be 
in vain.184 
 
Nevertheless, others have sought ‘to operationalise “effectiveness” in the context of 
overlapping regimes’ and one such classification, cited by van Asselt, identifies 
three levels by which a regime’s effectiveness can be measured, as: output, being 
‘norms generated’ that correspond to ‘cognitive interaction and interaction through 
commitment’; outcome, being ‘behavioural effects on relevant state and non-state 
actors’; and impact, being ‘the effects on the ultimate target of governance’.185 The 
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indicators to determine the existence of synergies, settled on by van Asselt, are 
shared principles and concepts (to the extent that such are observable); common 
economic incentives (promoting the same types of activities); streamlined 
monitoring and reporting obligations; shared supporting measures; and ‘positive’ 
diffusion and learning.186 The application of these indicators is considered in the 
next section. 
 
C The market mechanism compartmentalised 
 
Before attempting to apply van Asselt’s indicators, it is helpful to briefly recap. First, 
from the foregoing it can be seen that there is an issue of fragmentation in 
international law. Secondly, the consequences of fragmentation might be 
considered in terms of the management of interrelationships between regimes, 
where regimes are sets of norms, decision-making procedures and organisations 
coalescing around functional issue-areas and dominated by particular modes of 
behaviour, assumption and biases. While no classification for these interactions has 
been identified, this thesis argues that any such classification might also include the 
absence of interaction (thus, going beyond synergistic, conflicting or neutral) as a 
consequence of fragmentation, as a category, especially where that interaction 
would otherwise further the objectives of that regime. It is noted that fragmentation 
can have consequences for both hard and soft law regime interactions. The object 
of the interaction – or absence thereof in this case – is the IET regime. 
 
Thirdly, it can be seen that international environmental law is fragmented, such 
being said to be epitomised by the international legal regime for climate change.187 
Academic writers have described this variously in terms of its complexity, and the 
range and number of measures, initiatives and organisations that are now part of 
this regime. For instance, van Asselt and Zelli188 have described this fragmentation 
in terms of a transition from the initial centrality of global climate governance under 
the UNFCCC, to a plurality of global climate governance involving not just the 
                                                      
186 Ibid 56-57. 
187 Cinnamon Carlarne ‘International treaty fragmentation and climate change’ in D A Farber 
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UNFCCC, but a multitude of non-UNFCCC governance arrangements, including 
international organisations such as the World Bank and other environmental treaty 
organisations; high-level, club-like forums such as the Group of 8 highly 
industrialised countries (G8), the Group of 20 major economies (G20), and initiatives 
of consecutive US Presidents Bush and Obama; various government/non-
government stakeholder partnerships such as the Carbon Sequestration Leadership 
Forum and the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership; regulatory 
and voluntary emissions trading markets; corporate self-regulatory schemes such as 
Carbon Disclosure Project; and the various sub-national initiatives at provincial, city 
and local levels of government.189 
  
Keohane and Victor consider that what governments have created is ‘… a varied 
array of narrowly-focused regulatory regimes…’ they call the regime complex for 
climate change,190 the components of which resemble the components of van Asselt 
and Zelli’s plurality of global climate governance. Carlarne, on the other hand, looks 
at the climate issue from the perspective of its complexity and the inability of 
international environmental law to provide a satisfactory framework within which that 
complexity can be addressed.191 In Carlarne’s view, the framing of climate change 
as an environmental law issue is flawed.192 ‘Climate change is a problem firmly 
rooted in our basic post-war, global economic model, a model that is based on an 
underlying assumption that free trade and economic growth can simultaneously 
improve global economic welfare and address distributive justice concerns.’193   
 
This thesis takes another perspective, examining just a single functional element of 
Carlarne’s complexity, of van Asselt and Zelli’s plurality, or of Keohane and Victor’s 
regime complex, namely IET, as provided for by Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
This single mechanism is considered from the perspective of the consequences of 
being compartmentalised inside the climate regime. As such, the consideration here 
of fragmentation is not looking at treaty conflict in the sense examined by the ILC, 
nor perhaps even looking at hard law. It is looking at a mechanism inserted in the 
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Kyoto Protocol in order to improve the economic efficiency and cost effectiveness 
with which the climate regime might achieve its objective of mitigating greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions, and ultimately, the objective set out in Article 2 of the 
UNFCCC.194 
 
The argument propounded is that compartmentalising IET in the climate regime has 
had a negative consequence: any potentially beneficial outcomes that might have 
been realised through synergies between IET and other financial markets in 
general, have not been so realised. As a consequence, IET under the Kyoto 
Protocol has been less effective furthering the UNFCCC objectives.  
 
This argument extends the reasoning of the academic writers cited above, in two 
ways:  
 
• first, by looking not at the effect of fragmentation on international law 
generally, or on the climate regime as a whole, but rather having accepted 
that the climate regime is fragmented and made up of a multitude of 
components, by considering the impact of compartmentalisation on a single 
element in that fragmented climate regime; and 
 
• secondly, by applying that reasoning in the inverse, so to speak, considering 
not how fragmentation of the climate regime has led to either conflicting or 
synergistic interactions between different fragmented components, but rather 
by considering how compartmentalisation of that element of the climate 
regime has limited interaction, thereby preventing beneficial synergies which 
may otherwise have developed and enabled that component of the climate 
regime to better achieve the objectives for which it was put in place.  
 
Providing evidence to support this argument is a difficult proposition, as flagged 
earlier by van Asselt. It requires firstly, analysis of the actual effectiveness of IET 
under the Kyoto Protocol; secondly, speculation as to the synergies that might have 
been achieved with financial markets more generally, had IET not been cocooned 
inside the climate regime; and thirdly, what the aggregate effectiveness might have 
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been had those synergies, in fact, occurred. Nevertheless, it is proposed to apply 
the framework elaborated by van Asselt, in an attempt to demonstrate this 
proposition. To reiterate, for this exercise, IET is treated as principally consisting of 
trade in Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) and Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), 
and trading under the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EUETS). The 
ambit of the expression financial markets is elaborated in subsection 2 below. 
1.  Effectiveness of IET under the Kyoto Protocol 
 
As noted earlier, IET relies on the fundamental tenet of the exploitation of cost 
heterogeneity to minimise overall compliance costs.195 Also noted earlier, mitigation 
of GHG emissions means changing behaviour across a range of vectors, thus 
changing the way many economic activities are carried out and so, it is assumed, 
their effects. Imposing a climate-change related price on atmospheric carbon is one 
way to do this, by way of emissions trading schemes (ETSs).196 The larger the 
market, the greater the efficiency benefits it might be expected to yield.197 
 
Thus, it was intended IET would establish a carbon price that would determine the 
point at which emitters of GHGs would find it more cost effective to alter behaviour 
and reduce emissions. For a market to function there needs to be demand and 
supply. As no natural demand exists for the Kyoto Protocol units to be traded under 
IET, principally AAUs and CERs,198 demand could only be driven by compliance. 
While a compliance mechanism was established under the Kyoto Protocol,199 it was 
unrealistic to expect that this would drive demand in a market that consisted of the 
less than forty developed country parties (and EU), listed in Annex B of the Protocol 
(Annex B Parties) as having quantified emission limitation reduction commitments 
(QELRCs), that ratified it, especially when they had the option to leave the process if 
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they so desired (which Canada ultimately chose to do). The only realistic way for 
IET to work would be for those Annex B Parties to establish domestic markets, but 
with notable exception of the EU, this did not occur in any significant way. The 
World Bank reflected, in 2014, that: ‘It cannot be assumed that sovereign players 
will use a marketplace. The trading activity is primarily driven by private sector 
players. If a market, such as the AAU market, is to be made effective there may 
need to be an explicit role for the private sector.’200 
 
The AAU market was for countries with QELRCs ‘to achieve these at least cost’.201 
However, from an early stage it was observed ‘that even with trading, the 
heterogeneity of national policies would mean that AAU trading could not achieve a 
least-cost outcome’, as countries would make policy decisions based on national 
priorities and ‘would not necessarily optimise on carbon price alone’.202 Furthermore, 
economic collapse in the former Eastern bloc countries (the economies-in-transition 
(EITs)), in the late 1990s, provided an immediate supply of AAUs not stemming from 
any specific mitigation activity.203 The absence of transparent procedures in relation 
to purchases of Ukrainian AAUs introduced reputational risk.204 Most of the AAU 
purchasers, in the end, were from the Japanese private sector, sovereign 
purchasers from Spain and Austria, and the World Bank.205 
 
The market in CERs has been more successful in terms of the levels of activity it 
has generated. The World Bank indicates that 1,155 billion CERs had been issued 
by the end of 2012 (that is, over about eight years) and that the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) had generated US$130 billion of investment in GHG reducing 
project activities.206 Yet, as noted earlier, the CDM has been beset by numerous 
design issues and has been in a constantly evolving state.207 
 
                                                      
200 World Bank, Ecofys, 2014, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014, Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 44. Also the EBRD observes that one of the challenges for Article 6, Paris 
Agreement to succeed is restoring private sector confidence in policy dependent markets, 
see: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Operationalising Article 6 
of the Paris Agreement: Perspectives of developers and investors on scaling-up private 
sector investment, May 2017 <www.ebrd.com> accessed 21/09/17. 
201 Ibid (World Bank 2014). 




206 Ibid 44-45. 
207 Ibid. 
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The EUETS has dominated the carbon market and continues to do so. For example, 
in 2008 it recorded transactions valued at US$92 billion, a year-on-year growth of 
87% from 2007. However, the effects of the economic slow-down were beginning to 
be felt already at that time and as demand and commodity prices collapsed, so did 
emissions.208 Companies already holding excess European Union Allowances 
(EUAs) due to previous over-allocation, sold in order to raise cheap (essentially free, 
since allocations had been free) cash in an illiquid environment, and consequently 
prices fell dramatically. 
 
While noting the growth globally in implementation of carbon pricing mechanisms in 
various jurisdictions, both national and sub-national, the World Bank reported in 
2014 on setbacks for IET under the Kyoto Protocol, with Canada having withdrawn 
during the first commitment period, the Australian government planning to repeal its 
carbon pricing mechanism and Japan, Russia and New Zealand officially pulling out 
of the second commitment period.209 Market infrastructure was continuing to be 
dismantled as many market participants including banks, private sector 
intermediaries and aggregators, and Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) under 
the CDM, had either already exited or were substantially reducing their activities and 
exposure to the market.210 It was reported that the absence of any clear policy 
signals had led to fears that ‘demobilisation of the CDM market infrastructure’ would 
‘substantially damage the institutional memory’ that had been created.211 
Additionally, confidence in the EUETS had been negatively impacted by the 
mechanism’s design inability to deal with the market downturn. Consequently, prices 
for EUAs dropped substantially and CERs became almost worthless.212   
(i) Output 
 
Turning now to apply the three levels, flagged by van Asselt, by which a regime’s or, 
in this case, a mechanism’s effectiveness might be measured, the first is that of 
output, considered in terms of the norms generated, prompting the question what 
norms, or accepted standards of behaviour, have been generated by IET?  
                                                      
208 World Bank, 2009, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2009, Washington, DC: World 
Bank. May 2009, 5-7.  
209 Fn.200 (World Bank, 2014) 16. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid 17. 
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The information on the status of IET presents a mixed picture. While the level of 
carbon price might also be considered as an outcome of IET, if the purpose of IET 
under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol was to establish a carbon price, which would 
determine the point at which emitters of GHGs would find it more cost effective to 
alter behaviour and reduce emissions, then it seems, on balance, to have been 
ineffective. The AAU market has proved to be ineffective. As noted, AAU trading 
could not achieve a least-cost outcome. The CER market has generated a much 
greater level of activity, but while it could be said to be generating norms for projects 
that produce credits, it suffers due to design issues, frequent rule changes, policy 
changes impacting the usability of CERs and market uncertainty over its future. 
Based on the information cited, the CER market has been ineffective in establishing 
a carbon price, as the CER price seems to be determined largely by the EUA price. 
The EUETS market provides the major component of IET globally and while it 
showed much promise in the years up to the time when the impact of the global 
financial crisis was manifest, design flaws and operational issues have undermined 
market confidence in it. Nevertheless, it might be seen as effective, to a degree, in 
establishing a carbon price and thus helping to establish a norm for factoring carbon 
emission cost into business decision-making (at least in the EU). 
(ii) Outcome 
 
The second measure of effectiveness flagged is outcome, described as being 
behavioural effects on relevant state and non-state actors, corresponding to 
behavioural interaction. If this measure is assessed in terms of the growth in 
implementation of ETSs and other carbon pricing measures in jurisdictions, both 
national and sub-national, around the world, then it might be concluded that IET has 
been effective. About one hundred of the signatories to the Paris Agreement stated 
in Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) that they are considering 
or planning to put a price on carbon,213 although not all of these involved 
implementing market measures.  
 
                                                      
213 World Bank, Ecofys and Vivid Economics, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2016, 
World Bank, Washington, DC, 22  
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25160/9781464810015.pdf?
sequence=7&isAllowed=y> accessed 28/06/17. These INDCs cover about 58% of global 
GHG emissions. 
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Over twelve-hundred companies worldwide indicated that they are using or plan to 
use internal carbon pricing in the next two years and, of these, 83% are located in 
jurisdictions with (scheduled) mandatory carbon pricing initiatives,214 although it is 
not immediately apparent how many of these jurisdictional carbon pricing initiatives 
involve a market mechanism. All the same, numerous public-private initiatives have 
been implemented,215 including the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition,216 the 
Carbon Disclosure Project217 and The Carbon Pricing Panel,218 the G7 Carbon 
Market Platform,219 and the High Level Panel on Carbon Pricing.220  
 
In these terms, it would seem that there have been significant behavioural effects on 
relevant state and non-state actors, although it is hard to pin down precisely the 
extent to which this can be ascribed to IET under the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, 
to a certain degree it would seem to be an extension of what started there. On the 
other hand, if the behavioural effect in terms of which the outcome of IET is to be 
assessed is a change in emissions behaviour then, just as for the third measure 
(following), it would seem to have been ineffective. Also, as noted earlier, carbon 
price might be considered to be an outcome, rather than an output, while similarly, 
the various regulatory structures that have developed under the Kyoto Protocol seen 
as outputs. Notwithstanding such alternative approaches, the result in terms of an 
assessment of the mechanism’s effectiveness would be the same. 
(iii) Impact 
 
The third measure is impact, being the effects on the ultimate target of governance. 
Here, if the target of governance of IET was to achieve lower costs emission 
reductions, then (assuming the economic theory is correct) it can be argued that IET 
has had an impact. However, if on the other hand the ultimate target of IET is 
accepted as having been to mitigate global GHG emissions – that is, not just to do 
so at lower cost but actually to achieve the emissions reductions, at lower cost – 
                                                      
214 Ibid 24. 
215 Ibid 30. 
216 <https://www.carbonpricingleadership.org/> accessed 21/09/17. 
217 <https://www.cdp.net/en/> accessed 21/09/17. 
218 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2016/04/21/carbon-pricing-panel---setting-a-
transformational-vision-for-2020-and-beyond> accessed 21/09/17. 
219 <http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate/international-climate-
policy/carbon-market-platform/> accessed 21/09/17. 
220 <https://www.carbonpricingleadership.org/report-of-the-highlevel-commission-on-carbon-
prices/> accessed 21/09/17. 
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then, in this respect, one might conclude it has been largely ineffective. The 
evidence indicates that, rather than the rate of emissions decreasing, it has 
increased since IET was implemented. For example, it has been reported that about 
half the anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions between 1750 and 2011 
occurred in the last forty years.221 Total GHG emissions increased on average by 
1.3% per annum over the period 1970-2000; for the period 2000-2010, however, the 
average annual increase jumped to 2.2%, despite a growing number of climate 
change mitigation policies.222 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) noted: 
 
Globally, economic and population growth continued to be the most important 
drivers of increases in CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. The 
contribution of population growth between 2000 and 2010 remained roughly 
identical to the previous three decades, while the contribution of economic 
growth has risen sharply.223  
  
It is noted that the 2000-2010 period includes at least two years during which the 
global economy laboured under the impact of the global financial crisis. Whether, in 
these circumstances, IET had any impact on emissions is impossible to say 
definitively, and not even approximately without detailed mathematical and statistical 
analysis of the data, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, based on 
the simple fact of the rate of increase in emissions for part of the period during 
which IET has operated, it is difficult to ascribe any impact to IET in terms of 
effectiveness, on this basis, covering both outcome and impact. 
2.  Synergies that might have been achieved 
 
The second step in this process speculates on what synergies might have been 
achieved with financial markets more generally had IET not been cocooned inside 
the climate regime. The following quote from a time when the outlook for the carbon 
market was positive, before the impact of the global financial crisis was felt, is very 
pertinent: 
 
                                                      
221 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fifth Assessment Report, Climate 
Change 2014 Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf> accessed 
20/04/17, 4. 
222 Ibid 5. 
223 Ibid. 
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The world has truly changed today when power company executives and 
investment bankers talk about climate risk and environmentalists talk about 
leveraging the power of markets. Climate policy has mobilised the world of 
private capital to work in favour of protecting the environment. In doing so, it 
has brought together two widely different worlds with very little knowledge 
and experience of each other. A good example of the disconnect between 
the two worlds was the unauthorised release of verified EU ETS emissions 
data in April 2006, which highlighted the need for environmental officials to 
safeguard emissions data, which, for the first time, had large financial 
implications. 
 
Each of the two worlds described above has very different mental models 
and very little knowledge about how the other world operates, let alone any 
deep insights into the other’s assumptions, motivations, language and 
behaviour. Considering how widely different these two cultures are, it is quite 
extraordinary to recognise how successfully they have worked together so 
far to produce concrete action to reduce carbon emissions. In 2007, some 
prominent investment banks tried to further bridge the gap between the two 
worlds, as they hired specialist carbon staff, bought small and boutique 
carbon originators and made investments in the ‘infrastructure’ of the carbon 
market, including exchanges and registries. 224 
 
While this carbon market utopia may have germinated in the private sector,225 the 
same cannot be said for the public sector – the regulatory and institutional 
frameworks that were, after all, the designers, the managerial overseers, and drivers 
of market demand. The unauthorised release of data (the ‘disconnect’ cited in the 
quote) disclosed the fact, suspected by some already, that national emissions 
inventories had been over-estimated by national authorities in the EU, resulting in 
over-allocation of EUAs and consequently an over-supply in the market. The 
obvious outcome was a price plunge. As the World Bank observed, there were (and 
still are) two sides to the IET market, the environmental and the financial, and the 
‘very different mental models’ referred to by the Bank did not stop with the market 
participants. The different mental models, lack of knowledge and insight applies also 
to the policymakers, regulators and administrators of the IET market.226 
 
                                                      
224 World Bank, 2008, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2008, Washington, DC: World 
Bank. May 2008, 22. 
225 Flowering briefly, before shortly later beginning to wither. Note also that the issue of 
coordination between carbon market and financial market regulators was raised by the 
European Court of Auditors in its 2015 report on the EUETS. 
226 Another perspective on this issue might be in terms of engagement between the private 
sector and the UNFCCC, as examined in a report for the European Commission in 2010: 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development Secretariat, Ecofys and Climate 
Focus, ‘Private Sector and the UNFCCC Options for Institutional Engagement’, Final Report 
31/8/2010 <https://www.wbcsd.org/Clusters/Climate-Energy/Resources/Options-for-
institutional-engagement-in-the-UNFCCC-process> accessed 11/04/18. 
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To consider what synergies might have been achieved had IET not been cocooned 
in the climate regime, it is proposed, so far as is possible, to apply the indicators for 
determining the existence of synergies from van Asselt (see Section B supra): 
shared principles and concepts (to the extent that such are observable); common 
economic incentives (promoting the same types of activities); streamlined 
monitoring and reporting obligations; shared supporting measures; and positive 
diffusion and learning.  
 
Firstly, though, it is necessary to clarify what is meant here by the expression 
financial markets. As applied, this expression is intended to refer broadly to financial 
markets that trade internationally, such as the foreign exchange market, debt (bond) 
markets and some commodities markets. These are the sorts of markets with which, 
it is posited, the IET market might have achieved synergies, in a functional sense. 
As markets, the IET market and the financial markets share principles and concepts 
common to all markets: supply and demand, liquidity and depth, access to market 
information and so on. How could these shared principles and concepts have been 
better considered, had the IET market been exposed more to financial regulatory 
and institutional oversight, rather than just environmental? An obvious initial answer 
is in better understanding the importance of financially sensitive market information 
from the outset: the failure to do so has been noted in the quote above.  
 
A second, related way would be in better appreciating the importance of balancing 
supply and demand, and hence better controlling the way in which national 
emissions data (which has a direct relationship both to the size of allocations and 
hence supply, and to the anticipated size of demand) was both compiled and 
managed overall throughout the process. A third way, related to the initial design, 
would have been in better understanding the need for liquidity and depth in the 
market, especially in achieving smoother price movements. If the EU had not 
implemented its ETS, thereby creating a market of over 11,000 potential traders, the 
market might only have consisted of the 37 Annex B Parties and any legal entities 
they authorised, trading mostly AAUs and CERs.   
 
Synergies exist in terms of the other indicators as well. Both IET and financial 
markets have common economic incentives in the profit motive for participants, 
although in the case of IET, this is, or at least should be, subordinated to the 
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overriding environmental objective of mitigating emissions, the reason for which the 
IET market exists. The IET primary markets (in AAUs, CERs, EUAs) have generally 
been seen less as financial markets, the units traded being considered more often 
as commodities rather than as financial instruments (although in the European 
Union, at least, this is changing).227 However, just as there are for other markets, 
there have been derivatives markets in the units traded in the IET market and these 
have always been regulated as financial markets.  
 
Hence, it would seem opportunities exist for synergies in terms of streamlined 
monitoring and reporting obligations, shared supporting measures, and ‘positive’ 
diffusion and learning, were IET markets and financial markets more aligned. In 
particular, for instance, the closer oversight of the primary market in AAUs, CERs, 
EUAs and secondary (derivative) markets – futures, forward contracts, options – 
based on the underlying contracts for those units might have been expected to 
afford regulators (both environmental and financial) more of the “… deep insights 
into the other’s assumptions, motivations, language and behaviour” referred to by 
the World Bank. The EUETS is moving in this direction.228  
 
Nevertheless, the damage would appear to have been done in terms of the lost 
opportunity for greater synergies and in terms of private sector sentiment towards 
an international carbon market becoming more negative. Overall, it is concluded that 
IET has been, on balance, less effective than it could have been. Had it not been 
compartmentalised, there are synergies with other financial markets (and, probably, 
between primary and secondary carbon markets) that may have been realised. All 
the same, it is acknowledged these conclusions are, at best, speculative. 
3.  Aggregate effectiveness had those synergies occurred 
 
                                                      
227 MiFID II defines ‘financial instrument’ to include emission allowances, consisting of any 
units recognised for compliance with requirements of Directive 2003/87/EC (Emissions 
Trading Scheme): Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and 
Directive 2011/61/EU, OJ L 173, 12.06.2014, 394-496, Annex I, Section C, paragraph (xi), 
with effect from January 2018. 
228 In this respect, see the ECA observations re alignment of environmental and financial 
regulators: European Court of Auditors, ‘The integrity and implementation of the EU ETS’ 




To complete this exercise, it is necessary to consider what aggregate effectiveness 
might have been achieved, had those synergies, in fact, occurred. Again, it is 
acknowledged that this is speculative. Nevertheless, had the IET market been less 
compartmentalised inside the climate regime, it might be expected that there would 
have been more private financial sector involvement from the start, not just as 
market participants, but in shaping market design. If this had been the case, then it 
is reasonable to expect that there would have been a greater roll out of trading and, 
consequently a deeper and more liquid market, with a less volatile carbon price 
being more widely factored into business planning from the outset. To some degree, 
this private sector engagement was engendered by the early implementation of the 
EUETS, however, as also mentioned earlier, this too had problems. 
 
Climate change needs to be made mainstream and “… released from a 
compartmentalised framing.”229 One way proposed to achieve this is by framing 
climate change as an energy challenge.230 However, this thesis argues that 
mainstreaming the climate change issue into national and international economic 
decision-making can be achieved more readily if international emissions trading is 
perceived and treated more as an international financial market.231 The inclusion of 
the flexible mechanisms and especially IET, in the Kyoto Protocol, has already 
opened the door, at least partially, for this to happen.  
 
Aggregate effectiveness that might have been achieved, had the synergies between 
IET and the financial markets been realised, includes the possibility, for instance, 
that bond (debt) markets may have started factoring in a carbon price as part of the 
pricing of issuances. One could imagine this being the case for countries particularly 
exposed to fossil fuel resource exports (e.g., Australia) and for resources companies 
operating in those countries and borrowing in global financial markets. A second 
potential synergy might have been the carbon price being taken into account in 
commodities markets – not as a trade issue in the form of, say, a border tax 
adjustment – but upstream, being integrated into the cost of the commodity from the 
point of view of production, energy use, and transportation. Thirdly, the carbon price 
might even have become another of the many considerations that currency traders 
                                                      
229 Fn.191 (Carlarne) 48. 
230 Ibid. 
231 What this could entail has been elaborated in chapter I. 
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take into account (perhaps only to a small degree, but considered nonetheless) 
when setting and adjusting currency exchange rates.232 
4.  Conclusion on compartmentalisation 
 
The argument made here is that compartmentalising IET in the climate regime has 
had a negative consequence: potentially beneficial outcomes that might have been 
realised through synergies between IET and other financial markets generally, have 
not been realised, there has been a substantial loss of private sector confidence and 
support, its effectiveness as a mitigation policy measure being impaired as a 
consequence. The conclusion reached is that, on balance, IET has been less 
effective than it could have been in furthering the UNFCCC objectives. 
Compartmentalisation may have played a part in this outcome by impeding potential 
synergies that may have arisen between IET and financial markets.233  
 
This argument extends the reasoning of the academic writers cited by, firstly, 
looking not at the effect of fragmentation generally, but rather having accepted that 
the climate regime is fragmented, by considering the impact of compartmentalisation 
on a single element in that fragmented climate regime. Secondly, it does so by 
applying that reasoning in the inverse, by considering how compartmentalisation of 
that element prevented beneficial synergies, which may otherwise have developed. 
The market model proposed by this thesis aims, amongst other things, to address 
this issue and so to promote re-engagement of the private sector in the carbon 
market.  
  
                                                      
232 This might certainly be the case if a universally accepted methodology for determining 
mitigation value (MV) of different jurisdictions’ mitigation outcomes could be settled upon: 
this is discussed later in this thesis in the context of the conceptual model proposed. 
233 It is acknowledged that the exercise carried out does not apply scientific rigour. The 
conclusion, involving as it does a certain amount of speculation as to the outcomes that 










As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the carbon market embodies dual functions, 
operating as both a regime to implement the environmental policy measure of 
mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and as a trading market. With respect 
this duality, the preceding chapter considered the interaction of these dual functions 
from a broad perspective, arguing that compartmentalising the carbon market in the 
climate regime has been detrimental to potentially beneficial outcomes that might 
otherwise have been realised through synergies with other financial markets. As a 
consequence, emission trading has been less effective as an environmental policy 
measure for mitigating GHG emissions than might otherwise have been the case. 
 
This functional duality is pertinent also to the question of the nature of what is traded 
in the carbon market,234 examined in this chapter, which focuses at a more granular, 
micro-perspective level. It is argued that the way in which emissions trading 
evolved, particularly under the Kyoto Protocol, has resulted in greater emphasis and 
attention being placed on the entitlement, the nature of the rights associated with 
what is traded, rather than on its public policy, environmental function. This chapter 
aims to reconnect with that environmental function by arguing for a refocusing on to 
the value, rather than just the nature, of what is traded. It proceeds by reviewing 
briefly the background on the nature of what is traded in emissions trading schemes; 
it considers instances that have exposed the shortcomings in the approach to the 
nature of what is traded; then it analyses the transition in the current international 
legal position from the homogeneous approach under the Kyoto Protocol, to the 
heterogeneity of mitigation outcomes recognised by the Paris Agreement.  
                                                      
234 This corresponds to the theme of the need for greater certainty over the nature of 
allowances in the European Emission Trading Scheme, see European Court of Auditors, 
‘The integrity and implementation of the EU ETS’ Special Report, 2015, paragraphs 12-24 
<http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR15_06/SR15_06_EN.pdf> accessed 
23/06/17. The discussion in this chapter mostly focuses on allowances issued under 




The focus on the rights associated with what is traded has been framed in terms of 
a balance between the security afforded private law rights (in the emissions 
entitlements) and the need for regulatory flexibility (for example, in being able to 
adjust the caps).235 This chapter argues that the advent of the Paris Agreement has 
changed the situation, not by altering the balance away from market certainty in 
favour of regulatory flexibility, or vice versa, but rather through reaffirmation of the 
purpose for which the trading market exists in the first place, namely, to achieve 
reductions of GHG emissions effectively and efficiently. Thus, it argues that it is not 
just the nature, but the value, in mitigation terms, of what is traded that needs to be 
the focal point in the new regime under the Paris Agreement. This chapter builds on 
the author’s publication ‘From Homogeneity to Heterogeneity and the fundamental 
question – what is being traded?’ University of Edinburgh School of Law Research 
Paper Series No.2017/15: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3015798> 
  
 
A Approaches developed to the issue 
1. The focus on characterising what is traded 
 
The focus on the nature of what is being traded in emission trading schemes (ETSs) 
is understandable, given that its importance goes beyond just the operation of the 
schemes themselves. The Financial Markets Law Committee (FMLC) of the Bank of 
England has opined, in relation to the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EUETS) but with relevance to emissions markets generally, that without clarification 
of the legal classification of emission allowances, the issues it had identified 
‘…could significantly impede upon the development of the market…’236 There have 
been other, more existential impacts on the carbon market since that time, such as 
from the global financial crisis. All the same, the legal classification of emission 
allowances and rights attaching thereto remains an outstanding issue that may yet 
detract from the much needed, renewed basis for support, said to be afforded by the 
                                                      
235 Sabina Manea ‘Defining Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions 
Trading System’, (2012) 1:2 Transnational Environmental Law 303, 308. 
236 Bank of England, Financial Markets Law Committee, ‘Issue 116 – Emission Allowances: 
Creating Legal Certainty’, (October 2009), 1.6 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20170108031056/http://www.fmlc.org/uploads/2/6/5/8/26584807
/116e.pdf> accessed 11/05/17. 
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Paris Agreement.237 The FMLC stated that the most significant ramification was the 
relevance of the legal nature of an emission allowance ‘…in determining which law 
properly governs the creation, transfer and cancellation of the allowance, and 
whether (and how) security rights can be created over that allowance.’238 
 
ETSs are not ends in themselves, but are intended to generate a price signal, 
creating conditions whereby entities can plan long term action to reduce or avoid 
emissions,239 thus ‘…the question of whether carbon units are property concerns the 
important question of investment certainty’.240 Hedges also notes that whether the 
traded unit is a form of property is deeply relevant to decisions in a system designed 
to drive business investment decisions.241 Practical questions include, not only as to 
whether the asset can be used as security, but also whether the value is 
predictable, or whether the asset could be subject to unrestricted regulatory 
changes that affect its value.242 Further issues include how allowances should be 
treated for tax purposes and for accounting purposes; how they should be dealt with 
in the case where the registered holder becomes insolvent;243 how financial 
investment regulation might apply to allowances themselves, or derivative contracts 
in the allowances; and whether allowances could be subject to property-based 
criminal acts, such as theft.244  
 
Other authors have flagged the general failure by ETSs to specify the nature or 
scope of the emission allowances they trade and point to lessons to be learnt from 
the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, where the nature of what was being traded – 
in that case, securitized sub-prime mortgages – was inadequately regulated and 
poorly understood.245 The nature and treatment of traded units is important for giving 
                                                      
237 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol.12, 
No.663, Summary of the Paris Climate Change Conference, 29 November-13 December 
2015, 45 <http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12663e.pdf> accessed 26/06/17. 
238 Fn.236 (FMLC) 1.5.  
239 Andrew Hedges ‘Carbon Units as Property: Guidance from Analogous Common Law 




243 Although not touched on by the FMLC, this might also depend on the nature of the 
registered holder: for instance, if the allowances are held for surrender against emissions for 
compliance purposes, would this make a difference from if they were held for investment 
purposes. 
244 Fn.236 (FMLC) 1.5, 2.7.   
245 Hope Johnson et al., ‘Towards an international emissions trading scheme: Legal 
specification of tradeable emissions entitlements’ (2017) 34(1) Environment and Planning 
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legal security and certainty to governments, private and public sector entities, and 
providing confidence to the trading system.246 Concerns over the absence of an 
adequate definition addressing legal status of allowances under the EUETS (EUAs) 
were also raised by the European Court of Auditors, which noted that the emissions 
market needs sufficient liquidity to function well, and that the EUETS could improve, 
in this respect, if there were to be more certainty over an EU-wide definition of 
EUAs.247 
 
Much of the attention has been focused on whether or not emissions allowances 
constitute property and, if so, what sort of rights attach. The meaning of property 
rights is seen as being ‘…central to the language of economics…’248 and a system 
of property rights as forming the basis for all market exchange.249 Consideration of 
rights attaching to emissions allowances must take account of the interaction 
between the public policy aims of the scheme (such as those of the EUETS), and 
the private law entitlements created by it,250 and may not easily fall into pre-existing 
categories such as property rights or personal rights, but may well form a category 
of their own, which needs to be accurately defined.251  
 
It can be seen that the nature of what is being traded in ETSs can have implications 
for the individual parties to transactions, not just in terms of the ability to use it as 
security, or for tax purposes, or for its accounting treatment, but also in resolving 
disputes when, for example, criminality intervenes (for instance, in the EUETS when 
the traded units have been stolen and on-sold to innocent third parties). From a 
broader perspective, how the public policy need for flexibility to make adjustments to 
                                                                                                                                                         
Law Journal 3. Although the securitized sub-prime mortgages are probably a lot more 
sophisticated and complicated than emission allowances.  
246 Matthieu Wemaere, Charlotte Streck, Thiago Chagas, ‘Legal Ownership and Nature of 
Kyoto Units and EU Allowances’, in David Freestone and Charlotte Streck (eds.), Legal 
Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and beyond, (Oxford University Press, 
2009), 36; this confidence and certainty also underpins development of any secondary 
(derivatives) markets: Andrew Hedges ‘The Secondary Market for Emissions Trading: 
Balancing Market Design and Market Based Transactions’, in David Freestone and Charlotte 
Streck (eds.), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and beyond, (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 314; also on this point generally, see: Charlotte Streck, Moritz von 
Unger, ‘Creating, Regulating and Allocating Rights to Offset and Pollute: Carbon Rights in 
Practice’ [2016] CCLR 178. 
247 Fn.234 (ECA) paragraphs 25-28. 
248 Daniel Cole, Peter Grossman ‘The Meaning of Property Rights: Law versus Economics?’ 
(2002) Vol.78, No.3 Land Economics 317. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Fn.235 (Manea). 
251 Ibid 312. 
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emissions rights is balanced with the private law entitlements attaching to those 
emissions rights can have implications for the operation of an emissions market 
itself, in terms of ability to meet the policy objectives for which it has been 
established. The impact of this balancing exercise on market operation could have 
implications for the overall suite of public policies within which that mechanism 
resides. For example, Manea notes that the EUETS forms part of a larger scheme, 
the EU Climate and Energy Package, and thus ‘does not exist in a regulatory void’ 
where so long as reductions are achieved it matters not how they are.252 Rather, 
emission reductions are part of ‘concerted efforts to move to a low-carbon 
economy’, and so need also to promote wider environmental policy goals such as 
green investment and an energy efficient economy.253  
2. Definitions in legislative schemes 
 
Before global policymakers began to consider greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
trading and climate change, regulators in the United States (US) addressed the 
nature of what was being traded under the acid deposition control, or acid rain, 
program under the 1990 amendments to the US federal Clean Air Act: 
 
An allowance allocated under this subchapter is a limited authorization to 
emit sulfur dioxide in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter. 
Such allowance does not constitute a property right. Nothing in this 
subchapter or in any other provision of law shall be construed to limit the 
authority of the United States to terminate or limit such authorization…. 
Allowances, once allocated to a person by the Administrator, may be 
received, held, and temporarily or permanently transferred in accordance 
with this subchapter and the regulations…254    
 
The rationale for exclusion of ‘property rights’ in this and similar formulations under 
US federal and state laws has been ascribed to need to accommodate the 
protection of property from interference without compensation right under the US 
Constitution.255 All the same, the formulation preserves rights to hold and transfer, 
                                                      
252 Ibid 314.  
253 Ibid. 
254 Acid Rain Program, 42 U.S.C. United States Code, 2011 Edition, Title 42 - The Public 
Health and Welfare, Chapter 85 - Air Pollution Prevention and Control, Subchapter IV-A - 
Acid Deposition Control, Sec. 7651b - Sulfur dioxide allowance program for existing and new 
units, (f) Nature of Allowances <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-
title42/html/USCODE-2011-title42-chap85-subchapIV-A-sec7651b.htm> accessed 06/07/17. 
255 Fn.235 (Manea) 316: Fifth Amendment. On this point, see generally: fn.246 (Wemaere et 
al) 52; fn.246 (Streck, von Unger) 183-184.  
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which imply a form of property interest, namely, as against third parties, but not 
against the government.256  
 
The Kyoto Protocol provides for each Annex B Party’s assigned amount to be 
divided into assigned amount units (AAUs), defined in the modalities, rules and 
guidelines for emissions trading,257 as being ‘…equal to one metric tonne of carbon 
dioxide equivalent, calculated using global warming potentials defined by decision 
2/CP.3 or as subsequently revised in accordance with Article 5’.258 The Kyoto 
Protocol units are, firstly, accounting units, but also represent an entitlement to 
release an equivalent amount of GHGs, which is transferrable.259 It has been 
observed that, rather than providing clear definitions of what they are, schemes 
normally describe what allowances entitle the holder to do.260 
 
The EU has been criticized in relation to the definition of allowances (EUAs) under 
the EUETS.261 Initially, it had been proposed to define an EUA as an ‘administrative 
authorization’,262 but with the decentralized approach taken this was rejected in 
favour of each EU member state making a determination under its own national 
law.263 Despite EUAs being described as having legal characteristics that could be 
                                                      
256 Ibid (Wemaere et al). In United States’ jurisprudence property rights are based on a 
relational approach meaning that to establish a right (as opposed to a lesser interest), one 
must be able to identify a corresponding duty that another owes in relation to that right, thus 
a legally enforceable right presumes a legally enforceable duty: fn.248 (Cole and Grossman) 
citing Wesley N. Hohfeld ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied In Judicial 
Reasoning’, (1913) 23 Yale L.J. <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol23/iss1/4> 
accessed 20/02/19.  
257 Decision 11/CMP.1, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2, 17 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a02.pdf#page=17> accessed 06/06/17.  
258 Ibid paragraph 3; similar definitions are set out for the other tradable units, certified 
emission reductions (CERs) under the Clean Development Mechanism, emission reduction 
units (ERUs) under joint implementation and removal units (RMUs) from land use, land-use 
change and forestry activities (LULUCF). 
259 Fn.246 (Wemaere et al) 37. 
260 Ibid 44, citing Jillian Button, ‘Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an 
International Carbon Market Based on the Currency Model’ (2008) 32(2) Harvard 
Environmental Law Review 571, 574. 
261 Fn.234 (ECA). 
262 Markus Pohlmann ‘The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme’, in David Freestone 
and Charlotte Streck (eds.), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and 
beyond, (Oxford University Press, 2009), 350.  
263 Ibid: this was apparently due to the perceived conflict with the EU principle of subsidiarity. 
The general aim of the principle of subsidiarity is to guarantee a degree of independence for 
a lower authority in relation to a higher body or for a local authority in relation to central 
government. It therefore involves the sharing of powers between several levels of authority, 
a principle which forms the institutional basis for federal States: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.2.2.html, 
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viewed as ‘property rights’, their status in this respect seems to remain ambiguous 
across the jurisdictions,264 resulting in an array of legal classifications by individual 
member states:265 for example, Wemaere et al note that an EUA was deemed a 
financial instrument in Sweden, but treated as a tradable commodity in Austria, 
Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain; for accounting purposes, 
Spain, Finland, Italy, Malta and Portugal treated EUAs as either intangible assets or 
financial instruments, while France, Netherlands and Germany stipulated they be 
recorded as tangible assets or inventory.266 The situation was summed up as being 
that the EUA ‘...does not fit easily in any legal system of the EU Members. It can be 
deemed as a right ‘sui generis’ in many jurisdictions…’267 It is noted that, as of 
January 2018, emission allowances (defined to include Kyoto project-based credits 
that are accepted for compliance purposes in the EUETS, as well as EUAs) are 
classified as financial instruments,268 flagging a change to a more consistent 
approach. 
 
Finally in this respect, a study of twenty-three ETSs in force or under consideration, 
including seven from China, found twenty-one defined the emissions units they 
traded by objective features, rather than by legal relationships they were able to 
support.269 Thus, the authors concluded, holders of the units could not be certain of 
their ownership, nor of the rights associated therewith.270  
3. Some considerations arising from common law  
 
In English courts at least, emission allowances would be likely to be treated as 
constituting property271 based on decisions in relation to milk quotas, Swift and 
                                                                                                                                                         
accessed 03/08/15. “The EU has now moved to the centralised allocation model, with an 
EU-wide cap on greenhouse gas allowances”: Marjan Peeters ‘Greenhouse gas emissions 
trading in the EU’ in D A Farber and M Peeters (eds) Encyclopedia of environmental law: 
volume 1 climate change law, (Edward Elgar, 2016), 381. 
264 Ibid (Pohlmann) 351-352.  
265 Fn.246 (Wemaere et al) 50.  
266 Ibid 51.  
267 Ibid 52. 
268 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 
2011/61/EU, OJ L 173, 12.06.2014, 394-496, Annex I, Section C, paragraph (xi), with effect 
from January 2018. This is discussed further in later chapters. 
269 Fn.245 (Johnson et al). The schemes reviewed in this study were from the International 
Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) Emissions Trading Worldwide, Status Report 2016.    
270 Ibid at 11. 
271 Fn.236 (FMLC) 3.4. 
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Another v Dairywise Farms Ltd., and Others,272 and waste licenses, Re Celtic 
Extraction Ltd (in liq); Re Bluestone Chemicals Ltd (in liq).273 In the Re Celtic case, 
the Court of Appeal applied the test set out in National Provincial Bank Ltd v 
Ainsworth,274 that before a right can be recognized as being proprietary, or as 
affecting property, it must be definable, identifiable by third parties, capable of being 
assumed by third parties, and as having a degree of permanence or stability.275 The 
waste licenses in Re Celtic were found to be property for the purposes of being 
disclaimed as onerous by a liquidator, within the meaning of insolvency legislation. 
The case has been described as one of the leading English law cases as it 
‘…captured broad principles to be used in assessing whether a statutory instrument 
can be a form of property’.276 The court arrived at three criteria for an administrative 
permit or statutory instrument to constitute a form of property, being first, existence 
of a statutory framework conferring an entitlement on a person or entity that satisfies 
certain conditions (even if the framework contains discretionary elements); 
secondly, the permit or instrument must be transferable; and thirdly, it must have 
value.277   
 
The case of Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd 278 is directly on 
point as it considers in detail the nature, as property, of EUAs under the EUETS. 
This case related to the theft from a registry account of EUAs and their on-sale to an 
unsuspecting purchaser. There was no dispute between the parties that EUAs were 
capable of constituting, and did constitute, property as a matter of law; what was in 
issue was their precise nature and characterisation as property.279 The judge 
reviewed the nature of property, citing the test in National Provincial Bank Ltd v 
Ainsworth and setting out the categories of property recognized by English law, 
before considering the precise nature of an EUA, which he found was not a right, in 
the sense that it does not give the holder a right that is enforceable by civil action.280  
                                                      
272 [2000] 1W.L.R.1177. 
273 [2001] Ch 475. 
274 [1965] AC 1175 
275 Ibid 1247-8. 
276 Fn.239 (Hedges). 
277 Fn.273 (Re Celtic) 488-9 (paragraph 33). 
278 [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch.). 
279 Ibid paragraph 40.  
280 Ibid paragraph 48. 
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Rather, it represented a permission,281 or an exemption from a prohibition or fine. An 
EUA was property at common law, in terms of the Ainsworth test, and because it 
only existed electronically, was intangible property.282 By applying the threefold test 
in Re Celtic, the conclusion was that an EUA was certainly ‘property’ and intangible 
property under the statutory definition in place.283  
 
The Armstrong v Winnington case is one of a number reviewed by Hedges284 in 
considering how common law principles have been applied to various different 
statutory instruments when considering whether they constitute a form of property 
and what rights attach thereto. Hedges’ concern is that holders of carbon units (that 
is, emission allowances/entitlements) have the benefit of legal protections applicable 
to property, as this would enhance investment and market liquidity. The cases 
reviewed are divided into, on one hand, those where the ‘…statutory instrument is a 
form of property sufficient to enliven the wider protections and restrictions at law’ 
and on the other, where system design ensures power to adjust without 
transgressing compensable rights.285 This parallels Manea’s argument that 
interdependency between the viability of the emissions market and the successful 
pursuit of its environmental objective requires a careful balancing of, on one hand, 
the need for some level of security for emissions entitlement holders, and on the 
other, the need for regulatory flexibility to adjust the emissions cap as required for 
the purpose of the environmental policy objective. 
 
Hedges and Manea are both concerned with the need for a clear definition of the 
emission entitlement and clarity as to regulatory interventions that might impact on 
the emission entitlement, whether it is legally considered to be intangible property 
(e.g., in English law) or a limited authorization not constituting a property right (e.g., 
US federal Clean Air Act). It is clear from their analysis and the cases considered 
that the focus is on what the holder of these entitlements has and is consequently 
permitted to do; and what the relevant governmental authority may do in relation to 
that holder and their entitlement. In this latter respect, Manea refers to allowance 
                                                      
281 The judge here refers to it being a “liberty in the Hohfeldian sense”, that is, something 
less than a right, drawing a parallel with the US jurisprudential approach: see fn.256 supra; 
in relation to US cases, see the review of US Acid Rain Program cases by Manea: fn.235.  
282 Fn.278 (Armstrong v Winnington) paragraph 52. 
283 Ibid paragraph 58.  
284 Fn.239 (Hedges). 
285 Ibid 199. 
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issuing authorities cancelling valid allowances when they deem necessary,286 while 
Hedges refers to unfettered legislative power to adjust the regime without triggering 
claims for compensation or unlawfulness.287  
 
It is understandable that legislatures, in creating emissions trading schemes, would 
want to reserve broad discretion to adjust, deal with and amend the schemes to suit 
their policy objectives. All the same, it might be observed as perverse that a 
legislature would establish a scheme under which allowances or entitlements are 
distributed to entities (either for free or for payment) who must surrender them 
against their emissions, only then to forfeit or cancel the same before they can be 
surrendered as intended. To do so would seem to defeat the purpose of the scheme 
(suggesting poor design in the first place), since the value in the entitlements 
derives from their surrender under the scheme anyway.  
 
Notwithstanding this, the issue of the legal nature of the entitlement and the rights 
attaching thereto is important. However, to consider an alternative approach, what if 
the potential or risk of forfeiture or cancellation of entitlements and related rights 
were to be removed entirely from the calculation? A legislature might still make 
adjustments, as necessary, to fine tune its scheme in order to better achieve the 
environmental objectives, simply that those adjustments would not, or at least would 
not need to, include the possibility of forfeiture or cancellation. Such an approach 
would ameliorate, or even eliminate, the property and property rights issue in 
relation to the nature of the entitlements. How might such an alternative approach 
come about? It could operate, it is posited, by recognizing that the emissions 
entitlements have two values that can fluctuate: a financial value in the market, and 
an environmental value – not the static value determined by definition to always be, 
for example, one tonne avoided carbon dioxide equivalent GHG, but rather a value 
that would fluctuate according to the physical outcome ascribed to it (whether that 
be one tonne avoided GHG emission, or some other value) from time to time, based 
on periodic evaluations. Changes in this environmental value would then influence 
changes in the market price, so that the market would better reflect the physical 
outcome referable to the emissions entitlement. 
 
                                                      
286 Fn.235 (Manea) 309. 
287 Fn.239 (Hedges) 200. 
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A market based on such an approach to emissions entitlements can be compared 
with other financial trading markets, such as the bond (debt) markets or even share 
(equity) markets. These markets are not, it is conceded, the same as emissions 
markets (and, for example, the comparable regimes cited by Manea).288 However, 
they do demonstrate how the market price fluctuates according to other values: for 
example, in the case of bonds, the price will depend on the likelihood of the issuer of 
the debt making timely payments to service that debt and repaying the capital at the 
end of the term of the bond. This, in turn, depends on the a range of factors, both 
internal to the issuer (for instance, management, governance, cost controls) and 
external environmental factors (for instance, the markets in which it earns income) 
influencing its performance and ability in earning the revenue necessary to be able 
to service, then repay, the debt. The external factors can include (assuming the debt 
issuer is corporate, not governmental) actions of governments in the areas where 
the issuer operates. These factors, both internal and external, are constantly 
assessed by analysts, whose reactions to them result in the price movements seen 
in the debt market. In the case of shares, again the market price will fluctuate 
according to a range of factors, both internal to the company (again for instance, 
management, governance, cost controls) and external environmental factors (for 
example, the markets in which it earns income) influencing its ability to earn revenue 
to build the wealth of the company and also pay dividends. In light of their dual 
nature, emissions entitlements also correspond more to commodities or financial 
assets, than with administrative permissions or other statutory instruments, as the 
emissions market includes participants that do not have a compliance-based 
relationship with the regulator, but rather engage in the market for investment or 
speculation.289  
4. The issue of hot air and determining the value  
 
Manea gets close to this issue of the value of emission entitlements in discussing 
the case of the Corus steelmaking plant in the UK.290 In 2010, this plant had been 
mothballed and was to be sold to an investor, but was still set to receive a 
substantial number of EUAs under the EUETS. The situation gave rise to a number 
of issues, in particular, the fact that with the plant mothballed, Corus was effectively 
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 92 
receiving an over-allocation of allowances that would be surplus to its needs. With 
little or no production, there would be virtually no emissions against which the 
allowances would need to be surrendered, meaning they could be included in the 
sale of the plant, or sold on the market, either way for a windfall profit. In the 
outcome, the UK government treated the allocation already issued for the year in 
question as being the property of Corus,291 and future allocations were to be based 
on the extent of regulated activities (giving rise to emissions) carried on at the 
plant.292  
 
This issue has arisen before: in the case of economies in transition (EITs) under the 
Kyoto Protocol as noted earlier,293 their respective assigned amounts far exceeded 
their requirements for compliance over the first commitment period,294 thereby 
providing them with immediate surpluses of assigned amount units (AAUs) that they 
could sell. The mothballed Corus plant case and the example of the EITs illustrate 
the limited and awkward options available to authorities under the Kyoto Protocol 
model addressing the issue of hot air allowances already issued. Should they risk 
legal action for cancelling future projected allocations? Since the Corus case, the 
European Commission has issued a decision on hot air allocations,295 although as 
the current over-supply situation in the EUETS and creation of a market stability 
reserve demonstrate, dealing with allocated EUAs, or projected allocations, when 
emissions are reduced due to economic factors, rather than abatement measures, 
remains problematic. 
 
The hot air issue can be considered not just in terms of allowances as property and 
how action taken by authorities might affect the legal rights therein. The issue goes 
to the credibility of the trading regime and might be considered, alternatively, in 
terms of what is the appropriate value for the emission allowance unit, at any 
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particular time, given the prevailing circumstances. Hence, rather than legislators 
and judges trying to deal with how to clarify the legal nature of allocated units, so as 
to balance certainty of private legal rights with flexibility in seeking public policy 
aims,296 for units with a defined fixed value,297 the alternative model envisaged 
proposes that the value of the traded emission allowance units fluctuate according 
to accurate, periodic assessment of those units’ actual worth, in much the same way 
as the value of an asset in another financial market, such as the debt or equity 
markets might do.  
 
Such a market model might provide greater flexibility in pursuing public policy aims, 
without transgressing unit holders’ private legal rights, provided there was a clear 
process to set the value and information on that value setting transparently available 
to the market. From reports of the meetings, this might be one of the avenues the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) is investigating in 
developing guidance for operationalizing Article 6. As such, the next section looks at 
the current international legal context of the transition from the Kyoto Protocol to the 
Paris Agreement.  
 
B Moving from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous approach 
1. Kyoto Protocol and homogeneity 
 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex B Parties agreed to be bound by specific 
commitments expressed relative to a baseline year level and calculated over a five-
year period, the first such commitment period being from 2008 to 2012. These 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments (QELRCs) were used to 
calculate an assigned amount for each Annex B Party, which each agreed not to 
exceed over the course of the commitment period.298 Each Annex B Party’s 
assigned amount was divided into assigned amount units (AAUs), defined in the 
modalities, rules and guidelines for emissions trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto 
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Protocol,299 as being ‘…equal to one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent, 
calculated using global warming potentials defined by decision 2/CP.3 or as 
subsequently revised in accordance with Article 5’.300 Also set out in that decision, 
were the modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts301 and paragraph 13 
thereof provides for retirement of units to demonstrate compliance.302 
 
The idea that all units are of equal value, namely one tonne carbon dioxide 
equivalent GHG (CO2e), warrants closer consideration. In the centralised structure 
under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), for instance, all certified emission 
reductions (CERs) are issued by the CDM Executive Board (CDMEB) once it is 
satisfied that its requirements (such as a recognized methodology being applied, the 
project proposal being acceptable, monitoring and reporting are appropriate and 
there has been verification and certification of the outcomes) are met. These 
requirements have been evolving over time.303 Thus, even though there have been 
issues with the CDM and the CDMEB,304 the fact that CERs all emanate from the 
same entity, presumably applying its criteria on a consistent basis, provides a 
modicum of comfort that they are all of the same value as allocated.  
 
In the case of the Annex B Parties’ assigned amounts and AAUs, from one 
perspective it is appropriate that all are treated as equal, since it does not matter 
where the GHGs are reduced, a tonne reduced in one jurisdiction would equal a 
tonne reduced in another. However, the issue of hot air305 was an early signal that 
there were differences: not in the sense that a tonne in one location did not equal a 
tonne in another location, but between the actions (or lack thereof) to achieve the 
reduction of that tonne. Putting it another way, while a tonne is still equal to a tonne, 
the question is whether all AAUs are equal to a tonne mitigated? The AAUs 
allocated were the Party’s permitted emissions for the commitment period. In theory, 
                                                      
299 Decision 11/CMP.1, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2, 17 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a02.pdf#page=17> accessed 06/06/17. 
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if the Party’s emissions were less, then the surplus could be sold, if emissions 
exceeded the permitted amount, more would need to be acquired. Unlike the CDM, 
however, determination of the permitted level, monitoring and reporting actual 
emissions, verification and how the reductions were actually achieved were all 
decentralized to the Parties individually and not necessarily consistent. Furthermore, 
differing levels of ambition suggest that each AAU of a more ambitious Party – that 
is, one that committed to a higher percentage emission reduction – would (in theory, 
at least) equate to a higher level of emission reduction and thus be more 
environmentally valuable. However, as noted earlier, emission allowances are 
‘…first and foremost accounting units…’ with two determining features being that 
they represent an entitlement to release a certain quantity of GHG emissions into 
the atmosphere (namely, one tonne CO2e each); and they are transferable under 
certain established conditions.306 
 
The fact that this has not become more of an issue might be ascribed to the limited 
AAU trading that took place under the Kyoto Protocol.307 Whether or not this is the 
case, it is submitted that the only realistic way for international emissions trading 
(IET) under the Kyoto Protocol to have been effective would have been for Annex B 
Parties to establish domestic markets, thus engaging the private sector but, with 
notable exception of the EU, this did not happen to a significant degree.308 As 
mentioned in chapter III, the World Bank observed in 2014, looking back on IET it 
cannot be assumed sovereign governments will use the market, and trading will 
primarily be driven by the private sector, which needs to be given an explicit role.309  
 
The Kyoto Protocol evidences what has been described as a top-down governance 
model.310 All units were defined as having a value of one tonne CO2-eq GHG. These 
                                                      
306 Fn.246 (Wemaere et al) 37. 
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units were either allocated, as in the case of AAUs, or issued, as with, for example, 
CERs. In this sense, they were all centrally sourced. In the case of the project 
credits, only when the projects and their outcomes had been validated and verified 
as having reached the required standards, were their outputs recognized and CERs 
issued. Thus, the top-down model operated on the basis of what might be described 
as unitary homogeneity. All mitigation actions had to reach the same standard so 
that units derived from them could be of equal value. Yet, while this might have 
been valid for project credits in terms of mitigation, it was not necessarily so in the 
case of AAUs, which are an entitlement to release an equivalent amount of GHG, 
rather than an amount mitigated.311  
2. Paris Agreement and heterogeneity 
 
The Paris Agreement moves away from the unitary homogeneity of the Kyoto 
Protocol, by recognizing that jurisdictions will take different approaches that will 
have different outcomes. This has been ascribed to a general trend away from 
specific categories differentiating parties in terms of commitments towards self-
differentiation, in response to the continuing demands by developed countries for 
developing countries to take on commitments and developing countries continuing 
resistance.312 The deal struck in Paris ‘…allows parties to define their own 
commitments, tailor these to their national circumstances, capacities, and 
constraints, and thus differentiate themselves from each other.’313 The Paris 
Agreement ‘…establishes a new paradigm in international climate policy. While the 
Kyoto Protocol was essentially based on the so-called ‘targets & timetables’ the 
Paris Agreement is based on the so-called ‘pledge & review’ paradigm.’314 The 
differences in responsibility for, and in actual capacity to address climate change are 
implicit to this approach and evidenced through the intended nationally determined 
                                                                                                                                                         
and Michael Oppenheimer, ‘Paris: Beyond the Climate Dead End through Pledge and 
Review?’ (2016) Vol.4 No.3 Policy and Governance 142. 
311 Hence, AAUs are fundamentally different to project-generated credits, such as CERs, and 
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being defined as “equal to one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent, calculated using 
global warming potentials…”  
312 Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate Change Law, 
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313 Ibid. 
314 Martin Cames et al., ‘International market mechanisms after Paris’, Discussion Paper, 
November 2016, German Emissions Trading Authority (DEHSt) for German Environment 
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contributions (INDCs) that parties to the Paris Agreement have lodged. There is a 
considerable amount of variation in the levels of ambition disclosed, types of 
contributions, and target years or periods.315  
 
Inevitably, the mechanisms applied by different jurisdictions will vary greatly as well, 
including varied and diverse pricing mechanisms. The introduction by the Paris 
Agreement of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) ties the units 
traded to the physical results of the mitigation actions taken.316 This raises a number 
of issues, such as an appropriate measuring unit, accounting unit, how they should 
be represented (e.g., by a certificate), whether they could support a secondary 
market, whether they would all be equal and fungible and, most importantly, what 
exactly is meant by a mitigation outcome?317 Notwithstanding the similarities 
between the Mitigation and Sustainable Development Mechanism, introduced in 
Article 6, paragraphs 4-7, and the CDM under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol,318 the 
concept of mitigation outcomes introduced by the Paris Agreement is a fundamental 
departure from the Kyoto Protocol concept of centrally sourced and allocated units 
of equal value. Nonetheless, there are issues including, for example, accounting for 
these diverse mitigation outcomes; and how environmental integrity will be assured.  
 
Key aspects flagged in relation to accounting under this new approach include 
quantifying mitigation targets and progress towards them; quantifying mitigation 
outcomes; avoiding double counting of reductions; accommodating different metrics 
for outcomes and targets; accounting for time period factor variations in outcomes 
and targets; and other factors affecting outcomes (e.g., non-permanence).319 In 
relation to environmental integrity, in the context of international transfers of 
mitigation outcomes, there is support for the view this means that the transfer does 
                                                      
315 Ibid 15; also see: Lambert Schneider et al., ‘Robust Accounting of International Transfers 
under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement’ Discussion Paper, September 2017, German 
Emissions Trading Authority (DEHSt) for German Environment Agency 
<https://www.dehst.de/SharedDocs/downloads/EN/project-
mechanisms/Differences_and_commonalities_paris_agreement_discussion_paper_2809201
7.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2> accessed 29/09/17.  
316 Thus highlighting the environmental policy reason for that trading.   
317 Fn.314 (Cames et al) 12.  
318 Ibid 17: see table of similarities. 
319 Fn.315 (Schneider et al 2017) 18-19.   
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not result in an increase in global aggregate emissions.320 Four factors identified as 
influencing it are the robustness of accounting for international transfers; the quality 
of the units, which in turn depends on cap setting and monitoring; the ambition and 
scope of the transferring country’s mitigation target; and incentives or disincentives 
for future mitigation action.321 More jurisdictions have begun to develop emissions 
trading as part of domestic measures to achieve GHG reductions: ‘…2015–2016 
witnessed an increasing number of governments using or actively considering 
carbon pricing as an instrument to meet their emission reduction pledges and a 
growing number of companies engaging in this topic.’322 More frequently, they are 
engaging in discussions aimed at facilitating inter-jurisdictional trading, for example, 
by linking with each other. The more this happens, the more apparent it will become 
that such schemes do not all generate equivalent outcomes, thus necessitating a 
different approach. 
  
C Summation  
 
The purpose of this chapter, together with the other chapters in this Part, is to 
establish a foundation for the introduction of the market proposal, the subject of this 
thesis. Analysis in this chapter of the nature of what is traded in emissions trading 
schemes leads to a conclusion, it is argued, that it is not the nature but the value, in 
mitigation terms, of what is traded that needs to be the focus for international 
policymakers and lawyers, in the transition to the new regime under the Paris 
Agreement. Valuing mitigation outcomes will be essential for establishing 
cooperative approaches involving international transfers under Article 6 thereof, 
given the variations in measures by which they might be generated. Addressing this 
issue is fundamental to the market proposed by this thesis, which also seeks to 
address the compartmentalization issue through the governance structure 
proposed. The intention is that the carbon market be treated more as other financial 
                                                      
320 Lambert Schneider & Stephanie La Hoz Theuer ‘Environmental integrity of international 
carbon market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement’, (2019) 19:3 Climate Policy 386. 
This and other issues related to ITMOs are discussed further in following chapters. 
321 Ibid 389-392. 
322 World Bank, Ecofys and Vivid Economics, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2016, 
World Bank, Washington, DC, 28  
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25160/9781464810015.pdf?
sequence=7&isAllowed=y> accessed 28/06/17. 
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markets are, through that structure, allowing for greater synergies that might also 
engender re-engagement of the private sector. 
 
To properly define what emission allowances are, they need to be seen in the 
context in which they are generated, that is, the overall scheme and its 
environmental purpose. Under the Paris Agreement, what can be transferred 
internationally is a mitigation outcome, which it is posited, means the physical 
benefit afforded by the emission allowance (or other unit, such as a credit) under the 
scheme, that is, the actual amount of GHG emission reduction that can be ascribed 
to a unit of measurement under that scheme. The conclusion is that just as, if not 
more importantly than defining the units traded in emissions trading schemes, it is 
their value that should be considered under Article 6. Building from these 
foundations, the next chapter examines what is the ‘carbon market’ in this new 
environment. This leads, in following chapters, to consideration of the infrastructure, 
technical, administrative and legal frameworks, necessary to accommodate 
international transfers of mitigation outcomes as part of an effective and efficient 











This final chapter of Part 2 takes another perspective on the carbon market. Having 
considered the interaction of the dual functions of the carbon market as both 
environmental policy measure and financial trading market from a macro-
perspective in chapter III, and then at a more granular level in chapter IV, both in 
terms of how it has evolved, this chapter examines the carbon market as it stands 
now and the direction it might take in the future. It begins by profiling the diverse 
elements that constitute the carbon market, in Section A, before canvassing the 
rationale for connecting these diverse elements, in Section B. This touches on the 
economic arguments, however as full economic analysis of the case for connecting 
markets is beyond the scope of this thesis, it relies on the academic literature on the 
subject. Mechanisms that could be applied to achieve connections between the 
constituent elements, in terms of emission trading schemes (ETSs), are surveyed in 
Section C.  
 
A The carbon market in profile  
 
The carbon market can either be considered broadly as encompassing all carbon 
pricing (as outlined in chapter I), including not just emissions allowance trading 
schemes and project-generated credits, but also carbon taxes (credits for which 
might be traded) and tradable renewable energy certificates; or on the other hand, it 
might be construed narrowly as limited to, say, just emission allowance trading 
schemes. It might be categorised also according to a number of different criteria 
including the level at which it operates, for example, international, regional, national, 
subnational, municipal/local or even on a sectoral basis, or as including internal 
carbon pricing applied by corporations; or the legal basis on which it operates, that 
is, on a legal compliance basis, or on a voluntary basis; or even by the nature of the 
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instrument traded, that is whether as allowances as part of a cap-and-trade scheme, 
or credits generated on a project-basis.  
 
Taking an overall perspective, current carbon market activities present a mixed 
picture and, at the international level, are in a state of flux. Article 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol provided for international emissions trading (IET) in both allowances 
(assigned amount units (AAUs)) and a number of project-generated credits 
(including, for instance, certified emissions units (CERs), emission reduction units 
(ERUs)), which has occurred over the first commitment period from 2008-2012. 
However, the Doha Amendment323 to the Kyoto Protocol, providing for a second 
commitment period from 2013-2020, is yet to receive the requisite number of letters 
of acceptance,324 and thus is yet to take effect. As such, trading at this level is 
greatly reduced, although it has not discontinued entirely.325 It is difficult to see any 
change in the current volume of trading activity at this level until the second Kyoto 
commitment period commences, or parties to the Paris Agreement326 start to 
engage in cooperative approaches pursuant to Article 6 thereof. Nevertheless, at 
the same time, but in relation to emissions trading schemes at a regional level, the 
European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EUETS) continues and its framework 
for phase 4, from 2021-2030, is aiming to facilitate achievement of a 43% reduction 
in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from covered sectors, while safeguarding 
industrial competitiveness and fostering low carbon modernization and innovation.327 
Further, at the national and subnational levels, many other ETSs have either already 
                                                      
323 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, Doha, 8 December 2012, 
C.N.718.2012.TREATIES-XXVII.7.c (Depositary Notification) 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2012/12/20121217%2011-40%20AM/CN.718.2012.pdf> 
accessed 06/03/19. 
324 As at 21 February 2019, 126 of the required 144 letters of acceptance had been 
deposited <https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol/the-doha-amendment> accessed 
06/03/19. 
325 UNFCCC SBI 49: Report of the administrator of the international transaction log under the 
Kyoto Protocol, 26 October 2018 
<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbi2018_inf10.pdf> accessed 06/03/19. 
326Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 
November to 13 December 2015. Addendum. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, 29 January 2016 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf> accessed 13/03/17.  
327 See, for instance: European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, Report on the functioning of the European carbon market’, 
Brussels, 17.12.2018 COM(2018) 842 final <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0842&from=EN> accessed 06/03/19. 
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been implemented or are scheduled to be implemented,328 or are under 
consideration.329  
 
In terms of project-generated credits, at the international level, even though the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is not directly dependent for its continued 
operation on the second Kyoto commitment period,330 CDM activity has been 
waning since reaching a peak at the end of 2012. The absence of demand from 
parties with commitments under a second commitment period, as well as demand 
from the EUETS being cut,331 is compounded by the fact that the status of certified 
emission reductions (CERs) as mitigation outcomes under Article 6, paragraph 2, or 
for the purpose of the mechanism under Article 6, paragraph 4, Paris Agreement 
remains unclear.332 The drop off in CDM is evidenced by the fact that just three 
projects entered the validation process in 2017, this being last such activity, 
although there are still projects further along in the registration process.333    
 
Notwithstanding, developments at a sectoral level in relation to aviation and 
shipping may eventually provide a fillip for project-generated credits. While tangible 
                                                      
328 World Bank and Ecofys, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2018, World Bank, 
Washington, DC  <www.worldbank.org> accessed 12/08/18. National ETSs: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
the Republic of Korea, Romania, and Slovakia. Both national ETSs and carbon taxes: 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Subnational 
ETSs: Beijing, California, Chongqing, Connecticut, Delaware, Fujian, Guangdong, Hubei, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Ontario, Québec, Rhode 
Island, Saitama, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Tokyo, Vermont, and Washington State. Both 
subnational ETSs and carbon taxes: Alberta and British Columbia.   
329 Ibid. National ETS or carbon tax: Brazil, Canada, Chile (ETS), Colombia (ETS), Côte 
d’Ivoire, Japan (ETS), Mexico (ETS), the Netherlands (carbon tax), Thailand, Turkey, 
Ukraine (ETS), and Vietnam. Subnational ETS or carbon tax: Catalonia, Manitoba, New 
Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, New Jersey, Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, 
Oregon, Prince Edward Island, Rio de Janeiro, São Paolo, Saskatchewan, Taiwan, China, 
and Virginia.  
330 Although obviously it is dependent on the second commitment period to the extent that 
commitments thereunder may generate demand for CERs.   
331 The EU has a domestic emission reduction target that does not envisage the use of 
international credits after 2020 <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/credits_en> accessed 
06/03/19. 
332 See, for instance, the draft definition of ITMOs at paragraph VI, C: UNFCCC SBSTA 48-
2: Draft Text on SBSTA 48-2 agenda item 12(a) Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement: Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the 
Paris Agreement Version 1 of 9 September 02:00 hrs - corrected version 
<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta48.2_12a_DT_corr.pdf> accessed 
29/10/18. 
333 See <https://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/CDMinsights/index.html> accessed 05/03/19. 
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developments in relation to shipping are yet to crystallize, the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has resolved to develop a global market-based 
measure scheme for international aviation in the form of the Carbon Offsetting and 
Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA).334 Participation of ICAO 
member states in the pilot phase (2021-2023) and first phase (2024-2026) is 
voluntary, but from the second phase commencing 2027, all states with an individual 
share of international aviation activity above a threshold level are included.335 
CORSIA will use emission units that meet specified Emission Unit Criteria 
developed on the advice of a technical advisory body, which should promote 
compatibility with future relevant decisions under the Paris Agreement.336  
 
Apart from project-generated credits under the Kyoto Protocol, there are also a 
number of voluntary standards schemes337 under which projects generate carbon 
market offsets that are used by corporations and other entities, that otherwise do not 
have emission reduction compliance obligations, to offset their emissions voluntarily. 
These voluntary standards differ according to project activities and types allowed, 
project locations and the regulations to which the projects must adhere, but 
generally all the voluntary standards require the offsets to be real, additional, 
measurable and verifiable.338 While this is a comparatively small part of the carbon 
market, it is not negligible and claims to have offset over 437 million tonnes carbon 
dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) GHG since 2005, as well as providing sustainable 
development co-benefits such as supporting local economies through job training 
and creation, preserving watersheds that supply clean water, or safeguarding 
biodiversity.339 
 
                                                      
334 International Civil Aviation Organisation, ‘Resolution A39-3: Consolidated statement of 
continuing ICAO policies and practices related to environmental protection – Global Market-
based Measure (MBM) scheme’, Assembly 39th Session, October 2016, Paragraph 5 
<https://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/CORSIA/Documents/Resolution_A39_3.pdf> 
accessed 06/03/19.  
335 Ibid, paragraph 9(e), other than least developed countries, small island developing states 
and landlocked developing countries, unless they join voluntarily. 
336 Ibid, paragraph 20(c)-(e). 
337 Verified Carbon Standard: <https://www.verra.org>; Gold Standard: 
<https://www.goldstandard.org>; Plan Vivo: <www.planvivo.org>; Climate Action Reserve: 
<www.climateactionreserve.org>.  
338 Kelley Hamrick, Melissa Gallant, ‘Voluntary Carbon Markets Insights: 2018 Outlook and 





Since the Paris Agreement was reached in 2015, it seems there is a clear trend 
towards greater implementation of carbon pricing initiatives, at various levels of 
government around the world.340 The World Bank has reported, for instance, that 
eighty-eight Parties to the Paris Agreement, accounting for 56% of global GHG 
emissions, have indicated they are planning or considering use of carbon pricing 
and/or market mechanisms.341 It noted also that over one thousand three hundred 
companies globally are using or planning to use internal carbon pricing in 2018-
19.342 In the broadest sense, then, the carbon market can be seen as a diverse, 
heterogeneous collection of different types of pricing mechanisms, being 
implemented, or scheduled to be implemented, by a range of different levels of 
government, and other stakeholders, encompassing both voluntary commitments 
and legally binding obligations.  
 
There is also a wide variation in the carbon prices that apply across these 
mechanisms. While prices appear to be increasing slightly year-on-year, the current 
price trajectories are insufficient to stimulate emission reductions in line with the 
Paris Agreement temperature goals.343 Prices range from US$140 per tCO2e 
(carbon tax in Sweden) to less than US$1 for the carbon taxes in Mexico, Poland 
and Ukraine, while ETS prices range from US$23 in Alberta, Canada, to US$2 in the 
Hubei and Guangdong pilot ETS schemes in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC).344 The High Level Commission on Carbon Prices established pursuant to the 
22nd Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP22), has concluded that while 
countries may choose different instruments to implement their carbon policies, 
depending on national and local circumstances and support received, the explicit 
carbon price level consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature target 
is at least US$40-80 per tCO2e by 2020 and US$50-100 per tCO2e by 2030.345 
                                                      
340 World Bank, Ecofys and Vivid Economics, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2016, 
World Bank, Washington, DC, 11   
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25160/9781464810015.pdf?
sequence=7&isAllowed=y> accessed 28/06/17.  
341 World Bank and Ecofys, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2018, World Bank, 
Washington, DC, 18  <www.worldbank.org> accessed 12/08/18. It is noted that this number 
is less than in preceding World Bank reports, but substantial all the same. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid 27. 
344 Ibid 21. 
345 World Bank Group, Networked Carbon Markets: Mitigation Action Assessment Protocol, 
2016, World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank. 
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25371/110153-WP-
P161139-PUBLIC-MAAPMay.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 27/02/18. 
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Furthermore, as noted in the Stern Review: ‘If the carbon price across countries is 
not broadly similar, there will be unexploited opportunities to abate an extra tonne of 
GHG more cheaply in one country compared with another, so the overall cost of 
abatement will be higher.’346 Thus, an urgent challenge for international collective 
action, Stern states, is a broadly similar global carbon price.347 The currently diverse 
range of carbon prices across the various mechanisms might be seen, therefore, as 
not only being insufficient, but also as being inefficient. 
 
An additional element of inefficiency, it is argued, arises from the differences that 
exist not just in prices, but also across many design and other aspects of pricing 
mechanisms. The mechanisms, even those of the same type, such as ETSs, will 
differ from each other, at least to some degree, in terms of design, the rules and 
standards they apply, the extent of their coverage, how they are implemented, the 
framework of policies and ambition of which they form part, and in the legal, 
economic, social and political context of the jurisdiction in which they exist.348 For 
instance, share of allowances not provided for free (in other words, that must be 
acquired at auction or otherwise) can range from 100% under the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) covering 165 power generators across nine 
north-eastern US states, to 0% under the Korean ETS which covers 599 entities 
from a number of business sectors; or the percentage of emissions covered, which 
ranges from 85% under the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) over one US state and 
four Canadian provinces, to 68% for the Korean ETS, 52% for the NZ ETS, 45% for 
the EUETS down to 20% for RGGI.349 Other such differences are discussed in the 
following section. 
 
B Connecting diverse emissions trading schemes 
 
                                                      
346 Nicholas Stern The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 532.  
347 Ibid. 
348 See, by way of example of the variety: International Carbon Action Partnership Emissions 
Trading Worldwide: Status Report 2016. Berlin <https://icapcarbonaction.com> 
349 International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), Emissions Trading Worldwide: Status 




The two issues of firstly, increasing prevalence and diversity of carbon pricing 
mechanisms in jurisdictions around the world, and secondly, the corresponding 
complexity of, yet need to value comparatively, the units of measure traded in these 
heterogeneous mechanisms (to facilitate international transfers envisaged by the 
Paris Agreement), coalesce in the question of how to connect such mechanisms 
and, in particular, how to connect ETSs. This question is integral to the market 
proposed by this thesis, which looks into a future where there may be trading 
between the heterogeneous ETSs and other pricing mechanisms that are being 
developed. This thesis proceeds on the basis that trading across schemes and 
jurisdictions is desirable for a number of reasons, outlined in this and following 
sections.  
 
At its broadest, the proposal put here refers to a market in which any form of 
mitigation outcome could be traded, implying that there would be a valid and 
generally accepted methodology for valuing and comparing the various forms of 
mitigation outcome. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, the proposal as outlined is 
couched in terms of a market (initially) between ETSs, or put another way, a market 
that connects those ETSs. Much has been written and discussed how various 
jurisdictions’ ETSs might be better linked to one another,350 but there are only a few 
instances where such linking has actually taken place.351 Three notable examples 
are firstly, the link that was established in 2004 between the EUETS and the Kyoto 
Protocol project mechanisms, noting that this specifically excluded the use of project 
                                                      
350 For summaries and overviews of academic research and issues relating to linking 
emissions trading schemes, see: Michael Mehling, ‘Legal Frameworks for Linking National 
Emissions Trading Systems’, in C Carlarne, K Gray and R Tarasofsky (eds), Oxford 
Handbook of International Climate Change Law, (OUP, 2016), 261; Aki Kachi et al., Linking 
Emissions Trading Systems: A Summary of Current Research, January 2015, ICAP 
<https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/?option=com_attach&task=download&id=241> accessed 
06/09/17; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ‘International Cooperation: 
Agreements and Instruments’ in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. 
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, [Edenhofer, O., et al. (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press 
<https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_chapter13.pdf> 
accessed 31/07/17. 
351 As opposed to being ‘networked’ with each other, which is presently only conceptual, so 
there are no instances of networking that might be cited by way of example. For ‘linking’, on 
the other hand, the arrangement between the ETSs of the US state of California and the 
Canadian province of Quebec (and Ontario from January 2018, until July 2018 when 
regulation 386/18 terminated cap and trade regulation 144/16) is an example. Others are the 
EU Linking Directive with the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, the EU-Switzerland ETS link (yet 
to be ratified) and, in Japan, the link between the Tokyo Metropolitan Government cap-and-
trade scheme and the Saitama Prefecture ETS; and prior to joining the EUETS in 2007, 
there was a one-way link between Norway and the EUETS from 2005.  
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credits generated by nuclear facilities, from land use, land use change and forestry 
activities, and from large hydro projects that did not conform to the criteria specified 
by the World Commission on Dams;352 secondly, the agreement of September 2013 
between the US State of California and the Canadian Province of Québec to 
harmonise and integrate cap-and-trade programs;353 and the agreement between 
the European Union and the Swiss Confederation to link their respective ETSs.354  
 
This section proceeds by reviewing a selection of the literature and by considering 
the rationale put, in general, in support of connecting emissions markets. The term 
‘connecting’ is used as a generic expression inclusive of both linking and 
networking, since the reasons in support cited in the literature, for the most part, 
apply equally to both.355 All the same, before proceeding, it is helpful to make a brief 
introduction of linking and networking. One description of linking is: ‘…emissions 
trading systems are linked if a participant in one system can use a carbon unit 
issued under another system to meet compliance obligations … units are 
considered fungible, or equivalent for compliance purposes…’356 For this to be the 
case, linking entails a certain level of agreement between jurisdictions. As a 
precondition, they would need to consider, at least, the compatibility of their ETSs, 
but also, one might expect, the comparability of their economies and emissions 
profiles. Once linked, there might also be expected some degree of convergence 
between the systems. An indirect link may also occur where two or more 
jurisdictions accept project-generated credits from the same source, an obvious 
example being jurisdictions accepting CERs generated by CDM projects registered 
under the Kyoto Protocol.357   
                                                      
352 Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading within the Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol's project 
mechanisms, OJ L 338, 13.11.2004, 18–23.  
353Agreement between California Air Resources Board and the Government of Quebec, 
Concerning the Harmonisation and Integration of Cap-And-Trade Programs for Reducing 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 27 September 2013 
<https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/ca_quebec_linking_agreement_english.pdf
> accessed 06/03/18.  
354 Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation on the linking of 
their greenhouse gas emissions trading systems. OJ L 322, 7.12.2017, 3–26. Ratification of 
the agreement is still pending. 
355 Differences between the two mechanisms are elaborated, as are fuller definitions, in the 
following section. 
356 Fn.350 (Mehling 2016) 261. 




Networking would be a more flexible arrangement, entailing less need for 
convergence between the jurisdictions and their respective ETSs, because it places 
a value on the differences. As such, it requires no harmonising or integrating of 
physical infrastructure, laws, policies, administration, or other elements from the 
respective jurisdictions, just agreement as to the connection via which the 
transaction may proceed. Thus, having arrived at values for the respective units, a 
conversion factor can be derived, which is used in the transfer transaction between 
the networked jurisdictions’ ETS systems.358 
 
1. The rationale for connecting  
 
Economic, political and environmental arguments have been advanced that trading 
across schemes and jurisdictions is desirable for a number of reasons, broadly 
including: 
 
• because it can foster larger, deeper, and more liquid markets, that are less 
susceptible to manipulation and that more effectively price carbon emissions;  
• greater efficiency and scale might be achieved in those markets;  
• cross-jurisdictional trading could generate a more globally consistent, stable 
carbon price by reducing price volatility;  
• trading across jurisdictions would reduce the risk of carbon leakage;  
• politically it might demonstrate leadership, allowing pressure to be exerted 
on free-riding nations; 
• it may offer domestic support for emissions trading, indicating positive 
momentum; 
• administrative costs would be less; and 
• it would be more encouraging of investment in climate finance.359 
                                                      
358 See Justin Macinante ‘Networking Carbon Markets – Key Elements of the Process’, 2016, 
World Bank Group Climate Change 
<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/424831476453674939/1700504-Networking-Carbon-
Markets-Web.pdf> accessed 01/03/18. 
359 Daniel M Bodansky et al., ‘Facilitating linkage of climate policies through the Paris 
outcome’, (2016) 16:8 Climate Policy, 956; Daniel M Bodansky et al., “Facilitating Linkage of 
Heterogeneous Regional, National, and Sub-National Climate Policies through a Future 
International Agreement.” Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, 
November 2014; World Bank, Partnership for Market Readiness, Lessons Learned from 
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Four arguments are usually stressed, by the economic literature, in favour of linking, 
being that it: affords higher cost-efficiency through a larger number of mitigation 
options; provides a more robust price signal; reduces distortions, through 
converging carbon prices; and increases market liquidity due to more market 
participants.360 Linking can make an ETS a viable policy option, which may not be 
the case without linking, by reducing the cost of achieving the combined emissions 
cap of the linked ETSs, and by increasing the size of the market, thereby generating 
more liquidity, reducing the market power for larger participants and increasing the 
availability of more financial instruments, facilitating negotiation of trades and 
lowering transaction costs.361  
 
Of its nature, ‘linking results in an enlarged market, promising greater diversity of 
abatement costs and thus more efficient achievement of mitigation objectives’.362 By 
promoting liquidity and reducing price volatility in the market, it should help reduce 
the likelihood of market manipulation and abuse.363 It is also seen as one of the few 
options for meaningful collective action.364 All the same, reasons given by 
jurisdictions that have linked, or intended or attempted to link, are predominantly 
economic. For example, the EU has emphasised lower compliance costs, increased 
market liquidity and price stability (although it also mentions increasing global 
cooperation and levelling the playing field), while Switzerland and New Zealand both 
flag increased liquidity and greater flexibility for regulated entities – far more 
significant issues for these smaller economies, one might expect, compared to the 
                                                                                                                                                         
Linking Emissions Trading Systems: General Principles and Applications, Technical Note 7, 
February 2014. World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank; also fn.350 (Mehling 2016).  
360 Christiane Beuermann et al., ‘Considering the Effects of Linking Emissions Trading 
Schemes, A Manual on Bilateral Linking of ETS’, May 2017, German Emissions Trading 
Authority (DEHSt) on behalf of German Environment Agency 
<https://www.dehst.de/SharedDocs/downloads/EN/emissions-
trading/Linking_manual.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3> accessed 17/07/17.  
361 Fn.359 (World Bank, PMR, 2014) 8. 
362 Fn.350 (Mehling) 258. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Ibid; see also fn.350 (Kachi et al./ICAP); also fn.359 (Bodansky et al., 2014); Matthew 
Ranson and Robert N. Stavins ‘Linkage of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Systems: 
Learning from Experience’ Discussion Paper ES 2013-2. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Project 
on Climate Agreements, November 2013; Judson Jaffe and Robert N. Stavins ‘Linkage of 
Tradable Permit Systems in International Climate Policy Architecture’ Discussion Paper 
2008-07, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, 
September 2008.  
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EU – although California also sees linking as offering greater market liquidity and 
flexibility to its regulated entities.365 
 
Notwithstanding the emphasis on economic benefits, other authors identify political 
benefits that are centred on the political signals of a common effort to address 
climate change, enhanced cooperation and influence, limiting competitiveness 
concerns and enabling the adoption of more ambitious targets.366 There are also 
administrative benefits of sharing best practices, and lowering compliance and 
administration costs.367 
  
2. Risks of connecting   
 
Despite these positive aspects, the process of linking has been described as 
‘…procedurally demanding and politically complex…’368 as there are potential risks. 
For instance, once linked, design features of one system can extend to the other, 
possibly compromising environmental objectives and sovereign control.369 
Furthermore, convergence of prices ‘may have distributional impacts on participants 
and other stakeholders … potentially resulting in substantial capital flows across 
borders and undermining political support for continued linkage.’370 The legal and 
institutional considerations, also, ‘can ultimately undermine whether an emissions 
trading link becomes operational.’371 For instance, design features such as type and 
stringency of the cap, respective offset crediting provisions, commitment periods, 
price management mechanisms such as banking and borrowing, and governance 
and compliance enforcement, all need to be consistent or harmonised for linking to 
become operational.372 For example, the EU-Swiss linking agreement specifies 
                                                      
365 Fn.360 (Beuermann et al./DEHSt) at 13 (Box 4).  
366 Fn.350 (Kachi et al./ICAP) 4; also Michael Lazarus et al., (Stockholm Environment 
Institute) Options and Issues for Restricted Linking of Emissions Trading Systems, 
September 2015, ICAP Berlin, Germany, 6  
<https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/?option=com_attach&task=download&id=279> accessed 
06/09/16: “Full linking can yield multiple benefits.” 
367 Ibid (Kachi et al./ICAP). 
368 Fn.350 (Mehling 2016) 258. 
369 Ibid 259. 
370 Ibid, 
371 Ibid; also Michael Mehling ‘Linking of Emissions Trading Schemes’, in David Freestone 
and Charlotte Streck (eds.), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and 
beyond, (Oxford University Press, 2009), 110; also fn.366 (Lazarus et al./ICAP) 7-8. 
372 M J Mace et al., ‘Analysis of the legal and organisational issues arising in linking the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme to other existing and emerging emissions trading schemes’, 
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essential criteria, including such matters as the cap, level of ambition, and in relation 
to international credits, that need to be met by the two ETSs.373 
 
Others have noted that changes in the distribution of costs in each of the connected 
ETSs can affect the competitiveness by increasing production costs for firms that 
have emission intensive inputs.374 There may also be an incentive for each ETS to 
make smaller reductions over time, since this should reduce the amount of 
compliance instruments needing to be imported from the other jurisdiction.375 Also, 
each administrator loses some control over their own ETS, which may cause 
negative sentiment.376 One commentator goes further, arguing that carbon markets 
should not be linked, as linking would only deliver greater complexity and fewer 
emission reductions.377 A solution proposed to the problems identified is the 
introduction of a ‘central carbon bank’, although creating a new international 
institution and insulating it from political influence may be difficult.378 Another 
warning, specifically in relation to the EUETS, is that any link by the EUETS with a 
lower cost market, with lower ambition, would mean fewer reductions achieved 
domestically.379 The basic point made, was that no other current markets are 
compatible with the EUETS, a further issue being the current EUETS surplus.380 
                                                                                                                                                         
Final Report, May 2008, Study Commissioned by the European Commission DG-
Environment, Climate Change and Air, chapter 3  
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56bcccdcb09f954f203561af/t/5720d52df8baf30a23c
a975a/1461769520738/SYDDMS-719716-v1-FIELD_EU-
ETS_linking_project_2008+%283%29.PDF> accessed 19/01/18; fn.359 (World Bank, PMR, 
2014) 16; fn. 350 (Kachi et al./ICAP) Annex A; Dimitry Fedosov ‘Linking Carbon Markets: 
Development and Implications’, [2016] CCLR 202; fn.364 (Ranson and Stavins) 15.  
373 Fn.354 (EU-Swiss Confederation Agreement) Article 2; Annex 1. 
374 Fn.359 (World Bank, PMR, 2014) 9.  
375 Ibid. Although, this will also be dependent on the terms and nature of the agreement 
between the connecting jurisdictions. Re similar strategic behaviour, see also: fn.359 
(Bodansky et al., 2016) 958. 
376 Ibid (World Bank, PMR, 2014) 9. Again, the extent to which this is an issue will be a 
function of the agreement between the connecting jurisdictions. 
377 Jessica F. Green ‘Don‘t link carbon markets’ (2017) 543 Nature 484. This author cites the 
EUETS link to the CDM and the California-Quebec link as two examples that have gone 
wrong, but it is not clear from these examples that the cause of the problems identified has 
been the fact of linking. Rather, it may have exacerbated problems that are, in fact, due at 
least initially, to other causes such as poor design.  
378 Ibid 486. 
379 Carbon Market Watch, ‘Towards a Global Carbon Market – Risks of Linking the EU ETS 
to other carbon markets’, Policy Brief, 05 May 2015 <http://carbonmarketwatch.org/towards-
a-global-carbon-market-risks-of-linking-the-eu-ets-to-other-carbon-markets/> accessed 
06/09/16. It was not clear from the paper why the authors assumed that the lower price 
market would automatically have less ambition. 
380 Ibid. 
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3. Consideration in the literature 
 
The study of connecting ETSs has been traced back to when jurisdictions first 
began considering establishing domestic emissions trading as a mechanism for 
mitigation, in the context of Kyoto Protocol commitments.381 An overview of the 
research undertaken distinguishes three phases, being a conceptual phase, prior to 
the Kyoto Protocol entering into force; an instrumental phase, when there was a 
focus on specific conditions and mechanisms for successful linking; and a critical 
phase, with the concept established in the mainstream of policy discussions.382 
 
Consideration given in the literature to connecting emission trading schemes has 
been, to date, almost exclusively on linking: ‘The majority of studies on linking to 
date have focused on “full” bilateral linking in which compliance instruments 
(allowances, offset units) are fully fungible in all participating systems.’383 As might 
be expected, given this focus, studies concentrate on the degree to which elements 
of the respective ETSs must be harmonised for linking to work. For example, 
according to a World Bank analysis, design features that need to be harmonised to 
address political concerns are the type of cap (absolute or intensity based); 
stringency of the cap; offset crediting provisions; commitment periods; and 
stringency of enforcement; design features that need to be harmonised to protect 
environmental integrity or market operation are cost containment provisions and the 
exclusion of ex-post issuance of allowances (except to new entrants).384 The 
elements of the California-Quebec Linking Agreement are cited as an example, in 
that report, where the harmonisation and integration process included regulatory 
harmonisation; offset protocols; mutual recognition of compliance instruments; joint 
auctions; and common registry and auction platforms.385 As mentioned, elements 
that might be potential barriers to linking, in relation to which harmonisation is 
important, include the nature and stringency of the cap; borrowing provisions; offset 
provisions; and price ceilings/floors.386 Elements where harmonisation would 
                                                      
381 Fn.350 (Mehling 2016) 262.  
382 Ibid. 
383 Fn.350 (Kachi et al./ICAP) 10. 
384 Fn.359 (World Bank, PMR, 2014) 16 (Box 3). 
385 Ibid 18 (Box 4). See: fn.353 (California-Quebec Agreement) recitals; see also fn.354 (EU-
Swiss Confederation Agreement). 
386 Fn.350 (Kachi et al./ICAP) 12 (Table 1). This paper also provides, in Annex A, a detailed 
ETS design element overview according to implications for linking in terms of political, 
economic and environmental considerations. 
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facilitate operation of the linked system were considered to be the monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV) systems; registry designs; compliance periods; 
banking provisions; and enforcement/penalty provisions.387  
 
Another study, by Mehling, considered ETS design features that would be essential 
to mutual compatibility of the linked systems as being, in relation to scope and 
timeline, the continuity of the scheme; in relation to the cap, whether it was relative 
or absolute; and for cost containment, price ceilings and borrowing provisions.388 
Mehling also notes ‘typologies’ of linkages: these may be unilateral, bilateral, 
multilateral, or reciprocal unilateral.389 Others also include indirect links as a 
category.390 Some studies even look beyond ETS harmonisation: “Suggested ways 
to facilitate linking without the full harmonisation of key ETS design elements include 
restrictions on traded volume and the imposition of levies, taxes or an exchange rate 
that establishes a different compliance value to allowances from different 
schemes.”391 These authors also flag the need to contemplate further investigation 
of possible legal aspects of linking subnational, national, supranational and 
multilateral instruments, within a larger framework.392 
 
Notwithstanding the emphasis on full bilateral linking in the literature, one study 
examines alternatives, short of full linking, that jurisdictions could pursue to capture 
some of the political, economic and environmental benefits associated with 
linking.393 It reports on modelling carried out of four alternative restricted linking 
options, namely, quotas, one-way linking, exchange rates and discount rates. These 
options were compared to control situations of no linking and full linking, and 
analysed with respect to four broad criteria, being the environmental benefit; 
                                                      
387 Ibid. 
388 Fn.371 (Mehling 2009) 115 (Table 5.1).  
389 Ibid 119-122. 
390 Fn.359 (World Bank, PMR, 2014) 7. See, for example the EU Linking Directive: Directive 
2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
within the Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol's project mechanisms, OJ L 338, 
13.11.2004, 18–23. 
391 Fn.350 (Kachi et al./ICAP) 12. 
392 Ibid. 
393 Fn.366 (Lazarus et al./ICAP). 
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economic benefit; political feasibility; and other practical and overarching 
considerations.394 
 
The study found that restricted linking options do not achieve the full potential 
benefits of full linking, but do lessen some of the pitfalls. The benefits and risks of 
linking are not just economic, but also environmental, and among the restricted 
linking options considered, discount rates could increase the abatement outcome, 
while exchange rates could potentially increase or decrease it.395 Overall, restricted 
linking could reduce, but not wholly avoid, the need for harmonisation of the ETS 
design elements required for full linking.396  
 
It was observed that the implications and feasibility of linking (either restricted or full) 
depend heavily on the design of ETSs, ambition of their caps, the size of the ETSs, 
their marginal abatement cost curves, and use of offsets.397 While exchange rates 
provide full liquidity, as under full linking, they could be affected by information 
asymmetries and uncertainties in the rate setting. Exchange rates could also 
strongly affect the location, level and cost of abatement. The study found also that 
they could affect the transfer payments, auctioning revenues or any co-benefits, in a 
similar way to full linking.398 The overall conclusion was that exchange rates could 
generate environmental and economic benefits, or lead to adverse impacts, 
depending on how they are set. 
 
Existing or planned linkages between sub-national, national and regional ETSs have 
also been considered in the broader context of international cooperation. In its Fifth 
Assessment Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
critically examined and evaluated the ways in which agreements and instruments for 
international cooperation to address climate change have been organised and 
implemented.399 Climate change policy architectures were classified into three 
categories as strong multilateralism; harmonised national policies; and decentralised 
                                                      
394 Ibid. The other practical and overarching considerations include things such as 
administrative costs, complexity, communication difficulty and potential impact on economic 
resilience. 
395 Ibid 35. 
396 Ibid. 
397 Ibid. These points coincide with other studies mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
398 Ibid. 
399 Fn.350 (IPCC). 
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architectures and coordinated national policies, which included linked ETSs.400 
Broadly, policies could be evaluated in terms of four criteria, namely, their 
environmental effectiveness, or the extent to which the policy achieves its objective 
of reducing the causes and impacts of climate change; aggregate economic 
performance, being both economic efficiency and cost effectiveness; distributional 
impacts, being the burden and benefit sharing across countries and across time; 
and institutional feasibility, which was considered in terms of participation, 
compliance, legitimacy and flexibility.401   
 
The IPCC found that review of unilateral and bilateral linkages demonstrated that 
bilateral direct linkage could reduce mitigation costs, increase credibility of the price 
signal and expand market size and liquidity, but also raised concerns firstly, over 
mitigation dilution, since the linked system would only be as effective as the weakest 
performer and, secondly, that jurisdictions may be unwilling to accept carbon price 
increases resulting from a link.402 Other findings reflect the issues, mentioned 
earlier, over compatibility of respective ETSs. The IPCC noted also that bilateral 
links face lengthy adoption procedures as well as legal and other constraints, while 
less formal arrangements, for instance, reciprocal unilateral links provide similar 
benefits but may be easier to implement and more flexible.403  
 
C Mechanisms for connecting 
 
In outlining the rationale for, and the risks of, connecting ETSs, the preceding 
section is expressed in terms of linking. The less formal, more flexible arrangements 
referred to by the IPCC might well have also included the proposal advanced by this 
thesis, for networking of carbon markets. This section, therefore, elaborates what is 
meant by networking of carbon markets and how it differs from linking. 
                                                      
400 Ibid 1022 (Table 13.2). 
401 Ibid 1009-1010. Interestingly, IPCC assessment of proposed international cooperation by 
linking ETSs, based on the four criteria, is expressed in terms of the quality, effectiveness or 
similarity of the specific national policies, thus more in terms of the parts, as opposed to the 
sum of the parts; it also found that there are gaps in the literature on international 
cooperation concerning mitigation, for instance, few comparisons exist of proposals in terms 
of the four criteria (at 1053). 





Direct bilateral or multilateral linking entails a formalised arrangement between the 
participating jurisdictions. As a precondition, jurisdictions considering linking would 
need to consider, at least, the compatibility of their respective ETSs. They would 
then need to adapt to each other, even to converge, and once linked, it is perhaps 
inevitable that the economically larger will be favoured. In addition, as jurisdictions’ 
economies and emissions profiles do not remain static over time, imbalances and 
changes in balances will need to be managed as an on-going issue. For example, in 
relation to linking, the World Bank observes: 
 
The balance of environmental benefits and distribution of costs and hence, 
the design features, differ for each ETS. Each ETS also reflects the 
institutional structure, economic circumstances, culture and traditions and 
other characteristics of the implementing jurisdiction. Each jurisdiction has its 
own legislative process for implementing and amending the ETS. The 
economic structure and vulnerability to external competition is unique to 
each jurisdiction. And each jurisdiction has its own currency and 
language(s).404 
 
These differences are important to jurisdictions and a challenge to linking, which 
requires a level of harmonisation that implies the need for compromises in 
respective ETS designs and perhaps other jurisdiction specific considerations. 
There are risks of reducing ambition, of ‘the perceived loss of regulatory autonomy’ 
and ‘of unequal institutional and technical capacities’ and ‘competing domestic 
agendas, which may need to be reconciled’ in any particular instance.405 Successful 
linking requires matching jurisdictions with compatible ETS designs and policy 
objectives, and finding the right level at which to engage.406    
 
As the decision to link is a voluntary decision on the part of each linking jurisdiction, 
essential requirements include a political decision by each that the benefits 
outweigh the risks; sufficient compatibility in the ETS design elements; 
arrangements to maintain compatibility and consistency over time in the face of 
economic and other developments; and a legal agreement to cement and implement 
                                                      
404 Fn.359 (World Bank, PMR, 2014) 11. 
405 Fn.366 (Lazarus et al./ICAP) 4 
406 Ibid. 
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the link.407 As such, it has been noted: ‘To-date, bilateral links between ETS are 
rare, perhaps due to the limited number of systems or the low probability of finding 
two jurisdictions where, at the same time, the political leaders appreciate the 
benefits of a bilateral link.’408 
2. Networking 
 
The concept of networked carbon markets (NCM)409 is an initiative taken forward by 
the World Bank, in the conceptual development of which I have been involved. NCM 
is described as requiring410 ‘… (i) a transparent, reliable, efficient approach to 
providing the information needed to determine the relative climate change mitigation 
value of units to be traded internationally, (ii) infrastructure to assist jurisdictions to 
manage carbon market related risks and track international exchanges.’411 The 
infrastructure envisaged in this early World Bank framing of the concept comprises 
an international carbon asset reserve (ICAR), to support and facilitate carbon 
market related functions, and an international settlement platform (ISP), to track 
cross-border trades and possible clearinghouse functions.412 Thus, NCM as 
expressed by the World Bank comprises three elements: a mechanism to measure 
mitigation value of mitigation outcomes; the ICAR; and an ISP.  
 
Although still only conceptual, there being no concrete example of networking 
having been implemented, it is beginning to be acknowledged in the literature. Two 
such instances are interesting as they highlight a fundamental difference between 
networking and linking. The study on restricted linking, described in the preceding 
section,413 (the ‘first reference’) refers to NCM in the context of policy questions, 
such as who sets exchange rates and how; whether rates would be fixed or floating; 
and how they could be updated while retaining the integrity of allowance markets.414 
The authors note that it is unclear how rate setting would work in practice, and also 
                                                      
407 Fn.359 (World Bank, PMR, 2014) 11, Box 1. 
408 Ibid 12. 
409 Also (mis)described as ‘heterogeneous linking’ or ‘soft linking’. 
410 See: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/brief/globally-networked-carbon-
markets>; also, in particular, fn.358 (Macinante).  
411 World Bank, (2015) Overview of Networked Carbon Markets: 
<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/450811484257514457/Overview-of-Networked-Carbon-
Markets.pdf> accessed 25/07/17. 
412 Ibid. 
413 Fn.366 (Lazarus et al./ICAP). 
414 Ibid 14. 
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that unlike other products and services and the currencies used for their exchange, 
emission allowances have no value outside the markets created by regulators.415  
 
The second reference describes NCM as ‘Probably the most comprehensive 
exploration to date of a hub-based architecture for carbon trading systems 
employing exchange rates…’416 The author, Mehling, is discussing an alternative to 
the fungibility of traded units being based on a guiding principle of full system 
compatibility and equal unit value. The alternative is reliance on the metric of 
comparability.417 Thus, rather than ‘alignment of design features … participation in a 
common market could be based on adherence to a set of minimum conditions’ for 
design requirements, then by assessing the design quality, using discount factors, 
ratios, or exchange rates, to adjust mitigation values of units.418 Mehling notes that 
such mitigation value rating could even enable linkages across policies other than 
ETS, such as carbon taxes, or even performance standards.419 A centralised 
administration for such rate setting ‘would significantly increase transparency and 
lower transaction costs.’420 Hence: ‘Jurisdictions that have introduced carbon 
markets could voluntarily “opt in” if they agree to have their traded units (or ‘carbon 
asset classes’) rated for their ‘Mitigation Value’ (MV) by independent private rating 
agencies on the basis of a standardised process and formula.’421 
 
The fundamental difference highlighted by these two references is that linking is 
based on system alignment and compatibility, with equal unit values422 that 
represent an amount of allowable emissions. All discussions of linking, including the 
first reference above, are based on this approach. As the review of the literature in 
the preceding subsection indicates, studies of linking date from when jurisdictions 
first began considering establishing domestic emissions trading, as a mechanism for 
mitigation, in the context of Kyoto Protocol commitments. Thus, conceptually, linking 
has developed in an environment where the traded units, the emission allowances, 
represented an amount of emission permitted under the particular scheme’s cap, in 
                                                      
415 Ibid 28. 
416 Fn.350 (Mehling, 2016) 276. 
417 Ibid 275. 
418 Ibid. 
419 Ibid 276. 
420 Ibid. See the discussion of a medium of exchange as a mechanism for effecting 
transactions at chapter VII, section A 3(ii), following, which clarifies this point. 
421 Ibid. See also fn.358 (Macinante).  
422 Or in the case of restricted linking, relative proportions thereof. 
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effect, as an accounting unit for that scheme. Networking, on the other hand, is 
based on the converse, a system not of alignment but of heterogeneity, in which 
differences are respected and maintained, but valued according to agreed 
parameters. The traded units may differ in value, but importantly, they are valued for 
mitigation effectiveness, rather than representing an amount of emission allowed 
under a cap.  
 
Networking has been described as ‘heterogeneous linking’ or ‘soft linking’. This 
thesis argues such descriptions are misleading, as they incorrectly imply that 
networking is a form of linking. Linking, according to the second reference above, is 
a system in which the fungibility of traded units is based on a guiding principle of full 
system compatibility and equal unit value: what that could have gone on to say is 
that, not only is it based on ‘equal unit value’, but the units are all of the same kind, 
all being emission allowances (that is, rights to emit an amount of GHG equal to 
their value) often defined to equal one tonne CO2-eq GHG. Linking has only ever 
been discussed in terms of links between ETSs, for good reason, because 
conceptually, linking has always been framed in terms of trading rights to emit. 
 
In the alternative, this thesis posits that the metric of networking is units of mitigation 
achieved423 by the particular mitigation action. Such a metric can be derived not just 
from ETSs, but as noted by Mehling, also from any other sorts of mitigation action. 
Thus, networking potentially can be across ETSs, carbon taxes, or even 
performance standards, provided there is an accepted methodology for determining 
the mitigation value of the outcomes of these mitigation actions. It is postulated that 
this difference affords networking significant advantages over linking as a way of 
connecting diverse and heterogeneous carbon markets to realise the potential 
benefits as have been discussed. The next chapter considers, inter alia, reasons 
why networking may afford a better approach than linking, to connecting markets, in 





                                                      
423 Also measurable in terms of tonnes of CO2-eq GHG, but these are tonnes mitigated, 
removed or abated, not tonnes that may be emitted. 
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PART 3 – The proposal  
 
 
This Part sets out the market proposed to facilitate inter-jurisdictional trading under 
the Paris Agreement. It does so in two chapters, addressing the concept and theory 
of the proposal, analysing it in terms of its component parts – networking carbon 
markets (NCM); on a distributed ledger technology (DLT) platform – before 
examining the technology in more detail (chapter VI). It then sets out the proposal 
elements in practical detail – elaborating how it is envisaged the market would 







Chapter VI The market – concept and theory  
 
 
The market proposed by this thesis can be viewed as not a single market, but rather 
as a connection facilitating transactions between individual, separate markets, each 
of which will continue as an autonomous operation in its own jurisdiction, while 
participating in the network created by the connection. The proposal encompasses 
the digital infrastructure needed to provide the connection between these markets, 
as well as the legal and administrative structures that will operate, manage and 
oversee the network. This chapter sets out theoretical and conceptual 
underpinnings of the proposed market.  
 
Section A introduces the market proposed by this thesis in terms of its bifurcated 
nature, sets out the argument in favour of networking in preference to linking as a 
way to connect diverse carbon pricing schemes, and introduces the technology 
proposed to facilitate doing so. Section B examines that technology application in 
terms of specific characteristics, including in terms of the requirements of the Paris 
Agreement.424 The rationale for the application of the technology architecture 
proposed is thereby derived. 
 
Thirdly, Section C draws these threads together and leads into the following 
chapter, which elaborates what implementation of the proposal might entail in 
practical terms. Both this chapter and the next, to a significant extent, are dedicated 
to elaborating a new technology and a particular application of it, with the result that 
a certain level of descriptive material is included, while many of the sources 
referenced are from beyond the traditional, peer-reviewed academic literature. This 
range of sources provides a valuable contribution to building on what is currently an 
immature academic field, thus contributing to the current state of academic 
knowledge in the field. Importantly, it reflects also the inter-disciplinary elements of 
the research embodied in this thesis, which brings together materials from 
heterogeneous fields.  
                                                      
424 FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, 29 January 2016 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf> accessed 13/03/17 
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A Networked carbon markets on distributed ledger technology  
1. The two elements of the proposed market  
 
The proposed market is a network of carbon markets, on distributed ledger 
technology (DLT)425 architecture. Thus, the proposal consists of two distinct 
elements:  
 
• first, networking of carbon markets; and  
• secondly, that networking being carried out using a specific type of digital 
information technology (IT) architecture, namely, a distributed ledger (or 
ledgers) (DL).  
 
In addition to being comprised of these two distinct elements, the proposal can be 
viewed as proceeding down two independent, but interrelated, arms. The first of 
these can be seen as aiming to facilitate and stimulate an inter-jurisdictional market, 
so that it operates efficiently, encourages private sector engagement, promotes a 
stable carbon price and fosters the effective application of carbon finance. This first 
arm is directed towards, and supports, the second arm, but can be seen also as 
providing a standalone outcome in its own right. The second arm of the proposal 
promotes the objectives of climate policy, evidenced by the terms of the Paris 
Agreement, including higher ambition, greater transparency, accuracy, 
accountability and security of information sharing and management. This chapter 
will examine how characteristics of both elements, networking and DLT, contribute 
to and support both these arms of the proposal. 
 
There is, at present, no trading network or market such as that which is proposed. 
Networking carbon markets is a concept introduced by the World Bank,426 in the 
conceptual development of which I have been significantly involved. However, there 
are no existing examples, nor are there market networking models in other areas of 
                                                      
425 DLT is sometimes referred to as ‘blockchain’, for reasons evident later in this section, 
although blockchain is just one implementation of the broader distributed ledger technology. 
This thesis will refer mostly to the broader concept, that is, DLT. 
426 See generally: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/brief/globally-networked-
carbon-markets, accessed 23/01/18 
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application with which direct comparisons might be drawn. Even more so, while DLT 
use cases in the financial markets are being developed and will be considered, 
there are none that relate to a market of markets, as proposed here.  As such, the 
approach taken to analysing the proposal is to consider the rationale for each 
element, in turn, independently of the other, as follows:  
 
• for the networking element, reasons why such a connected trading 
arrangement between markets is desirable have been addressed in the 
preceding chapter. In the absence of an illustration of networking that might 
be examined, the reasons to network in order to achieve that connection, 
rather than link, are drawn out in the following sub-section by considering 
issues that have arisen with linking and the extent to which networking might 
ameliorate or avoid them; and  
 
• for the DLT element, in relation to which, conversely, use cases are 
continuing to grow in a dynamic, developing environment, not only is it 
necessary to distinguish the use case proposed here from the expanding 
universe of such applications, but also to precisely define what that use case 
is. This is set out in the third sub-section. The rationale for the application of 
DLT is then derived in the following Section B.  
 
Section C of this chapter draws these two elements together. The details of the 
proposal are elaborated in more concrete terms in the following chapter.  
 
2. The reasons to network rather than link 
(i) Political issues 
 
In order to determine that it is desirable to connect by linking, jurisdictions need to 
make a political decision, influenced by factors including perceived environmental 
stringency/credibility of the overall cap; perceived benefits, such as cost savings; 
impact on domestic action; distributional impacts; and loss of control.427 With 
regards the last point regarding control, it would seem to be clearly preferable to 
                                                      
427 World Bank, Partnership for Market Readiness, Lessons Learned from Linking Emissions 
Trading Systems: General Principles and Applications, Technical Note 7, February 2014, 12. 
World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank. 
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avoid, as far as possible, compromising the sovereignty and autonomy of 
jurisdictions, as part of a process to engage them in a system of inter-jurisdictional 
cooperation. In this respect, networking has an advantage over linking in that, first, it 
requires less compromise of the domestic legal regime for trading, of the institutional 
structures, or of the independence of participating jurisdictions; and secondly, to the 
extent that it does involve compromise, any such accommodation by jurisdictions 
participating in the network will be required on the basis of equivalence: in other 
words, there would be a level playing field, where the same parameters would be 
applied equally to all.    
 
Many political issues in relation to linking ETSs appear to flow from the potential 
impact it may have on jurisdictional sovereignty: for instance, the risk of design 
features from one jurisdiction’s scheme extending to the scheme of the other, linked 
jurisdiction.428 As networked jurisdictions’ schemes, on the other hand, would remain 
separate, the potential compromise of environmental objectives and control would 
not be an issue. Potential reduction in control over the domestic ETS, by its 
administrator, in a linked system would not arise in a networked arrangement and, 
similarly, the related issue of harmonisation of ETS design elements, would not 
arise, since the networked schemes remain separate and independent. 
 
Linking results from an agreement negotiated by the governments of the respective 
jurisdictions seeking to link. Negotiations take time, sometimes a long time: in the 
case of Switzerland and the EU, for instance, seven years.429 Inevitably, also, there 
will be imbalances between negotiating counterparties. An economically larger 
jurisdiction will, more than likely, have greater influence over the terms on which the 
parties link.430 This is not to say that a smaller jurisdiction may be unwilling to accept 
                                                      
428 Michael Mehling, ‘Legal Frameworks for Linking National Emissions Trading Schemes’, in 
C Carlarne, K Gray, K, and R Tarasofsky (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Climate 
Change Law, (OUP, 2016), 259 citing J Jaffe and R N Stavins, (2007). Linking Tradable 
Permit Schemes for Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Implications, and Challenges, Geneva: 
International Emissions Trading Association; also, the challenges raised by linking are 
largely political in nature: Michael Mehling ‘Linking of Emissions Trading Schemes’, in David 
Freestone and Charlotte Streck (eds.), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, 
Copenhagen and beyond, (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
429 EC Climate Action announcement 23/11/17 that EU and Switzerland had signed an 
agreement to link their emissions trading schemes, noting that negotiations opened in 2010: 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/eu-and-switzerland-sign-agreement accessed 18/12/17. 
430 The EUETS is cited as an example of a unilateral approach under which other carbon 
markets have to adapt to its architecture, although the California-Quebec negotiation is, on 
the contrary, collaborative: Dmitry Fedosov ‘Linking Carbon Markets: Development and 
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that agreement, even though an unequal negotiating position may put it at a 
potential disadvantage.431 Nevertheless, in such a negotiating process the smaller 
jurisdiction will be dependent, in some respects, on the goodwill of their larger 
counterparty.  
 
This imbalance of negotiating positions, giving rise to potential issues, should not 
arise in the case of networking. Rather, with networking the compromise of 
sovereignty – if it could be called that – would come in the form of acceptance of the 
parameters by which a jurisdiction’s mitigation actions are valued (to give the 
mitigation value (MV) of the jurisdiction’s mitigation outcomes).432 These parameters 
would apply on the same basis to all jurisdictions that agree to participate in the 
network. Hence, the compromise would apply equally to all participating 
jurisdictions, rather than differentially depending on the relative economic size of 
counterparties to the particular bilateral or multilateral linking arrangement. 
 
In linked systems, convergence of prices may have distributional impacts on 
participants and other stakeholders, resulting in substantial capital flows that may 
affect political support.433 While there is no reason to expect there would not be 
                                                                                                                                                         
Implications’, [2016] CCLR 202. However, both California and Quebec are part of the initial 
collaboration, the Western Climate Initiative and their schemes were very similar to begin 
with: Christiane Beuermann et al., ‘Considering the Effects of Linking Emissions Trading 
Schemes, A Manual on Bilateral Linking of ETS’, May 2017, German Emissions Trading 
Authority (DEHSt) on behalf of German Environment, 13 
<https://www.dehst.de/SharedDocs/downloads/EN/emissions-
trading/Linking_manual.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3> accessed 17/07/17. Note also that 
California and Quebec staff conducted line-by-line comparisons of the respective program 
regulations in order to harmonise them in every respect to ensure environmental integrity 
and compatibility: fn.427 (World Bank, PMR, 2014) 15. 
431 The experience to date has been that when linking with the EUETS, the other scheme 
needs to align itself with the EUETS; Switzerland revised its ETS in December 2011, to 
increase compatibility with the EUETS, see: Angelica P. Rutherford ‘Linking Emissions 
Trading Schemes: Lessons from the EU-Swiss ETSs’, [2014] CCLR 282. 
432 See: Justin D Macinante ‘Operationalizing Cooperative Approaches Under the Paris 
Agreement by Valuing Mitigation Outcomes’ [2018] CCLR 258: discussed in chapter VII 
following. 
433 Fn.428 (Mehling 2016) 259 citing: Baron R, C Philibert, ‘Act Locally, Trade Globally 
Emissions Trading for Climate Policy’, © OECD/IEA, 2005 
<https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/act_locally.pdf> accessed 
14/05/17; also see:  Matthew Ranson and Robert N Stavins, ‘Linkage of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Trading Systems: Learning from Experience’ Discussion Paper ES 2013-2. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, November 2013, 9; the nature 
of impacts will also be a function of the elasticity of demand in certain markets (that is, 
whether the additional costs can be passed through to consumers) and the extent to which 
regulated entities are competing in international markets not covered by emission mitigation 
restrictions, see: Mirabelle Muûls et al., ‘Evaluating the EU Emissions Trading System: Take 
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distributional impacts also in any networked system, it is envisaged that networking 
arrangements would afford governments greater flexibility to set the terms for 
participation by the entities they authorise to trade in the networked market. 
Networking would also incorporate greater flexibility for a jurisdiction to opt out 
altogether were it to determine that trading flows are no longer favourable to its 
domestic policy objectives.  
 
A further consideration is that linking arrangements can default to the lowest 
mitigation standard of those jurisdictions participating, thereby affecting jurisdictions 
whose policies target higher ambition.434 In a networking arrangement, the aim of 
market design is to correlate MV with price, so that the market incentivises 
continued improvement, in conformity with the Paris Agreement objectives seeking 
higher ambition.435 Thus, the aim would be for the market to operate so as to 
encourage a race to the top, not the bottom. It is appreciated that assessments 
valuing mitigation outcomes may cause consternation for some governments. 
Nevertheless, the mitigation outcomes of all participating jurisdictions would be 
assessed independently, according to the same objective, technical criteria. 
Participating jurisdictions would have assessments made on the same basis, such 
that there would be equivalence of treatment. Additionally, the feedback from and 
the transparency of the MV assessment process (discussed in the following chapter) 
should enhance jurisdictions’ information and knowledge bases, again, facilitating 
continuous improvement. 
 
As mentioned earlier, linking has been described as being politically complex and 
this has been suggested as a reason for so few links occurring to date,436 although 
there seems to be a divergence of views on the extent to which linking has actually 
been occurring.437  Establishing an operational system for trading mitigation 
                                                                                                                                                         
it or leave it? An assessment of the data after ten years’, October 2016, Imperial College 
London, Grantham Institute, Briefing Paper No. 21 
<https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/grantham-
institute/public/publications/briefing-papers/Evaluating-the-EU-emissions-trading-
system_Grantham-BP-21_web.pdf> accessed 16/03/17. 
434 Fn.427 (World Bank, PMR, 2014) 9. 
435 For example: Article 2 and Article 4, paragraph 3, Paris Agreement. 
436 Fn.428 (Mehling, 2016) 258. 
437 Fn.427 (World Bank, PMR, 2014), according to which, bilateral linking was rare to date of 
that publication but other authors are more bullish about links up to the date of the Paris 
Agreement: see Michael A. Mehling, Gilbert E Metcalf and Robert N Stavins, ‘Linking 
Heterogeneous Climate Policies (Consistent with the Paris Agreement)’ Discussion Paper 
 129 
outcomes, based on a network between jurisdictions, could also well involve 
elements of political complexity. All the same, it is posited that many of the issues 
and obstacles, such as those outlined above, that complicate, slow or deter 
attempts to link jurisdictions are not present, or not present to the same extent, in 
the case of networking. From a political perspective, networking offers a more 
flexible way to achieve international transfers of mitigation outcomes. 
(ii) Legal issues  
 
Notwithstanding the preceding sub-section, it has been pointed out that political 
motives are not all that need to be considered in relation to linking: ETSs operate in 
complex frameworks of rules, principles and procedures under domestic law438 and 
these factors will be relevant when units are traded across jurisdictions. Just as with 
linking of ETSs, networking would require agreement between participant 
jurisdictions. In the case of networking, however, the nature of the agreement is 
fundamentally different. Rather than being between two (or more) individual 
jurisdictions, each of which is seeking to construct the arrangement on its own terms 
in order to reduce the degree to which it must compromise its existing system, a 
networking agreement would be between the jurisdiction seeking to join and the 
network, that is, the platform on which trading takes place.  
 
Under the networking arrangement there would not be a need for agreement as to 
legal alignment of parties’ ETSs to ensure the respective units are fungible; there 
would not be a need for joint registries, nor would there be a need for joint 
auctioning, or similarly coordinated issuance arrangements. Under networking, the 
jurisdictions’ ETSs would remain independent of each other.439 Thus, there would be 
no need to harmonize the legal systems,440 institutions, administration or 
                                                                                                                                                         
ES 2017-6. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, October 2017. 
Mehling seems to have changed from previous position (Fn.428 (Mehling 2016)). 
438 Fn.428 (Mehling, 2009) 116. 
439 This is subject to the qualification that under the proposal, the ledger (registry) is 
distributed, such that all participating jurisdictions may hold a copy of the ledger for all 
transactions across the entire network: see following sections. 
440 For instance, Article 4 of the California-Quebec linking agreement provides specifically for 
regulatory harmonization: see Agreement between California Air Resources Board and the 
Government of Quebec, Concerning the Harmonisation and Integration of Cap-And-Trade 
Programs for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 27 September 2013 
<https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/ca_quebec_linking_agreement_english.pdf
> accessed 06/03/18. 
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procedures, simplifying the process for jurisdictions to decide whether to participate, 
or not.  
 
This approach relies on the jurisdictions that wish to participate in the network 
accepting the rules, infrastructural arrangements and other measures – such as the 
mechanism and parameters for determining the value of participating jurisdictions’ 
mitigation actions (the MV) – and adhering to those rules and other requirements. 
As proposed here, the agreement required of a prospective networking participant 
would involve, first, acceptance of the same terms on which all other jurisdictions 
agree to participate; and secondly, that jurisdiction signifying any limits or conditions 
it wishes to impose on transactions entered by the legal entities it authorizes to 
trade on the network. The decision whether to join – at least in so far as the terms 
and conditions of participation – should be relatively straightforward: either accept 
and join, or reject and not join. As noted above, the agreement is not between 
jurisdictions, as such, but rather between the joining jurisdiction and the network 
(that is, the collective of jurisdictions that have already agreed to the common rules). 
Further, as matters such as ETS alignment, registries and issuance do not need to 
be negotiated, the relative bargaining position of jurisdictions, as a legal issue in 
negotiations, is rendered nugatory.   
 
A further legal consideration relates to the nature of what is being traded, that is, the 
carbon units. One commentator, Munro, has asserted that, while the nature of 
carbon units makes it difficult to classify them under traditional categories of 
financial instruments, nevertheless, it is likely that they constitute objects regulated 
by the Annex on Financial Services to the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) under the WTO Agreement.441 This finding is applied by Munro to conclude 
that carbon markets are subject to international trade rules, which could thereby 
lead to emission trading schemes that only accept their own units, or perhaps also 
units from other linked schemes, being impugned.442 However, Munro does not 
address the critical issue of whether surrender of the units against compliance 
obligations, by an entity regulated domestically under the scheme (which is, after all, 
the core element of a scheme where the restriction on units becomes relevant) 
                                                      
441 James Munro ‘Trade in Carbon Units as a Financial Service under International Trade 
Law: Recent Developments, Future Challenges’, [2014] CCLR 106, 113. 
442 Ibid. 
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comes within the concept of trade under the GATS. Rather, this is glossed over on 
the basis of the ‘non-acceptance’ of units from other jurisdictions.    
 
All the same, even though it does not need to be answered for the purpose of this 
thesis, the argument is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, in the context of 
multinational, even global, corporations carrying on all sorts of trading and other 
business undertakings in multiple jurisdictions, thus being exposed to the growing 
number of emissions trading schemes spawning across those jurisdictions, it may 
only be a matter of time before an issue such as that raised by Munro is tested. 
Secondly, and pursuant to the preceding point, it would seem logical, therefore, for 
climate policymakers to embrace a trading mechanism that could both (a) facilitate 
emission unit trading across jurisdictional boundaries, doing so within a climate 
policy framework that accounts for the differences between jurisdictions, but (b) in 
the converse, could supply a methodology (that is, MV assessment) to show that 
discrimination is objectively necessary and reasonable in terms of climate 
mitigation,443 thereby justifying, as an alternative, reliance on an exception under the 
GATS, when necessary. It is the view of the author of this thesis that networking 
provides such a trading mechanism.  
 
(iii) Practical issues 
 
It follows from the political and legal considerations that in terms of practical 
application, networking should be administratively more feasible than linking. As 
proposed by this thesis, networking would not require the transfer of units from one 
registry to another, thereby avoiding the legal and administrative complexity that can 
arise in proposals for linking arrangements. There would still need to be the physical 
(electronic) infrastructure to give effect to transactions, but unlike approaches to 
linking, networking would not require equivalence of the assets – emission 
allowances – in the connecting ETSs in order to achieve fungibility.  
 
In a networked system, the units may not even need to be the same type of asset, 
or primarily measured in the same terms (for example, the asset in one scheme 
might be measured as an absolute value, in the other as a performance standard), 
                                                      
443 Ibid 114. 
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provided an assessment can be made of the respective mitigation values. Thus, 
subject to agreement being reached on (or at least there being acceptance of) the 
parameters and methodology for comparative assessments, the actual transaction 
process should be simpler, and more transparent. 
 
Two further points follow from the greater simplicity of the transaction process in a 
networking arrangement: first, since there is no need to move units from the registry 
of one ETS to the registry of another, accounting and record keeping in a networked 
system would be less complicated. Instead, the units the MV of which is to be 
transferred would be cancelled in their domestic registry (a process illustrative of 
how transactions could proceed is set out in the following chapter); and secondly, 
once applicable parameters and methodology for comparative assessments have 
been agreed, networking would not be restricted to ETSs, but could include other 
mitigation actions, provided their outcomes were capable of MV assessment. As 
such, networking offers potential scope for a much larger, more flexible market than 
could occur under linking. It is submitted that this would also be more effective in re-
engaging the private sector. 
 
Connecting ETSs, whether by linking or networking, necessarily involves reconciling 
the differences between schemes. The integral point of difference is the extent of 
mitigation brought about by the respective schemes. By assessing MV, the 
networking approach separates this climate element from elements of a more 
administrative or mechanistic nature, whereas linking requires the harmonisation of 
these elements as part of the process to reconcile climate (mitigation) element 
differences.444  
(iv) Flexibility (opting in and out) 
 
It follows also from the preceding points, that because there is no need for legal, 
institutional or administrative integration of systems, it is more flexible for 
jurisdictions to join or leave the networked market. The network, in this sense, might 
be viewed as a facility of which any jurisdiction might avail itself, so long as it sees 
there is an advantage for participants in its domestic market, and from which it might 
remove itself when it perceives that advantage no longer continues. While there 
                                                      
444 In this respect, the line-by-line comparisons of the respective program regulations by 
California and Quebec staff spring to mind: see fn.427 (World Bank, PMR, 2014) 15. 
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would be a need for institutional and regulatory frameworks for the network itself 
and these would require time and resources to establish, their existence and 
operation should not inhibit the flexibility of jurisdictions seeking to join or leave the 
network, but rather facilitate it.  
 
Two complementary consequences flow from this structure: first, the network could 
continue to operate unaffected when an individual jurisdiction elects to leave it; and 
secondly, a jurisdiction that wishes to opt out of the network could do so seamlessly, 
not only without impacting on-going network operation, but also without affecting 
operation of its own ETS. For individual jurisdictions this would mean less of an 
administrative burden, less cost and the ability to give effect to decisions relatively 
expeditiously – certainly much more quickly than the time it would take to negotiate 
a linking agreement, or the severing of one. 
 
3. Distributed ledger technology 
(i) Introduction 
 
This sub-section introduces the second element of the proposal, the specific type of 
IT architecture in which the network of carbon markets might operate. In this 
respect, the question might be posed why is it necessary, or even desirable, to 
specify as part of this proposal for a market to achieve climate objectives, the IT 
platform architecture on which it is to operate? The short answer is that, like any 
other financial market, it is being driven by technological change. This sub-section 
and the following sub-sections on use cases, terminology, definitions and the use 
case of the proposal, expand on that answer. 
 
The proposal for networking of carbon markets across jurisdictions necessarily 
implies that there must be some form of infrastructure (which, it is assumed, would 
necessarily need to be electronic) in place to allow such a market to operate by 
transactional communications taking place between participants, even if this were 
just some basic form of IT communication, say, by email across the internet. What is 
proposed, however, is the inter-jurisdictional trade in carbon assets and, as outlined 
in an earlier chapter, increasingly these are being defined legislatively as financial 
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instruments.445 As such, the networked market will be a financial market (albeit, one 
constructed for the purpose of achieving environmental objectives), implying certain 
basic essential requirements for its transactional infrastructure, such as security, 
capacity, and reliability.446 As with any financial market, this infrastructure might be 
expected to facilitate accountability, auditability, certainty and accuracy of the 
transactions it processes, as well as regulatory supervision, the facility to ensure 
financial and legal risk management can be addressed, and that the system’s 
capacity is as time and cost efficient, as possible. 
 
The context in which this proposal is made is one of global recognition that 
technological developments are occurring that will fundamentally change how 
financial services are provided, how markets, business and governments operate.447 
These developments are occurring in many fields of application, at such a rate of 
change that it is difficult to present an overview with more than a pretence of 
completeness, or one that might remain so for any length of time. All the same, they 
include developments in subject areas such as Big Data;448 Internet of Things;449 the 
platform economy;450 and in so-called emerging transformative technologies that 
include biometrics; cloud computing; cognitive computing; distributed ledger 
technology (DLT), or blockchain; machine learning, or predictive analytics; quantum 
computing; and robotics.451   
                                                      
445 See, for instance: Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2 (MiFID2): Directive 
2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in 
financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, OJ L 
173, 12.06.2014, 394-496.   
446 As to characteristics of a financial market, see generally: Shelagh Heffernan ‘A 
Characteristics Definition of Financial Markets’, (1990) 14 issues 2-3 Journal of Banking and 
Finance 583. 
447 Mark Walport, Chief Scientific Adviser to HM Government, ‘Distributed Ledger 
Technology: beyond block chain’ A report by the UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser, 
UK Government Office for Science, GS 16-1, published 19/01/16 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/distributed-ledger-technology-blackett-review> 
accessed 30/09/16; Carlota Perez ‘Technological Revolutions and techno-economic 
paradigms’, (2010) 34(1) Cambridge Journal of Economics 185, 197 Table 3: this is the 5th 
technological revolution: the Age of Information and Telecommunications, see innovation 
principles.  
448 Gartner (2012) <https://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/big-data> accessed 8/01/18. 
449 IEEE, ‘Towards a definition of the Internet of Things (IoT)’ Revision 1 published 27 May 
2015 (IEEE) <https://iot.ieee.org/definition.html> accessed 8/01/18.  
450 For discussion of definitions and approaches to regulation, see: Michèle Finck, ‘Digital 
Co-Regulation: Designing a Supranational Legal Framework for the Platform Economy’ 
(2018) Vol.43 no.1 European Law Review 47. 
451 For how financial services industry transformation has spun off technology innovation 
over the last 50 years, see: World Economic Forum, ‘The future of financial infrastructure: An 
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To a degree there is overlap across these technological areas, nevertheless, the 
focus of this thesis is solely on DLT and blockchain (note: an introductory 
description of DLT and blockchain is set out in the first chapter of this thesis). This 
technology alone has been described as portending ‘a new digital revolution,’452 
having emerged after twenty years of scientific research that produced advances in 
the fields of cryptography and decentralised computer networks.453 Such exorbitant 
claims may not be as outlandish as sober assessment would otherwise suggest, 
given the level of attention and related research being applied by intergovernmental 
bodies, governments and public institutions,454 global business bodies,455 the 
financial sector,456 lawyers and consultants457 and market regulators.458  
                                                                                                                                                         
ambitious look at how blockchain can reshape financial services’, (WEF, New York USA, 
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454 For example, to mention a few: Bank of International Settlements: Morten Bech, Rodney 
Garratt, ‘Central bank cryptocurrencies’, September 2017, BIS Quarterly Review, 55-70 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1709.pdf> accessed 24/01/18; European Commission: 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Online 
Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and Challenges for Europe, 
COM/2016/0288 final; Robleh Ali, John Barrdear, Roger Clews, ‘Innovations in payment 
technologies and the emergence of digital currencies’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 
2014 Q3 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2014/qb14q3digit
alcurrenciesbitcoin1.pdf> accessed 12/01/17; John Barrdear and Michael Kumhof, Bank of 
England, Staff Working Paper No.605, ‘The macroeconomics of central bank issued digital 
currencies’, July 2016, (Bank of England 2016) 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2016/swp605.pdf> 
accessed 12/01/17; A Blundell-Wignall ‘The Bitcoin Question: Currency versus Trust-less 
Transfer Technology’, OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private Pensions, 
2014, No. 37, OECD Publishing <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz2pwjd9t20-en> accessed 
27/10/16.  
455 Fn.451 (World Economic Forum). 
456 For example, R3 is a consortium with over 80 banks, clearing houses, exchanges, market 
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applications of distributed ledger technology for the financial services industry: 
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financial-services> accessed 12/03/18  
457 For example: Sigrid Seibold and George Samman, ‘Consensus: Immutable agreement for 
the Internet of value’, KPMG, (2016), 
<https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/06/kpmg-blockchain-consensus-
mechanism.pdf > accessed 05/02/18; Allens Lawyers, ‘Blockchain Reaction Understanding 
the opportunities and navigating the legal frameworks of distributed ledger technology and 
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While much of this research attention is applied to the opportunities and potential 
benefits the technology offers,459 some applications, such as cryptocurrencies and 
their uses, as well as aspects that test the boundaries of current regulations, such 
as initial coin offerings (ICOs), are increasingly the focus of lawmakers’ and 
regulators’ attention.460 The applications of DLT for business, financial and 
government services, while growing rapidly, are still nascent, yet already there has 
been consideration given in the literature to the regulation of DLT461 and this is 
increasing as new use cases are assessed and implemented. Nevertheless, for the 
moment it remains largely limited to and focused on specific applications of the 
technology such as cryptocurrencies, where the most tangible applications, to date, 
have occurred.462  
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Finally, in this respect, it is noted there have been issues, previously, with security of 
carbon market transactions and the existing carbon market IT.463 The expectation is 
that on-going technological developments can help ensure episodes such as 
hacking of registry accounts are far less likely, if not impossible, to recur.464 
Additionally, this technological development purports to hold out the promise of 
better addressing some of the core elements of climate policy incorporated in the 
Paris Agreement, such as greater transparency, accountability, traceability and 
security. The extent to which DLT could better address these elements, than 
existing IT infrastructure does, is considered in section B. 
(ii) Use cases, especially in financial markets 
 
A World Economic Forum (WEF) report in 2016 found that, while there was 
significant awareness and interest in DLT, hurdles to large-scale implementation (in 
terms of financial infrastructure), such as an uncertain and unharmonised regulatory 
environment, nascent collective standardisation efforts and an absence of formal 
legal frameworks, remained.465 Some of the potential areas of application of DLT 
that have been identified include in trade finance, through operational simplification; 
in compliance automation, improving regulatory efficiency; in global payment 
systems, by reducing settlement times; and in asset rehypothecation, thereby 
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Parliament and of the Council, Decisions No 280/2004/EC and No 406/2009/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Commission Regulations (EU) 
No 920/2010 and No 1193/2011 Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 122, 3.5.2013, 1–59; 
although, the European Court of Auditors report noted that even though the EC operates the 
EU registry, it has no powers to monitor and supervise transactions: fn.463 (ECA) supra.   
465 Fn.451 (World Economic Forum): reported that at that time, more than 24 countries were 
investing in DLT, over 90 corporations had joined DLT consortia, 80% of banks were 
predicted to initiate DLT projects by 2017 and over the preceding three years, more than 
2500 patents had been filed and over US$1.4 billion invested; see also fn.457 (Allens) 
Lawyers; Stuart Davis and Julian Cunningham-Day, Linklaters LLP, ‘Blockchain – 
recalibrating the market infrastructure’, Going Digital Quarterly Breakfast Briefing, 14 
October 2016, presentation Powerpoint slide deck.  
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enhancing liquidity.466 Other broader, potential applications being tested or 
implemented include in relation to record keeping, such as patient health records, or 
land property titles; legal inheritance; source traceability for supply chains, including 
diamonds, or gold production; or other proof of ownership.467 Some 
intergovernmental bodies, national and provincial governments have instigated 
projects to provide services based on DLT.468 Other application areas that have 
been reported include decentralised power generation sharing, music streaming 
royalty payments, and voting in elections.469  
 
In terms of potential areas of impact of DLT on financial markets, operational 
simplification, regulatory efficiency improvement, counterparty risk reduction, 
clearing and settlement time reduction, liquidity and capital improvement, and fraud 
minimisation have been identified as value drivers.470 The claimed ‘transformative 
characteristics’ of distributed infrastructure include immutability, which for financial 
market participants might eliminate the need for reconciliations and provide a single 
version of the correct record;471 transparency, thereby removing market information 
asymmetries and increasing regulator/regulated party cooperation; and autonomy, 
disintermediating centralised parties whose roles in bringing trust and reducing 
counterparty risk will no longer be required.472 Possible benefits of DLT applied, for 
instance, to the securities market include speeding up clearing and settlement by 
reducing the number of intermediaries involved; facilitating recording of ownership 
                                                      
466 Ibid (World Economic Forum) 21. For example, also reported that the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority was leading a project with 21 banks to provide a blockchain-based trade 
finance platform to enhance efficiency, reduce transaction costs: Financial Times, 16 July 
2018, 18. 
467 Fn.457 (Seibold and Samman/KPMG); fn.459 (Maupin/CIGI 2017); International 
Monetary Fund, ‘Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations’ January 2016, Staff 
Discussion Note SDN/16/03. 
468 Fn.459 (Walch) 718, n.13; also Fn.447 (Walport) chapter 6; fn.454 (Ali et al./Bank of 
England); Reuters report on UN using blockchain to avoid fraud in aid shipments 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-refugees-blockchain/u-n-glimpses-into-blockchain-
future-with-eye-scan-payments-for-refugees-idUSKBN19C0BB> accessed 28/01/18; fn.459 
(Ferrarini et al./ADB 2017), give examples of digital identity, trade finance, project aid 
monitoring and results-based disbursements, smart energy, and sustainable supply chain 
management.  
469 Fn.459 (Finck 2018) 671-4; Marc Pilkington ‘Blockchain Technology: Principles and 
Applications’, Research Handbook on Digital Transformations, F. Xavier Olleros and 
Majlinda Zhegu (eds), (Edward Elgar, 2016); The Guardian, article on broader applications 
of blockchain <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/28/blockchain-so-much-
bigger-than-bitcoin> accessed 28/01/18. 
470 Fn.451 (World Economic Forum) 19 et seq. 
471 Note that this characteristic is explored in more detail in the following section B. 
472 Fn.451 (World Economic Forum) 24; also fn.457 (Allens Lawyers); fn.465 (Davis et 
al./Linklaters).  
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and safekeeping of assets; facilitating collection, consolidation and sharing of data 
for reporting, risk management and supervisory purposes; reducing counterparty 
risk by shortening the transaction settlement cycle; improving the efficient 
management of collateral; continuous availability; greater security and resilience 
against attack; and cost reduction.473 Other possible financial services applications 
relate to global payments, trade finance, corporate proxy voting, insurance claims 
processing, syndicated loans and contingent convertible bond issuances.474  
 
Notwithstanding the overwhelmingly positive sentiment that surrounds the 
applications and benefits to be expected of DLT, it is important not to be swept up 
by the hype of the ‘thought leaders’.475 The general perception, in this environment, 
is that DLT could make networking of carbon markets both feasible and effective, by 
enabling traceability of the provenance of assets, or their attributes such as 
mitigation value; by the security dimension it brings; and by the permanence of 
records it can afford, thereby facilitating accounting and auditability. Thus, it would 
be promoting the objectives of climate policy, evidenced by the terms of the Paris 
Agreement, while also facilitating and stimulating an inter-jurisdictional market, so 
that it operates efficiently, encourages private sector engagement, promotes a 
stable carbon price and fosters the effective application of carbon finance. These 
perceptions are examined below.  
 (iii) DLT terminology 
 
The dynamic state of DLT development and the range of fields in which it might be 
applied introduce issues of terminology and meaning.476 For example, the 
expressions ‘DLT’ and ‘blockchain’, are frequently used interchangeably, both in 
academic and general literature. Even use of ‘distributed’ can cause the 
misperception that because a ledger is distributed, there is no overall controlling 
entity, whereas this is a question of design.477 Confusion of meaning over the terms 
used is a risk not only for academics, researchers and business entities designing 
and building applications in the various different fields, but more especially so for 
                                                      
473 Fn.458 (ESMA 2016) 9-13.  
474 Fn.451 (World Economic Forum) 46-127, setting out ‘deep dive analyses of these and 
other use cases’. 
475 Fn.459 (Walch) 740, n.108.  




policymakers and regulators overseeing such developments and determining the 
extent to which their intervention in the use cases is warranted and how that 
intervention should be carried out.478  
 
The technology is populated with particular nomenclature such as ‘permissioned’ 
and ‘permissionless’, ‘smart contracts’, ‘miners’ and ‘mining’, ‘tokens’, 
‘cryptocurrencies’, ‘initial coin offerings’ and with acronyms, such as, just in relation 
to different types of cryptography and security, PKI, HASH, SHA-256, zk-SNARK, 
HE, ECC, ECDSA, SGX.479 For some expressions, there will be other parallel 
expressions (for example, public and private, for permissionless and permissioned), 
which may have identical meanings, or slightly nuanced differences of meaning.480 
 
Of perhaps greater concern is the way in which fundamental descriptive 
characteristics of the technology may be understood, particularly when they are 
used so broadly and repetitively that they enter the technological/DLT vernacular 
without scrutiny or detailed consideration. Walch cites the example of “immutable”, 
as used to describe the ledger created by blockchain technology, in this respect.481 
In view of the integral importance of it as a characteristic of DLT, since other 
claimed beneficial characteristics of the technology, such as traceability, 
accountability and auditability follow from it, immutability is considered in more detail 
in section B below, along with other such characteristics. 
 (iv) DLT definitions 
 
In the shifting sands of terminology flagged above, formal definitions will not 
necessarily be universally agreed and, even so, may be superseded relatively 
quickly.482 All the same, it is necessary to clearly explain what is meant by the terms 
and expressions, as employed here, in this particular context.483  
                                                      
478 Fn.459 (Walch) 728 et seq. 
479 Mark Simpson, Steven Wang ‘Bitcoin, Crypto Assets and Blockchain’, RBS Emerging 
Technology presentation at Edinburgh University, 8 February 2018 
<https://uoe.sharepoint.com/:p:/r/sites/sw-dev-
group/_layouts/15/Doc.aspx?sourcedoc=%7B55954a3c-3de6-4ae0-a3ae-
2788d521c4d9%7D&action=edit> accessed 13/02/18. 
480 Fn.459 (Walch) 719-728, has examined this issue in considerable detail, highlighting the 
particular problems this generates for regulators.   
481 Ibid 735-745. 
482 See, for instance, fn.459 (Walch) 730 in relation to New York’s ‘BitLicence’.  
483 Fn. 447 (Walport) 17-19. 
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The infrastructure on which it is proposed to provide networking of carbon markets 
is, at its most elementary, a series of computers, or nodes, connected with each 
other in a network, for instance, via the internet. In this sense, it is no different from 
other such structures that exist, for example, the connections of computers of legal 
entities trading in the EUETS or other markets. The fundamental difference 
introduced by DLT is that the ledger, or registry – the record/database of unit 
holdings of participating entities and of the transactions between them – is no longer 
held only by a trusted, centrally positioned entity (comparable, for instance, to the 
International Transaction Log (ITL) under the Kyoto Protocol, although the ITL role 
is also more limited) through which all transactions must be routed in order to be 
approved, recorded and that record maintained. Rather, the ledger is held in full and 
kept up-to-date on all nodes, that is, on each participating entity’s computer (or 
alternatively, just on a certain number thereof). Thus, the ledger is distributed. 
Another description is as a shared ledger, which has been applied particularly in the 
context of industry-based (e.g., financial sector) applications.484  
 
DLT is considered broadly as consisting of three elements, being the combination of 
a distributed ledger, with public/private key encryption and a decentralised 
infrastructure.485 It has been described also as ‘a distributed, shared, encrypted-
database that serves as an irreversible and incorruptible public repository of 
information’, enabling ‘unrelated people to reach consensus on the occurrence of a 
particular transaction or event without need for a controlling authority.’486 Another 
description of DLT is as ‘a protocol for building a replicated and shared ledger 
system’, collectively maintained by the participants in that system or network, rather 
than by one central party.487 
 
DLT is not huge technological leap, but rather an incremental improvement,488 one 
source even noting the existence of ledgers over thousands of years.489 In DLT, the 
ledger can (but need not necessarily) be organised as a chain of blocks of 
                                                      
484 Ibid. 
485 For example, see: fn.458 (ESMA 2016) section 2.1; also Fn.452 (Wright & De Filippi) 4, 5. 
486 Fn.452 (Wright & De Filippi) 2.  
487 Fn.458 (ASTRI). 
488 Fn.452 (Wright & De Filippi) 5, note 15. These authors trace the historical development of 
the individual elements back to the late 1970s. See also Fn.451 (World Economic Forum). 
489 Fn.458 (ASTRI). 
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information, each block containing a collection of transactions – new transactions 
being collected to form a new block that is time-stamped when added to the 
ledger.490 Each block, thus, contains one or more new transactions and the adding 
of blocks to the chain (hence this implementation is referred to as the ‘blockchain’) 
means the ledger grows cumulatively.491  
 
Blockchain is one implementation of a distributed ledger. Records can also just be 
stored one after the other, on a distributed ledger, in a continuous manner (but not 
in blocks), being added after the participants reach consensus.492 There is also a 
newer type of DLT that uses Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) that transmit and 
confirm transactions in an asynchronous, as opposed to chained way.493 However, it 
is not necessary for these purposes to catalogue and examine every such form, 
except to the extent it impacts on the beneficial characteristics of the DL and, 
ultimately, the regulatory framework. It is simply noted that different technical 
mechanisms exist for adding to the ledger. 
 
As DLT covers a wide range of potential functionality, it is useful to identify key 
features that define a DLT system.494 These are: 
 
• firstly, a decentralised, distributed infrastructure, meaning the system is 
composed of multiple entities or nodes, each (or at least a number thereof) 
holding a copy of the full ledger, obviating the role of the central ledger 
holder;  
• secondly, participants using public/private key encryption to interact with 
transactions in the system, obviating the role of a trusted central 
counterparty to intermediate transactions;  
• thirdly, a mechanism by which the nodes reach consensus on the valid 
entries to add to the ledger; and  
• fourthly, immutability, meaning that the ledger is accumulative, so that once 
entries are added to the ledger, (theoretically, at least) they cannot be 
                                                      
490 Ibid. 
491 Ibid. 
492 Fn.447 (Walport) 18. 
493 Fn.459 (Ferrarini et al./ADB 2017) 5. 
494 Adrian Jackson, Ashley Lloyd, Justin Macinante, Markus Hüwener, ‘Networked Carbon 
Markets: Permissionless Innovation with Distributed Ledgers?’ (July 4, 2017), 7 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2997099> accessed 09/10/17.  
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changed or removed.495 Thus, if it is desired to reverse or unwind a 
transaction, the transaction will need to be undertaken again, literally, in 
reverse.496  
 
There are also elements of a DLT system that are configurable to suit the desired 
design and the application to which the system is to be put.497 The configurable 
features include permissioning, referring to whether a system is open for anyone to 
join (that is, it is public or permissionless), or is private, or at least, is set up by a 
collaboration of parties, so that only trusted or vetted participants can partake in the 
control and maintenance of the system;498 proof of work, which is a means to 
achieve consensus in a permissionless system;499 ‘smart contracts’, referring to 
transactional terms and conditions embedded in computer code, which allow 
automatic execution of the relevant transaction once precise conformity with those 
terms and conditions has been established;500 and arrangements for settlement, 
exchanges or payment systems, which may be required in some shape or form to 
provide for the actual transfer of money, or settlement of physical assets, between 
counterparties.501 
 
Configuration of all of these elements can add up to very different outcomes. For 
instance, the contrasting nature of the Ethereum platform, compared with the 
Corda™ platform: the former is public, anonymous, token-based, relies on proof-of-
                                                      
495 Ibid, Table 1. As to immutability, see section B of this chapter. 
496 There will, of course, be implications of this if, for example, the counterparties’ positions 
have changed in the interim. 
497 Fn. 494 (Jackson et al) 8. 
498 Ibid, Table 2; also fn.458 (ASTRI); for a comparison of relative strengths and weaknesses 
of permissioned, unpermissioned and hybrid blockchains, see: fn.459 (Ferrarini et al/ADB 
2017) 2-6; for advantages of private over public blockchains, see: Vitalik Buterin, Public and 
Private Blockchains, Coindesk website, 7 August 2015 <https://www.coindesk.com/vitalik-
buterin-on-public-and-private-blockchains/> accessed 02/02/18.  
499 As the proposal set out in this paper is for a permissioned system, proof of work is not 
considered in any detail, but rather other consensus mechanisms will be considered. 
500 Fn.494 (Jackson et al) 8, Table 2; also Justin D Macinante ‘A Conceptual Model for 
Networking of Carbon Markets on Distributed Ledger Technology Architecture’, [2017] CCLR 
243, 251. The original formulation is: “A smart contract is a computerized transaction 
protocol that executes the terms of a contract. The general objectives of smart contract 
design are to satisfy common contractual conditions (such as payment terms, liens, 
confidentiality, and even enforcement), minimize exceptions both malicious and accidental, 
and minimize the need for trusted intermediaries. Related economic goals include lowering 
fraud loss, arbitration and enforcement costs, and other transaction costs.” Nick Szabo, 
Smart Contracts, 1994 
<http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinter
school2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html> accessed 26/01/18. 
501 Ibid (Jackson et al) Table 2. 
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work for consensus, holds data on all nodes and is blockchain-based; whereas the 
latter is private, identity-based, tokenless, relies on proof-of-authority for consensus 
(notaries are used as trusted entities), data is private to the parties to a transaction 
and it is not blockchain-based, but blockchain inspired: yet both these platforms 
facilitate peer-to-peer smart contract transactions.502  
(v) Use case of the proposal 
 
In these circumstances, the importance of specifying the configuration (or, at least, 
the options for such) of the use case proposed by this thesis is evident, for two 
reasons. First, the way in which the use case is configured will determine whether 
the perceived benefits of the technology (considered in section B of this chapter) are 
actually realisable, or exist only in theory. Secondly, the design of the technology 
platform will indicate how the application should be regulated and the institutional 
framework required, as considered in later chapters. 
 
The specific application of DLT proposed connects the carbon markets (that is, the 
emissions trading schemes (ETSs)) of individual jurisdictions that choose to 
participate in the network, in order to provide for inter-jurisdictional trading of their 
carbon assets (the units traded in the respective ETSs). Hence, the aim is to 
facilitate, as with the two platforms mentioned above, smart contract-based 
transactions peer-to-peer, in this case, across jurisdictions. For the market system 
proposed, a primary element is that it will be comprised of multiple nodes (however, 
whether each and every node would need to hold a copy of the full ledger, will be a 
matter of design). There would be encryption, for instance, using public/private keys 
and there would need to be a consensus mechanism for updating the ledger. If this 
updating is accumulative, such that new entries to the ledger followed consecutively 
on earlier entries (whether in blocks, or otherwise, being another design question), 
without changing or altering them, then the four key elements that identify a DLT 
system (outlined above) would be present.  
 
As the network would connect the administrators of the respective ETSs, as well as 
the legal entities participating in each domestic ETS, the participants would all be 
                                                      
502 Fn.479 (Simpson) slide 39. The notary design utilises a trusted authority and consensus 
is reached on an individual transaction basis, rather than in blocks of transactions, with 
limited information sharing, see fn.454 (Bech, Garratt/BIS) 58, Box A. 
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identified. Thus, the ability for a legal person (whether natural or corporate, 
depending on the criteria applied for participation in their domestic ETS) to 
participate in cross-jurisdictional trading will depend on their authorisation to 
participate in their domestic ETS. Accordingly, the distributed ledger would not be 
anonymous, nor public/permissionless, in the sense that anyone at all can 
participate. Strictly speaking, it would not be private either, in the sense of being 
closed to all but an exclusive group, since presumably any legal entity satisfying the 
relevant criteria could be authorised to trade in a domestic ETS. The network may 
best be described as public but permissioned (a hybrid), since the pre-condition for 
participation on the DL network would be that the legal entity was first authorised to 
trade in a participating domestic ETS.503 
 
In the context of participation by Paris Agreement parties, it is assumed that mutual 
authorisation of each other for the purposes of Article 6 would apply. There is the 
further consideration of whether participation by a jurisdiction in the DL network 
would imply all participants in that jurisdiction’s domestic ETS were automatically 
considered to be authorised, by that jurisdiction’s government, to trade inter-
jurisdictionally, or if specific authorisation for each individual legal entity to so trade 
would still be necessary to satisfy the requirement that use of internationally 
transferred mitigation outcomes to achieve nationally determined contributions is 
voluntary and authorised by participating parties.504 This will be a matter for each 
individual jurisdiction to determine as it sees fit. For the purposes here, it is 
assumed that if a jurisdiction agrees to join the network, then automatically, all the 
entities in its domestic ETS are considered so authorised.      
 
It follows that, as a public but permissioned DL, there would need to be configured a 
system providing for the type of permissioning granted to nodes, that is, identifying 
those permitted to view, and those permitted to interact with, the ledger. Legal 
entities, for example, might have permission to interact with the ledger by submitting 
transactions for addition to it, as well as being permitted to view that part of the 
ledger pertaining to their own holdings and transactions. Further, as suggested 
                                                      
503 Also could be described as a hybrid: see Fn.459 (Ferrarini et al/ADB 2017) 4-5. 
504 UNFCCC, Draft Text on SBSTA 49 agenda item 11(a) Matters relating to Article 6 of the 
Paris Agreement: Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, 




earlier, they might not hold a copy of the entire ledger, as this could lead to 
scalability problems as the ledger grows in size,505 but might only need hold that part 
relating to their own holdings and transactions.506 ETS administrators might be 
restrained from interacting with the ledger in the sense of submitting transactions, 
but might have broader viewing permission rights, for instance, by being able to 
view the accounts of all legal entities in their own ETS and some components of the 
information held on the overall ledger more generally (although perhaps not, for 
instance, information pertaining to individual legal entities from other jurisdictions). 
Consideration would also need to be given to the extent of public access to 
information on the ledger. 
 
Related to this would be the consensus mechanism by which new transactions are 
entered on the ledger. This might operate on a distributed basis507 but only between 
the administrator nodes. For example, the administrator of the ETS from which a 
transaction originates would perform the role of validator by confirming that the 
seller in the transaction is the true owner of the carbon assets being sold. They 
would then broadcast the information concerning that transaction (and any other 
transactions originating from its ETS at the same time), as other administrators 
would also do concerning transactions originating in their respective ETSs at that 
time. These validating nodes would then agree (by a mechanism they would have 
determined in advance) which of the transactions – presumably all, if they had all 
been confirmed as being correct – would be included in the block to be added to the 
blockchain, if the platform were to be blockchain-based, or otherwise stored one 
after the other in a continuous manner (but not in blocks).   
 
As this proposal concerns the conduct of transactions between jurisdictions, it 
presumes there will be contracts setting out the terms and conditions on which 
                                                      
505 There is a discussion of this issue in the Ethereum white paper: Ethereum, ‘A Next-
Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform’, White Paper 
<https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper> accessed 13/02/18; scalability 
limitations have been identified as a weakness of permissionless DLs: see fn.459 (Ferrarini 
et al/ADB 2017) 3. 
506 Richard Gendal Brown et al., ‘Corda: An Introduction’, White Paper, August 2016 
<https://docs.corda.net/_static/corda-introductory-whitepaper.pdf> accessed 12/02/18; 
Richard G Brown ‘Introducing R3 Corda™: A Distributed Ledger Designed for Financial 
Services’, blog post, 5 April 2016   
<https://www.r3.com/blog/2016/04/05/introducing-r3-corda-a-distributed-ledger-designed-for-
financial-services/> accessed 12/02/18. 
507 Fn.458 (ASTRI) 10-15 provides a description of this process. 
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those transactions have been agreed. Such terms and conditions could be 
standardised for all transactions across the network, with provision for variable 
factors – parties, quantity, price, origin, mitigation value or any other variable 
characteristics – to be inserted. This will be the function of smart contracts, which 
would allow automatic execution of the relevant transaction to which they pertain 
once precise conformity with the terms and conditions had been established. In 
conjunction with execution of the smart contract for a transaction, in order to 
complete the transaction, arrangements for financial settlement coordinated with the 
transfer of the carbon asset, will need to be in place. This aspect is considered in 
more detail in the next chapter. 
 
Finally, it is envisaged that the DLT application being proposed here may, or may 
not, operate as a blockchain. Hence, the technology platform will continue to be 
referred to by the broader descriptive term, DLT, or DL, unless the context requires 
specific reference to a blockchain mechanism. 
 
B Specific characteristics of the proposed technology 
platform 
 
The last sub-section introduced DLT and the use case proposed here. This section 
now explores in more detail the appropriateness of DLT for the proposed market. To 
analyse the claimed beneficial characteristics of a DL platform in the market 
proposed, an obvious approach would be to compare the proposal with a similar 
existing market based on current technology, that is, on a traditional, centralised 
database platform. However, as no trading network or market, such as that which is 
proposed, exists at present, this is not feasible. The ITL is probably the closest 
comparable example, but as it relates to the homogeneous trading under the Kyoto 
Protocol and does not provide a trading platform, is not appropriate for this purpose.  
 
Comparisons might be drawn, alternatively, between the networked market 
proposed and the IT platforms of existing linked arrangements between jurisdictions 
(EUETS-Switzerland, California-Quebec). However, it is considered on one hand, 
that the technological aspects of those comparisons would be likely to be obscured 
by the parallel networking-linking distinctions between the two approaches, while on 
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the other, if it were possible for the respective approaches to be stripped back to just 
the IT platforms, such an exercise in comparative analysis of the relative technical 
IT specifications would be too removed from the legal and policy analysis the 
purpose of this thesis. Hence, this approach also is not pursued.508  
 
Rather, another alternative is applied. As stated in the preceding Section A, the 
proposal can be viewed as proceeding down two independent, but interrelated 
arms, the first aiming to facilitate and stimulate an inter-jurisdictional market, so that 
it operates efficiently, encourages private sector engagement, promotes a stable 
carbon price and fosters the effective application of carbon finance, while the 
second promotes the objectives of climate policy, evidenced by the decisions of the 
parties at COP 21 and the terms of the Paris Agreement. Accordingly, the approach 
taken to analysing the claimed benefits of DLT in the case of NCM is similarly 
twofold: firstly, by considering the DLT application in terms of the beneficial 
characteristics it purports to bring to financial markets (this application being 
probably the most extensively examined area of application for DLT at the present 
time); and secondly, by analysing the DLT application to networking carbon markets 
in terms of the extent to which it can better facilitate matching the requirements and 
expectations of the Paris Agreement, than otherwise might be achievable (that is, 
without DLT).   
 
1. DLT application to NCM as a financial market 
 
The multifarious applications of DLT,509 particularly in relation to the financial sector, 
are increasing all the time, as are claims extolling the superiority of the technology 
over legacy systems for existing applications, or the beneficial features of new 
applications made possible by the technology.510 For instance, the Chief Scientific 
Advisor to the UK government has stated: 
                                                      
508All the same, references and comparisons are made to the IT platforms used under 
current arrangements, where appropriate.  
509 See section A, preceding; see also Fn.457 (Siebold and Samman/KPMG) Figure 4 DLT 
Landscape. 
510 Fn.451 (World Economic Forum); DTCC Connection, ‘Eight Key Features of Blockchain 
and Distributed Ledgers Explained’, 17 February 2016 
<http://www.dtcc.com/news/2016/february/17/eight-key-features-of-blockchain-and-
distributed-ledgers-explained> accessed 15/02/18, which sets out eight key capabilities that 
it claims has created the innovative platform that has the potential to modernise the post-
trade financial ecosystem. 
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Existing methods of data management, especially of personal data, typically 
involve large legacy IT systems located within a single institution. To these 
are added an array of networking and messaging systems to communicate 
with the outside world, which adds to the cost and complexity. Highly 
centralised systems present a high cost single point of failure. They may be 
vulnerable to cyber-attack and the data is often out of sync, out of date or 
simply inaccurate.511  
 
DLs, on the other hand, are inherently harder to attack, the technology is resistant to 
unauthorised change or malicious tampering and the methods by which information 
is secured and updated mean that participants can share data and be confident that 
all copies of the ledger at any one time match each other.512  
 
How the technology and its applications are perceived, however, is a question of 
perspective and, in this sense, the regulators can balance the picture. Thus, key 
challenges and possible shortcomings, of a technological nature, have been flagged 
to include scalability issues, interoperability with existing systems and between 
systems, the need for a way to settle transactions in central bank (fiat) money, the 
absence of a recourse mechanism for dealing with mistakes, the inability to net off 
positions in financial markets, and absence of scope for margin finance and short 
selling.513 In relation to the governance framework, who might be permissioned in 
such a system, and rule design, arise as issues; privacy issues arise in relation to 
which parties might access what information, and regulatory and legal issues arise 
concerning ownership of records, liability of participants and enforcement of 
obligations.514 Key risks raised include cyber risk, fraud and money laundering, the 
difficulty of identifying anomalies in such an automated system, and dealing with 
erroneous coding.515 
 
What are the ‘transformative characteristics’516 and how do they address the issues 
and risks raised? According to one source, they are immutability, transparency and 
autonomy.517 Another source lists consensus, validity, uniqueness, immutability and 
                                                      
511 Fn.447 (Walport) 6. 
512 Ibid. 
513 Fn.458 (ESMA 2016). 
514 Ibid. 
515 Ibid. In relation to risks, see also: Fn.451 (World Economic Forum). 
516 Fn. 451 (World Economic Forum) uses this description. 
517 Ibid. 
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authentication.518 Others emphasise the distributed ledger and consensus;519 or the 
security engendered through encryption;520 or the decentralised nature of the 
system across participating nodes and its peer-to-peer facility.521  
 
Again, a preliminary issue is terminology, as characteristics can be described 
differently, depending on the perspective of the proponent. For example, anonymity, 
privacy, confidentiality, party identity abstraction, permissionless, trustless, security 
and transparency are descriptions that might all refer to the same feature, but from 
different perspectives; autonomy and uniqueness might refer to the same thing, 
which others might refer to as party identity abstraction. In these circumstances, for 
the purpose of this analysis, a set of features is selected, then by examining each in 
turn, consideration is given to the extent to which they afford the benefits claimed, 
any risks to which they give rise and how they mesh with other elements. The 
selected features comprise the following:  
 
• immutability (includes traceability, auditability, robust accounting);  
• decentralised (includes smart contracts);  
• distributed (includes transparency and privacy, permissioning);  
• security (includes hash cryptography, consensus mechanism).  
 (i) Immutability 
 
Immutability is probably the most important characteristic that DLT brings and 
virtually every description of blockchain or DLT refers to it. For instance: 
‘Immutability is a characteristic of blockchain technology… Certain features of the 
blockchain concept might be relaxed…but not immutability, which remains 
crucial...’522 Acceptance of immutability is implicit even in the way technological 
challenges are identified: for instance, the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) poses the absence of a recourse mechanism as an issue for 
dealing with mistakes once the immutable DL records a transaction.523  
 
                                                      
518 Fn.506 (Brown et al/Corda). 
519 Fn.459 (Ferrarini et al/ADB) 
520 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, What’s in a blockchain? 
<https://www.freshfields.com/en-gb/our-thinking/campaigns/digital> accessed 06/02/18.  
521 Fn.479 (Simpson). 
522 Fn.459 (Pilkington); also see: fn.452 (Wright & De Filippi); fn.510 (DTCC Connection). 
523 Fn. 458 (ESMA 2016) 14-15, paragraph 33. 
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The fact that entries to a DL are cumulative, that once added they cannot be 
amended or edited or tampered with, is extremely important for other claimed 
beneficial characteristics of DLs. If entries or transactions (that is, the information 
related thereto), are always added cumulatively and cannot be altered once added, 
then the provenance of an item transacted, such as an emission unit, is easily 
traceable; its current ownership and history of ownership is readily ascertained; any 
transactions affecting it or its validity will be apparent; and any co-benefits 
associated with it can similarly be identified and tracked. Consequently, accounting, 
auditing and reporting are facilitated. It follows logically also that, once a legal entity 
has transacted and sold that emission unit, the entity will be incapable of selling the 
unit again, unless they have first bought it back and nothing has transpired in the 
meantime to affect its validity, such as surrender or cancellation. In other words, this 
immutability characteristic facilitates robust accounting. These are all important 
features for the proper and efficient operation of a financial market. 
 
However, as Walch points out,524 immutability isn’t all that it seems, for two 
conceptual reasons. First, so-called ‘immutable’ blockchains can and have been 
changed post-facto; and secondly, even though immutability is generally used to 
describe all types of blockchain, there is no consensus yet on what generates this 
feature and whether it is present in all variations.525 In relation to the first of these 
reasons, the people operating the system can always agree to go back and change 
the record. In the two instances Walch cites, both were public blockchains 
(Ethereum and Bitcoin) and the action apparent to and accepted by users.526 An 
ability to go back and change the ledger would be even more likely for a private (or 
hybrid) DL where, by definition, it is operated by a select group. Whereas blockchain 
is often described as immutable, this is only the case to the extent that its human 
creators choose not to intervene.527  
 
Another view, from the security perspective, is that both permissioned and 
permissionless systems are only trustworthy so long as the majority of the validators 
are behaving honestly: in a permissioned system, there is also the need to consider 
the integrity of the entity that identifies and grants credentials to consortium 
                                                      
524 Fn.459 (Walch) 722 n.35, and Part IV, 735-745. 
525 Ibid 738. 
526 Ibid 739. 
527 Fn.459 (Finck 2018) 668.  
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members. ‘The sanctity of the consensus mechanism, and thus the immutability of a 
ledger, is only upheld by trust in an identifying agent and the safekeeping of identity 
credentials by participants…’528 Thus, security and consensus are tied to 
immutability, which in a permissioned system, essentially relies on the 
trustworthiness of the person or entity running the scheme.529  
 
The second conceptual point about DL immutability is the lack of agreement as to 
how it arises.530 Some ascribe it to the consensus mechanism (that is, in Bitcoin, 
proof of work); others to the cryptography (hash functions turn data into a trunk of 
random characters called ‘hash’: see fuller explanation under (iv) security, below); 
others still, to the chaining together of blocks of transactions (although this is tied to 
the hash process). Another perspective is that other entities will not accept 
transactions that try to build on a modified version of some data that has already 
been accepted by them, the reason being that transactions commit to the outcome 
of prior transactions, blocks to previous blocks.531  
 
Ultimately, in the case of the public permissioned DL envisaged for the financial 
market proposed by this thesis, immutability, or more appropriately, the permanence 
and accuracy of the ledger record as it accumulates, will be a function of the 
operators, who will be the ETS administrators (hence parts of the respective 
governments) of the participating jurisdictions. The risk of improper collusion on their 
part to alter the ledger, in the first instance, will be a function of who they are and 
how many.532 Additionally, once transactions have been entered and form the 
starting point for subsequent transactions, it would be difficult to alter the ledger 
without the awareness (and concurrence, one imagines) of all affected participants 
(that is, legal entities counterparty to the relevant transactions). If public/private key 
cryptography applies and, assuming the DL is a blockchain, the blocks are chained 
with hash functions related to the information content in the blocks, then even more 
                                                      
528 Van Valkenburgh, Peter, Director of Research, Coin Center (NFP DLT research and 
advocacy center), Comments to the European Securities and Markets Authority on its 
Consultation on Distributed Ledger Technology Applied to Securities Markets, September 
2016, Coin Center <https://coincenter.org/files/2016-09/coin-center-letter-to-esma.pdf> 
accessed 02/02/18. 
529 Ibid. 
530 Fn. 459 (Walch) 741 et seq. 
531 Fn. 506 (Brown, April 2016). 
532 Also the institutional supervision proposed in the model should make improper activity 
highly unlikely. 
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so it would be necessary to engage all participants in order to alter the record.533 
This is very unlikely, given the nature of the envisaged application.       
(ii) Decentralised 
 
One of the features that defines a DL system is a decentralised infrastructure, 
meaning the system is composed of multiple entities or nodes, each holding a copy 
of the full ledger, obviating the role of the central ledger holder.534 While in the 
scheme design envisaged by this proposal, not every node may hold a full copy of 
the ledger, the decentralised nature of the system means there will be multiple 
participants capable of interacting with each other, peer-to-peer, rather than through 
a central body. Some commentators describe permissioned (private or hybrid) 
ledgers as more centralised,535 but it has been noted that these and other design 
choices need to be tailored to the specific goals pursued in the particular use 
case.536  
 
If truly decentralised, then no one entity owns the network completely. If a group of 
nodes control the network, however, why not just use a centralised database (as at 
present in the carbon market)? Several reasons have been suggested.537 First, once 
deployed, the technology is very resilient and it is very difficult to close down the 
entire system. If one node loses data due to, for instance, hacking or loss of power, 
it can recover from another node on the network. Secondly, in an open market a 
middleman with a big enough platform controls pricing and will have an incentive to 
increase prices, whereas in a consortium everyone should have an interest in 
reducing transaction costs. Third, if nodes can interact peer-to-peer, they are not 
dependent on the central party for the speed of the interaction; and nodes might 
control their own dataset and determine who can see it, although this will be a 
function of the DL design and permissioning arrangement established. 
 
A further element of a decentralised infrastructure is the means by which nodes 
transact, in other words, the smart contract arrangements put in place as part of the 
                                                      
533 Fn.459 (Walch) 738-9: see discussion of Bitcoin and Ethereum ‘forks’. 
534 Fn.494 (Jackson et al). 
535 see, for instance: fn.469 (Pilkington); however, this really relates to the consensus 
mechanism, and they would still be decentralised in the sense of operating peer-to-peer. 
536Fn.459 (Ferrarini et al/ADB 2017) 2.  
537 Fn.479 (Simpson) slides 49-56. 
 154 
system design. Smart contracts are not a defining element, but rather configurable 
to suit the desired design and the application to which the DL system is to be put.538 
They have been described as a computer code or protocol that automates the 
execution of certain terms and conditions of an arrangement.539 They replicate legal 
contracts by coding the underlying agreement in computer language ‘and have the 
advantage of low contracting, enforcement, and compliance costs.’540  
 
Smart contracts enable transactions between counterparties digitally without the 
need for a trusted central counterparty, on the basis that once all the pre-conditions 
on the respective parties have been satisfied, the contract executes automatically. 
The advantage they bring, therefore, is reduced time and cost for carrying out 
transactions.541 Smart contracts differ from established forms of automated contract 
execution of an underlying agreement, such as automated banking payments, or 
standing orders, in a number of respects.542 Third parties usually retain control over 
the transaction with those established forms, whereas the smart contract is neither 
administered nor controlled by a third party and, with the former, the computer 
program is usually run on the third party’s server, ensuring their internal control. 
Further, with traditional automated contract execution the code is exclusively in the 
hands of the third party responsible for it, whereas with smart contracts the DL 
enables all participants to be running the same code on a decentralised basis, 
enabling the peer-to-peer transaction basis.543 
 
All the same, the need for third parties may not be totally obviated, with roles 
continuing in relation to, for instance, technical governance matters such as 
maintaining the technical code, auditing it against legal code, or in managing 
operation of the system more generally, by providing validation, ensuring regulatory 
compliance, and carrying out reporting functions or dealing with mistakes, errors or 
                                                      
538 Fn.494 (Jackson et al). 
539 Fn.459 (Finck 2018) 670-1; Fn. 452 (Wright & De Filippi) 10; for original formulation: Nick 
Szabo, Smart Contracts, 1994, 
<http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinter
school2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html> accessed 26/01/18. See also fn.500.  
540 Ibid (Finck 2018). 
541 Fn.451 (World Economic Forum); see also fn.457 (Allens Lawyers); fn.465 (Davis et 
al./Linklaters).  
542 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, What’s in a smart contract? 5 February 2018 
<www.lexology.com> accessed 06/02/18. 
543 Ibid. 
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fraud.544 Other than in terms of the validation role, however, the third party would, 
most likely, not be central to or interposed between counterparties to a transaction. 
As such, these functions are more properly considered as systems maintenance 
and management. The validation role, on the other hand, relates to the consensus 
mechanism design for a private DL. Many of the potential issues raised, such as 
insolvency of a counterparty, or payment failure, or privacy and confidentiality, can 
be addressed through system design (considered in chapters following).  
(iii) Distributed 
 
To some extent, this could be seen as covering similar ground as the decentralised 
elements above. However, whereas the emphasis in decentralisation relates to the 
interaction of the nodes in the network (for example, through smart contracting) and 
disintermediation of central third party gatekeepers, the distributed element 
emphasises the informational side – how the ledger is held, viewed and updated. It 
deals with issues of consensus and permissioning, hence transparency, privacy and 
confidentiality.  
 
In a fully distributed ledger, the complete record of transactions, such as rights to 
payment, or ownership of an asset, would be shared more or less instantaneously 
across the network with all participants. Thus the record is held on all nodes with 
concurrent updating once the correct version of the record is established. There is 
no one central administrator or database. For an external cyber attack to impact a 
distributed system, it would therefore need to infiltrate multiple copies of the ledger, 
not just a single central record.545 
 
To establish the correct version of the record, there will need to be a consensus 
mechanism.546 In the case of unpermissioned, or open ledgers, this is most often a 
mechanism known as ‘proof of work’547 as applied in Bitcoin, although since 2012 
                                                      
544 Fn.457 (Allens Lawyers). 
545 Fn.465 (Davis et al./Linklaters). 
546 Fn.506 (Brown, April 2016): “The first, and most important, feature of blockchains…”; 
fn.457 (Siebold and Samman/KPMG): “Consensus mechanisms are central to the 
functioning of any blockchain or distributed ledger.”   
547 fn.457 (Siebold and Samman/KPMG): this was the first such mechanism, developed 
1999, and requires the system’s users to repeatedly run algorithms to a mathematically 
complex problem; Fn.458 (ASTRI) addresses the technology as does fn.459 (Ferrarini et 
al/ADB 2017) who also list technical references. It is not considered necessary to delve in 
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there has also been the ‘proof-of-stake’ mechanism, which requires fewer 
calculations and is therefore less energy intensive.548 As DLT applications in 
financial markets will likely be permissioned549 and as the application proposed by 
this thesis is also permissioned, the unpermissioned consensus mechanisms are 
not considered further, other than to note that the scalability limitation, related to 
their excessive energy demand,550 is not the case with permissioned consensus 
mechanisms. 
 
An outline of a permissioned consensus mechanism is set out earlier in relation to 
the use case of the proposal.551 The main difference between the unpermissioned 
and permissioned DL is the degree to which it is distributed, or decentralised. The 
permissioned system, being applied to a limited number of nodes, would be more 
susceptible to cyber attack, yet simply reverting to a centralised database would 
only increase that risk. The permissioned system also has the advantage of being 
able to tailor the permissioning rights to the requirements of the participating nodes. 
Thus, rather than all nodes being able to view the ledger in its entirety, but without 
the identity of transaction participants being known (as in an anonymous, 
unpermissioned system), the permissioned system might be configured to allow 
differing levels of access to information on the ledger and differing rights to interact 
with the ledger, for example, by submitting transactions for adding to it. 
Confidentiality and privacy aspects, therefore, could be balanced with regulatory 
transparency needs as part of the system design.   
(iv) Security 
 
Security in DL systems relates, primarily, to the implementation of cryptographic 
techniques, of which there are multiple examples.552 One illustration is hash 
                                                                                                                                                         
any detail into the technical aspects by which the unpermissioned consensus mechanisms 
function for the purposes of this thesis. 
548 Ibid (Siebold and Samman/KPMG). 
549 Fn.458 (ESMA 2016) 8, paragraph 3. 
550 Fn.459 (Ferrarini et al/ADB 2017) 3.   
551 Section A, sub-section 3(v); see also Fn.458 (ASTRI) 10-15. 
552 For example: public key infrastructure (PKI), cryptographic hash function (HASH), secure 
hash algorithm (SHA-256), zero-knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments of 
Knowledge (zk-SNARK), homomorphic encryption (HE), Elliptical Curve Cryptography 
(ECC), Elliptical Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), software guard extensions 
(SGX). 
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cryptography,553 which applies a one-way mathematical function to summarise the 
relevant data as a piece of unique, fixed-size, short data called its hash value. An 
alteration to the data causes the hash value to change, making it impossible to 
decipher the original data from the hash. A change to the content of a block in a 
blockchain also causes the value of its hash link to change.554 
 
The security offered by cryptography operates at the micro level, while security can 
be viewed also at a macro level, through design.555 Design is evident in the three 
preceding elements: the permanent (but perhaps not totally immutable), 
accumulative nature of the ledger; the decentralised nature of participating nodes, 
transacting peer-to-peer, not needing central trusted counterparties in order to add 
transactions to the ledger; and the ledger held by the nodes on a distributed basis, 
updated by a consensus mechanism and viewed on the basis of defined 
permissions. The design of the overall DL, through these elements, thus contributes 
to security. Nevertheless, permissioned DL systems are still potentially exposed to 
threats including, for instance, cyber attacks, that may cause network fragmentation 
or performance issues. The potential for these sorts of events points to the need not 
only for design that avoids vulnerabilities such as network ‘choke points’, where the 
entire network can be impacted by an attack on a single node, but also to 
administration design, to provide for continuity in spite of such events. 
 
2. DLT matching the expectations of the Paris Agreement 
 
While the preceding subsection considered the beneficial characteristics DLT might 
bring to financial markets, this one now examines the extent to which it facilitates 
matching the requirements of the Paris Agreement. The signatory parties (Parties) 
having committed to prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs),556 the Paris Agreement provides encouragement 
for carbon markets by recognising that Parties may engage voluntarily in 
cooperative approaches involving the use of internationally transferred mitigation 
                                                      
553 SHA-256 is a common example. 
554 Fn.458 (ASTRI) 23. 
555 Ibid 18. 
556 Article 4, paragraph 3, Paris Agreement. 
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outcomes (ITMOs) towards their NDCs.557 Voluntary cooperation in implementing 
NDCs is to allow for higher ambition by the Parties choosing so to act in their 
mitigation and adaptation actions, and to promote sustainable development and 
environmental integrity.558 Additionally, where engaging in such approaches that 
involve the use of ITMOs towards their NDCs, the Parties shall promote sustainable 
development and ensure environmental integrity and transparency, including in 
governance, and apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of 
double counting.559  
 
This subsection examines the proposition that the application of DLT provides 
innovative solutions in two areas of critical importance if operationalization of Article 
6, paragraph 2 is to engage the private financial sector in building a cross-
jurisdictional carbon market. They are firstly, in data (information) sharing and 
management; and secondly, in transaction management.  
 (i) Centrality of information sharing and management 
 
Interpretation and implementation of Article 6, paragraph 2, is subject to the 
guidance being developed by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA), in accordance with the decision of the Parties in adopting the Paris 
Agreement.560 All the same, it is observed that the international transfer of mitigation 
outcomes for use towards Parties’ NDCs sits in a matrix of inter-related principles, 
or themes, infused throughout the decision of the Parties and in the Paris 
Agreement.561 In this matrix, the centrality of information and information 
management, to all aspects of the Paris Agreement relating to mitigation, is an 
unavoidable conclusion. Information, principally in relation to its provision by Parties 
is key, as underscored by concepts such as transparency, robust accounting and 
reporting. These three concepts are now considered. 
                                                      
557 Article 6, paragraph 2, Paris Agreement. As the proposal is being outlined in terms of the 
connecting of ETSs, to avoid confusion, analysis of the terms of the Paris Agreement (e.g., 
re ITMOs) will not include the mechanism under Article 6, paragraph 4, as this is project 
crediting-based, as opposed to allowance based. See also clarification of approach in 
chapter I. 
558 Article 6, paragraph 1, Paris Agreement. 
559 Fn. 557 (Art.6. para.2).  
560 Decision 1/CP.21, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, 29 January 2016, paragraph 36 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf> accessed 13/03/17. 





Transparency has been described as having become ‘one of the fundamentally 
distinctive traits of contemporary Western culture’, and that its opposites, ‘such as 
secrecy and confidentiality, have taken on a negative connotation.’562 It ‘is not 
immediately associated with international law’,563 which classically has been a 
device to ‘formalise the outcomes of inter-State negotiations on select issues of 
mutual concern.’564 However, this paradigm has proved to be incomplete in relation 
to international environmental law, where ‘environmental concerns implicate 
individuals and groups in society, not just states.’565 In particular, transparency is not 
a new concept in climate policy, having been recognised as a principle or good 
practice since adoption of the UNFCCC, an early application being in the National 
Communications thereunder.566  
 
While it is ‘often associated with information and knowledge, legitimacy and 
accountability, participatory democracy and good governance’, transparency ‘means 
different things to different people in different contexts.’567 For instance, one author 
defines it as ‘…a system in which the relevant information is available … now widely 
seen as an important element of institutional legitimacy, both for global institutions 
and national authorities.’568  Yet this description begs further questions, such as 
relevant to whom? Relevant when? Relevant for what purposes? And does the 
institutional legitimacy mentioned derive from procedural transparency (e.g., 
openness in the process)569 or from transparency in the outcomes?570  
                                                      
562 A Bianchi ‘On Power and Illusion: The Concept of Transparency in International Law’, in 
A Bianchi & A Peters (eds.), Transparency in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 1-2. 
563 Ibid 3. 
564 J Brunnée & E Hey, ‘Transparency and International Environmental Institutions’, in A 
Bianchi & A Peters (eds.), Transparency in International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 26. 
565 Ibid. 
566 Sina Wartmann and Raúl Salas, Ricardo Energy & Environment; Daniel Blank, GIZ, 
‘Deciphering MRV, accounting and transparency for the post-Paris era’, January 2018, GIZ, 
<https://www.transparency-partnership.net/system/files/document/MRV.pdf> accessed 
12/02/18. 
567 Fn. 562 (Bianchi) 8. 
568 Anne-Sophie Tabau ‘Evaluation of the Paris Climate Agreement according to a Global 
Standard of Transparency’, [2016] CCLR 23. 
569 Fn.564 (Brunnée & Hey) 25: what these authors refer to as ‘transparency of governance’. 
570 Ibid: what these authors refer to as ‘transparency for governance’. 
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Paris Agreement and transparency 
 
In Paris, the Conference of the Parties (COP) adopted decisions in relation to 
transparency of action and support,571 including establishing a Capacity-building 
Initiative for Transparency,572 and agreeing to establish an enhanced transparency 
framework for action and support, taking account of Parties’ different capacities.573 
This framework is to be implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive 
manner, respectful of national sovereignty and avoiding placing undue burden on 
Parties.574 The purpose is to provide a clear understanding of climate change action, 
in light of the objective in Article 2, UNFCCC, including clarity and tracking progress 
towards achieving NDCs.575 According to Tabau, the aim: 
 
… is not, as was the case with the Kyoto Protocol, to link transparency of 
implementation and compliance, but rather to enhance trust in order to raise 
ambition … by generating forward-looking and real time information, this 
transparency framework will dissipate fears of free-riding and competitive 
disadvantage, allow mutual learning and support, and send a signal beyond 
the level of States, in particular to private investors. 576  
 
Thus, an outcome perceived by Tabau, of the trust generated by greater 
transparency, is re-engagement with the private sector.  
 
Each Party is to regularly provide a national inventory report of anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks,577 and the information necessary to 
track progress in achieving its NDC.578 In accounting for anthropogenic emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks corresponding to their NDCs, Parties agree, inter 
alia, to promote transparency,579 to do so as well in communicating their NDCs,580 
and to ensure transparency in using ITMOs towards their NDCs.581 The COP, 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) will adopt 
                                                      
571 Fn.560 (Decision 1/CP.21) paragraphs 84-98. 
572 Ibid, paragraph 84. See also <https://www.cbitplatform.org/>.  
573 Article 13, paragraph 1, Paris Agreement. 
574 Article 13, paragraph 3, Paris Agreement. 
575 Article 13, paragraph 5, Paris Agreement.  
576 Fn.568 (Tabau) 30.  
577 Article 13, paragraph 7(a), Paris Agreement. 
578 Article 13, paragraph 7(b), Paris Agreement. 
579 Article 4, paragraph 13, Paris Agreement. Also, in this context, they commit to promote 
accuracy, completeness, comparability and consistency of the information.  
580 Article 4, paragraph 8, Paris Agreement and Decision 1/21, paragraph 13. 
581 Fn.557 (Art.6, para.2). 
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common modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency of action and 
support at its first session582 and, to this end, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the 
Paris Agreement (APA) has been requested to develop such, inter alia, taking into 
account the importance of facilitating improved transparency over time,583 and the 
need to promote transparency, accuracy, completeness, consistency and 
comparability.584  
 
‘The word “transparency” appears 30 times in the text of the decision adopted by the 
COP 21; 13 of these occurrences are contained within the Paris Agreement’.585 
Given the pervasive references, the Initiative, and the framework, it is 
understandable that transparency has been described by some commentators as 
being ‘core to the whole treaty’.586 And while these processes should be positive for 
information sharing and management, in themselves they provoke further questions 
about transparency. For instance, notwithstanding references in the decisions taken 
in Paris587 it is not clear the scope for non-state actors’ (civil society) participation or 
contribution to the development of the Initiative and framework, or in the work of the 
APA. Thus, it is not clear whether there is transparency of process such as to afford, 
for instance, the APA with the ‘institutional legitimacy’ referred to above.588 
 
Two further, concluding points are made for this section concerning transparency 
under the Paris Agreement. Modalities, procedures and guidelines (MPGs) for the 
transparency framework were adopted at CMA.1.589 The purpose of the framework 
                                                      
582 Article 13, paragraph 13, Paris Agreement. The first session of the CMA (CMA.1) was at 
COP 24, December 2018. 
583 Fn.560 (Decision 1/CP.21) paragraph 92(a). 
584 Ibid paragraph 92(c). 
585 Fn.568 (Tabau). 
586 Lambert Schneider et al., ‘Environmental Integrity under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement’ 
Discussion Paper, March 2017, German Emissions Trading Authority (DEHSt) at the 
German Environment Agency, 24 
<https://www.dehst.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/JI-CDM/Discussion-
Paper_Environmental_integrity.pdf?__blob=publicationFile> accessed 28/03/17.  
587 Fn.560 (Decision 1/CP.21) paragraphs 133-136. 
588 Fn.564 (Brunnée & Hey). For instance, in its work developing guidance on cooperative 
approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, the SBSTA has 
open sessions, which clearly imports that it must also have closed sessions, raising 
questions about the transparency of its processes.  
589 Decision 18/CMA.1, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
Parties to the Paris Agreement on the third part of its first session, held at Katowice from 2 to 
15 December 2018, Addendum, Part two, FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2, 19 March 2019, 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of Parties to the Paris 
Agreement, Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
Parties to the Paris Agreement, 
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is expressed as being ‘…to provide a clear understanding of climate change action 
in the light of the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2…’590 while the 
guiding principles of the MPGs include ‘Promoting transparency, accuracy, 
completeness, consistency and comparability;’ 591 Notwithstanding the stated 
purpose as being to provide understanding of climate action, although it is not 
explicit, the transparency provisions suggest an emphasis on the provision, rather 
than both provision and receipt, of information. Yet receiving the information (Who? 
How? When?), interpreting the information (importing the notion of capacity to do 
so) and the ability to understand what it means for the recipient, what it means in the 
particular context and how to use that knowledge, surely need to be equally 
balanced with the provision of it, given the importance of the concept of 
transparency and for building trust?  
 
Secondly, Article 13 provides, inter alia, that the enhanced transparency framework 
for action and support is to be implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-
punitive manner, respectful of national sovereignty. The MPGs repeat this 
formulation as part of the first guiding principle ‘…implementing the transparency 
framework in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respecting national 
sovereignty…’592 and again in setting out how technical expert review should be 
implemented.593 What it means in that last context might be gleaned from the 
following paragraph, which states that expert technical review teams, inter alia, shall 
not review the adequacy or appropriateness of NDCs, or of a Party’s domestic 
actions.594 While it is the prerogative of the CMA to put boundaries around the 
processes it establishes, the inference might be that investigative analysis should be 
limited in scope. Relating this back to the preceding point, the further question is 
whether this is intended to or will, in fact, also have a dampening effect on the ability 
to interpret information that flows from this enhanced transparency framework. This 
is pertinent to the networked market proposed by this thesis, to which consideration 
is now given. 
                                                                                                                                                         
<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2018_3_add2%20final_advance.pdf> 
accessed 07/05/19. 
590 Ibid paragraph 1. 
591 Ibid paragraph 3(d). 
592 Ibid paragraph 3(a). 
593 Ibid paragraph 148. 
594 Ibid paragraph 150(a)-(e). 
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Proposed market model and transparency 
 
A number of the elements of the model proposed are directed to ensuring both 
transparency and the trust it is hoped to generate. First, the ledger can be 
distributed to all nodes, so that, theoretically at least, any participant can see all 
transactions. In reality, which parties can view the ledger and which can interact with 
it will be a function of the levels of permissioning accorded them. Nevertheless, the 
very fact that information could be there, on all or at least a specific number of the 
nodes, would increase, it is suggested, the onus on jurisdictions participating.  
 
Secondly, more detailed information on the units transferred can be held on the 
distributed ledger, in contrast to the limited accounting role performed by registries 
to date.595 The Kyoto Protocol’s ITL has been described as opaque, despite being 
public, only recording transactions between countries, not individual account holders 
and not holding any information about contracts for forward delivery or options.596 It 
is noted also that the European Commission has been criticized for a lack of 
transparency in aspects of its implementation of the EUETS.597    
 
Thirdly, the accuracy of information concerning transactions will be ensured by 
elements such as the consensus mechanism between participating ETS 
administrators, the accumulative nature of the ledger and oversight of the market 
operation by supervisory bodies (elaborated in later chapters). Again in contrast, it 
might be noted that concerns were raised by the European Court of Auditors in its 
2015 report on the EUETS pertaining to suitability of the supervisory framework for 
the emission allowance market. They included the need for effective cooperation 
between European Commission entities responsible, on the one hand, for the 
carbon market and, on the other, for financial market regulation. No EU level 
oversight of the emissions market existed, no price or financial information relating 
to transactions was recorded, and there were no integrated procedures for 
                                                      
595 National registries hold no price or contract information, perform no role in relation to 
trading or clearing and hold no information concerning emissions: Anthony Hobley and Peter 
Hawkes, ‘GHG Emissions and Trading Registries’, in David Freestone and Charlotte Streck 
(eds.), Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms: Making Kyoto Work, 
(Oxford University Press, 2005) 128-9. 
596 Elizabeth Lokey Aldrich, Cassandra L. Koerner, ‘Unveiling Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) 
Trades: Current Market Impacts and Prospects for the Future’, Atmosphere 2012, 3, 229-
245, 233. 
597 Fn.463 (ECA) paragraphs 64-79. 
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investigating suspicious transactions.598 Systems related to the EU Registry for 
processing fundamental information also showed certain shortcomings, for example, 
procedures for opening accounts were not sufficiently robust and transactions were 
insufficiently supervised and monitored at the EU level.599  
 
Fourthly, the permanent, accumulative nature of the distributed ledger is an element 
that ensures the integrity of the record. This is reflected also in the traceability of 
data through the ledger, thus ensuring accuracy of the record. Security can be 
provided, also, by the distributed nature of the ledger and by the use of encryption. 
Under the current UNFCCC arrangements, communications between registries and 
the ITL rely on functional specifications that specify use of connections using 
encrypted messaging over the internet, just as under the proposal. Current 
communications are encrypted using Secure Socket Layer (SSL),600 which relies on 
certificate authorities to issue digital certificates for identity and authentication 
purposes, but these have been described as ‘a complete sham’ and not providing 
any actual security, as it is claimed that the average user doesn’t bother to verify the 
certificate exchanged.601 However, no conclusions are drawn as to the relative 
technical merits of different types of cryptography, as it is not necessary for the 
purpose of this thesis. 
 
Finally, the independent assessment process by which the mitigation values of 
mitigation outcomes are assessed should afford the proposed market with another 
layer of transparency. Whereas the preceding elements all pertain to the functional 
operation of the distributed ledger itself, this element deals specifically with the 
interpretation placed on the information about the schemes generating the units to 
be traded in the market and the jurisdictions from where those schemes derive. As 
such, this aspect is tied directly to the information provided by Parties under the 
Paris Agreement and so may be influenced by the dampening effect of the ‘non-
intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of national sovereignty’ qualification on 
                                                      
598 Ibid paragraphs 14-24. 
599 Ibid paragraphs 29-41. It is noted that in the proposed market these procedures will 
remain primarily the responsibility of participating jurisdictions, however, there will be 
additional checks and balances in the market operation rules: see next chapter. 
600 UNFCCC Secretariat, Data Exchange Standards for Registry Systems under the Kyoto 
Protocol, Technical Specifications (Version 1.1.11), 24 November 2013, 6-7 
<https://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/registry_systems/itl/application/pdf/data_exchange_st
andards_for_registry_systems_under_the_kyoto_protocol.pdf> accessed 14/11/18. 
601 Fn.528 (Van Valkenburgh). 
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implementation of the enhanced transparency framework for action and support, 
pursuant to Article 13. While intergovernmental processes and bodies like the 
technical expert review panels may be constrained, the market is more likely to 
respond if sentiment is that one particular jurisdiction or another is not pulling its 
weight. This flags a potential point of friction between the intergovernmental 
processes and private sector engagement through the market. However, if 
transparency is to build trust and, as Tabau postulates,602 send a signal beyond the 
level of States to private investors, market sentiment will provide a useful 
independent yardstick on effort. 
 (b) Robust accounting 
 
In accounting for anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks 
corresponding to their NDCs, Parties agree also to ensure the avoidance of double 
counting,603 implying the need for robustness in their accounting processes. In using 
ITMOs towards their NDCs, Parties must apply robust accounting to ensure, inter 
alia, the avoidance of double counting.604 The need to ensure that double counting 
is avoided is a consideration also for the APA.605 
 
The model proposed relates principally to the interaction between participating 
entities. Thus, elements such as those ensuring the accuracy of information 
concerning transactions, security afforded by encryption and the permanent, 
accumulative nature of the ledger – with information added by consensus – should 
ensure traceability of provenance, facilitating an environment of robust accounting in 
transactions that should avoid double counting. Accounting in relation to emissions 
and removals corresponding to their NDCs by individual Parties participating in a 
network based on a distributed ledger (DL), of which their domestic registry forms a 
part, will nevertheless remain a function of the robustness in their domestic 
accounting processes. Part of the process for a jurisdiction to join the network would 
need to include establishing the accuracy of the domestic accounts of entities they 
authorise to trade as at the time of joining. 
 
                                                      
602 Fn.568 (Tabau). 
603 Article 4, paragraph 13, Paris Agreement. 
604 Fn.557 (Art.6, para.2) 
605 Fn. 560 (Decision 1/CP.21) paragraph 92(f). 
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It is conceivable also that a jurisdiction may wish to maintain its existing domestic 
registry IT system and apply software that provides an interface to the DL network, 
so that legal entities regulated by it and operating on the existing legacy IT system 
can still trade on the network. While it is understood that this is technically feasible, 
such an arrangement would put that jurisdiction’s domestic registry outside the DL 
network. Thus, elements of the network that ensure accuracy of the information, 
security and robustness of the accounting processes would stop at that interface.  
(c) Reporting 
 
Reporting is a key part of measurement, reporting and verification (MRV), which has 
evolved from individual requirements under the UNFCCC to become a robust 
framework,606 that now forms the basis for the modalities, procedures and guidelines 
for the enhanced transparency framework.607 The centrality of information and 
information management is apparent not only from the significance attaching to 
transparency – that is, the openness, availability and clarity of that information – and 
in the way it is compiled (through robust accounting), but also in terms of how it is 
communicated. All Parties agree, in communicating their NDCs, to provide ‘the 
information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding’ as they have also 
been exhorted to do in relation to their intended NDCs.608 The NDCs communicated 
by Parties are to be recorded in a public registry,609 for which the Subsidiary Body 
for Implementation (SBI) is to develop modalities and procedures.610  
 
Parties also have regular inventory reporting obligations611 in relation to tracking 
NDC progress,612 and the MPGs take into account the importance of improved 
reporting over time.613 Counterparties to transactions involving ITMOs are urged to 
report transparently, including on outcomes used to meet international pledges, with 
                                                      
606 Fn.566 (Wartmann et al./GIZ) 15.  
607 Fn.560 (Decision 1/CP.21) paragraph 98; also fn.566 (Wartmann et al./GIZ) 22.  
608 Fn.580 (Art.4, para.8 and Decision 1/21, para.13). See also Fn.560 (Decision 1/21) 
paragraphs 25, 27. 
609 Article 4, paragraph 12, Paris Agreement. 
610 Fn.560 (Decision 1/CP.21) paragraph 29. Again, transparency questions arise in relation 
to how the SBI will go about this process and what it will provide about the information in the 
public registry and access to it. 
611 Fn.577 (Art.13, para.7(a)). 
612 Fn.578 (Art.13, para.7(b)). 
613 Fn.589 (Decision 18/CMA.1) paragraphs 7-9.  
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a view to promoting environmental integrity and avoiding double counting.614 The 
CMA must also periodically take stock of implementation to assess collective 
progress towards achieving the purpose of the Paris Agreement (the ‘global 
stocktake’).615 ETS administrators of the participating jurisdictions will have 
permissioned access to the ledger, as will the entity that operates the ledger. 
Reporting, insofar as it relates to transactions between jurisdictions, should be a 
matter of interrogating the ledger, functionality for which would be built into the 
design. Thus, it is anticipated that these reporting obligations would be capable of 
being addressed. 
 (ii) Transaction management 
 
The second area of critical importance to a cross-jurisdictional carbon market is in 
relation to transaction management. As noted above, provision for the international 
transfer of mitigation outcomes for use towards Parties’ NDCs sits in a matrix of 
inter-related principles, infused throughout the decisions of the Parties and the 
terms of the Paris Agreement. These principles address the potential impact of 
transactions involving international transfers of mitigation outcomes expressly in 
terms of the need to ensure environmental integrity, and in the application of robust 
accounting to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting. This is especially 
so in provisions dealing with how Parties account for their NDCs616 and how Parties 
use ITMOs towards NDCs.617  
(a) Environmental integrity 
 
Environmental integrity is referred to in the context of Parties engaging in voluntary 
cooperation in the implementation of their NDCs,618 and to the extent that, in so 
doing, they use ITMOs.619 Yet, as is the case with a number of the concepts 
introduced, the decisions of the Parties and Paris Agreement provisions do not 
define what ‘environmental integrity’ means in this context.620 Commentators have 
                                                      
614 Ibid paragraph 107. 
615 Article 14, paragraph 1, Paris Agreement.  
616 Fn.579 (Art.4, para.13). 
617 Fn.557 (Art.6, para.2). 
618 Fn.558 (Art.6, para.1). 
619 Fn.557 (Art.6, para.2). 
620 Although the draft negotiating text provides some indication in terms of the information on 
cooperative approaches that Parties potentially must submit: paragraphs 28(h) and (i), 
UNFCCC, SBSTA49: Draft Text on SBSTA 49 agenda item 11(a) Matters relating to Article 6 
 168 
noted that Parties to the negotiations seem to view the concept as being confined to 
risks undermining GHG mitigation action, as opposed to broader environmental 
damage.621 Some Parties’ submissions have referred to additionality, or the 
avoidance of transfers of ‘hot air’, but none actually defines environmental 
integrity.622 In the context of Article 6, some commentators understand 
environmental integrity to mean ‘the use of international transfers does not result in 
higher global GHG emissions than if the mitigation targets in NDCs had been 
achieved only through domestic action, without international transfers.’623 This 
definition may seem limiting, considering the multiple references to the expression 
from which a broader intended meaning might be inferred.624 Nevertheless, it is 
sufficient in the context of international transfers in accordance with Article 6, 
paragraph 2, the focus of this thesis.  
 
Aspects of an IT system architecture based on DLT as proposed could ensure that 
environmental integrity – as so defined – can be maintained when international 
transfers take place. For example, with DLT the basis on which a jurisdiction opts to 
engage in international transfers (the rules governing that jurisdiction’s participation, 
or perhaps more accurately, governing the basis on which it authorises an entity to 
engage in international transfers) can be embedded in the computer code that sets 
out the transactional terms and conditions on which those entities engage in 
transactions (the so-called ‘smart contracts’). If these rules were not satisfied in a 
particular case, the transaction would not proceed. In this way, a jurisdiction could 
also set its national requirements and have scope to vary them, to adapt to 
changing economic, market or environmental circumstances. There might also be 
                                                                                                                                                         
of the Paris Agreement: Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, 
paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, Version 2 of 8 December 10:00 hrs, Annex 
<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/SBSTA49_11a_DT_v2.pdf> accessed 
21/01/19.  
621 Fn.586 (Schneider et al./Environmental Integrity) 12.  
622 Ibid. 
623 Ibid.  
624 For instance, the Parties agree to promote environmental integrity in accounting for 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks corresponding to their NDCs 
(Article 4, paragraph 13); the AWGPA is requested to take into account the need to ensure 
environmental integrity in developing recommendations for common modalities, procedures 
and guidelines for the transparency of action and support (Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 
92(g)); and counterparties to transactions involving ITMOs are urged to report transparently, 
including on outcomes used to meet international pledges, with a view, inter alia, to 
promoting environmental integrity (Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 107). As such, it is open for 
the expression to be interpreted to include broader environmental impacts, beyond just GHG 
emissions. 
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more general rules embedded in the code addressing environmental integrity (for 
example, directed towards ensuring that a transaction could not result in higher 
GHG emissions by either counterparty), supplementarity and other requirements, 
applying to all international transfer transactions, regardless of the jurisdictions 
involved. Examples of these are set out in the next chapter and Appendix. 
(b) Robust accounting, avoidance of double counting 
 
Robust accounting is ‘a key prerequisite for ensuring environmental integrity’625 and 
‘crucial for ensuring environmental integrity and providing transparency on climate 
action.’626 The SBSTA is charged with the task of developing and recommending 
guidance for the application of robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance 
of double counting as referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, Paris Agreement.627 It is 
to complete this task by the first session of the CMA.628  
 
Like ‘transparency’ and ‘environmental integrity’, what ‘robust accounting’ or 
‘avoidance of double counting’ are intended to mean, is not spelt out. In order to 
begin defining these terms, consideration must first be given to the question of what 
is to be robustly accounted for, in this context. Yet the Paris Agreement provides no 
definition of  ‘mitigation outcomes’, the subject of international transfers. The 
question of what are mitigation outcomes and related issues, such as methods for 
their quantification, technical tools and infrastructure for their operationalization and 
management, the means to ensure environmental integrity through robust 
accounting rules, and comparability of outcomes, are the subject of consideration by 
the SBSTA629 and comment by observers.630 Nevertheless, an IT system 
                                                      
625 Fn.586 (Schneider et al./Environmental Integrity) 13. 
626 Lambert Schneider et al., ‘Robust Accounting of International Transfers under Article 6 of 
the Paris Agreement, Discussion Paper’, October 2016, German Emissions Trading 




627 Fn.560 (Decision 1/CP.21) paragraph 36. 
628 Ibid. This was at COP 24, in December 2018. However, consensus could not be reached, 
so the decision was for the SBSTA to continue consideration and forward a draft decision for 
consideration at CMA.2: Decision -/CMA.1, Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement and paragraphs 36-40 of decision 1/CP.21 
<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/auv_cp24_i4_Art.6.pdf> accessed 21/01/19. 
629 See, for example, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, Vol.12 No.747, Summary of Katowice Climate Change Conference: 2-15 December 
2018, 17, 18 <http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12747e.pdf> accessed 12/03/19. 
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infrastructure based on DLT that can incorporate the transactional rules Parties 
agree as part of the computer code by which transactions proceed (smart 
contracts), to ensure that appropriate adjustments are made to the ledger 
automatically as part of any transactional process, should provide the robustness of 
accounting mandated at Paris. Adjustments to the ledger would be accumulative 
and more or less immutable, thereby guaranteeing traceability and permanence, 
facilitating auditability. The distributed nature of the ledger and constant updating by 
consensus of all copies, to ensure all are the same, would reduce the need for 
reconciliations. 
  
C Summation of proposal  
 
This chapter elaborates the concept of and theory for a market between carbon 
markets, a trading platform connecting and facilitating transactions between 
individual, separate markets, each of which will continue to operate as an 
autonomous operation in its own jurisdiction, while participating on the network 
created by the connection. The proposed market consists of two distinct elements, 
being firstly, the networking of the individual markets across this trading platform, 
and secondly, the platform operating on distributed ledger IT architecture. It aims to 
facilitate and stimulate an inter-jurisdictional market that will encourage private 
financial sector engagement, while at the same time promoting the objectives of 
climate policy evidenced in the Paris Agreement. 
 
Networking is not current practice, presently being only conceptual in nature. The 
current approach for connecting carbon markets from different jurisdictions is for 
them to link, which involves alignment of schemes, policies, laws, processes and so 
on. This gives rise to political issues, stemming from the perceived impact of system 
alignment on the sovereignty of the participant jurisdictions. Networking better 
addresses these issues, as the inherent problem of imbalance of negotiating 
positions would not arise. Networking also holds out a more time efficient process 
by avoiding the need to homogenise laws, systems, registries, policies and other 
                                                                                                                                                         
630 Fn.626 (Schneider et al./Robust Accounting); also see: Martin Cames et al., ‘International 
market mechanisms after Paris’, Discussion Paper, (November 2016), German Emissions 




elements of the respective participating jurisdictions’ systems. Hence, many legal 
and practical issues might be avoided, thereby promising a more flexible 
arrangement.  
 
The global recognition that technological developments are occurring that 
fundamentally change how financial services are provided, how markets, business 
and government operate, leads to a conclusion that in proposing a model for 
networking carbon markets, it is necessary and desirable to propose that the 
networked market platform should operate on distributed ledger technology. 
Application of this technology is not without issues. Some of the issues identified 
with the technology include scalability, interoperability with existing and between 
systems, need for a way to settle transactions in central bank money, absence of a 
recourse mechanism for dealing with mistakes, and no scope for margin finance and 
short selling. Key risks that have been raised include cyber risk, fraud and money 
laundering, difficulty in identifying anomalies, and how to deal with erroneous 
coding.  
 
At the same time, DLT offers useful features, including (qualified) immutability 
(supporting traceability, auditability, and robust accounting); decentralised 
participants (using smart contracting to facilitate transactions); distributed 
information sharing and management (enabling balancing of transparency with 
privacy, and the permissioning mechanism); and security (based on hash 
cryptography, and the consensus mechanism). Realisation of these benefits, 
resolution of issues and management of risks, and how the application should be 
regulated, will be a function of use case design. In the model proposed, all 
participants would be identified, so the DL would be public but permissioned; and 
the consensus mechanism, it is proposed, should be based on nodes of the 
administrators from participating jurisdictional schemes (ETSs). 
 
It has been argued in this chapter that the application of DLT provides innovative 
solutions in two areas of critical importance if operationalization of Article 6, 
paragraph 2 is to engage the private sector in building a cross-jurisdictional carbon 
market. They are firstly, in data (information) sharing and management; and 
secondly, in transaction management. As examined, elements of the decisions of 
the Parties, and in the Paris Agreement, concerning mitigation, so far as they relate 
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to information and information management, emphasise transparency but appear to 
focus on the provision of information.631 Yet information is not the same as 
transparency. Rather transparency involves also the other side of the information 
coin, namely its receipt, interpretation, use and understanding. These aspects in 
relation to information (that is, receipt, use, interpretation, understanding), 
correspond with assumptions that underlie the networked carbon markets (NCM) 
concept, for instance that: 
 
• governments need information about jurisdictions and schemes with which 
they may consider ‘connecting’ their scheme;  
• changes may take place in a scheme and its effectiveness over time, or with 
a jurisdiction’s economy, so information needs to be collected and monitored 
on an on-going basis; 
• similarly, market participants need information to make informed investment 
decisions; 
• some governments and market participants have the resources to carry out 
their own due diligence on an on-going basis to make these decisions, while 
others may not. For those governments and market participants that do not 
have access to these resources, an independent source of information would 
be important; and 
• it is implicit that governments retain sovereignty to act on this information as 
they see fit, and the hegemony over their schemes and policies.632 
 
Information not only needs to be available, but also needs to be reliable: in terms of 
the Paris Agreement, there must be transparency, accuracy, completeness, 
consistency and comparability of information. The various elements of an IT system 
architecture based on DLT would seem to be able to address these requirements. 
As noted, with DLT the ledger is accumulative and permanent (more or less 
immutable, as previously discussed), thus affording security of transactions, for 
instance, through fraud prevention. This can facilitate robust accounting and the 
avoidance of double counting, since entries are only added once they have satisfied 
                                                      
631 Although it is acknowledged that UNFCCC work is continuing in this respect through 
bodies such as APA, SBSTA and SBI. 
632 Justin Macinante ‘Networking Carbon Markets: Key Elements in the Process’, 2016, 
World Bank Group Climate Change, 9,10 
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25750> 
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a consensus process in which the relevant authorised entities agree they are correct 
and should be added to the ledger. Once in the ledger, it is very unlikely they can be 
altered, other than by overall consensus.  
 
From a technical perspective, individual features and elements described as part of 
the DL such as the accumulative nature of the ledger, and cryptographic security, 
could equally well be incorporated using a centralised database. The question that 
needs to be considered continually is whether the distributed architecture adds 
anything that could not otherwise be achieved using a centralised database 
currently in use such as, say, the ITL, suitably adapted. The answer, this thesis 
proposes, is that consideration of the technical arrangements must be set in the 
broader overall context. Application of the DL, particularly for networking carbon 
markets, as proposed, affords greater flexibility to jurisdictions to access, or 
conversely to leave the networked market, according to their perception of domestic 
economic suitability, as well as a level-playing field irrespective of economic size or 
development.  
 
Information needs not only to be available and reliable, it needs to be capable of 
interpretation and understanding. In the market proposed, this is the function of the 
independent evaluation process, the mitigation value assessment. The next chapter 
(chapter VII) illustrates how the market proposed might be implemented in practical 
terms. This elaboration, in turn, provides the basis for analysis of the potential 
regulatory and institutional frameworks for such, in the following chapters (chapters 











Building on the concept and theory set out in the preceding chapter, this chapter 
elaborates more tangibly how the proposed market might be implemented. Section 
A sets out the elements of the proposed market, before consideration is given in 
Section B to alternative potential market structures under Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement. Elaboration of the proposal in this and the preceding chapter provides 
the foundation for subsequent analysis of the institutional and regulatory 
frameworks. 
 
A The proposed market elaborated 
 
The proposal is elaborated in terms of the following five areas:  
 
• infrastructure of the market;  
• rules for the operation of the distributed ledger;  
• operational mechanisms that will be required, being (i) a mechanism for 
valuing differences between units of participant jurisdictions in terms of 
mitigation; and (ii) a mechanism to effect transactions;  
• transactional rules as part of a regulatory framework; and  
• participants, on a jurisdictional, cross-jurisdictional and supra-jurisdictional 
basis. 
 
There are overlaps across these categories, as to a degree they just examine the 
market from different perspectives: for instance, infrastructure, categories of 
participant and then, the institutional framework, in the following chapter. This aims 
to demonstrate how the various elements will mesh together to form a coherent 
scheme.  
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1. Infrastructure considerations 
 
The market can be visualised at three levels, illustrated in Diagram 1, as being 
 
• in the middle, the jurisdiction where an emissions trading scheme (ETS) 
operates: the registry, or jurisdictional, level (the single market ledger in 
Diagram below);  
• below the jurisdictional level, the entities in the ETS, trading at an intra-
jurisdictional (i.e., corporate – single organisation ledger) level; and  
• above the jurisdictional level, the network where trading transactions 











There is the possibility of sub-levels between the jurisdictional and intra-jurisdictional 
levels, in the case of, for instance, provincial or municipal-based ETSs operating 
within a jurisdiction. For the sake of simplicity, the discussion here is based on just 
the three: inter-jurisdictional (networked market); jurisdictional (single market – 
ETS/registry); and intra-jurisdictional (single organisation or entity/corporate) levels. 
(i) Existing infrastructure and network design 
 
Some of the infrastructure exists already, while some new infrastructure would be 
required. The starting point is that ETSs exist in various jurisdictions.633 They consist 
of registries managed by administrators (who may also be the ETS regulator); 
entities with compliance obligations under the scheme; and other entities (such as 
traders and market makers) that are also authorised to trade in the ETS. Assuming 
that the ETS in each jurisdiction operates electronically, the ETS administrator and 
each entity authorised to trade will be a node.634 The nodes will already be capable 
of connecting electronically with each other, through the internet. In each ETS, the 
registry is the ledger and when another ETS networks with the first, their registries 
together become the ledger and so on, as others join the network. The ledger is in 
effect, therefore, a collective database for all participating registries. If the ledger 
electronic architecture is fully distributed, then each node will be on the distributed 
ledger (DL) network and operate the relevant DL software.  
 
If each node on the network holds a full copy of the network ledger, a number of 
technical considerations arise. For example, this may present a problem for 
individual participants because of the computing and memory capacity it would 
require them to install, thus impacting the degree to which the network is scalable. 
This issue may be accounted for by design that limits the amount of historical 
transactions needing to be held and accessible on each and every node. Thus, 
authorised entities might primarily hold that part of the ledger relating to current 
transactions (what these include would need to be defined), while perhaps just the 
ETS administrator, who itself would not interact to engage in transactions, might 
hold the complete updated record of all ledger transactions.  
 
                                                      
633 These would operate within a domestic legal framework, being based on primary and/or 
secondary legislation of the jurisdiction.  
634 Each node being a computer address or location. 
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Secondly, and related to the preceding point, is consideration of how new entrants 
to the network get up to speed, so to speak, in terms of holding a copy of the ledger. 
If, as suggested in the preceding point, the ETS administrator holds the full ledger 
history and authorised entities trading on the network only hold that part of the 
ledger relating to current transactions, this consideration arises twice: firstly in 
respect of the ETS administrators and secondly, in relation to the authorised trading 
entities. The technical and timing requirements for the two situations would differ; 
nevertheless, it is assumed for the purposes of this thesis that these issues are 
capable of being addressed by the technical design and participating nodes’ 
capacities.  
 
Thirdly, as each copy of the ledger needs to be updated when new transaction(s) 
are added and the ledger changes, the greater the distribution of copies of the 
ledger the more time it will take, reaching the more physically far-flung nodes later 
(perhaps only seconds or parts of seconds, but nonetheless relevant in the context) 
than more centrally located nodes: hence, as well as taking account of this in design 
of the overall ledger, it may necessitate inclusion of a measure such as short 
periods (presumably only seconds, or even parts of seconds) when trading 
doesn’t occur while the ledger updates, so that all market participants have the 
same accurate, up-to-date ledger information available at all trading times.  
 
Finally, the greater the distribution of the ledger, the more careful ledger structural 
design will need to be to avoid ‘choke points’, where a hacking attack on the system, 
or technical breakdown, might isolate a portion of the network, thus causing that part 
of the ledger to be divergent from the rest (at least until the problem is identified and 
rectified).  
 
Approaches to address these practical issues of market operation would be, 
primarily, a matter for technical design and, as such, beyond the scope of this 
thesis. If required, it would be possible also to implement interfaces between 
existing635 IT systems and the DL system. Thus, at the intra-jurisdictional level, if 
they so chose, entities could continue to operate their corporate systems on existing 
software and implement a software interface to the DL system, if the jurisdiction 
operated its ETS on a DL system. Similarly, if a jurisdiction wished to continue 
                                                      
635 These are also described as ‘legacy’ systems. 
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operating on a legacy system, it may be feasible to implement an interface between 
it and the DL network. The downside of this approach would be that the traceability, 
transparency and immutability of the DL system would stop at the relevant interface, 
resulting in a sub-optimal network outcome overall. Hence, while from a technical 
perspective it is an option to accommodate retention of legacy software systems, 
while still implementing the DL at a higher level, the optimal outcome would be for 
the DL architecture to be fully diffused.   
(ii) Additional infrastructure requirements  
 
Apart from implementing the DL software if they choose to do so, existing ETSs 
would continue to operate on the same basis domestically, without any impediment 
or imposition, and the administrators would continue to perform their roles as before. 
Similarly, entities trading domestically in the ETS would continue to do so, without 
change. Participating jurisdictions would continue to be accountable for their 
respective ETSs, including the operation and integrity of their own registries, 
notwithstanding becoming part of the broader networked ledger, which would, in 
turn, were this to be done by implementing DLT domestically, facilitate their record 
keeping, accounting, audit and reporting.636 
(a) Network entity and standing management body 
 
While participating jurisdictions would own, manage and remain responsible for that 
part of the network operating inside their geographical area, at the network level 
there would be a need for a new entity to manage, operate and maintain the 
network to the extent that it would exist outside the individual jurisdictional 
boundaries. This ‘network entity’ could possibly be privately owned and operated, 
but it is considered more appropriate that it be owned by jurisdictions participating in 
the network, which would bear the costs of its provision and operation collectively. It 
would be accountable for the network overall, including in respect of reporting 
obligations to the Conference of Parties to the Convention, serving as the meeting 
of Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA).637  
 
                                                      
636 See also: Justin D Macinante ‘A Conceptual Model for Networking of Carbon Markets on 
Distributed Ledger Technology Architecture’ [2017] CCLR 243, 250. 
637 Ibid. Considered in the next chapter. 
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On-going governance and operational management direction for the network entity 
could be provided by a standing management body. This body might be constituted 
at two levels, being an executive level, possibly in the form of a permanent 
secretariat, and a non-executive level made up of representatives of participating 
jurisdictions, with rotating presidency and membership, procedural rules and 
schedule of periodic meetings.638 The functions of the network entity would relate to 
the operation and maintenance of the physical and electronic components of the 
network and, in this sense, would appropriately be in the remit of the professional 
executive. The standing management body, in addition to overseeing and ensuring 
appropriate funding of the network entity to perform its functions, would monitor 
trading (international transfers), and ensure environmental integrity of the trading 
system, reporting, robust accounting and audit across the trading network. 
 
There is limited consideration in the literature given to governance of connected 
carbon markets and what there has been is, understandably, in the context of linking 
ETSs (see preceding chapter). For instance, a review of current research in 2015 
even notes: ‘governance of linking is an area of potential further exploration.’639 In 
this context, it has been observed that arrangements may range from loose 
cooperation between jurisdictions through to an international organisation with 
formal powers.640 As that observation is about linking, the consideration given is in 
terms of the degree of integration or harmonisation states may be willing to 
countenance under such institutional arrangements.641 Issues identified to explore in 
that context include the legal form of the link, mechanisms for information, 
consultation and conflict resolution.642 The establishment of an international or 
supranational organisation might occur as a later stage of integration and such an 
entity might have separate legal personality, a defined governance structure, and 
                                                      
638 There are examples of such supervisory structures in international and transnational 
organisations: for instance, the Bank for International Settlements: <www.bis.org>; the 
Financial Stability Board: <www.fsb.org>; International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions: <www.iosco.org>. The UNFCCC COP and Secretariat are another illustration 
of such a structure. 
639 Aki Kachi et al., Linking Emissions Trading Systems: A Summary of Current Research, 
January 2015, ICAP, 11 
<https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/?option=com_attach&task=download&id=241> accessed 
06/09/17. 
640 Michael Mehling ‘Linking of Emissions Trading Schemes’, in David Freestone and 
Charlotte Streck (eds.), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and beyond, 
(Oxford University Press, 2009, 122. 
641 Ibid. 
642 Ibid 123. 
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enforcement powers; power to collect market information, control over market 
access and accountability, oversight of market abuse and management of prices.643 
The EU-Swiss ETS linking agreement,644 for instance, establishes a Joint 
Committee composed of representatives of the parties645 to administer the 
agreement and ensure its proper implementation. The Committee’s functions are 
confined to discussing proposed amendments to the agreement, conducting reviews 
in the light of developments in either ETS and trying to settle any disputes that might 
arise.646 Similarly, the California-Quebec agreement provides for a Consultation 
Committee.647 
 
The elements described by Mehling would be applicable also to the network entity 
proposed here, which is envisaged performing a functional, operational role, 
ensuring the proper and efficient running of the networked market. It would have 
separate legal personality and its constitutional rules, to which jurisdictions would 
sign up, and the standard terms and conditions for transactions built into smart 
contracts, could address market governance issues. ETS administrators of 
jurisdictions participating would be part of the network and domestic financial 
regulators from those jurisdictions would continue to oversee the operation of 
markets domestically. It is proposed these domestic bodies – the ETS 
administrators and financial regulators – would also cooperate with (or their 
representatives would constitute) the standing management body to ensure 
effective governance of the networked market, including maintenance of 
environmental integrity, and efficient operational management of, inter alia, matters 
such as price volatility, market abuse, market manipulation or dominant trader 
behaviour (see chapters VIII and IX). 
                                                      
643 Ibid. Note also that another author, Joseph Aldy, has proposed a Bretton Woods type 
climate institution, however, this proposal corresponds more with the entity proposed by this 
thesis for overseeing mitigation value assessments (later in this chapter): see Joseph Aldy 
‘Designing a Bretton Woods Institution to Address Climate Change’, 2012, HKS Faculty 
Research Working Paper Series RWP12-017, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University <https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8830777/RWP12-
017_Aldy.pdf> accessed 17/04/18.  
644 Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation on the linking of 
their greenhouse gas emissions trading systems. OJ L 322, 7.12.2017, 3–26.  
645 Ibid, Article 12. 
646 Ibid, Article 13. 
647 Article 12, Agreement between California Air Resources Board and the Government of 
Quebec, Concerning the Harmonisation and Integration of Cap-And-Trade Programs for 
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 27 September 2013 
<https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/ca_quebec_linking_agreement_english.pdf
> accessed 06/03/18. 
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   (b) Exchange, settlement platform and intermediaries 
 
A further infrastructural consideration relates to the need for a trading exchange and 
settlement platform for transactions between jurisdictions. Whereas settlement for 
many securities transactions can take up to three days from the trade date (T+3), 
foreign exchange settlements two days (T+2) and US Treasury bonds even 
requiring one day (T+1),648 one of the benefits of a decentralised infrastructure 
based on a network of nodes, in which participants are able to engage and transact 
with one another peer-to-peer (P2P) is that, by removing the need for trusted central 
counterparties to intermediate the transactions, there are various efficiencies ‘…by 
reducing the need for multiple intermediaries, the DLT could also reduce transaction 
costs.’649 Reducing transaction costs improves the efficiency with which the market 
operates to achieve mitigation outcomes.650 Thus, while the actual electronic 
transaction process may be marginally slower – seconds or even minutes, rather 
than microseconds – the end-to-end execution, settlement and transaction 
completion theoretically should be faster overall. 
 
The question is whether multiple levels of custody, clearing and settlement might be 
reduced to a single platform, with trading taking place directly on the trading 
platform attached to the ledger, obviating the roles of broker, central clearing 
counterparty and clearing members and, arguably, custodians (central securities 
depositaries and nominees).651 While counterparty risk in cash ‘spot’ transactions (in 
the primary market) may be ameliorated by immediate settlement, counterparty risk 
extends throughout the life of a derivative (secondary market) contract, such as a 
future. Hence, given that derivatives will probably constitute a substantial part, if not 
                                                      
648 International Monetary Fund, ‘Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations’ 
January 2016, Staff Discussion Note SDN/16/03, 22. 
649 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), ‘The Distributed Ledger Technology 
Applied to Securities Markets’ Discussion Paper, 2 June 2016, ESMA/2016/773 9-13, at 12. 
650 Transaction costs in relation to emissions market mechanisms and Coase theory 
discussed in: Navraj Ghaleigh ‘Two Stories about EU Climate Change Law and Policy’, 
(2013) vol.14 no.1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 43. As to the impact of administrative 
transaction costs in the EUETS: Peter Heindl ‘The impact of administrative transaction costs 
in the EU emissions trading system’, (2017) 17:3 Climate Policy 314. 
651 Stuart Davis and Julian Cunningham-Day, Linklaters LLP, ‘Blockchain – recalibrating the 
market infrastructure’, Going Digital Quarterly Breakfast Briefing, 14 October 2016, 
presentation Powerpoint slide 16. 
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the bulk, of the market,652 central clearing counterparties are likely still to be 
required.653 In relation to other intermediaries, whether these roles persist (and, 
consequently, the need for regulatory controls on them) will be a matter for how the 
conduct of transactions across the network is structured (see operational 
mechanisms, below).  
 
Furthermore, settlement delivery against payment raises the issue of the need for 
an interface between smart contracts on the DL network and fiat money, for 
immediate settlement to be effective. In order that a DL networked market can 
deliver the time and cost savings of immediate settlement delivery against payment, 
there needs to be a way to provide for payment on the ledger. One possibility is to 
provide for payment through digital currencies, although this is not favoured as it 
would introduce another step (and related risks, for instance, volatility of digital 
currencies) to the settlement process.654 An alternative is for there to be an interface 
between the ledger and fiat currency system. This would build in an additional time 
factor, and also risk considerations, into the transaction process. All the same, it is 
noted that central banks and intergovernmental organisations are investigating both 
digital currencies655 and the possibility of adapting central bank settlement systems 
to facilitate emerging settlement and payment infrastructures to access central bank 
money,656 thus potentially affording a solution. 
                                                      
652 Emissions derivatives constitute more than 90% of the carbon market: European Court of 




653 Fn.651 (Davis et al./Linklaters) slide 18. 
654 It is noted that tokens or digital currencies tied to the value of the US$ or other fiat 
currencies are being developed, however, as these depend on the balance sheet and capital 
reserves of the entity or organisation backing them, really need to be issued by central 
banks or substantial financial organisations to be considered viable. 
655 Fn.648 (IMF); also see: Morten Bech, Rodney Garratt, ‘Central bank cryptocurrencies’, 
September 2017, BIS Quarterly Review, 55-70 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1709.pdf> accessed 24/01/18; Robleh Ali, John 
Barrdear, Roger Clews, ‘Innovations in payment technologies and the emergence of digital 
currencies’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2014 Q3 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2014/qb14q3digit
alcurrenciesbitcoin1.pdf> accessed 12/01/17; John Barrdear and Michael Kumhof, ‘The 
macroeconomics of central bank issued digital currencies’, July 2016, Bank of England, Staff 
Working Paper No.605 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2016/swp605.pdf> 
accessed 12/01/17.   
656 In 2018, the Bank of England announced it was conducting Proof-of-Concept exercises 
with technology companies to understand how its Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) 
service could support settlement in systems operating on innovative payment technologies, 
 184 
2. Operational rules of the distributed ledger network657 
 
Jurisdictions that join the network would need to abide by certain operational rules 
necessary for the functioning of the network. As proposed here, these rules would 
be part of the contractual terms by which jurisdictions subscribe to the constitution 
and become part owners of the network entity. They would include arrangements as 
to permissioning, consensus and encryption. 
 
Private/public key encryption is one of the elements that identifies a DL system, 
while permissioning is a configurable element that defines both who is able to join 
the system and their level of access to, and interoperability with, the ledger – 
notwithstanding that they may hold the ledger in full on their computer. In the model 
proposed, the ledger may be organised as a chain of blocks of information – each 
block containing a collection of transactions. Transaction information is, thus, 
exchanged between nodes and added as a new ledger entry to the computers of all 
participants (nodes). In the absence of a trusted central party, the updating in this 
way relies on a consensual process amongst the nodes.  
(i) Consensus 
 
To briefly recap, distributed consensus requires two processes to be carried 
through: firstly, validation of each transaction, which involves certain nodes, the 
validating nodes, performing a validation check of every transaction in the entire 
block of transactions to ensure that the contents of each transaction are legitimate. 
For example, they must verify that the sender of a transaction is true owner of the 
asset being sold. The second process is broadcast and consensus, which is after a 
validating node has validated one or more transactions and initiates the process of 
adding the transaction data to the ledger by broadcasting information about this new 
block or entry to other validating nodes, which communicate amongst themselves 
and agree upon a common set of validated transactions to be added to ledger. 
                                                                                                                                                         




06/08/18. Note also the discussion following in chapter IX, section B, in relation to: European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), ‘Advice on Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-
assets’, 2019, ESMA50-1391. 




Permissioning signifies, firstly, that the network is not open. In other words, it is set 
up so that only trusted or vetted participants can participate in the control and 
maintenance of the system. The network proposed here is a permissioned network, 
meaning only authorized entities659 are able to participate. Thus, the primary 
requirement for being able to trade on the network is the existence of an 
authorization to trade in the domestic ETS of a jurisdiction that joins the network.  
 
The level of permission – in effect, access to the ledger – granted to an entity would 
depend on the nature of its activity in the distributed market. For instance, entities 
with compliance obligations under the ETS (compliance entities), other authorised 
traders and market makers (not subject to compliance obligations) would, perhaps, 
be able to access that part of the ledger relating to their own accounts and 
transactions (possibly even just their current transactions on the ledger, but not their 
full history of transactions). The administrator of a participating ETS would 
necessarily have access to its own registry, that is, it would have the competence to 
access all parts of the ledger relating to accounts and transactions within its 
domestic ETS, but not necessarily have access to the entire ledger of the distributed 
network as a whole.  Depending on the level of international transparency 
considered appropriate by the standing management body (or, where necessary, its 
participating jurisdictions), each jurisdiction’s ETS registry administrator might be 
authorized to see also the composite ledger records for each of the other participant 
jurisdictions, but certain restrictions might be regarded as necessary, for example: in 
regard to the entries relating to individual entities (of other jurisdictions), in particular 
because of data protection and confidentiality concerns; and possibly even 
regarding access to the ledger as a whole, to information which, for a variety of 
reasons, may be considered nationally sensitive (for example, relating to or 
considered indicative of the strength of a national economy).660 Public access to 
information might be through the ETS administrator in each jurisdiction. 
                                                      
658 This sub-section builds on the author’s prior publication: Fn.636 (Macinante 2017). 
659 The word ‘entity’ could conceivably include a ‘natural person’ if any jurisdiction authorizes 
natural persons to trade on its ETS. 
660 Although, such a restriction may run counter to the objective of greater transparency in 
the Paris Agreement. 
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(iii) Private/public key encryption 
 
Private/public key encryption is an example of asymmetric key encryption, using a 
pair of keys with the public key used to encrypt the data and the private key being 
held by the recipient who is to decrypt it. This permits strangers to exchange 
confidential data on a public network, without concerns over security and without 
sharing a single key.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the robustness of DLT in protecting the integrity of information 
is due, at the macro-level, to high-level design including, for instance, the consensus 
process amongst validating nodes. At the micro-level, it is due to the cryptographic 
technology applied. The level of transparency and replication of records provides a 
certain buffer against fraud, hacking and other possible abuse or corruption.661 It 
would be incumbent on the jurisdictions joining and subscribing to the network to 
ensure that the entities they authorise to trade on the DL network put in place 
sufficient security measures to protect private keys. Any losses resulting from failure 
by an authorised entity to protect its private key should, logically, fall on that entity.   
3. The operational mechanisms required  
 
Before considering possible rules governing how market transactions might 
proceed, it is necessary to outline two mechanisms that, while both essential to the 
operation of the market proposed, pertain to differing aspects. The first mechanism 
relates directly to climate policy, namely, how differences between the efforts of 
different jurisdictions in terms of mitigation might be valued and how this value 
possibly translates into a conversion factor for mitigation outcomes transferred 
between jurisdictions, and so, a price differential. The second relates to how the 
transaction proceeds, so in one sense is purely mechanistic, yet in another sense, 
also relates back to climate policy.       
                                                      
661 ASTRI, ‘Whitepaper On Distributed Ledger Technology’, (11 November 2016) 
Commissioned by Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
<http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-functions/finanical-
infrastructure/Whitepaper_On_Distributed_Ledger_Technology.pdf> accessed 12/1/17.  
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(i) A mechanism for valuing mitigation662 
 
Chapter V introduced the concept of networking as a way of connecting markets, 
based on a model that values the traded emission allowance unit to take account of 
that unit’s actual worth in terms of mitigation achieved. This recognises the existing 
global diversity of mechanisms for carbon pricing as such mechanisms, although 
reflecting local preferences, are fragmented and heterogeneous. As a result, 
differences in design, implementation and standards detract from their 
effectiveness.663 It also takes account of the heterogeneity of approaches 
recognised by the Paris Agreement.  
 
Networking carbon markets664 identifies as one of its three core elements a 
mechanism to measure value of mitigation outcomes: “an independent assessment 
framework to guide and assess the implementation of climate actions.”665 Thus, 
networking is based on the notion that an ETS, designed and implemented to 
achieve the mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to the atmosphere, 
generates an outcome upon which it is possible to place a measurable value, the 
mitigation value (MV).666 This section introduces the concept and briefly addresses 
the mechanism by which such an assessment can be made.  
 
There are differing understandings as to what the expression ‘mitigation value’ 
entails667 and, more so, how the MV of a mitigation outcome is determined. Early 
reports of the negotiations concerning guidance on cooperative approaches referred 
to in Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement,668 indicated that discussions 
                                                      
662 This sub-section builds on the author’s publication: Justin D Macinante ‘Operationalizing 
Cooperative Approaches Under the Paris Agreement by Valuing Mitigation Outcomes’, 
[2018] CCLR 258. 
663 Fn.636 (Macinante 2017) 244. 
664 See chapter VI supra as to source of concept. 
665 World Bank Group, Networked Carbon Markets: Mitigation Action Assessment Protocol, 
2016, World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank, 8 
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25371/110153-WP-
P161139-PUBLIC-MAAPMay.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 27/02/18. 
666 Fn.636 (Macinante 2017). 
667 See, for instance, World Bank’s Networked Carbon Markets webpage, documents on 
concept development <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/brief/globally-
networked-carbon-markets> 
668 Informal note by the co-chairs, Third iteration, 12 November 2017, Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice, Forty-Seventh meeting, 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_nov_2017/in-
session/application/pdf/sbsta47_11a_third_informal_note_.pdf, accessed 27/02/18. 
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touched on related issues, such as in relation to environmental integrity, the quality 
of units; in relation to governance oversight arrangements, third party technical 
review of the environmental integrity of internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes (ITMOs) created/approval of ITMOs; in relation to governance role of the 
secretariat, reporting on overall mitigation of global emissions delivered through 
cancellation/discounting;669 and in relation to reporting on use of ITMOs, information 
including characteristics of units, originating programmes, source of ITMOs, 
vintage/time periods of ITMOs.670 There appears also to be consensus in the 
negotiations on the need for common accounting standards and transaction 
procedures, and for quantifying ITMOs (with the possibility of tonnes CO2-equivalent 
GHG as a standard unit mentioned).671  
 
Yet given its relevance to the outcome of the negotiations, it is surprising how little 
discussion there has been of mitigation value, or the valuing of emission trading 
scheme units, in the literature. One reason for this might be the fact that, to date, the 
majority of studies on connecting schemes seem to have focused on full bilateral 
linking under which the units are fully fungible in all participating systems.672 Another 
possible explanation might be the fact of the homogeneous approach taken prior to 
the Paris Agreement, that is, under the Kyoto Protocol,673 where the value of all 
traded units was defined as being equal to one tonne CO2-equivalent GHG.  
 
All the same, there is some analysis of MV in the literature. For instance, in 
anticipation of outcomes under the Paris Agreement, Aldy noted that assessments 
of mitigation value could play an important role in linking between countries with 
disparate mitigation policies.674 These MV assessments, it was speculated, could 
                                                      
669 This would be difficult to do unless the value of units cancelled is known. 
670 Interestingly also, that in relation to infrastructure, both ‘blockchain’ and ‘a centrally 
accessible distributed ledger’ were mentioned at that stage, but have since been dropped 
from the negotiating text. 
671 World Bank, Ecofys and Vivid Economics, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2017, 
World Bank, Washington, DC, Annex III, Summary of Parties’ views on the operationalization 
of Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/468881509601753549/pdf/120810-REVISED-
PUB-PUBLIC.pdf> accessed 25/02/18. 
672 Fn.639 (Kachi et al/ICAP 2015) 10. 
673 Discussed in chapter IV supra. 
674 Joseph E Aldy ‘Evaluating Mitigation Effort: Tools and Institutions for Assessing 
Nationally Determined Contributions’ Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Project on Climate 
Agreements, November 2015 
<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/736371454449389076/pdf/Evaluating-Mitigation-Effort-
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inform the linking agreement through exchange rates which, if transparent, could be 
used to incentivise higher ambition on the part of more poorly performing 
jurisdictions.675 More recently, having discussed the World Bank NCM initiative, 
another author, Mehling, observes that while a move from a regime based on 
compatibility of systems and equivalence of traded units, to one that seeks to 
quantify and compare mitigation effort, offers interesting perspectives, it will also 
give rise to political controversy and raise similar challenges to those experienced in 
negotiations to date.676 Two responses are briefly mentioned here.677  
 
First, in the context of heterogeneous mitigation efforts recognised by the Paris 
Agreement, the application of analytical tools and corresponding means for data 
gathering, ‘is crucial for assessing the country-level, comparative, and aggregate 
impacts of those efforts.’678 These tools and associated data ‘in turn rely on effective 
transparency and review mechanisms.’679 Aldy demonstrates that the idea of 
transparency and policy surveillance of countries in the context of multilateral 
regimes, is not something new680 referring to a number of transparency models from 
other multilateral regimes that may be cited, such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) annual country-level economic surveillance; the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) peer reviews of member states’ 
economic policies every one or two years; and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
regular reviews of members’ trade policies. The conclusion is that the international 
community can draw on an array of models.681  
 
Furthermore, countries undergo sovereign credit rating assessments in order to 
borrow. For example, Standard & Poor’s sovereign issuer credit ratings, pertaining 
                                                                                                                                                         
Nov-2015.pdf> accessed 27/02/18. The work of Aldy and his colleagues in this respect has 
been reviewed in the author’s previous publication: see fn.662 (Macinante 2018). 
675 Ibid 32. See also: Michael Lazarus et al., (Stockholm Environment Institute) Options and 




676 Michael Mehling ‘Legal Frameworks for Linking National Emissions Trading Schemes’, in 
C Carlarne, K Gray and R Tarasofsky (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Climate 
Change Law, (OUP, 2016), 276.  
677 These are set out in author’s previous publication at fn.662 (Macinante 2018), but given 
the centrality of the concept to the model proposed, are set out again for completeness. 
678 Fn.674 (Aldy 2015) 13.  
679 Ibid. 
680 Ibid. 
681 Ibid 34. 
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to a sovereign’s ability and willingness to service financial obligations to commercial 
creditors, encompasses a framework including (amongst other factors) 
policymaking; income levels, GDP per capita, tax and funding bases; currency in 
international transactions, external liquidity, residents’ assets and liabilities relative 
to rest of the world; sustainability of debt burden; and exchange rate regime and 
monetary policy credibility.682 Countries’ sensitivities to disclosure of these sorts of 
statistics seem to recede when the objective at stake is access to international debt 
markets. Why should there be a difference when it comes to accessing an 
international carbon market, for which there may be similar financial, economic, 
trade and policy benefits? 
 
The second response is that many of the sources of potential political controversy 
can be addressed through careful regime design. For instance, consider the 
conceptual model proposed in this thesis. It is postulated that elements of the 
proposed regime ameliorate the causes of potential political controversy:  
 
• by ensuring the independence of the process to quantify and compare 
mitigation effort and that the entity or entities carrying it out comprise 
relevantly qualified, independent, impartial experts;  
• by applying generic criteria to assessments uniformly across all jurisdictions 
in that process, such that all jurisdictions are subject to equivalent treatment 
under the process;  
• ensuring that the process and outcome are open and transparent and that 
outcomes are communicated appropriately as market sensitive information; 
and  
• affording all jurisdictions the flexibility to engage with, or leave, the process 
relatively easily and on the same basis – in the event that, as an information 
tool, the assessment is part of an agreed governance framework (as 
opposed to being purely private sector driven).  
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to postulate a specific methodology for 
determining the MV of mitigation outcomes. Rather, the approach taken is to 
suggest possible approaches to how a methodology might be applied being, firstly, 
                                                      
682 S&P Global, ‘Sovereign Rating Methodology’, 2017 
<https://www.spratings.com/documents/20184/4432051/Sovereign+Rating+Methodology/5f8
c852c-108d-46d2-add1-4c20c3304725> accessed 01/03/18. 
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by a public, intergovernmental institution, possibly along the lines of the Clean 
Development Mechanism Executive Board (CDMEB) model; or secondly, by private 
sector entities, under a model similar to that which operates for credit reference 
agencies (CRAs), subject to regulation such as that now administered by the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). The details of the latter, private 
sector approach are set out in an earlier publication by the author.683 In short, it 
would entail private sector (CRA-type) entities being accredited to assess and 
determine MVs, based on approved methodologies, subject to authorisation and 
supervision along the lines of the ESMA regulatory model. The outcomes would be 
publicly available market information.  
 
The public, intergovernmental institution model is more problematic, given aspects 
of the CDMEB experience, particularly in fostering re-engagement in the market by 
the private sector.684 Issues raised in relation to CDMEB operations have included a 
lack of transparency (in spite of provisions in its rules for public disclosure), lack of 
clarity and predictability in decision-making, and the absence of decision review or 
appeal rights. Its nature as a body made up of regional negotiating group nominees, 
rather than a panel of independently assessed, expert appointees, has been flagged 
as well.685 Further, the CDM process has been lengthy and cumbersome.686 The 
complexity of the CDMEB’s role, including as de facto gatekeeper over the flow of 
projects to the market has been problematic. The lesson for any MV process is that 
the structure needs to separate the function of regulating providers of MV, from the 
actual provision of MV, which should just be market information, available openly to 
and independently of market operation. 
 
Notwithstanding these observations, as noted, proposing a process for delivering an 
MV methodology is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the regulatory and 
institutional frameworks within which the model proposed might operate are the 
                                                      
683 Justin Macinante ‘Networking Carbon Markets – Key Elements of the Process’, 2016, 
World Bank Group Climate Change, 33-40 
<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/424831476453674939/1700504-Networking-Carbon-
Markets-Web.pdf> accessed 01/03/18. 
684 Dependence of this market on investor confidence has been flagged by: Charlotte Streck, 
Jolene Lin ‘Making Markets Work: A Review of CDM Performance and the Need for Reform’, 
(2008) Vol.19 no.2 European Journal of International Law 409, 420. 
685 Ibid. Also see: Millar, Ilona, Martijn Wilder, ‘Enhanced Governance and Dispute 
Resolution for the CDM’, [2009] CCLR 45. Recommendations for how the issues can be 
rectified are noted, as are the alternative models raised by these authors. 
686 Fn. 684 (Streck & Lin). 
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focus of this thesis so, to this extent, the body or entities that might carry out the MV 
assessments and the regulatory and institutional structures that may exist for that 
purpose are relevant. Hence, to carry out this analysis, (in next chapter) it is 
proposed to proceed on the basis of the private sector model, since this is perceived 
more likely to engage private sector involvement.  
 (ii) The mechanism required for effecting transactions687  
 
There are different possible mechanisms by which transactions could be carried out. 
For instance, a jurisdiction might cancel the units being transferred at the time of 
transaction and, the buyer having purchased them, the receiving jurisdiction create 
and credit them to the buyer’s account in its registry. This assumes that the units 
from the respective jurisdictions would be fully fungible. However, such a process 
would be administratively cumbersome, involving coordination across jurisdictions. 
 
An alternative to the movement of emission units from one jurisdiction to another, for 
instance where they are not fully fungible, would be to have a ‘transaction unit’ 
(TU).688  In terms of the mechanics of a transaction and transfer, the transferring 
jurisdiction would convert its units into TUs (at the applicable rate),689 following 
which, the buyer having purchased them, the receiving jurisdiction would convert the 
TUs concerned into its domestic ETS units (at the rate applicable).690 In this 
instance, the TU serves as the medium of exchange. 
 
The interposition of TUs as a medium of exchange might be considered useful for a 
number of reasons, including reduction in the number of conversion rates needed 
within a multilateral system; for example, in a market of five jurisdictions, there 
would be ten MV conversion rates (whereas, using a TU, there would be only five); 
the advantage of fewer, larger and more liquid markets with fewer mitigation 
outcome asset (unit) balances; reduction in the informational needs of participating 
jurisdictions and trading entities, thereby fostering simpler and cheaper operation; 
faster and more efficient networking transactions, and reduction of both scope for 
                                                      
687 This section draws on author’s previous publication: fn.636 (Macinante 2017).  
688 The role of such a transaction unit would be analogous to the role played by the US$ in 
foreign exchange currency transactions. 
689 The transferring jurisdiction’s units would be cancelled when the transaction units are 
created. 
690 The transaction units would be cancelled when the receiving jurisdiction’s units are 
created and credited in its registry. 
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error and capacity for manipulation and fraud; and generally reduced administration 
and transaction costs across the system. All the same, it is not necessary to 
propose a conclusive basis upon which TUs might be founded, but simply to note 
that interposing a transaction unit mechanism may facilitate the transactional 
process, especially once the distributed network goes beyond two participant 
jurisdictions.691 
4. Transactional rules as part of the regulatory framework692 
 
Each market participant (that is, trading entities in each ETS) would be associated 
with, and gain access to, the DL through a participant jurisdiction and the individual 
entity’s link with that jurisdiction’s domestic register.693 Each participant jurisdiction 
would be the operator of a domestic ETS and would thus: (a) maintain a registry for 
that purpose, and (b) impose rules on the participants within its own ETS. In order 
for the distributed network to create the framework for inter-jurisdictional emissions 
trading that conforms to international (and national) climate change policies, certain 
fundamental rules and principles would be of critical importance. The rules that 
govern the relationships between ETSs in the networked market (that is, the rules 
they commit to uphold when joining the network) would themselves, to a degree, be 
transposed into the code for the terms and conditions of contracts between 
counterparties to transactions.694 Thus, these rules would operate on two distinct 
levels, firstly, in the form of terms and conditions to which a jurisdiction would need 
to subscribe in order to join the network entity; and secondly, as part of the standard 
terms and conditions applicable to each individual transaction.  
 
                                                      
691 Issues related to this element are relevant to and considered as part of the analysis of 
regulatory and institutional frameworks in chapters VIII and IX. 
692 Fn.636 (Macinante 2017). The regulatory framework is analysed in the next chapter, 
however, the transactional rules straddle both the elements of the market proposed (hence 
mentioned here) and the regulatory framework within which it would operate. 
693 Some, such as international traders or market makers, may be associated with multiple 
jurisdictions; but in the context of any particular transaction, they will only be associated with 
one – the one where they have a registry account to or from which units will be moved for 
the purpose of that specific transaction. 
694 It is noted that participating jurisdictions would, at all times, retain jurisdictional control 
over the entities authorized by them to trade – including trading in the networked market. 
Hence, in the circumstances of incompatibility between the rules of a participating jurisdiction 
and the trading rules of the networked market, the entity would be obliged to follow the rules 
of its domestic jurisdiction. However, given the fact that jurisdictions, when opting to join, can 
decide the basis on which they authorize their entities to participate (e.g. any limits or 
boundaries that apply), the likelihood of such a situation of incompatibility arising between 
rules of a jurisdiction and NCM trading rules is considered remote.  
 194 
Illustrations of possible standard terms and conditions governing transactions that 
would be applied automatically through the code of smart contracts are set out, by 
way of illustration, in the Appendix. Transactions on the network would apply 
standard terms and conditions embodied in electronic code (smart contracts). A 
number of the rules mentioned above would be transposed into these standard 
contract terms and conditions, particularly for example, those in (i)(a)-(e) in the 
Appendix. Thus, the commitments given by the jurisdictions in joining the network 
would be automatically applied by the entities they authorise in the transactions 
undertaken. 
5. Participants at different jurisdictional levels 
(i) Jurisdictional 
 
The ETS administrators of participating jurisdictions would be non-trading actors in 
the network. The registries administered by them would themselves be part of the 
distributed ledger, to which they would have access for monitoring and verification of 
transactions involving counterparties authorised by them, and for examining data for 
audit and reporting purposes. A range of entities under domestic ETSs would be 
authorized, including those that have compliance obligations (compliance entities) 
and those that are participating for other commercial reasons as traders, brokers 
and market makers (for example, on behalf of clients), and do not have specific 
compliance obligations under the ETS. The computer code for contracts would need 
to distinguish entities that were subject to compliance obligations under a 
jurisdiction’s ETS, from those that were not. The absence of specific compliance 
obligations on entities would mean that certain conditions, such as compliance 
reserve obligations (see Appendix), would not apply to them individually (although 
they might still be applicable on a jurisdictional basis). The domestic financial 
regulator in participating jurisdictions would also have a role, both regulating the 
activities of market participants in the jurisdiction and by contributing to the broader 
governance process through participation in a supra-jurisdictional financial 
supervisory/advisory body (see following chapter).  
 (ii) Cross-jurisdictional 
 
As noted earlier in relation to additional infrastructure requirements, participating 
jurisdictions could establish a standing management body to ensure on-going 
 195 
governance and operational management of the network entity operating the 
distributed ledger platform. There are a number of models in existing international 
bodies for how this might be structured and conduct its business. For example, as 
noted earlier, there might be a standing secretariat that would call together 
jurisdictional representatives for either regular periodic, or ad hoc meetings. This 
would also necessitate procedural rules.  
 
These elements would generate additional financing requirements for staff, 
equipment and premises, legal drafting and advice, financial management and 
accounting, and so on. Nevertheless, it is expected that such additional costs 
(shared by the participating jurisdictions perhaps according to a formula, for 
instance, based on the volume traded or another metric) would be minimal in 
comparison with the value the distributed market could achieve. It is conceivable, 
also, that the addition of a standing management body may well, in the long-term, 
save the participating jurisdictions from duplicated supervisory or controlling 
mechanisms within their own administrations, thereby lowering costs overall. Even if 
transactions in the primary market were to be peer-to-peer, without the need for 
intermediaries such as central counterparties, there would need to be an exchange 
or trading platform where transactions take place. This would be part of the ledger 
function and, as such, come under the purview of the network entity.  
 
Additionally, as flagged earlier and based on experience in the EUETS, transactions 
in the derivative (futures) market are likely to make up the bulk of trading. Since 
counterparties’ positions can remain open in futures contracts for the term of the 
contract, it is likely that there will be a need for provisions to reduce structural 
market risk due to defaults. Thus, at least in so far as futures contracts trading is 
concerned, there may be the need for centralised clearing. All the same, for the 
purpose of this discussion consideration is confined to the primary market as this 
has most direct relevance to the actual transfer of mitigation outcomes between 
entities. Assuming that MV assessment is carried out by private sector entities, 
possibly under a model similar to that which operates for CRAs, those entities could 
also be seen as operating at a cross-jurisdictional level since, it is envisaged, the 




Two overriding supervisory bodies, acting conjointly, are proposed to take account 
of the fact that, firstly, the model, transactions and market proposed are designed 
principally to give effect to the international transfer of mitigation outcomes (as 
understood in the Paris Agreement): thus, ultimately one of the overriding 
supervisory bodies should be a subordinate body of the CMA; and secondly, the 
nature of the proposed networked market as a financial market means that the other 
body would need to be a financial supervisory body. The nature and roles of these 
bodies and the regulatory framework within which they might operate are 
considered in the following chapter. 
 
Finally, for the regulation of private sector entities undertaking MV assessments, 
there would be a need, at the supra-jurisdictional level, for a regulatory body, 
possibly along similar lines to the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA) and directly answerable to the overriding supervisory bodies, acting 
conjointly. The role of this body would include licensing MV assessors, supervising 
the assessments, and approving and certifying the methodologies applied. This role 
and these functions are also analysed as part of the institutional and regulatory 
framework for the proposed market, in the following chapter. 
 
B Alternative approaches for implementing Article 6 of the 
Paris Agreement 
 
Before moving to examine potential institutional and regulatory frameworks for the 
market model proposed in this thesis, possible alternative approaches for the 
implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement should be considered. As has 
been noted, the proposal in this thesis consists of two elements, thus alternatives 
might be considered in terms of those not involving networking; those that do not 
apply distributed ledger technology; and those applying neither element. Thus, 
possible alternatives might include: 
 
• firstly, international trading of mitigation outcomes between the ETSs of 
individual, unconnected jurisdictions, either (a) via a globally centralised 
registry and transaction log, or (b) on a distributed ledger platform; 
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• secondly, trading taking place in clusters of linked jurisdictions forming 
homogeneous ‘club’ structures, either (a) via a globally centralised registry 
and transaction log, or (b) on club-based distributed ledger platforms, but 
without trading taking place from one such club to another; or 
• thirdly, international trading of mitigation outcomes in a networked market on 
a globally centralised registry and transaction log, with a CDM Executive 
Board-type body policing compliance (the ITL model). 
 
Reasons have been set out695 why connecting jurisdictions is considered more 
appropriate and beneficial than jurisdictions remaining unconnected. These reasons 
are valid in the case where unconnected jurisdictions trade with each other. A 
primary issue for such trading would be how the units traded would be valued and 
accounted for, raising a further question of whether this approach might also require 
inclusion of mitigation value assessments to ensure fungibility. Notwithstanding that 
the jurisdictions under this option are not connected by linking or networking, the 
need for a mechanism by which the values of units traded are derived points to the 
need for an agreement or treaty. Thus, any benefit from not negotiating a treaty to 
connect, would be cancelled out by the need to negotiate an agreement on how to 
value respective units. All the same, for the reasons outlined earlier, this thesis 
contends that connecting ETSs offers greater benefits.  
 
In relation to the second alternative, reasons have been advanced also why 
networking is favoured over linking.696 These apply irrespective of whether the club 
structures would have their own DL platforms or there would be a globally 
centralised registry and transaction log. It is acknowledged that there would be 
benefits to be gained by operating the club structures on DL platforms; however, 
realisation of these benefits would still be subject to successful negotiation of the 
linking treaty. The fact that the jurisdictions were linking would remove the need for 
the development and implementation of a process to assess mitigation value, since 
the linking process would presumably include determination of a basis for 
equivalence, or at least alignment, of the carbon units/assets of the respective 
linking jurisdictions. All the same, negotiation of the terms for alignment of 
jurisdictions’ schemes may be both time-consuming and difficult. 
                                                      
695 See chapter V.  
696 See chapter VI. 
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With respect the third alternative, a networked carbon market could operate on the 
ITL model. In a sense, this may be an easier alternative as the ITL structure exists 
under the Kyoto Protocol and could be adapted to accommodate trading on a 
networked basis. On the other hand, the work required to carry out that adaptation 
may prove to be substantial, noting that the ITL deals with country-to-country 
transactions, thus would need to be able to accommodate transactions between 
authorised entities. More significantly, perhaps, would be whether and how the ITL 
could adapt from the existing binary checking function it performs to providing a 
more substantive ledger function, including an exchange platform with settlement 
and clearing. This would necessitate building in a mechanism to measure the 
mitigation value of mitigation outcomes: an independent assessment framework to 
assess the implementation of climate actions. Negotiation of a treaty for such would 
be necessary, unless the private sector were to step in and drive development of 
such a mechanism organically, facilitating adoption by jurisdictions participating in 
trading.  
 
While alternative approaches such as one including a centralised ledger like the ITL 
certainly are possible, this thesis contends that to continue with a centralised model 
would be an opportunity missed, given the technological developments taking place 
that have particular application to how both government services and financial 
sector services may be delivered in the future. Rather than moving forward in lock-
step with exploration of these developments by the financial sector, re-engagement 
of which in the carbon market is important to the success of carbon pricing as a 
mitigation mechanism, continuing with a centralised model may forego a rare 
opportunity to maximise the effectiveness that carbon pricing can have in changing 
behaviour. Recognition of the heterogeneity of approaches to mitigation, including 
cooperative approaches involving the international transfer of mitigation outcomes in 
the Paris Agreement has enabled these favourable circumstances; the networking 
of carbon markets can provide a mechanism; and the decentralised nature of 
distributed ledger technology is consistent with both the heterogeneity of 
approaches to mitigation and the disaggregated nature of networking. Together they 
might provide the facilitative platform on which the effectiveness of carbon pricing 




PART 4 – Analysis of the proposal 
 
 
This Part identifies the governance structure for the proposed market and sets out a 
framework for analysis, then applies that analytical framework. It is split over two 
chapters, the first dissects the governance structure, then examines it in relation to 
the each of the three areas of law – climate change; financial market regulation; and 
regulation of the technology and its applications – according to the particular 
requirements of each (chapter VIII).  
 
The second focuses more specifically on the regulatory frameworks, examining in 
particular the point of their intersection in what is traded, the mitigation 
outcome/financial instrument/ token, before continuing the analysis by examining 








Chapter VIII Analysis of the governance structure  
 
 
This chapter examines the regulatory and institutional frameworks and relationships 
that comprise the governance structure for the proposed networked market. 
Governance, as used here, is taken to be the process through which state and non-
state actors interact to design and implement policies within a given set of formal 
and informal rules that shape and are shaped by power.697 Thus, the expression 
‘governance structure’ is used here in a very broad sense to include the regulatory 
and institutional frameworks, involving both state and non-state actors and both 
formal and informal rules, established to implement greenhouse gas (GHG) 
mitigation policies and, specifically, emissions trading. 
 
Application of the framework for analysis is split over this chapter and the next. It 
aims firstly, to examine the governance structure for the proposed market to 
determine how well it accounts for the requirements of the three areas of law in 
which it must function, namely climate change law; financial markets regulation; and 
the legal requirements developing in relation to distributed ledger technology (DLT) 
and its applications. Each of these areas of law requires a different analytical 
approach as, for example, in relation to climate change law, there is an existing 
international governance structure with which comparative analysis can be made; 
financial markets regulation is, on the other hand, principally a matter for domestic 
law, although there is a developing global structure which can be considered in 
terms of how the governance structure proposed here could fit; while DLT and its 
applications are new, so jurisdictions are currently active in formulating approaches, 
thus the approach taken here is to examine these developments and assess 
compatibility of the governance structure with the direction they are taking. 
Secondly, the analysis focuses specifically on the regulatory frameworks for these 
                                                      
697 World Bank. 2017. World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law. 
Washington, DC: World Bank, 3.  
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areas of law, their point of intersection and the particular issues to which they give 
rise for the governance structure. 
 
This chapter begins (Section A) by dissecting the governance structure vertically 
into three pillars, demonstrating the differing functionality of each; and then 
horizontally, to show seven tiers of governance, from the bottom tier comprised of 
conditions imposed by the jurisdiction on its authorised entities when it joins the 
network, up to the top tier comprised by the overriding supervisory bodies. In 
Section B, the structure is compared with the existing carbon market governance 
structure for international emissions trading (IET) that developed under the Kyoto 
Protocol. How the proposed governance structure could fit into global financial 
market governance is considered in Section C, reviewing the institutions involved, 
their structures and roles. Section D then focuses on the responses to the advent of 
distributed ledger technology (DLT) applications in financial markets, in regulatory 
and analytical terms, interrogating those responses for how they might inform the 
application to networking of carbon markets. 
 
The chapter following (chapter IX) continues analysis in this framework with an 
examination of legal issues arising in relation to the proposed market, whether those 
issues pose particular difficulty for the governance structure envisaged and 
consideration of how those issues might be addressed. This analysis aims to 
demonstrate, so far as possible in terms of the hypothetical market proposed, firstly, 
that the governance structure set out is suitable for emissions trading in the context 
of the Paris Agreement; and secondly, that allowing the networked market to 
operate as a global financial market, with as little intervention as possible so as to 
maximise efficiency and effectiveness, but within a well-designed boundary 
framework of climate change rules, can promote the objectives of climate policy. 
  
A  The governance structure 
1.  Three pillars of functionality 
 
Vertical dissection of the governance structure for the proposed networked carbon 
market shows it consisting of three pillars, each with differing functionality. The 
three, interacting pillars of functionality for the market proposed are: 
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supervisory/regulatory; self-regulatory market operation; and the provision of market 
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There are two aspects to this first pillar. First, is the dual nature of the institutional 
framework within which the market will operate: if not apparent already from the 
nature of the market itself, this duality is borne out by the proposal that there be two 
overriding supervisory bodies – one from the climate policy perspective and one 
from the financial market perspective – acting conjointly to ensure: (a) that the 
operation of the market is efficient and does not impact global financial stability in 
any way; and (b) that the market operates effectively in promoting and enhancing 
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global mitigation efforts towards achieving the higher ambition envisaged by the 
Paris Agreement.  
 
The second aspect to this pillar is the involvement of domestic financial regulators in 
jurisdictions participating in the networked market. While it is not essential that, in 
line with the approach taken by the EU, jurisdictions that have implemented 
domestic emission trading schemes (ETSs) legislate to treat emission units traded 
in those schemes as financial instruments, it would be desirable and ultimately may 
become the default position for jurisdictions wishing to join the networked market. It 
would afford greater consistency if they were to, as well as establishing the basis for 
domestic financial regulators from those jurisdictions to participate in and contribute 
to the work of the overriding financial supervisory body.  
 
In relation to the conjointly acting supervisory bodies, it is noted that the Conference 
of Parties (COP) remains the supreme policymaking body, decision making body 
and negotiating forum, of the UNFCCC and, acting as the Meeting of Parties to the 
Paris Agreement (CMA), does so for the Paris Agreement.698 Thus the ultimate 
function of the supervisory bodies acting conjointly would be to advise, inform and 
report to the CMA.  
 
The CMA is to keep implementation of the Paris Agreement under review and, 
within its mandate, make decisions to promote effective implementation, including 
establishment of such subsidiary bodies as deemed necessary for implementation 
and exercise of such other functions as may be required.699 This mandate includes 
supervision of international transfers of mitigation outcomes by Parties engaged in 
cooperative approaches under Article 6 and this could be undertaken through a 
climate subsidiary body established for that purpose (which would act conjointly with 
the financial supervisory body established under the auspices of a financial 
intergovernmental body or organisation).  
 
                                                      
698 Art.16, paragraph 1, Paris Agreement. 
699 Art.16, paragraph 4, Paris Agreement. 
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The Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board (CDMEB) provides a model 
for such a subsidiary body.700 It is small (10 members), with members nominated 
from regional groupings,701 although they serve for limited periods, must possess 
appropriate technical and/or policy expertise and act in their personal capacity.702 
Thus, the climate supervisory body might have a membership based on the number 
of jurisdictions participating in the networked market, with members required to 
possess technical and/or policy expertise and to act in their personal capacity. 
 
With respect to the financial supervisory body, the role of providing supervision over 
this new inter-jurisdictional financial market might be allocated to an existing body, 
or a new committee or subordinate body of an existing body. There are a number of 
possible, relevant existing organisations in this respect, such as the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS),703 Financial Stability Board (FSB),704 International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),705 or the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF).706 The nature of these organisations and their roles suggests the 
function of providing supervision for an inter-jurisdictional carbon market might 
potentially come within the remit of any of them. All the same, bearing in mind the 
role envisaged (under this pillar) for domestic financial regulators of participating 
jurisdictions, a committee under the auspices of IOSCO would appear to be most 
appropriate, given IOSCO’s role in relation to securities markets and also the range 
of committees carrying out current policy work under the aegis of its Board.707 
Membership of such a committee could be constituted by representatives of 
financial regulators from jurisdictions participating in the proposed market. 
(ii) Self-regulatory market operation 
 
                                                      
700 Although note that it is constituted specifically in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Kyoto 
Protocol, as opposed to under Article 13, paragraph 4(h), which corresponds to Article 16, 
paragraph 4(a) Paris Agreement. 
701 UNFCCC COP7: Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, held at 
Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 November 2001, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2, 21 January 
2002, Decision 17/CP.7, annex, paragraph 7  
<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/cop7/13a02.pdf> accessed 22/10/18. 
702 Ibid, paragraph 8. 
703 See Section C table 1 for details <www.bis.org>  
704 See Section C table 1 for details <www.fsb.org>   
705 See Section C table 1 for details <www.iosco.org>  
706 See Section C table 1 for details <www.fatf-gafi.org> 
707 See Section C table 1 for details <www.iosco.org>  
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This second pillar comprises the networked market, constituted by the market 
participants, that is, the ETS administrators of participating jurisdictions and the 
entities authorised by them to trade inter-jurisdictionally, as well as the network 
entity operating and managing the transaction platform and its standing 
management body. As noted earlier,708 there are models for how the network entity 
might be constituted – for instance, as a corporate entity with articles including the 
rules for participation and for market operation, to which jurisdictions joining would 
agree to adhere.709 The participating jurisdictions would each hold a share in it. 
Alternatively, it may be an unincorporated association, with a charter to which 
participating jurisdictions subscribe, and with articles of association and procedural 
rules with which they agree to abide.710 A question of the laws of which jurisdiction 
the network entity is created under will arise irrespective of what form it takes. 
 
The standing management body of the network entity (for instance, its board of 
directors) would be responsible for governance and operational management 
direction.711 It would provide information on the operation of the market to, and be 
subject to the supervision of, the supervisory bodies acting conjointly. In this sense, 
the market would not be entirely self-regulatory. In fulfilment of their roles and based 
on the analysis of the market and other data provided to them, the supervisory 
bodies might also provide guidance to the network entity to ensure efficient 
operation of the market does not impact global financial stability in any way and is 
effective in promoting and enhancing global mitigation efforts to achieve higher 
ambition. 
 
Transactions carried out over the platform would be based on a set of standard 
terms and conditions. The network entity would be responsible for keeping the 
standard terms and conditions under review, to ensure their suitability and 
applicability to transactions in general. Specific transactions would proceed on the 
basis of a term sheet in which the variables applicable to that transaction, for 
                                                      
708 In chapter VII. 
709 Examples of what these rules might cover are set out, for illustration, in the Appendix. 
710 The FSB is a model along these lines with a charter, articles of association and 
procedural rules. 
711 Functions and structure of the standing management body were canvassed in chapter 
VII. 
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example, counterparties, units being traded, price and so on, would be set out.712 
Completion and verification of the information in the term sheet would effectively 
operate as conditions precedent to the transaction proceeding. Thus, once they 
were complete and verified, the transaction would automatically proceed to 
settlement and completion. 
 
The market would be self-regulatory in the sense that participating jurisdictions 
would be responsible for its operation through the network entity and for funding that 
operation. Further, by inclusion of transaction rules into the digital code by which 
transactions are processed on the platform, any transaction proposed that did not 
comply, for example, because it would result in a net increase in permitted 
emissions, would not be able to proceed. Similarly, for any other applicable rules 
and conditions built into the code, whether rules of the network platform or 
conditions imposed by a jurisdiction on entities authorised by it to trade (for 
instance, a domestically imposed rule as to acceptable counterparties, such as only 
those from certain jurisdictions), non-observance would automatically mean no 
transaction. 
(iii) Independent market information 
 
The third pillar comprises the process and entities through which the outcomes of 
mitigation actions undertaken in different participating jurisdictions are valued.713 
The products of this process would be mitigation values that would attach to the 
units traded in the networked market. Thus, the function is to provide price sensitive 
information to the market and, as such, the sources of this information need to be 
independent, objective, credible and reliable, and the process secure and 
trustworthy. 
 
The concept of mitigation value and the mechanism by which assessment could be 
made has been canvassed earlier.714 Further, it is noted that the idea of 
transparency and policy surveillance of countries in multilateral regimes is well 
                                                      
712 Illustrations of what variable elements might be included in a term sheet are set out in the 
Appendix. 
713 The background to the process is set out in chapter VII. 
714 In chapter VII. 
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established.715 As noted earlier, Aldy and colleagues have reviewed a number of 
transparency models from other multilateral regimes, including the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) annual country-level economic surveillance; the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) peer reviews of member 
states’ economic policies every one or two years; and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) regular reviews of members’ trade policies. The conclusion is that, in terms 
of precedents for the proposed mitigation value assessment process, the 
international community can draw on an array of transparency and policy 
surveillance models.716 
 
Two possible approaches to how an assessment methodology might be applied are 
firstly, by a public, intergovernmental institution along the lines of the CDMEB 
model, emulating the models analysed by Aldy.717 Or secondly, by private sector 
entities under a regulatory model similar to that which is applied to credit reference 
agencies (CRAs) by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). As 
noted earlier, the latter approach is favoured.718 In relation to how the regulatory 
body might be constituted, there are various models. The CDMEB again provides 
one such example, constituted under the Kyoto Protocol,719 with details of its 
structure in decisions of the COP.720 In terms of organisational structure, ESMA 
provides another model,721 as a financial market regulator (particularly for regulation 
of CRAs).  
                                                      
715 Joseph Aldy ‘Designing a Bretton Woods Institution to Address Climate Change’, 2012, 
HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP12-017, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University 
<https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8830777/RWP12-017_Aldy.pdf> accessed 
17/04/18; Joseph E Aldy ‘The crucial role of policy surveillance in international climate 
policy’, (2014) Vol.126, Iss.3-4, Climatic Change, 279-292; Joseph E Aldy ‘Evaluating 
Mitigation Effort: Tools and Institutions for Assessing Nationally Determined Contributions’ 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, November 2015 
<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/736371454449389076/pdf/Evaluating-Mitigation-Effort-
Nov-2015.pdf> accessed 27/02/18. 
716 Ibid (Aldy 2015). 
717 Ibid (Aldy (2015))18. Thus, also heeding the lessons Aldy draws out, such as the need to 
be a substantial, well-staffed and well-functioning independent organisation.  
718 A description of the suggested level of regulatory supervision for this approach is set out 
in the author’s previous publication: Justin D Macinante ‘Operationalizing Cooperative 
Approaches Under the Paris Agreement by Valuing Mitigation Outcomes’, [2018] CCLR 258. 
Reasons the author does not favour the CDMEB applying the assessment methodology are 
referenced there. 
719 Fn.700 (Article 12, paragraph 4). 
720 Fn.701 (Decision 17/CP.7). 
721 ESMA is established under the ESMA Regulation: Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European 
 209 
2. Seven tiers of governance 
 
The governance structure for the market proposed can also be viewed horizontally 
as seven tiers, or layers, of governance, illustrated in the following diagram: 
 
7. Overriding supervisory bodies, acting conjointly 
 
6. Financial regulators 
 
5. Market discipline 
 
4. MV assessment process 
 
3. Code for the transactions (smart contracts) 
 
2. Network imposed conditions on jurisdictions joining 
 
1. Jurisdiction electing to join network  
 
Diagram 3: Horizontal analysis: the seven tiers of governance 
 
Considering these tiers from the bottom up: 
(i) Conditions imposed by the jurisdiction electing to join  
 
The bottom tier relates to the fact that transactions will be taking place between 
entities from individual, separate markets, each of which is continuing as an 
autonomous operation in its own right in its jurisdiction, while participating in the 
connection created by the networking arrangement. Thus, while an entity is trading 
only within its domestic market, the existence of the network is irrelevant to its 
trading activity and, in general, to the operation of that domestic market.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision 
No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, 
84-119.  
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Once that entity seeks to trade outside its domestic market, with an authorised entity 
from another market, the rules and institutions of the networked market would 
become relevant and provide the legal framework within which that inter-
jurisdictional transaction proceeds. In the first instance, those rules would include 
the conditions on which the jurisdiction authorises an entity to engage in such inter-
jurisdictional transactions, for example, by imposing conditions specifying a value 
range for acceptable MV for units that might be acquired from another jurisdiction. 
These conditions could be incorporated into the code for transactions entered by 
authorised entities from that jurisdiction so that, in the example, if the units proposed 
for purchase do not come within the range specified by that jurisdiction, the code 
would automatically prevent the transaction from proceeding. 
(ii) Conditions imposed by the network on jurisdictions 
 
The network entity will impose conditions on jurisdictions joining the network, 
relating to the operational and administrative requirements for participating in the 
network. For instance, these terms and conditions might include a commitment to 
funding a proportion of the network costs, or agreeing to abide by requirements as 
to permissioning for access to information on the ledger, or as to the consensus 
mechanism for adding verified information to the ledger. Other conditions might 
pertain to matters concerning eligibility requirements (for instance, as may be 
specified in the guidance on operationalization of Article 6), or to environmental 
integrity of transactions, or supplementarity requirements. Again, where applicable, 
these conditions could be incorporated into the code for transactions entered by 
entities authorised by the relevant jurisdiction so that, in instances where the 
conditions were not satisfied, the transaction could not proceed. 
(iii) Code for transactions (smart contracts) 
 
As envisaged by this thesis, the contract between counterparties would be based on 
standard terms and conditions applicable to all inter-jurisdictional transactions on 
the distributed ledger platform, which in the case of an authorised entity from any 
particular jurisdiction would include the conditions imposed by the jurisdiction on 
entities authorised by it (as in (i) above) and transaction relevant conditions imposed 
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on that jurisdiction by the network entity (as in (ii) above) that are applicable to 
entities authorised by it.722  
 
The standard terms and conditions would take the form of a master agreement, 
similar in approach to that developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA),723 by which the transaction counterparties would be bound. 
Counterparties would provide information pertaining to the particular transaction, 
such as details of the parties, units being transacted, price and other necessary 
variable details in the form of a term sheet, which together with the standard terms 
and conditions would constitute the contract between them. Once the term sheet 
information is complete and verified, the transaction would proceed to settlement 
and completion automatically and irreversibly.  
 (iv) The mitigation value assessment process 
 
The mitigation value (MV) assessment process provides the value determined for 
the outcome of a mitigation action. Where the mitigation action is an ETS, this value 
is expressed as the mitigation value of a unit traded in that ETS. This value might be 
seen as the difference in mitigation with and without the action, adjusted for risk 
factors relating to the mitigation action itself, the suite of actions of which it forms 
part and the particular jurisdiction. 724  
 
By assessing mitigation actions to determine MVs for the outcomes, that is, the units 
traded in the ETSs of jurisdictions participating in the networked market, a common 
metric would be derived, enabling fungibility of the units across schemes. The MV 
provides a direct connection between the actual mitigation being achieved by these 
actions and market price of the outcomes. It also transmits information between 
counterparties about the respective jurisdictions. The MV of the units traded would 
be one of the variable elements included on the term sheet for a transaction. 
 (v) Market discipline on MV assessments 
 
                                                      
722 It is envisaged that these would probably be the same for all jurisdictions, for instance, 
representations and warranties that the jurisdiction satisfies eligibility requirements for 
engaging in cooperative approaches under Article 6 as agreed by the CMA. 
723 International Swaps & Derivatives Association, Inc., 2002 Master Agreement, as of June 
9, 2010 <www.isda.org/about-isda/> 
724 Fn.718 (Macinante 2018). 
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This level does not exist as any formal governance layer but rather in the broader 
sense of the governance structure. Nevertheless, market sentiment would operate 
as a reality check on the MV assessment process. The correlation between the 
mitigation value of a traded unit and its price is likely to lead to market price 
movements in any situation where the sentiment is that an MV assessment is not 
accurate. Thus, the market reaction on price will reflect a consensus on the MV 
assessed for any particular unit.  
 
This might be viewed as a threat to the integrity of the market, as it could provide an 
opportunity for manipulation of the price. However, several considerations militate 
against such: first, if the networked market is successful engaging the private 
financial sector, it should be sufficiently deep and with a broad enough cross-section 
of participants as to make attempts to move the price for improper purposes unlikely 
to succeed; secondly, if the sources of MV assessment information are perceived to 
be independent, objective, credible and reliable, not least because of the quality of 
the regulatory process under which that information is generated, then logically, an 
MV assessment would need to deviate significantly and obviously from the market 
expectation for traders to be willing to move against it; thirdly, supervision of the 
domestic markets by financial regulators, supervision of the MV assessment 
process by the MV assessment regulatory body, both reporting to the overriding 
supervisory bodies, acting conjointly, should provide an appropriately thorough and 
rigorous level of scrutiny of all aspects of market activity as to make manipulation of 
this nature difficult to carry out successfully; and fourthly, it is likely that market 
sentiment that an MV assessment was not accurate would manifest itself primarily in 
pricing of the futures contract for the carbon asset in question.  
(vi) Regulators acting collaboratively 
 
As noted, it is proposed that domestic financial regulators in each participating 
jurisdiction would monitor behaviour in the context of domestic market operation. In 
this respect, they would act collaboratively with their counterpart ETS 
administrator/regulator or, if Paris Agreement rules so provide, the jurisdiction’s 
Designated National Authority (DNA). This domestic oversight would then feed into 
the oversight provided by the supervisory bodies. 
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(vii) The overriding supervisory bodies, acting conjointly 
 
These bodies, one a climate subsidiary body established by the CMA under the 
Paris Agreement, the other an existing body, or a new committee or subordinate 
body of an existing inter-governmental financial organisation, acting conjointly and 
reporting to the CMA, could be charged with setting overall policy direction, 
supervising the effectiveness of market operation in moving towards the climate 
objective, supervising the network of carbon markets behaviour as a global financial 
market and supervising operation of the MV assessment regulator. They would 
advise, inform and report on these matters to the CMA. 
3. Analysis in terms of IPCC criteria  
 
Finally, it is noted that the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report includes consideration of 
agreements and instruments for international cooperation in addressing climate 
change.725 It proposes criteria to evaluate forms of international cooperation as: 
environmental effectiveness; aggregate economic performance; distributional and 
social impacts; and institutional feasibility.726 These criteria are applied by the IPCC 
to different existing forms of international cooperation,727 including the UNFCCC, 
Kyoto Protocol, the CDM, agreements under the UNFCCC pertaining to the post-
2012 period, and other forms of international cooperation outside the UNFCCC, so 
are not specific to governance structures; nevertheless, there are parallels. For 
instance, elements of the governance structure for the market proposed in this 
thesis include, firstly, that it fosters pursuit of the climate policy objective by allowing 
for higher ambition, ensuring environmental integrity and transparency and applies 
robust accounting (environmental effectiveness); secondly, that it allows proper and 
efficient operation of the market through appropriate elements of financial regulation 
(economic performance), while the networked market should have similar cost-
benefits to those ascribed to linking (cost effectiveness); and thirdly, the functional 
separation of the self-regulating networked market would afford jurisdictions both a 
                                                      
725 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ‘International Cooperation: 
Agreements and Instruments’ in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. 
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, [Edenhofer, O., et al. (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press 
<https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_chapter13.pdf> 
accessed 31/07/17.  
726 Ibid 13.2.2. 
727 See, for instance, Table 13.3, 1042. 
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level playing field and relative ease in joining or leaving, based on their own 
domestic requirements (institutional feasibility). So, while the IPCC criteria may not 
be directed specifically to governance structures of these existing instances of 
international cooperation, nonetheless it might be claimed that the proposal 
compares favourably, when considered in the same terms. 
 
B Comparison with existing Kyoto Protocol structure  
There is an obvious parallel between what is proposed in this thesis and the existing 
governance structure in that the Conference of Parties (COP) remains the supreme 
policymaking body, decision making body and negotiating forum of the UNFCCC for 
both – for existing arrangements, as the Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP) and, with effect from December 2018, as the Meeting of Parties to the Paris 
Agreement (CMA). Yet, at the same time, these supplementary instruments to the 
Convention – the Protocol and the Agreement – mark the point of departure 
between the existing governance structure for emissions trading and that proposed 
in this thesis. 
1. Differing expressions as to emissions trading 
 
A basic difference between the Kyoto Protocol (KP) and the Paris Agreement (PA) 
is the terminology used to refer to emissions trading. Under Article 17 KP, the COP 
has the role of defining the relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines in 
particular, for verification, reporting and accounting for emissions trading, which it 
has done in a series of decisions, starting with COP7.728 On the other hand, Article 6 
PA sets out requirements for the cooperative approaches and particularly for those 
involving the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) towards 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs),729 but requires them only to be 
consistent with guidance provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
                                                      
728 Fn. 701 (COP7). See for instance, Decision 19/CP.7 Modalities, rules and guidelines for 
emissions trading under Art 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. Also later decisions including, for 
example: 24/CP.8 (technical standards for data exchange), 11/CMP.1 (modalities, 
guidelines, rules for emissions trading), 13/CMP.1 (modalities, guidelines, rules for assigned 
amounts under Art.7.4 KP), 14/CMP.1 (standard electronic format for reporting), 16/CP.10 
(issues related to registry systems under Art.7.4 KP). 
729 Parties “shall” promote sustainable development, ensure environmental integrity and 
transparency, including in governance, apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, 
avoidance of double counting: Article 6, paragraph 2. 
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Technological Advice (SBSTA), pursuant to paragraph 36 of Decision 1/CP.21 as 
adopted by the CMA. The difference in terminology is clear – definition of principles, 
modalities, rules and guidelines as opposed to consistent with guidance – indicating 
a conceivably less prescriptive approach under the Paris Agreement. Yet questions 
remain whether the guidance (being developed under the Work Programme under 
the Paris Agreement (PAWP),730 and commonly referred to as the Paris Rulebook), 
in fact, will be less prescriptive and binding on parties in practice than is the case at 
present.731  
2. Fundamentally different approaches 
 
Secondly, there are fundamental differences between the PA approach to emissions 
trading and that taken in the KP beyond just the way they are expressed, which 
mean that, inevitably, the governance structure under the proposal will be different 
from that which exists at present. The KP differentiates between developed and 
developing countries in applying to developed countries quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments (QELRCs). These translate into assigned 
amounts and assigned amount units (AAUs), which along with other ‘Kyoto units’ 
could be surrendered and cancelled against emissions over a commitment period. 
Parties with these commitments are required to maintain a commitment period 
reserve (CPR) and there are eligibility and reporting requirements in order for a 
party to engage in emissions trading, which is only available to parties with 
QELRCs.  
 
In contrast, while the PA differentiates between parties in terms of their respective 
capacities, it does not in terms of ability to engage in cooperative approaches 
(emissions trading), which is open to all, although it has been reported that 
differentiation continues to be a contentious subject in the context of burden sharing 
in emissions reductions, given countries’ different historical contribution to the 
                                                      
730 UNFCCC COP23: Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-third session, 
held in Bonn from 6 to 18 November 2017, Addendum, Part two, FCCC/CP/2017/11/Add.1, 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-third session, 8 February 2018, I. 
Completion of the work programme under the Paris Agreement and Annex I,  
<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2017/cop23/eng/11a01.pdf> accessed 
23/01/19. Negotiators at COP24 failed to reach agreement on relevant aspects: considered 
further in the following chapter. 
731 On the recurring issues of bindingness, prescriptiveness and differentiation, see: Daniel 
Bodansky and Lavanya Rajamani ‘The Issues that Never Die’, [2018] CCLR 184. 
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causes and capacities to respond.732 There are no QELRCs in the PA, but all parties 
are expected to put forward an NDC indicating, inter alia, the target emission level 
they will aim to achieve,733 and these are to be periodically revisited734 and the 
ambition increased.735 Leaving to one side the sustainable development mechanism 
in Article 6, paragraph 4, there are no flexible mechanisms with corresponding units 
specified in the PA. Rather, parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures with 
the aim of achieving the objectives of their NDCs,736 reflecting acceptance of the 
diversity and heterogeneity of approaches that countries may take. Article 6, 
paragraph 2, refers only to ‘internationally transferred mitigation outcomes’, as 
opposed to any specific unit that might be traded. The eligibility requirements for 
inclusion as, and questions of whether a specific value will be prescribed for 
mitigation outcomes (similar to the approach under the KP), are in the hands of the 
Paris Rulebook negotiators. On the latter point, the networked market clearly 
diverges by proposing independent, objective assessment of mitigation values, as 
evidenced in the third pillar described earlier (Section A, 1(iii)).  
 
Until the Paris Rulebook is elaborated it is difficult to provide more detailed 
distinguishing points, for example, in relation to matters such as requirements 
affecting eligibility to engage in international transfers of mitigation outcomes that 
will count towards a party’s NDC and how they compare to the eligibility 
requirements for IET under the KP. The negotiating text includes a list of potential 
requirements, not dissimilar to that which applied under Article 17 KP.737 All the 
same, some differences are readily apparent: for example, the accounting of 
assigned amounts is separated into three distinct phases under the KP: the eligibility 
phase, the annual (trading) phase; and the end of commitment period phase when 
                                                      
732 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol.12, 
No.733, Summary of Bangkok Climate Change Conference: 4-9 September 2018, 12 
September 2018, 14 <http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12733e.pdf> accessed 30/10/18. 
The differentiation debate is crystallizing around the scope of NDCs and, in terms of the 
proposal in this thesis, may be relevant to how MV assessments are devised and 
undertaken. It is noted that the increased ambition in Article 4, paragraph 3 is expressed to 
reflect common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of 
different national circumstances.  
733 Article 4, paragraph 2. 
734 Article 4, paragraph 9. 
735 Article 4, paragraph 3. 
736 Fn.733 (Art.4.2). 
737  UNFCCC SBSTA49: agenda item 11(a) Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement: Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the 
Paris Agreement <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/SBSTA49_DT_i11a.pdf> 
accessed 05/12/18. 
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compliance is assessed.738 In the networked market proposed this phased approach 
will not apply, not least because there is no assigned amount or commitment period, 
but also because the ledger will be continuously updated and accessible to 
appropriately permissioned entities. Eligibility criteria will be factored into the code 
for smart contracts such that transactions proposed by ineligible entities or from 
ineligible jurisdictions are unable to proceed. 
3. Emphasis on proposed market as a financial market 
 
A third point of distinction is that the proposal places greater emphasis on the inter-
jurisdictional carbon market as a financial market. In a sense, this approach mirrors 
the bottom up approach often mentioned in relation to the PA,739 since financial 
regulation is, in the first instance, a matter for domestic law making. As the proposal 
is based on a network of autonomous domestic carbon markets, it is illustrative to 
consider briefly the approach taken in one such market. The EUETS is the obvious 
choice, since it constitutes the bulk of the global carbon market trading at present.   
 
Illustration of EUETS 
 
The EUETS is ‘a cornerstone of the EU's policy to combat climate change and its 
key tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions cost-effectively.’740 It was 
introduced on 1 January 2005 and covers energy-intensive industrial sectors, the 
power sector and as from 2012 the aviation sector. As at April 2018, Directive 
2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
within the Union and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (EUETS Directive)741 
has been amended by ten instruments, providing for matters such as linking with 
project-based mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol; for all allowances to be held in 
                                                      
738 UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol Reference Manual on Accounting of Emissions and Assigned 
Amount, February 2007, 31 
<https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/08_unfccc_kp_ref_manual.pdf> accessed 
23/10/18. 
739 ‘The Paris Agreement can be described as a hybrid between a top-down, rules-based 
system and a bottom-up system of pledge and review. The NDCs “codify” the bottom-up 
approach that emerged from Copenhagen’: International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol.12, No.663, Summary of the Paris Climate 
Change Conference, 29 November-13 December 2015, 43 
<http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12663e.pdf> accessed 26/06/17.  
740 European Commission, EUETS webpage: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en 
accessed 02/07/18. 
741 OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, 32. 
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a Union Registry, rather than in national registries of member states; and for the 
inclusion of aviation, amongst other matters.742  
 
In particular, Article 12 of the EUETS Directive was amended in 2009743 to include 
provision requiring the Commission, by 31 December 2010, to examine whether the 
market for emissions allowances was sufficiently protected from insider dealing or 
market manipulation and, if appropriate, to bring forward proposals to ensure such 
protection.744 By a Communication dated 21 December 2010, the Commission 
provided a first assessment of the then current levels of protection of the carbon 
market from such misconduct and similar problems.745 It reported that 75-80% of the 
total volume traded in the EUETS was traded as derivatives contracts; over-the-
counter (OTC) spot and forward transactions, which had formerly prevailed, had 
receded with the development of standardised exchange-based spot and futures 
trades. The Commission noted the importance of information transparency, and 
canvassed the types of market abuse and other issues to be addressed. It noted 
that the then existing framework included financial markets legislation, the Market 
Abuse Directive (MAD) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), 
applying to emission allowances derivatives. Both of these items of legislation were 
under review at that time and there were a number of new financial markets 
measures proposed.746 
                                                      
742 Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 
2004, OJ L 338, 13.11.2004, 18; Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 19 November 2008, OJ L 8, 13.1.2009, 3; Regulation (EC) No.219/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009, OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, 109; 
Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009, OJ L 
140, 5.6.2009, 63; Decision No.1359/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 December 2013, OJ L 343, 19.12.2013, 1; Regulation (EU) No.421/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014, OJ L 129, 30.4.2014, 1; Decision 
(EU) 2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2015, OJ L264, 
9.10.2015, 1; Regulation (EU) 2017/2392 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 December 2017, OJ L 350, 29.12.2017, 7; Directive (EU) 2018/410 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2018, OJ L 76, 19.3.2018, 3; and Treaty of 
Accession of Croatia (2012), OJ L112, 24.4.2012, 21. 
743 Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009, OJ 
L 140, 5.6.2009, 63. 
744 Article 12(1a). 
745 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, Towards an enhanced market oversight framework for the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme, 21.12.2010, COM(2010) 796 final. 
746 Ibid at 8. Also noted that a key future segment in the primary market, auctions, would 
come in full under the market oversight regime set out in the Auctioning Regulation: 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 of 12 November 2010 on the timing, 
administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances 
pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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The Commission reports periodically to the European Parliament and the Council on 
the functioning of the European carbon market.747 In its 2017 report,748 it noted that 
under the new MiFID II legislative package,749 emission allowances (defined to 
include Kyoto project-based credits that are accepted for compliance purposes in 
the EUETS, as well as EU allowances) are classified as financial instruments, 
meaning that rules formerly applicable only to allowance derivatives also applied to 
the spot segment of the secondary carbon market, putting emission allowances on 
an equal footing in terms of transparency, investor protection and integrity.750 
Moreover, by virtue of cross-references to the definition of a financial instrument, 
other financial market legislation such as the Market Abuse Regulation,751 and the 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive752 applied. Thus, the EU emissions trading market 
has been brought under financial market supervision. 
 
Defining an emission allowance to be a financial instrument is not without problems, 
quite apart from the imposition it represents on the autonomy of EU member states’ 
legal systems. It has been pointed out, for instance, that spot emission allowances 
differ from financial instruments in a technical sense, as they do not confer a 
financial claim against the public issuer, do not represent either title to capital or title 
to debentures and do not constitute forward contracts; from an application 
perspective, their primary purpose is to address climate change objectives, not to 
                                                                                                                                                         
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowances trading within the 
Community, OJ L 302, 18.11.2010, 1. 
747 In accordance with Articles 10(5) and 21(2) of the EUETS Directive. 
748 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, Report on the functioning of the European carbon market, COM/2017/693 final 
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0693&from=EN> accessed 26/06/18. 
749 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 
2011/61/EU, OJ L 173, 12.06.2014, 394-496, took effect 3 January 2018.  
750 Fn.748 (EC) 29. Note also that the MiFID II definition of emission allowances will need to 
be amended to accommodate international transfers of mitigation outcomes under the Paris 
Agreement, if the EU chooses to engage in cooperative arrangements under Article 6. 
751 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 
2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, OJ L 173, 12.06.2014, 1. 
752 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or 
terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No.648/2012 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, 73. 
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serve as an investment product; and from a regulatory perspective, invoking the 
legal obligations imposed by MAD and MiFID is onerous for smaller industrial 
enterprises.753 Furthermore, legal and fiscal treatment of emission allowances varies 
across EU member states, with national treatment of allowances ranging from 
financial instrument and intangible asset to property right and commodity. These 
aspects – the legal and fiscal treatment – are not addressed in the EUETS 
Directive.754  
 
Nevertheless, in spite of these variations, the clear intent at the EU level is to treat 
the carbon market as a financial market for regulatory purposes, suggesting this 
approach is seen as more effective and efficient than prior, less formal 
arrangements. As the proposed networked market builds on existing carbon 
markets, such as the EUETS, it would be both logical and beneficial to take account 
of the approach in those markets, particularly the EUETS, given its size relative to 
the overall global trade. This will invoke financial regulation, facilitating better 
investor protection in relation to areas such as market manipulation and insider 
dealing, and better investor and market risk management by drawing on risk 
management principles already developed for financial markets.  
 
Greater emphasis on the networked market as a financial market is reflected in the 
proposal firstly, by the introduction of the two supervisory bodies, one established 
under the CMA and the other established under an intergovernmental financial body 
such as IOSCO (although both reporting to the CMA), and acting conjointly; 
secondly, in acknowledgement that domestic financial regulators could play a bigger 
role in management of the market (as ESMA will do in the EUETS); and thirdly, in 
the two other functional pillars, one being the self-regulatory market, and the other 
being the independent source of market information. These elements distinguish the 
                                                      
753 Krzysztof Gorzelak ‘The legal nature of emission allowances following the creation of a 
Union Registry and adoption of MiFID II—are they transferable securities now?’ (2014) 
Vol.9, Issue 4 Capital Markets Law Journal 373, 377, citing submissions on the consultation 
on MiFID review. Noted also that, in relation to provisions applicable as a result of emission 
allowance definition as a financial instrument, the UK Financial Conduct Authority has 
acknowledged that “it is not always clear how all this overlapping legislation fits together”: 
Financial Conduct Authority UK, The Perimeter Guidance Manual, Chapter 13, Guidance on 
the scope of MiFID and CRD IV, 13.4 Financial Instruments, Release 28, June 2018, at 
PERG 13/22 <https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/PERG/13/4.pdf> accessed 
02/07/18. 
754 Fn.748 (EC) 30. See also: Fn.753 (Gorzelak). The issue of the precise nature of what is 
being traded in explored in detail in the following chapter (chapter IX), when addressing 
specific legal issues, and also earlier (chapter IV).  
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proposal from the governance structure existing under the KP. The fact that the 
proposed market has a trading platform which will be owned, operated and self-
regulated by the participating jurisdictions is another point of distinction. Under 
Article 17 KP, there is no distinct trading platform, just bilateral agreements between 
counterparties, which are opaque as to terms such as price. Under the proposal a 
distinct inter-jurisdictional marketplace would be established which should facilitate 
better price disclosure and enable scope to better curtail improper market 
behaviour. 
  
Separating the function of independently supplying market information further 
delineates the nature of the proposed market. By placing this assessment process 
on an objective, independent, structured, replicable basis it is intended to remove, to 
the greatest extent possible, the political element (although it is recognised that this 
will be difficult to remove entirely). Nevertheless, the process design would be 
intended to achieve, so far as is possible, a scientific outcome objectively, on a level 
playing field, not an outcome determined by compromise or political agreement. The 
proposal aims also to separate the functional process of deriving and delivering 
market information from the structural and operational aspects of the marketplace, 
thereby facilitating separation and, consequently, clearer resolution of the issues 
relevant to each function.  
4. Accounting and informational differences 
 
Fourthly, the KP accounting system is centred on two parallel information streams – 
GHG inventories and assigned amount information,755 which starts at the national 
level. Each developed country (Annex I Party) is required to establish and maintain 
a national system for the preparation of its national GHG inventory. On the assigned 
amount side, each Annex I Party is required to establish a national registry for 
tracking its holdings of and transactions of Kyoto units.756 GHG inventory data and 
assigned amount information are compiled in national reports and are subject to 
review and compliance procedures. These procedures verify the Party’s level of 
emissions and assigned amount, and its eligibility to participate in the Kyoto 
mechanisms.757 Each Party’s emissions and assigned amount information are 
                                                      
755 Fn.738 (KP Reference Manual) 37. 
756 Article 5, paragraph 1 KP; Decision 13/CMP.1, annex, paragraph 17 et seq. 
757 Article 7, paragraphs 1, 2; Article 8 KP. 
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recorded as official only after the information has been reviewed and any questions 
of implementation have been resolved through the compliance procedures. The 
Secretariat must maintain a compilation and accounting database (CAD) as the 
official repository of information related to each Party’s accounting of emissions and 
assigned amount.758 
  
Rather than continuing this KP approach of dual stream national accounting being 
fed up to the Secretariat for checking and confirmation, an alternative would be to 
approach the networked market as a self-contained unit, accounting for itself, so 
that there would be an information stream pertaining to the holdings and 
transactions of the authorised entities participating in trading. Information on 
account balances of those entities, at any point in time, would be available to the 
national administrators of participating jurisdictions and so, capable of being fed into 
the reporting arrangements the particular jurisdiction might have in relation to its 
NDC and overall GHG emissions759. Hence, operation of trading is separated from 
and self-contained, but accessible to the broader accounting and reporting 
requirements of jurisdictions in relation to their NDC. At the same time, the 
distributed ledger could be interrogated by the network entity for purposes of its own 
reporting to the supervisory bodies. 
 
A fundamental difference is that under the KP, there has been no organised inter-
jurisdictional trading platform, per se, that might be identified as ‘the market’, 
whereas the establishment of such a trading platform is proposed here. Thus, the 
market might be seen as largely self-contained and functionally separate from, but 
capable of feeding the required information into, other functional requirements such 
as overall NDC emissions accounting and reporting. Funding, administration and 
operational responsibility would reside with the participating jurisdictions, through 
the network entity, which they would own and manage. In this way, only the 
countries that see a benefit in authorising entities to trade inter-jurisdictionally 
                                                      
758 Decision 13/CMP.1, annex, paragraph 50 et seq. 
759 As elaborated in the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency 
framework: UNFCCC CMA.1, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of Parties to the Paris Agreement on the third part of its first session, held at 
Katowice from 2 to 15 December 2018, Addendum, Part two, FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2, 
19 March 2019, Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
Parties to the Paris Agreement, Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving 
as the meeting of Parties to the Paris Agreement, Decision 18/CMA.1 
<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2018_3_add2%20final_advance.pdf> 
accessed 07/05/19.  
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contribute to the funding and maintenance of the market infrastructure. In the case 
of the KP, funding, administration and operational management of the ITL and the 
CAD is through the Secretariat, therefore funded by all Annex I Parties.  
5. Compliance 
 
A final aspect that might be mentioned relates to compliance, in relation to which 
two points arise. First, emissions trading markets are not natural markets; demand 
needs to be supported by compliance and consequently, the threat of enforcement. 
Under the KP, international emissions trading is primarily directed to the Annex I 
Parties, thus the trading rules are backed up by the compliance mechanism.760 
Application of compliance and enforcement procedures against a sovereign party 
are always fraught with difficulty, as the transgressing sovereign party will have the 
ability to withdraw from the agreement.761 In contrast, the proposed market and its 
operation are separated from the commitments made by participant jurisdictions 
through their NDCs, which in any case are voluntary. The networked market 
proposed is primarily based on the continued, autonomous operation of the carbon 
markets in the participating jurisdictions, thus compliance and enforcement will be 
primarily a domestic jurisdictional matter and so both more likely and more effective, 
providing a stronger underpinning to demand in the overall network.762 
 
Secondly, under both the KP and the proposal, a non-compliant transaction or one 
involving non-compliant counterparties would not proceed. However, under the KP, 
the process is for the ITL and any relevant supplementary transaction log (such as 
the EUTL under the EUETS) to perform electronic checks on each transaction.763 
Under the proposal, the transaction process is designed so that a transaction cannot 
proceed unless the jurisdictions and the entities authorised by them to participate in 
the transaction are in compliance and the transaction, similarly, would not cause 
                                                      
760 Article 18 KP; Decision 27/CMP.1. 
761 Canada withdrew from the KP at a time when it was unlikely to be able to meet its 
compliance obligations. 
762 Along similar lines, a global federalist, bottom up approach was advocated as early as 
2005: D G Victor, J C House and S Joy, ‘A Madisonian Approach to Climate Policy’, (2005) 
Vol.309 No.5742 Science 1820. 
763 Fn.738 (KP Reference Manual) 69; UNFCCC Secretariat, Data Exchange Standards for 
Registry Systems under the Kyoto Protocol, Technical Specifications (Version 1.1.11), 24 
November 2013, sections 4.6.1-5 (technical checks), 4.6.6-7 (policy and transactions 
checks)  
<https://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/registry_systems/itl/application/pdf/data_exchange_st
andards_for_registry_systems_under_the_kyoto_protocol.pdf> accessed 14/11/18. 
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non-compliance (for instance, impacting environmental integrity by resulting in 
increased allowable emissions). The requirements are built into the code for the 
transaction, which will not proceed unless there is conformity with the requirements 
and these have been verified. The difference is that under the KP, the transaction 
involves a sequence of messaging steps764 after the transaction is proposed, 
whereas in the proposal the code for performing the transaction automatically 
prevents the transaction from proceeding and alerts the counterparties to the non-
compliance, thereby disintermediating the third party gatekeepers, involving less 
process steps and so increasing efficiency of the process. 
 
C Global financial market governance structures 
 
A key aspect of the approach for global financial market governance that emerged 
following the global financial crisis of 2008 was that, ‘[A]s a supplement to sound 
micro-prudential and market integrity regulation, national financial regulatory 
frameworks should be reinforced with a macro-prudential overlay that promotes a 
system-wide approach to financial regulation and oversight and to mitigate the build-
up of excess risks in the system.’765 Thus, it has been observed that supervision 
over commercial actors in financial markets should be based on a two-tier system 
with national supervisors continuing to exercise micro-prudential oversight and a 
level of macro-prudential oversight introduced for financial markets as a whole in 
order to provide early recognition of systemic risks, although this would be more 
through enhanced cooperation of national authorities, rather than creation of a new 
global body.766  
 
A similar two-level approach is proposed in the governance structure for the 
networked market. As noted in section B above, with greater emphasis placed on 
the networked market as a financial market, it is proposed that domestic financial 
regulators would play a more important role, in a similar micro-prudential sense, in 
                                                      
764 Ibid (KP Reference Manual) 68, figure VI-6 (Sequence of Registry transactions). 
765 G20 Working Group 1, Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency, 
Final Report, March 25 2009, Executive Summary and Recommendations, ii 
<http://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/protected/G20_/G20_wg1_25_03_09.pdf> 
accessed 20/11/18. 
766 Erik Denters ‘Regulation and Supervision of The Global Financial System’, (2009) Vol.1 
No.3 Amsterdam Law Forum 63, 76-77 <http://amsterdamlawforum.org/issue/view/13> 
accessed 19/11/18. 
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management of their respective emissions trading markets. In the first instance, this 
would be through the exercise of greater oversight as derivatives markets develop 
domestically. Secondly, if as in the EU, jurisdictions define the domestic allowance 
traded in their ETS as a financial instrument, this could be expanded to bring their 
physical trading market under financial regulation (assuming domestic financial 
regulations that are set out on a similar or parallel basis to those in the EU), further 
enhancing this micro-prudential level oversight. The proposal is also that the 
domestic financial regulators in those jurisdictions participating in the networked 
market would contribute the membership of the overriding financial supervisory body 
that would act conjointly with the climate supervisory body. Together, these 
supervisory bodies would provide oversight at the macro-prudential level. 
 
While this approach to governance is consistent with developments in global 
financial governance, the later has not been without challenges. For instance, it has 
been noted that one fundamental underlying weakness in the international financial 
regime that remains is that there are too many institutions and mechanisms, with 
sometimes overlapping mandates, but limited powers.767 The proposal set out in this 
thesis cannot alter that state of affairs, but nor does it exacerbate it by proposing 
addition of another institution. Rather, it proposes that the financial supervisory body 
be a committee or subordinate body of one of the existing bodies in the global 
financial governance framework, as listed in the following table: 
 




The BIS mission is to serve central banks 
in their pursuit of monetary and financial 
stability, to foster international cooperation 
in those areas and to act as a bank for 
central banks. 
It is owned by sixty central banks, 
representing countries from around the 
world that together account for about 95% 





CPMI promotes the safety and efficiency 
of payment, clearing, settlement and 
related arrangements, thereby supporting 
financial stability and the wider economy; 
monitors and analyses developments in 
these arrangements, both within and 
across jurisdictions. It also serves as a 
forum for central bank cooperation in 
CPMI representatives are senior officials 
of member central banks. 
                                                      
767 Council on Foreign Relations, ‘The Global Finance Regime’ Report by International 
Institutions and Global Governance Program, 2012 <https://www.cfr.org/report/global-
finance-regime> accessed 06/07/18. 
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related oversight, policy and operational 




FSB was established by the group of 
twenty industrialised countries (G20) with 
a key role in promoting the reform of 
international financial regulation. FSB 
operates through a three-stage process for 
the identification of systemic risk in the 
financial sector, for framing the financial 
sector policy actions that can address 
these risks, and for overseeing 
implementation of those responses 
FSB is a not–for-profit association under 
Swiss law and is hosted by the BIS under 
a five-year renewable service agreement. 
The organisation structure of the FSB 
consists of the Plenary, Steering 
Committee, Standing Committees, 
Working Groups, Regional Consultative 
Groups, Chair and the Secretariat. The 
Plenary is the sole decision-making body 
of the FSB. It consists of representatives 
of all Members and is currently composed 
of 54 representatives from 25 jurisdictions, 
six representatives from four international 
financial institutions and nine 
representatives from six international 
standard-setting, regulatory, supervisory 





IOSCO develops, implements and 
promotes adherence to internationally 
recognized standards for securities 
regulation. It works intensively with the 
G20 and the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) on the global regulatory reform 
agenda. 
IOSCO membership regulates more than 
95% of the world's securities markets in 
more than 115 jurisdictions; securities 
regulators in emerging markets account for 
75% of its ordinary membership.  IOSCO 
committees cover: Issuer Accounting, 
Auditing and Disclosure; Regulation of 
Secondary Markets; Regulation of Market 
Intermediaries; Enforcement and the 
Exchange of Information and the 
Multilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding Screening Group; 
Investment Management; Credit Rating 
Agencies; Commodities Derivatives 
Markets; and Retail Investors, as well as 
Growth and Emerging Markets 
Financial Action 
Task Force 
FATF is an independent inter-
governmental body that develops and 
promotes policies to protect the global 
financial system against money 
laundering, terrorist financing and the 
financing of proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. The FATF 
Recommendations are recognized as the 
global anti-money laundering (AML) and 
counter-terrorist financing (CFT) standard. 
FATF currently comprises 35 member 
jurisdictions and 2 regional organisations, 
representing most major financial centres 
in all parts of the globe. 
Table 1:  Global financial governance regime bodies (information from related 
websites: see footnotes 703-707 supra)  
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As flagged earlier, IOSCO is considered the most appropriate of these bodies that 
might form a new committee or subordinate entity to function as the financial 
supervisory body as part of the governance structure proposed for the networked 
market. This conclusion is supported both by the nature of the functions performed 
by IOSCO and its existing committees in relation to regulation of financial markets, 
and by its composition and the broad coverage of that membership. All the same, 
the other bodies carry out functions that have a bearing on applications of DLT that 
are relevant to their areas of focus. For example, BIS-CPMI has undertaken 
analysis of the application of DLT in payment, clearing and settlement to provide an 
analytical framework for central banks and other authorities to review and analyse 
DLT arrangements, in order to understand the use cases and identify opportunities 
and risks.768 The responses of these and other organisations to applications of DLT 
are interrogated in the following section for how they might inform application to 
networking of carbon markets.  
 
D Responses to DLT and its applications 
 
The surge of development related to information and communication technology in 
the decades immediately before and since the millennium has been characterised 
as the fifth technological revolution, the Age of Information and 
Telecommunication.769 Yet while it is appropriate to include innovations such as 
distributed ledgers as part of the revolutionary developments, it is difficult to agree 
with commentators who see these technological developments as presaging entirely 
new areas of law.770 For instance, it has been argued that the real innovation due to 
digital technologies ‘... is that, in the digital world, technology itself can be regarded 
as a parallel form of regulation. Such regulation derives from the technical features 
                                                      
768 Bank for International Settlements, CPMI, ‘Distributed ledger technology in payment, 
clearing and settlement, An analytical framework’, 2017 
<https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d157.pdf> accessed 18/10/18. 
769 Carlota Perez ‘Technological Revolutions and techno-economic paradigms’, (2010) 34(1) 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 185, 196-7. 
770 Aaron Wright and Primavera De Filippi ‘Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the 
Rise of Lex Cryptographia’ Background Paper, (Mar 12, 2015) Internet Governance Forum, 
UN-Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Workshops Descriptions and Reports, IGF 
2015 Workshop No.239 Bitcoin, Blockchain and Beyond: FLASH HELP!  
<http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals> 
accessed 31/10/16.   
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of various online platforms, which ultimately determine what can or cannot be 
done.’771  
 
This has been described as Lex Informatica, an alternative normative system 
consisting of a particular set of rules and customary norms arising from the 
limitations imposed by design of the infrastructure subtending the network: a toolkit 
for regulation of online transactions through establishment of technical norms, in 
addition to contractual rules. The authors of this theory posit that this has led to 
establishment of a separate body of law.772 They speculate that progressive 
deployment of blockchain technology may lead to recognition of another body of law 
– Lex Cryptographia, characterized by a set of rules administered through self-
executing smart contracts and decentralized (and potentially autonomous) 
organisations.773 These ideas are premised on ‘cyberspace’ being a separate 
(parallel) world, or jurisdiction, in which a different set of rules, or regulations, 
applies, giving rise to the potential for competition (or rather conflict) between the 
‘laws’ of cyberspace and those of the real world.774  
 
This thesis does not subscribe to the idea of a separate legal system for 
cyberspace, but rather roots its analysis of regulatory responses to DLT and its 
applications firmly in the real world, beginning with the initial question of whether 
regulation should address the technology itself, or its applications. To examine this 
point, a theory proposed in the literature for DLT regulation is examined in the next 
sub-section, before other regulatory analytical techniques are reviewed, in terms of 
applicability to the proposed model, in the sub-section thereafter. Evolving 
jurisdictional approaches to regulating applications of the technology are considered 
in the third sub-section. 
1. Regulation of the technology or its application 
 
It has been observed that the ‘… patchwork of regulations applied to businesses 
using decentralized ledger technology is compromised by its inability to adapt to the 
technology, its inefficient mechanisms for responding to market and governance 
failures, and its overwhelming tendency to quash innovation in the name of 
                                                      
771 Ibid 46.  
772 Ibid 48. See also Lawrence Lessig, Code Version 2.0 (2nd Edn., Basic Books, 2006).  
773 Ibid. 
774 Fn. 772 (Lessig).   
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preventing crime and protecting consumers.’775 Thus, despite predictions of DLT 
revolutionizing the way things are done, the author, Reyes, argues that as a result of 
criminal and other illicit uses, regulators have adopted an increasingly aggressive 
approach to applying and enforcing existing regulations against a drastically 
different new and emerging technology, resulting in barriers to entry and a climate of 
legal stigma.776 
 
Recognising the shortcomings of current regulatory approaches (bearing in mind 
also the US context and time period of approximately 2009-2015 being considered), 
Reyes notes that the literature puts forward alternative proposals as, firstly, applying 
existing law to bitcoin and other virtual currencies by shoehorning decentralized 
payment applications into specific types of asset or property categories; secondly, 
applying US federal financial services law to all decentralized virtual currencies to 
address anti-money laundering (AML) issues, but leaving the remaining policy 
issues to (US) states to address; or alternatively, a variety of proposals calling for 
various methods and levels of self-regulation, which focus on the regulatory 
approach to bitcoin and other decentralized virtual currencies, and do not address 
the underlying technology.777 The literature (according to Reyes) tends to skip the 
question of how to regulate DLT and moves straight to jurisprudential questions of 
how blockchain might disrupt or alter known legal structures. In so doing, Reyes 
argues, a significant gap is left and DLT will never revolutionize contracts and so on, 
if the regulatory environment remains so hostile.778   
 
To develop a regulatory approach robust enough to account for DLT, Reyes 
proposes a set of seven standards for evaluating alternative regulatory proposals. 
They are: minimising compliance risk; minimising risk of illicit use; minimising 
malfunctions and related problems; minimising data security risk; minimising 
systemic risk; promoting innovation and adaptability; and maximising political 
feasibility.779 Applying these criteria to dismiss alternative proposals from the 
                                                      
775 Carla L. Reyes ‘Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized 
Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal’, (2016) 61 Vill. L. Rev 191, 233. This was 
published in 2016 and focuses on responses by US regulators, both financial and criminal, 
from 2009, with the advent of bitcoin, onwards.  
776 Ibid. This is not necessarily the case in other jurisdictions, as is explored later in this 
section. 
777 Ibid 213. 
778 Ibid 214. 
779 Ibid. 
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literature, Reyes concludes that there has been a failure to regulate at the DLT 
level, rather than just at the payments application level; an overly reactive approach 
to bitcoin market failures, AML and curbing illicit use applications; and that this focus 
is grounded in current characteristics of bitcoin and virtual currencies, thereby tying 
the regulation to a point in time. The problem is to find a regulatory approach that 
will treat DLT holistically, without tying regulations to specific applications, while 
maximising the seven criteria. 
 
Reyes’ solution is an endogenous model of regulation that simultaneously governs 
from within and without by building compliance into the protocol, building on the idea 
of code-as-law, not as others have proposed,780 but primarily directed at the 
technology itself. Thus, the idea is to regulate the technology itself by writing the 
regulation into the code, by ‘… leveraging smart contracts and other features of 
decentralized ledger technologies…’781 However, this begs a number of questions, 
not least being how Reyes proposes to distinguish between the code being 
regulated from the code of the smart contracts and other features? Perhaps more 
fundamentally, Reyes never asks or answers the obvious question: why regulate 
DLT? Or, equally fundamentally, what is DLT, as opposed to its applications, and 
does it (as opposed to the applications) actually need (or readily avail itself of) 
regulation? In other words, what is it that is being regulated when one regulates 
DLT? How, then, to regulate it? 
 
The problem with the argument made by Reyes (which, unfortunately, tends to 
undermine her theoretical approach to regulation, considered below), is that the 
technology – DLT – is just lines of computer code, so for legal or regulatory 
purposes it does not, of itself, have a distinct economic or social function capable of 
being subject to legal framing (such as through regulation), but only derives such in 
its specific applications. There are coding rules that apply to how the code is written 
and, presumably, if these are not applied and observed the code will either not work, 
or will malfunction, or produce an undesired outcome. But this is different from the 
sort of regulation that this thesis addresses and that, it is surmised, Reyes’ theory 
addresses.  
 
                                                      
780 Fn. 770 (Wright & De Filippi). 
781 Fn.775 (Reyes) 229. 
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This thesis argues that there is no tangible manifestation of the technology capable 
of regulation other than in the form of the various different applications. In most 
cases, the technology is being applied to scenarios that are already subject to 
regulation in some form or other, whether that is for mitigating systemic risk, for 
protecting consumers, or for preventing illegal or illicit activities. In applications 
where, by virtue of the technology, the reason for the regulation doesn’t arise, for 
instance, by using the technology consumer risk does not arise, then there would be 
no reason to bring that application under the regulation that otherwise applies to the 
activity. There may also be instances where the applications are not covered by 
existing laws but, on proper consideration, give rise to public policy reasons why 
they should.782  
 
This points to the need for case-by-case consideration on the part of the regulators, 
not holistic regulation of the technology. This approach is recommended in order to 
ensure that regulators do not stifle innovation in the underpinning technologies.783 It 
has been pointed out that this approach aligns with core values of internet design 
and for this reason, most discussion of global internet governance has centred on 
higher-level use cases and prominent actors, leaving technical decisions on protocol 
specification to specialised standards bodies.784 It has been noted also that: 
‘Regulators should focus on specific use cases of blockchains rather than the 
technology itself. This position finds support in experience with other disruptive 
technologies, such as the Internet and digital platforms’785 
2. Regulatory analytical techniques  
 
Notwithstanding the above, the way in which Reyes arrives at the endogenous 
theory of regulation for DLT is interesting: she follows a functional approach 
                                                      
782 See for instance: Dirk A Zetzsche, Ross P Buckley and Douglas W Arner, ‘The 
Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain’ (2018) 2018(4) 
University of Illinois Law Review 1361,1382-3. 
783 Julie Maupin ‘Mapping the Global Legal Landscape of Blockchain and Other Distributed 
Ledger Technologies’, Centre for International Governance Innovation, CIGI Papers No.149, 
October 2017  
<https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.149.pdf> accessed 
24/01/18. 
784 Ibid 5.  
785 Michèle Finck ‘Blockchains: Regulating the unknown’ (2018) Vol. 19 No.4 German Law 
Journal 665, 689 citing Julie Maupin (fn.783 supra). 
 232 
explored in financial regulatory literature.786 Financial regulation is often tethered to 
the financial architecture – the design and structure of firms, markets and other 
institutions at the time it is promulgated, but the financial system is changing 
dynamically.787 On-going monitoring and updating can address this but is costly and 
prone to political interference, suggesting that it may be more effective, or at least 
instructive, to focus on the system’s underlying, less time-dependent economic 
functions.788 
 
Translating this approach to the governance structure for the networked market 
proposed in this thesis, one might consider what are the underlying functions of that 
system. In terms just of Article 6 PA, functions might include: allowing for higher 
ambition; promoting sustainable development; ensuring and promoting 
environmental integrity; ensuring transparency, including in governance; and 
applying robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting. In 
terms of market operation, the functions might include: facilitating better investor 
protection in relation to areas such as market manipulation and insider dealing; and 
better investor and market systemic risk management. However, it is likely that 
these climate-related and market-related functions will underpin the governance 
structure by virtue of the legal framework within which the market will operate. 
Perhaps more fundamentally, the functions of this governance system might be 
couched in terms of, from a climate perspective, driving higher mitigation ambition 
towards limiting GHG emissions at levels that will confine global average 
temperature increase below the 1.5°C target and doing so by, from a market 
perspective, providing a stable global carbon price (or price range). A governance 
structure that focuses on these underlying functions would clearly be directed at the 
objectives of climate change policy. 
 
Another regulatory analysis argues that only through a polycentric collaborative 
effort between industry and other stakeholders with regulators can the complex 
regulatory challenges of blockchain be satisfactorily addressed. 789 It proposes a 
number of guiding principles to facilitate achievement of that objective, being that: 
regulatory stability is a means of innovation and growth; public policy considerations 
                                                      
786 Reyes cites Steven L Schwarcz ‘Regulating Financial Change: A Functional Approach’, 
[2016] 100 Minnesota Law Review 1441.   
787 Ibid 1442. 
788 Ibid 1444. 
789 Fn.785 (Finck 2018) 685-687. 
 233 
must be considered from the outset; the importance of regulatory conversations; 
technological innovation triggers legal innovation; regulators should encourage 
experimentation; the focus should be on use cases rather than the technology; 
regulators should resist the temptation of prematurely creating new institutions; and 
regulators should engage in a transnational conversation. 
 
While these principles are directed to blockchain as a technical innovation more 
generally, nevertheless they have resonance in relation to the specific application of 
DLT envisaged by this thesis. Two, in particular, warrant consideration. First, 
technological innovation necessitates legal innovation; and secondly, focus should 
be on use cases rather than the technology. In relation to the first, Finck states that 
experience shows that while code is a self-regulatory mechanism, it should not 
operate in isolation from regulatory framing: a process of polycentric co-regulation 
acknowledges the limits of traditional top-down approaches in the context of 
technological innovation, while ensuring that public policy objectives are 
achieved.790 The idea of co-regulation (also described as ‘regulated self-regulation’) 
encompasses various approaches in which the regulatory regime involves a 
complex interaction of general legislation and a self-regulatory body.791  
 
Marsden addresses the origins of internet co-regulation as arriving at a typology of 
co-regulation and self-regulation. The various definitions canvassed792 in the 
process are perhaps best covered by that of the European Community (as it then 
was): 
 
Co-regulation means the mechanism whereby a Community legislative act 
entrusts the attainment of the objectives defined by the legislative authority 
to parties which are recognised in the field (such as economic operators, the 
social partners, non-governmental organisations, or associations).793  
 
                                                      
790 Ibid 24. 
791 Ibid, citing C Marsden Internet Co-Regulation: European Law, Regulatory Governance 
and Legitimacy in Cyberspace, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 46. 
Marsden notes that this is often identified with the rise of ‘new governance’ in the late 1990s 
in environmental and financial regulation, but can be traced back to the inception of the 
Information Society policy in the mid-1990s. 
792 Fn.791 (Marsden) 54-6.  
793 Inter-institutional agreement on better law-making (2003/C 321/01), The European 
Parliament, The Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European 
Communities, Official Journal C 321, 31/12/2003 P. 0001–0005, Article 18. 
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This idea of co-regulation translates neatly to the specific application of DLT 
envisaged in the self-regulatory market component of the governance structure. As 
outlined earlier, the various tiers of governance (levels 1-5 in Diagram 3), 
incorporating the climate policy (and legal provisions, assuming conformity with the 
Paris Rulebook) provide the legislative framework within which the self-regulatory 
market is entrusted to attain the objectives defined by the legislative authority, the 
CMA. 
 
Secondly, as addressed in the preceding sub-section, the focus should be on use 
cases rather than the technology. Like the concept of co-regulation, this is a lesson 
derived from earlier experiences with the advent of the Internet.794 Two analytical 
frameworks illustrate this use case approach, the first, as applied by the World 
Economic Forum (WEF),795 the second put forward by the Bank for International 
Settlements Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (BIS-CPMI) in the 
use case of payment, clearing and settlement activities.796 Although these analytical 
frameworks are not directed to a governance structure, but rather examine potential 
use cases for DLT in financial sector applications in terms of benefits, risks, 
alternatives, and so on, they underscore the point that it is the use case that should 
be the focus, not the technology, in determining whether and how existing legislation 
may be relevant and applicable. This is demonstrated in practical terms by the 
evolving approaches to regulating applications of the technology, considered in the 
next sub-section. 
3. Developing jurisdictional approaches 
 
Distributed ledger technology is evolving and the range of potential applications, 
especially in relation to the financial sector, is expanding rapidly. Consequently, the 
response of legislators and regulators is in a state of flux, constantly reviewing 
developments and, increasingly, responding to technological changes and new 
applications with changes in applicable laws and in their approaches to regulating 
the use cases. 
 
                                                      
794 Fn.785 (Finck 2018) 689; see also fn.783 (Maupin). 
795 World Economic Forum, ‘The future of financial infrastructure: An ambitious look at how 
blockchain can reshape financial services’, (WEF, New York USA, August 2016) 
<www.wef.org> accessed 02/11/16.  
796 Fn. 768 (BIS-CPMI). 
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The initial application of blockchain as an alternative payment system (as bitcoin) 
has evolved in the decade since it first appeared, into fund raising through the issue 
of tokens, initial coin offerings (ICOs – which nomenclature is even evolving: now 
also known as ‘token generating events’ (TGEs), suggestive of changing emphasis 
and purpose), and investment vehicles. While many of the early concerns pertaining 
to the advent and use of bitcoin as an alternative payment system, such as its use 
for illegal or illicit transactions, tax evasion, anonymity of participants, money 
laundering and terrorism financing risks continue, to these have been added fraud, 
hacking and other consumer protection risks, and market manipulation and other 
market abuse issues as first bitcoin, then other subsequently issued digital coins (or 
‘virtual currencies’) have rapidly become objects of arbitrage trading and investment. 
At the same time, the numbers of exchanges, platforms for trading, and other 
service providers (for example, ‘wallet providers’) have multiplied.  
 
In its October 2018 submission to the UK House of Commons Treasury Select 
Committee report on crypto-assets, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) noted 
that in spite of technical limitations meaning that crypto-assets have not been able 
to scale up to challenge existing payment infrastructure, ‘…the crypto-asset market 
is developing at pace with over 1500 different coins and tokens valued at around 
$311b.’797 Both the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee report on 
crypto-assets798 and the Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group (SMSG) in 
advice provided to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)799 use 
the term ‘crypto-asset’ to encompass crypto-currency, virtual currency, virtual asset, 
and digital token, and ‘token’ rather than coin or currency, although others (see 
below) also use ‘virtual asset’.800 The SMSG advice includes background research 
                                                      
797 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Evidence on digital currencies to Treasury Committee 
(DCG0028)’, House of Commons, April 2018, paragraph 1 
<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/treasu
ry-committee/digital-currencies/written/81677.pdf> accessed 25/09/18. Five months later, the 
Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group advice to ESMA, citing the same source as the 
FCA, identified 1930 cryptocurrencies: see fn.799 (ESMA) following. 
798 Treasury Committee, Crypto-assets, (twenty-second report) (2017-19, HC 910) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmtreasy/910/910.pdf> accessed 
23/09/18. 
799 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), Securities and Markets Stakeholder 
Group, ‘Advice to ESMA Own Initiative Report on Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets’, 
2018, ESMA22-106-1338. 
800 Ibid paragraph 12: ‘The term “token” is more neutral as it does not carry the implicit 
legitimacy of “currency”.’ Presumably the same argument can be made for using asset, 
opposed to currency or coin. 
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showing significant changes in country of issuance for crypto-assets between 2017 
and 2018, from the USA (32%), Switzerland (27%) and Singapore (21%) in 2017, to 
Cayman Islands (40%) and the Virgin Islands (21%) in 2018; in 2017, 78% of the 
listed coins/tokens with a market cap of $50m or over, were found to be scams; 15% 
continued to get traded, about half (7%) of which were successful.801  
 
Thus, the initial alternative payment system has transmogrified into fund-raising 
vehicle and source of investment assets, giving rise to a plethora of additional 
concerns, which are developing and evolving continuously. For instance, in other 
developments the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), noting 
with concern the growing investor interest in gaining exposure to virtual assets via 
funds and unlicensed trading platform operators in Hong Kong, has issued guidance 
on the regulatory standards expected of virtual asset portfolio managers and fund 
distributors,802 while in a broader context, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
noting the urgent need for an effective global, risk-based response to the anti-
money laundering/counterterrorism financing (AML/CTF) risks associated with 
virtual asset financial activities, has urged all jurisdictions to take legal and practical 
steps, such as ensuring that virtual asset service providers are subject to AML/CTF 
regulations, to prevent the misuse of virtual assets.803 
(i) Survey of jurisdictions’ responses 
 
In these changing and challenging circumstances, this subsection briefly surveys 
the regulatory approaches in place, or planned, in illustrative jurisdictions804 to the 
                                                      
801 Ibid paragraphs 21, 22. 
802 Securities and Futures Commission, Hong Kong, Statement on regulatory framework for 
virtual asset portfolios managers, fund distributors and trading platform operators, 1 
November 2018, https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/news-and-announcements/policy-statements-
and-announcements/reg-framework-virtual-asset-portfolios-managers-fund-distributors-
trading-platform-operators.html, accessed 31/12/18. 
803 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Regulation of Virtual Assets’, 2018 <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/regulation-virtual-assets.html> 
accessed 07/11/18.  
804 This does not attempt to be comprehensive, however, it is noted that the Library of 
Congress, Law Library, produced two overviews of cryptocurrency regulation in June 2018, 
the first covering 130 jurisdictions: Library of Congress, Law Library, Regulation of 
Cryptocurrency Around the World, June 2018 
<https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/cryptocurrency-world-survey.pdf> accessed 
03/01/19; and the second, a selection of 14 jurisdictions: Library of Congress, Law Library, 




end of 2018. The aim is to identify and examine some approaches taken by 
legislators and regulators up to that time. The purpose is also, so far as possible, to 
elicit the direction in which regulation might move in the coming period in order to 
draw a picture of how a networked carbon market between jurisdictions operating on 
a distributed ledger architecture, as proposed here, and the governance structure 
envisaged, might fit into this evolving environment. 
(a) Typology of strategies 
 
A typology of regulatory strategies for distributed ledger applications has been 
produced by Finck,805 as follows:806  
 
i. the wait-and see approach: regulators gather information, which is assessed, 
often in consultation with stakeholders and taking account of developments 
in other jurisdictions. The disadvantage of this approach is that until the 
regulator is in a position to classify the activity, innovators are faced with 
legal uncertainty with respect to the likely application of existing legislation; 
ii. issue narrowing or broadening guidance on how existing legal frameworks 
apply: the disadvantage of this approach is that often the guidance is non-
binding, thus leaving legal certainty lacking; 
iii. regulatory sandboxing: ‘defined as a set of rules that allows innovators to 
test their product or business model in an environment that temporarily 
exempts them from following some or all legal requirements in place.’807  
iv. issuing new legislation: this approach is fraught with risk, not least in relation 
to changing terminology, as noted earlier in relation to the BitLicence in New 
York.808 
v. using the technology for their own purposes: Finck acknowledges that this is 
not a regulatory strategy so much as an educational response, citing several 
jurisdictions where government agencies are partnering with technology 
providers to develop applications based on the provision of government 
                                                      
805 Fn.785 (Finck 2018). It is noted that this is dated August 2017, meaning two years of 
developments have taken place since.  
806 Ibid 675-682. 
807 Ibid 677. 
808 Angela Walch ‘The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law)’ (2017) Vol.36 Iss.2 
Review of Banking & Financial Law 713, 728. 
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services (government data availability in Ukraine, land registry in Sweden; 
inter-bank payments in Singapore).809  
 
In practice, responses observed seem often to be a mixture of strategies, at times 
emanating from different parts of the same government,810 for instance, a wait-and-
see approach taken in conjunction with guidance on the application of existing laws 
and a sandboxing initiative. The UK is a case in point: the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) has established a regulatory sandbox to allow firms that may 
require authorisation the ability to test products and services in a controlled 
environment, with restricted authorisation and waivers;811 and is participating in the 
Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN), together with 11 financial regulators 
and related organisations, to create a ‘global sandbox’.812 The FCA also has a 
project to help innovator businesses understand the regulatory framework and how 
it applies to them.813 As part of this project, the FCA has entered cooperation 
agreements with a number of other regulators to facilitate entry of innovative 
businesses into each other’s markets, including Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Canada, Japan, Korea and China.814  
 
At the same time, the actions to be taken forward by the FCA, HM Treasury and 
Bank of England (BoE) as outcomes of the House of Commons Treasury Select 
Committee report on crypto-assets, apart from continuing to monitor market 
developments and regularly reviewing the UK’s approach (that is, wait-and-see), are 
otherwise aimed at shoring up the existing regulatory framework (thus, some 
guidance, some new legislation). They include: consulting on guidance for crypto-
asset activities currently within the regulatory perimeter (FCA); consulting on a 
                                                      
809 Fn.785 (Finck 2018) 681. 
810 For example, in the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Bank of England (includes 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA)), HM Treasury, the Office of the Chief Scientist, HM 
Revenue & Customs (HMRC), and the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee are 
all active with respect to fintech, ICOs and DLT applications in their respective roles. 
811 Financial Conduct Authority, UK, ‘Regulatory Sandbox’ 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/print/firms/regulatory-sandbox> accessed 31/12/18. Singapore, 
Switzerland, Australia and even some US states are amongst other jurisdictions to have 
established regulatory sandboxes. 
812 Financial Conduct Authority, UK, Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN), 7 August 
2018 <https://www.fca.org.uk/print/publications/consultation-papers/global-financial-
innovation-network> accessed 01/01/18. 
813 Financial Conduct Authority, UK, Innovate and Innovation Hub 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/innovate-innovation-hub> accessed 31/12/18. 
814 Ibid. 
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potential prohibition of the sale to retail consumers of derivatives referencing certain 
types of crypto-assets (for example, exchange tokens), including contracts for 
difference (CfDs), options, futures and transferable securities (FCA); consulting on 
potential changes to the regulatory perimeter to bring in crypto-assets that have 
comparable features to specified investments, and exploring how exchange tokens 
might be regulated if necessary (HM Treasury); transposing the EU Fifth AML 
Directive and broadening the scope of AML/CTF regulation further (HM Treasury); 
continuing to assess the adequacy of the prudential regulatory framework, in 
conjunction with international counterparts (PRA); and issuing revised guidance on 
the tax treatment of crypto-assets (HMRC).815  
(b) Support for DLT applications 
 
Jurisdictions also express statements of support for applications of DLT, especially 
in the financial sphere. For example, the October 2018 resolution of the European 
Parliament noted the potentially beneficial applications of DLT and urged the 
European Commission (EC), European supervisory authorities and other institutions 
to investigate and develop applications in various sectors, including monitoring 
developing trends and use cases in the financial sector.816 Another such instance is 
the coming together of seven southern European states to sign the ‘Southern 
European Countries Ministerial Declaration on Distributed Ledger Technologies’ in 
December 2018. Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain express 
a vision to make southern Europe a leader in emerging technologies, such as DLT 
and commit to share best practices with each other, while calling on the EC to 
continue the work it is undertaking through the European Blockchain Partnership.817 
They declare that legislation should allow innovation and experimentation in order 
that the public and private sectors better understand DLT and its use cases, and be 
based on European fundamental principles and technological neutrality.818 
                                                      
815 Fn.798 (Treasury Committee) Table 5.A. 
816 European Parliament, resolution ‘Distributed ledger technologies and blockchains: 
building trust with disintermediation (2017/2772(RSP))’, 3 October 2018, P8_TA-
PROV(2018)0373  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-
2018-0373+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> accessed 01/01/19.  
817 Southern European Countries Ministerial Declaration on Distributed Ledger Technologies, 
4 December 2018, Brussels, Belgium 
<https://www.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/images/stories/documenti/Dichiarazione%20MED7%
20versione%20in%20inglese.pdf> accessed 01/01/19.  
818 Ibid. 
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(c) Technology neutrality and regulatory guidance 
 
The concept of existing legislation being applied on a technology neutral basis is 
used by many jurisdictions describing their approach to DLT use cases. For 
instance, ‘Swiss legislation on financial markets is principle-based; one such 
principle is technology neutrality.’819 German law has been described as being 
‘…generally agnostic as to the use of technology’820 thus, there is neither specific 
DLT legislation, nor are there any express restrictions, but rather general German 
law principles apply.821 The German context also provides an illustration of how 
guidance emanating from regulatory authorities might not always be straightforward. 
The German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) has qualified bitcoin as 
being a ‘unit of account’ and thus a financial instrument within the meaning of the 
German Banking Act, meaning that engaging in commercial activities involving 
bitcoin without authorization under that act constitutes a criminal offence.822 
However, in September 2018, an appeal court in Berlin ruled that bitcoin does not 
qualify as a financial instrument for the purposes of the German Banking Act, as it 
did not represent units of account given that it lacks a stable value and is not an 
accepted means of payment. Nevertheless, BaFin is treating the decision as being 
limited to the facts of the case and maintaining its interpretation.823 
                                                      
819 Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA, Regulatory treatment of initial coin 
offerings, FINMA Guidance 04/2017, 29 September 2017 
<https://www.finma.ch/en/~/media/finma/dokumente/dokumentencenter/myfinma/4dokument
ation/finma-aufsichtsmitteilungen/20170929-finma-aufsichtsmitteilung-04-2017.pdf?la=en> 
accessed 01/01/19. Others to make such statements include the UK FCA and Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).   





+Daily+Newsfeed+2018-11-16&utm_term=> accessed 19/11/18. 
821 Ibid. As such, German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) follows a strictly 
no sandboxing approach, although some accommodation applies in general based on the 
size of the company (principle of proportionality). 
822 Jens Muenzer ‘Bitcoins: Supervisory assessment and risks to users, BaFin Journal, 
Expert article, 2014 
<https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Fachartikel/2014/fa_bj_1401_bit
coins_en.html> accessed 02/01/19.  
823 KG Berlin, Sept. 25, 2018, Docket No. (4) 161 Ss 28/18 (35/18), Court Decisions of 
Berlin-Brandenburg website; Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [Kreditwesengesetz] [KWG] 
[Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl.] [Federal Law Gazette] I at 2776, as 




(d) Case-by-case determination 
 
Increased emphasis on ICOs/TGEs means that much of the regulatory focus is on 
how to address these activities so that they are not just a way of avoiding proper 
controls on fund-raising, but at the same time the controls imposed do not stifle 
innovation. At one end of the spectrum is the Chinese response, where on 4 
September 2017, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and six other regulators 
declared ICOs illegal and called on existing issuers to refund monies raised.824 It 
has been reported that the Chinese authorities are ramping up the clampdown.825 At 
perhaps the other end of the spectrum, the position adopted by the UK FCA, 
amongst others, is that ‘Whether a crypto-asset (including crypto-tokens issued as 
part of an Initial Coin Offering) itself is capable of falling within the (regulatory) 
perimeter will…be fact specific depending on the particular crypto-asset instrument 
in question.’826 All the same, as noted above, the House of Commons Treasury 
Select Committee report on crypto-assets does recommend authorities investigate 
further regulatory controls.   
(e)  Token taxonomy 
 
The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) guidance also indicates 
a case-by-case approach to the application of financial market law and regulation to 
ICOs, flagging areas of current regulatory law where the underlying purpose and 
specific characteristics of ICOs may intersect as being: in relation to combatting 
money laundering and terrorist financing (issuing payment instruments); banking law 
(accepting public deposits); securities trading provisions (dealing in tokens that are 
securities); and collective investment scheme legislation (assets collected for 
external management).827 Developing this approach, FINMA issued guidelines828 
                                                                                                                                                         
=yes&doc.id=KORE223872018&doc.part=L&doc.price=0.0#focuspoint> accessed 04/04/19. 
Also see: Library of Congress, Law Library, ‘Germany: Court Holds That Bitcoin Trading 
Does Not Require a Banking Licence’, Global Legal Monitor, 19 October 2018 
<http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/germany-court-holds-that-bitcoin-trading-does-
not-require-a-banking-license/> accessed 03/01/19. Also fn.820 (Jones Day). The effects of 
this decision are limited to Germany in that ‘unit of account’ as a sub-category of the 
definition of “financial instrument” is particular to the German Banking Act and it is the 
interpretation of ‘unit of account’ on which the court and BaFin differed. 
824 Fn.804 (Library of Congress/Selected Jurisdictions) 31. 
825 Fn.798 (Treasury Committee) paragraph 153. It is ironic that PBOC is also investigating 
issuing its own fiat crypto-currency: see fn.804 (Library of Congress). 
826 Fn.797 (FCA). 
827 Fn.819 (FINMA).  
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focusing on the economic function and underlying purpose of the tokens, 
distinguishing three general categories: payment tokens (synonymous with crypto-
currencies) intended for use as a means of payment for goods or services; utility 
tokens that provide access digitally to an application or service; and asset tokens, 
representing a debt or equity claim on the issuer and thus analogous to equities, 
bonds or derivatives. Generally, asset tokens will be treated by FINMA as securities; 
if a payment token acts only as a means of payment and a utility token solely 
confers access to an application or service, then FINMA does not treat them as 
securities. The guidelines also recognise that these classifications are not mutually 
exclusive, allowing for tokens to have hybrid functionality.  
 
The House of Commons Treasury Select Committee report on crypto-assets applies 
a similar typology in discussing crypto-assets, being: an exchange token (common 
uses as a means of exchange; to facilitate regulated payment services); security 
token (common use as a capital raising tool); and utility token (common use as a 
capital raising tool) and in the case of all three types, common uses include for 
direct investment or indirect investment.829 Guidance from the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC), similarly, focuses on the indicators of when 
an ICO or token might fall within one of the definitions of a financial product.830 
    
The SMSG advice to ESMA831 applies the FINMA taxonomy as payment, utility, 
asset or hybrid tokens to assess whether they are covered or should be covered by 
existing EU financial regulation. It concludes that payment tokens are not currently 
covered by MiFID II, the Prospectus Regulation or Market Abuse Regulation. If they 
are transferable, they can be investment objects, in which case consideration should 
be given to listing them as a financial instrument under MiFID II. Similarly, utility 
tokens are not covered by financial regulation. Just as for payment tokens, if they 
are transferable, they can be investment objects, in which case the SMSG advises 
consideration should be given to listing them as a financial instrument.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
828 Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA, Guidelines for enquiries regarding 
the regulatory framework for initial coin offerings (ICOs), 16 February 2018 
<https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2018/02/20180216-mm-ico-wegleitung/> accessed 02/01/19. 
829 Fn.798 (Treasury Committee) chart 2.B. 
830 Australian Securities & Investments Commission, Initial coin offerings and crypto-
currency, Information Sheet INFO225 <https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/digital-
transformation/initial-coin-offerings-and-crypto-currency/> accessed 25/09/18. 
831 Fn.799 (ESMA/SMSG) paragraph 47 decision-tree.  
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In relation to asset tokens, the SMSG advice is more complicated. In order to 
determine whether financial regulations applied, it would be necessary to determine 
whether they are a financial instrument (for the purposes of MiFID II and the Market 
Abuse Regulation) and a transferable security (for the Prospectus Regulation). This 
depends on whether the asset token gives right to a financial entitlement, or an 
entitlement in kind (in which case, whether that includes a decision power in the 
project), and in both cases whether the token is transferable. Tokens giving right to 
an entitlement in kind without a decision power, but being transferable, might also 
share characteristics with derivatives, in which case questions arise as to whether 
the underlying asset is a commodity and, if so, whether cash settled or physically 
settled. Clearly, careful consideration of the structure and functionality of tokens is 
necessary to determine whether, and if so how, existing EU financial regulation 
applies. 
(f) Instances of specific legislation 
 
The SMSG advice832 provides a desktop survey of legislative developments or 
regulatory approaches taken by national securities supervisory authorities in the EU, 
EEA Member States and Gibraltar, Switzerland, Channel Islands and Isle of Man, in 
regard of ICOs and crypto-assets, undertaken in August 2018. Seven jurisdictions 
(Malta, Switzerland, Lithuania, Gibraltar, Jersey, Isle of Man, plus France has 
proposals) had expressly legislated or specifically developed methodologies, criteria 
or guidelines for assessing how and to what extent ICOs could be considered as 
financial instruments. Fifteen appeared to be taking the wait-and-see approach, 
dealing with proposals on a case-by-case basis, although as noted earlier, this can 
include a range of responses (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK, 
Liechtenstein, Guernsey). The remaining fourteen did not provide a clear position 
(Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Cyprus, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Norway and Iceland). 
 
While many governments are putting together taskforces and committees to 
examine the implications of new disruptive technologies, including DLT and its 
                                                      
832 Ibid. 
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applications,833 as the SMSG research bears out, most EU member states and other 
countries have not yet put in place legislation specifically relating to DLT, ICOs or 
crypto-assets. Rather, amongst the jurisdictions reviewed, the SMSG report found 
there are ‘very divergent regulatory approaches to crypto-assets.’834 All the same, 
some jurisdictions already have specific legislation: for example, Japan amended its 
Payment Services Act in 2016 (effective 1 April 2017) defining ‘cryptocurrency’, 
requiring registration of and regulating cryptocurrency exchange businesses, and at 
the same time requiring them to undertake AML checks. The provisions do not, 
however, cover ICOs.835  
 
While the Japanese legislation was in response to cyber-attacks on unregulated 
exchanges, other jurisdictions’ enactments are designed to attract tech business: for 
example, Gibraltar introduced the Distributed Ledger Technology Regulatory 
Framework on 1 January 2018, requiring locally-based firms using DLT on a 
commercial basis to store or transmit value belonging to others to be registered and 
adhere to a set of nine regulatory principles: it plans to bring ICOs within the ambit 
of the regulation;836 in July 2018, Malta introduced three laws aimed at encouraging 
DLT projects to locate there: one of these, the Virtual Financial Assets Act 2018, 
regulates ICOs, requiring publication pre-issue of a white paper approved by an 
agent registered under the Act, who needs to be in place at all times to ensure 
compliance with the law;837 while Liechtenstein is moving forward with a Blockchain 
Act as part of its aim to take advantage of the potential of the technology, in an 
environment of legal certainty and user protection.838 The Liechtenstein proposals 
                                                      
833 For example, in December 2018, Israel announced the establishment of an interagency 
team for regulatory coordination in the area of virtual assets: Library of Congress, Law 
Library, ‘Israel Establishes Interagency Team for Coordinating Regulation of Virtual Assets’, 
Global Legal Monitor, 28 December 2018 <http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/israel-
establishes-interagency-team-for-coordinating-regulation-of-virtual-assets/> accessed 
03/01/19.  
834 Fn.799 (ESMA/SMSG) paragraph 27.  
835 Library of Congress, Law Library, ‘Regulation of Cryptocurrency: Japan’, June 2018 
<https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/japan.php> accessed 03/01/19.  
836 Fn.798 (Treasury Committee). 
837 Library of Congress, Law Library, ‘Malta: Government Passes Three Laws to Encourage 
Blockchain Technology’, Global Legal Monitor, 31 August 2018, 
<http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/malta-government-passes-three-laws-to-
encourage-blockchain-technology/> accessed 03/01/19. 
838 Principality of Liechtenstein, Ministry for General Government Affairs and Finance, 
Unofficial Translation of the Government Consultation Report and the Draft-Law on 
Transaction Systems Based on Trustworthy Technologies (Blockchain Act), 28 August 2018, 
LNR 2018-879, 36 <http://www.regierung.li/media/attachments/VNB-Blockchain-Gesetz-en-
full-clean.pdf?t=636799366866600241> accessed 03/01/19. 
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allow for continuing technological evolution by creating a legal basis for much 
broader scope of application on a technology neutral basis (thus, ‘trusted 
technologies’ or TT systems, rather than just distributed ledgers or blockchain) in 
the ‘token economy’, where ‘token’ is a construct introduced to embody all types of 
rights on a TT system.839     
 
Countries are also enacting provisions to tighten up the application of AML/CTF 
laws. The Law Library of Congress report of June 2018 identifies seventeen 
countries that have applied AML/CTF legislation to DLT applications. For example, 
in Australia the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 
was amended in 2018 to require businesses providing convertible digital currency 
exchange services to be registered with and comply with mandatory reporting 
obligations to the Australian Transactions Reports and Analysis Centre 
(AUSTRAC).840   
 
Although to date these legislative enactments (apart from AML/CTF) seem to be 
more the exception, rather than the norm, changes are perceptible that seem to 
impute a trend towards more targeted legislation. France is proposing legislation to 
provide a regulatory framework for entities offering services in relation to digital 
assets. This would include a wide definition of crypto-assets and an extensive list of 
crypto-asset services, including custody of cryptographic keys for third parties; 
exchange trading of crypto-assets (that is, for fiat money); trading crypto-assets with 
other crypto-assets; operation of a crypto-asset trading platform; and investment 
services for crypto-assets.841  
 
Switzerland has introduced a new type of fintech banking licence (under Article 1b 
Swiss Federal Banking Act) as the third element of a three-pillar fintech programme, 
the two prior elements being an extension of the maximum holding period for third 
party funds in settlement accounts from seven to sixty days; and introduction of a 
regulatory ‘sandbox’ creating an unregulated regime for small innovative projects. 
                                                      
839 Ibid 40. 
840 AUSTRAC <http://www.austrac.gov.au/digital-currency-exchange-providers> accessed 
03/01/19. 
841 Fn. 820 (Jones Day); also fn. 804 (Library of Congress). 
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These both came into force in August 2017.842 The new banking licence will permit 
companies that are not banks (for example, crowd lending platforms, trading 
platforms, payment service providers) to accept public funds up to CHF100 million, 
provided they are not engaging in typical banking activities, in other words, the 
funds may not be reinvested and no interest is to be payable on them, however, 
they must be held separately from the company assets, or booked so they are 
capable of identification at any time.843 As financial intermediaries, the new licence 
holders will be subject to Swiss AML laws but benefit from market recognition 
attaching to prudential FINMA supervision, without being as highly regulated as 
traditional banking business.844 
 
A further Swiss development is the release by the Federal Council, in December 
2018, of a report on the regulatory framework for blockchain and distributed ledger 
technology.845 The Federal Council ‘wants to create the best possible framework 
conditions so that Switzerland can establish itself and evolve as a leading, 
innovative and sustainable location for fintech…’846 It found that there was no need 
for fundamental adjustments to the Swiss legal framework, but rather just specific 
amendments, such as in civil law, increasing the legal certainty for the transfer of 
rights by means of digital registers: this involves distinguishing two types of tokens – 
those that primarily represent a value in the blockchain context such as crypto-
currencies, and those that represent a legal position, such as a claim, membership 
or a  right in rem; in financial market infrastructure law, devising a new and flexible 
authorisation category for blockchain-based financial market infrastructures; and in 
AML law, more explicitly anchoring  the current practice of making decentralised 
trading platforms subject to AML legislation.847 
                                                      
842 Confederation of Switzerland, ‘Federal Council puts new fintech rules into force’, Federal 
Council release, 5 July 2017 <https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-
releases.msg-id-67436.html> accessed 04/01/19.   
843 Baer & Karrer, ‘Legal framework for new Swiss fintech licence finalised – entering into 
force January 2019’, Briefing December 2018 
<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3ca756d7-79dd-4227-a5db-593b77b24fbe> 
accessed 18/12/18.  
844 Ibid. 
845 Confederation of Switzerland, ‘Legal framework for distributed ledger technology and 
blockchain in Switzerland An overview with a focus on the financial sector’, Federal Council 
report, Bern, 14 December 2018 
<https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/55153.pdf> accessed 02/01/19. 





(ii) Conclusions on responses  
 
This short survey of jurisdictions illustrates regulatory approaches to DLT and use 
cases in the financial sector. It does not attempt to canvass, for instance, measures 
by jurisdictions that have or are investigating the introduction of crypto-currency in 
their own right; or different approaches being taken to taxation in this field across 
jurisdictions. Rather, the historical evolution of the use cases and application of DLT 
from an alternative payment system to the present emphasis on ICO/TGEs and 
investment, points to a changing and increasing array of risks for both users and 
regulators to countenance, while remaining focused on the potential opportunities 
technological innovation can provide. As a consequence, regulatory approaches 
and responses cover the gamut from wait-and-see, through supportive measures 
and guidance vis-à-vis current laws, to sandboxing, innovator-friendly regulatory 
frameworks, technology neutral risk-based application of AML/CTF, consumer 
protection and systemic risk management provisions.  
 
Even within the limited selection of jurisdictions surveyed by the SMSG, there are 
very divergent approaches to crypto-assets, making it difficult to discern any stand 
out direction that regulation might take apart from, perhaps, increasing in amount. 
All the same, it is noted that soon, potentially not so much technology neutral as 
more technology positive adjustments (witness the Swiss proposals) may be 
introduced to existing financial regulatory frameworks to encourage applications 
while, at the same time, making it easier for those applications to come ‘within the 
fold’ in terms of the usual financial regulatory expectations.  
 
In the course of this evolutionary process, the obvious starting point from a 
regulatory perspective has been for jurisdictions to consider whether the financial 
sector applications of DLT fall within the ambit of existing financial regulation. As the 
FINMA guidelines, the SMSG analysis and the House of Commons Treasury Select 
Committee report on crypto-assets, amongst others, demonstrate, such analysis 
devolves into a question of the nature of the token issued, its economic purpose and 
function and the rights and entitlements, if any, attaching to it. At the same time, it is 
noted that, at least in the EU, an emissions allowance has been defined to be a 
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financial instrument under MiFID II.848 Consequently, financial regulatory provisions 
apply to the EU carbon market, meaning that trading on a DL platform with tokens 
representing the units of emission allowance849 would, in any case, be subject to 
financial regulation – but by definition, rather than because of their economic 
purpose and function (which is GHG emission mitigation), and the rights and 
entitlements attached thereto. In other jurisdictions where emission allowances or 
other mitigation outcomes are not yet defined as financial instruments, it would be 
necessary to address the question of their economic purpose and function and the 
rights and entitlements attached thereto, specifically to determine whether trading 
on a DL platform using tokens would invoke local financial regulations. These and 
other legal issues that may be relevant to the governance structure for the 
networked market proposed are considered in the chapter following.  
 
  
                                                      
848 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 
2011/61/EU, OJ L 173, 12.06.2014, 394, Annex I, Section C (11). Emission allowances are 
defined as any units recognized for compliance under the EUETS. 
849 Recalling also that emission allowance is defined as units accepted for compliance 
purposes in the EUETS and thus includes certified emission reductions that are so accepted. 
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This chapter continues analysis of the governance structure for the proposed 
network of carbon markets, under the framework for analysis introduced in the 
preceding chapter. It focuses on the regulatory framework by considering legal 
issues relevant to or impacting on that structure, the three areas of law focused on, 
as throughout this thesis, being climate change law; financial market regulation; and 
the regulation of distributed ledger technology and its applications.  
 
Before considering issues pertaining to each of these areas, this chapter begins by 
examining the element that intersects all three areas of law, namely the nature of 
what is traded in this networked market. The survey of jurisdictions in the last sub-
section of chapter VIII establishes that the nature of tokens, issued on distributed 
ledger platforms used in financial applications, is at the intersection between legal 
issues relating to applications of DLT and financial market regulatory issues. If the 
units traded on the network of markets – that is, as tokens traded on the DLT 
platform – represent units of mitigation value (MV), then the application of DLT and 
financial market regulation also intersect with the operation of climate law. The 
distributed ledger token/financial instrument/MV unit is germane to all three. This is 
examined in Section A.  
 
Section B analyses other issues pertaining to the DLT application, such as potential 
conflict with data privacy laws, location of transactions, and dispute resolution, then 
Section C canvasses issues that stem from the potential application of domestic 
financial regulation, considering the situation in the European Union (EU) as a 
specific illustration. The analysis concludes in Section D with a review of the position 
in relation to international climate law issues, which might arise from the 
development of rules for operationalizing the Paris Agreement, particularly in 
relation to emissions trading under Article 6. 
 
 250 
A The intersection point of applicable laws  
 
The governance structure analysed in this thesis relates not to the mitigation action 
or carbon market of any jurisdiction in particular, but to a network of the markets of 
jurisdictions that choose to participate. The networked market sits above and thus, 
is external to, those markets and their regulatory and institutional frameworks and, 
as mentioned in chapter VII, Section A, it will not be the mitigation outcomes (for 
example, emission allowances, or project generated credits) from mitigation actions 
in the particular jurisdictions that are traded on the networked market, but rather a 
common metric (a ‘vehicle’ or transaction unit) representing the value of those 
mitigation outcomes as determined through a credible, independent, impartial MV 
assessment process. These transaction units, it is posited, representing the MV 
embodied in the mitigation outcome from which they are derived, would facilitate the 
transactions on the networked market by performing functions similar to those which 
an international currency serves for financial transactions between jurisdictions, that 
is, as a medium of exchange; as a unit of account; and as a store of value850 
(although in the international transaction context, the two former functions would be 
more important). 
 
The transaction unit would serve as the vehicle for carrying out indirect exchanges 
between different types of mitigation outcome; and as the unit of account, it would 
define the rate of conversion from one mitigation outcome to another. It would also 
function as a transmitter of information: informing counterparties as to value (along 
with the price) so that they would not need to undertake time-consuming and 
expensive research of their own; and more broadly, conveying information about the 
performance of the market in policy terms.851  
 
Notwithstanding that the governance structure being analysed relates to the network 
sitting above the individual participating jurisdictions’ markets, in considering the 
                                                      
850 George S Tavlas ‘The International Use of Currencies: The U.S. Dollar and the Euro’, 
Finance & Development, June 1998, Vol.35, No.2, International Monetary Fund 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/tavlas.htm> accessed 19/02/16. These 
functions are just the same as the functions of money, that is, the local currency in a 
domestic context. 
851 See: Justin Macinante ‘Networking Carbon Markets – Key Elements of the Process’, 
2016, World Bank Group Climate Change, 22 
<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/424831476453674939/1700504-Networking-Carbon-
Markets-Web.pdf> accessed 01/03/18.  
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transaction unit, its nature and how it would function, it is necessary to take account 
of both the network level, where transactions involving the transaction unit take 
place (in sub-section 2) and how transaction units might be treated for the purpose 
of domestic regulatory frameworks (in sub-section 3), since this is where the market 
participants and assets are principally regulated. First, however, there is the 
preliminary consideration of why it is necessary to have a transaction unit. 
  
1. The necessity for a transaction unit 
 
Why is a transaction unit necessary? Why not simply use another mitigation 
outcome such as a European emission allowance (EUA) or a Certified Emission 
Reduction (CER) to fulfil this transaction vehicle role, in the same way as the United 
States dollar (US$) or the Euro (EUR€) might be used as a transaction currency?  
 
The answer is that while this certainly might be possible, there are reasons why it is 
considered unlikely. First, it is unlikely that a mitigation outcome from one 
jurisdiction, for instance, such as an EUA, could achieve sufficiently wide 
acceptance by other jurisdictions to be viable as a transaction vehicle. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that, in terms of market share, the EUA in the carbon 
market is probably comparable to the US$ in world trade. The reason, it is 
suggested, stems from the nature of the function it performs. The purpose of a 
transaction unit is to convey MV between the counterparties to a transaction. While 
no formal definition exists at present, MV might be thought of in terms of the 
physical amount of reduced or avoided greenhouse gas (GHG) emission to, or GHG 
sequestered from, the atmosphere, that can be attributed to a particular tradable 
unit (mitigation outcome) under, or derived from, a GHG mitigation scheme 
(mitigation action).852 The assessment of MV can be seen as the process whereby 
the mitigation outcome being assessed is compared to a theoretically perfect 100% 
outcome of a mitigation action (that is, 100% of the mitigation intended, projected or 
claimed to be achievable, being achieved), in other words, comparison against a 
standard. The expression of the MV of a jurisdiction’s mitigation outcome would be 
as a ratio to, or fraction of, the notional standard (perfect) outcome.853  
                                                      
852 Justin D Macinante ‘Operationalizing Cooperative Approaches Under the Paris 
Agreement by Valuing Mitigation Outcomes’, [2018] CCLR 258, 260. 
853 Hence, for example, it might be expressed as a number between 0.00 and 1.00. 
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As the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS) has shortcomings (noted 
earlier), as most other jurisdictions’ schemes would have as well, it is likely that 
political objections would be raised by other jurisdictions that neither an EUA, nor 
any other jurisdiction’s mitigation outcome, could validly provide a suitable standard 
against which to measure the MV of their own mitigation outcomes. Secondly, and 
more importantly, given the nature and purpose for which mitigation outcomes – 
particularly emission allowances – are created, including the fact that they (emission 
allowances) are intended to reduce in number over time in accordance with the 
mitigation curves of their respective jurisdictions’ economies, it would appear 
inappropriate for them to be fulfilling the transaction vehicle role, especially given 
the potential circumstances where the third role of the transaction vehicle, namely 
as a store of value (and thus an object for investment), may become more 
prominent (see below).  
2. Transaction unit treatment at the network level 
 
Acknowledging that any existing mitigation outcome such as an EUA will not be 
suitable as a transaction vehicle, and thus that a transaction unit is necessary, or at 
least desirable, for carrying out transactions on the networked market, the question 
becomes what is a transaction unit, in a legal sense? Does it have, or need to have, 
a separate, distinct legal existence, or need only a notional existence for the 
purpose of facilitating transactions? The answer, it is posited, is a function of the 
transaction process. Consideration of the process suggests that, as a vehicle to 
facilitate transactions, the transaction unit may, but would not necessarily need to, 
have a separate legal existence.  
 
For example, the transaction process might involve a series of steps, such as (1) 
transferor mitigation outcome converted to transaction unit by applying MV; (2) 
transaction whereby transferor transfers transaction unit to transferee and 
transferee transfers consideration (payment) to transferor; (3) transferee converts 
transaction unit to transferee mitigation outcome by applying MV. If these steps 
were to flow consecutively and automatically from start to finish (that is, steps 1, 2 
and 3), the transaction unit might only be a notional value in that process to effect 
the conversion from one mitigation outcome to the other. On the other hand, this 
would not be the case if the transaction process were not to proceed automatically 
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from start to finish. In the case where, say, the transferor might convert mitigation 
outcomes to transaction units (step 1) and hold those units, perhaps awaiting 
favourable moves in the market price, or the transferee having taken receipt of the 
transaction units on completion of the transaction (step 2), hold those units also 
possibly awaiting a favourable move in the market price, then the nature of the 
transaction unit would need to be reconsidered.854 The third possible role of the 
transaction unit, that is, as a store of value, would become more significant. The 
relevant counterparty would be holding a unit that clearly has a value – the 
transaction unit represents an amount of MV that was embodied in the mitigation 
outcome from which it was converted. Thus, its legal nature would no longer be 
merely notional.  
 
If the transaction process for the networked market were to allow for these individual 
steps, so that an authorised entity might hold transaction units in its account, what 
would be the legal nature of the units so held? In a sense, the transaction unit is just 
the same asset as the mitigation outcome from which it is derived, since it is just a 
revaluation of that mitigation outcome against the standard (hence, a standardised 
value mitigation outcome). However, if this approach to the legal nature of the 
transaction unit were followed through, then a situation might arise in which 
transaction units would be of differing legal natures depending on the jurisdiction 
from which they derived, just as for the mitigation outcomes. For example, assuming 
that emission allowances come within the definition of a mitigation outcome, there 
have been a variety of approaches across jurisdictions to defining the legal nature of 
emissions allowances.855 In some jurisdictions they have been defined as intangible 
property, while others specifically exclude there being a property right attached; 
some jurisdictions deem them to be intangible assets or financial instruments, while 
others treat them as tradable commodities. Hence, while different jurisdictions have 
determined the definitional approach that works in their legal context, at the network 
level that diversity could not practicably carry through to the transaction unit – there 
would need to be clarity as to its specific legal nature.  
 
                                                      
854 It is noted that the favourable moves in the market in so far as they would pertain to 
changes in the MV which might alter the conversion rate would be subject to any rules 
relating to environmental integrity, and so this hypothetical situation might not eventuate. 
855 These differences were reviewed in chapter IV supra. 
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In these circumstances, where there is the need to define the legal nature of a 
transaction unit held in an account on the network platform, a practical approach 
could involve either (i) for the applicable law of the network platform – based either 
on the jurisdiction of, or choice of law governing, the network entity (as agreed to by 
participating jurisdictions) to be the basis for determining the legal nature of the 
transaction unit; or (ii) for the constitutional documents of the network entity and/or 
the transactional rules of the network, which as noted earlier form part of the 
governance structure for the network, to define the legal nature of the transaction 
unit (again, as agreed to by the participating jurisdictions). Either approach would 
afford a degree of certainty to transactions, to the resolution of potential disputes 
and to the legal entitlements of the entities holding transaction units where they are 
determined to be held beyond the jurisdiction of any domestic regulatory framework. 
The next sub-section now considers how they might be treated when they do come 
within a relevant domestic regulatory framework. 
3. Transaction units in domestic regulatory frameworks 
 
Continuing with the assumption that there is a transaction unit for the purpose of 
transactions in the networked market, it is necessary also to consider how 
transaction units might be treated for the purposes of domestic regulatory 
frameworks of participating jurisdictions. The following diagram (next page) shows 
an approach for making such a determination. It also illustrates how the three areas 

























The progression illustrated is from the domestic mitigation action through mitigation 
value assessment to consideration of the outcome of that process in two ways: 
firstly, by asking how that assessed outcome, namely the MV, is represented – that 
is, as a legal instrument; and secondly, how that representation might be defined. In 
the networked market proposed, the possible instruments are either a transaction 
unit (under NCM), or a token (on DLT) or perhaps, as both. The question is then 
whether the way in which they are defined invokes the financial regulatory regime in 
that jurisdiction and to what issues this might give rise. 
 
To illustrate the application of this approach, the case of the EU is set out in diagram 
5 (following page). In this case, the starting point is the EUETS, in which EUAs and 
certain CERs are accepted for compliance purposes. Under the updated Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II)856 emission allowances (defined to include 
Kyoto project-based credits that are accepted for compliance purposes in the 
EUETS (CERs), as well as EUAs) are defined as financial instruments.  
 
There is no definition of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) 
agreed yet for the purposes of operationalizing Article 6 of the Paris Agreement,857 
so it needs to be assumed that EUAs and CERs, acceptable for compliance under 
the EUETS, will come within that definition. Hence, there are mitigation outcomes 
that are defined as financial instruments. If these mitigation outcomes are assessed 
to arrive at an MV, the question is what is the effect of applying the MV assessment 
to convert the mitigation outcomes into transaction units – does it make any 
difference to their treatment for regulatory purposes?  
  
                                                      
856 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 
2011/61/EU, OJ L 173, 12.06.2014, 394, which took effect 3 January 2018. 
857 See: UNFCCC SBSTA49: Draft Text on SBSTA 49 agenda item 11(a) Matters relating to 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 







Diagram 5: Analysis-tree for domestic regulatory treatment of transaction unit applied to the case of 
the EU 
 
Even though the transaction units are essentially the same mitigation outcomes, but 
with a standardised value, such that it might be argued that they also should be 
considered to be a financial instrument, they are not. To be a financial instrument for 
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the purposes of the EU financial regulatory framework,858 they need to be listed in 
Annex 1, Section C of the Directive,859 which in turn, could necessitate being 
acceptable for compliance purposes under the EUETS. They are neither listed in 
Annex 1, Section C, nor acceptable for compliance purposes (noting, of course, that 
presently they are only conceptual). 
 
There are two other potential ways in which the EU financial regulatory framework 
might be applicable: firstly, it is necessary to consider whether a transaction unit 
might be considered to be a derivative of the mitigation outcome (which is a financial 
instrument); and secondly, if the transaction units are represented by tokens on the 
EUETS platform, it would be necessary to assess whether the EU financial 
regulatory framework is invoked by virtue of the characterisation of those tokens.   
 
The first of these can be dealt with shortly. A derivative is something that is derived 
from another source860 and the transaction unit is derived from the mitigation 
outcome. However, in the sense considered here, namely as a financial derivative, a 
derivative is normally defined as a financial contract the value of which is derived 
from the value of an underlying asset (the ‘underlying’).861 The function of the 
derivative is to manage risks associated with movements in the price of the 
underlying862 and the positions of the contract counterparties with respect these 
movements form the basis of the contract. Thus, while the value of the transaction 
unit can be said to be derived from the underlying mitigation outcome, it clearly is 
not a financial derivative but rather, as noted above, just a standardised value 
version of that mitigation outcome. 
 
Secondly, if the transaction units are represented by tokens, it is necessary to 
consider the classification and identify characteristics of tokens that may invoke the 
EU financial regulatory framework. For this purpose, one might apply the approach 
elaborated by the Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group (SMSG) in advice 
                                                      
858 The expression ‘EU financial regulatory framework’ is elaborated in Section C following. 
859 Fn.856 (MiFID II). 
860 Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th Edition (revised), 2006, Oxford University Press. 
861 Michael Chiu ‘Derivatives markets, products and participants: an overview’, 2012, Bank 
for International Settlements (ed.), Proceedings of the workshop “Data requirements for 
monitoring derivative transactions”, Bank for International Settlements 
<https://ideas.repec.org/h/bis/bisifc/35-01.html> accessed 15/01/19. 
862 Ibid. 
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provided to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).863 The SMSG 
bases its taxonomy on the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) 
guidelines864 that distinguish three general categories: payment tokens intended for 
use as a means of payment for goods or services; utility tokens that provide access 
digitally to an application or service; and asset tokens, representing a debt or equity 
claim on the issuer and thus analogous to equities, bonds or derivatives. In order to 
classify tokens on this basis and to determine the applicability of financial 
regulations, SMSG asked four questions: (1) does the token give the owner an 
entitlement against the issuer and, if so, what kind of entitlement? (2) Is it 
transferable? (3) Is it scarce and how is scarcity controlled? (4) Does it give decision 
power on the project of the issuer? 
 
Applying the SMSG decision-tree questions to transaction unit tokens, the token 
does not give a right against the issuer;865 it is transferable, but then the question is 
whether it has a use value: if it does, then the SMSG approach would treat it as a 
commodity, and if it doesn’t, then the question would be is it scarce and how is that 
scarcity controlled. As the level of scarcity of transaction unit tokens would be 
changeable, the SMSG outcome would be to treat it as a currency (payment token). 
The SMSG conclusion is that neither commodities, nor payment tokens, are covered 
by the regulatory framework. However, as they are increasingly being held for 
investment purposes, raising concerns over investor protection and market abuse, 
SMSG suggests they should be defined under MiFID II as a financial instrument.866 
Thus, in the EU, while mitigation outcomes, that is, emission allowances (as so 
defined) are financial instruments under MiFID II, at present (were they to exist) 
neither a transaction unit nor a transaction unit token would be treated as a financial 
instrument, although the latter may be in future by reason of being considered a 
payment token.  
 
                                                      
863 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), Securities and Markets Stakeholder 
Group, ‘Advice to ESMA Own Initiative Report on Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets’, 
2018, ESMA22-106-1338.  
864 Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA, Guidelines for enquiries regarding 
the regulatory framework for initial coin offerings (ICOs), 16 February 2018 
<https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2018/02/20180216-mm-ico-wegleitung/> accessed 02/01/19. 
865 For the purposes here, it is not necessary to explore more technical design questions 
such as who would be that issuer, although for illustration, the network entity might be the 
issuer, issuing transaction units upon cancellation of the corresponding mitigation outcomes 
in the domestic registry by the transferring jurisdiction’s registry administrator. 
866 Fn. 863 (ESMA/SMSG). 
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In summary, this example illustrates two ways in which transaction units might 
potentially come within the ambit of domestic financial regulatory frameworks: either 
as a result of the mitigation outcome from which they derive being defined as a 
financial instrument (or otherwise subject to financial regulation) and the regulators 
recognising that the transaction unit is essentially the same legal instrument but with 
a standardised value; or as a result of the domestic financial regulations applying to 
the transaction unit token by virtue of it being characterised as a payment token.  
 
B Legal issues pertaining to DLT 
 
As the preceding chapter and the preceding section of this chapter underscore, 
analysis of the regulation of the distributed ledger technology on which it is 
proposed to build the network of carbon markets is very much a matter of the 
particular application proposed. All the same, there are issues of a legal nature that 
may be considered to relate more generally to use of the technology itself, not just 
specific applications. Mention of these issues was made when introducing the 
technology in chapter VI, some being inextricably linked to technical aspects such 
as system design, while others relating more to the structuring of legal relationships 
within that design. Nevertheless, it can be difficult to quarantine the legal aspects 
entirely from business and technical aspects as technical issues concerning 
operation of the trading platform often will generate legal and governance issues. To 
illustrate this point, network design is relevant to the speed of transaction processing 
and ledger updates for participants in different parts of the network, particularly 
geographically far-flung reaches of the network. At the same time, equivalence of 
access firstly, to the market, and secondly, to the same accurate, up-to-date market 
(ledger) information, is essential for ensuring a level playing field not just between 
trading entities, but also, critically, between participating jurisdictions (to generalise, 
for instance, lesser developed economies perhaps being more likely to be at the 
geographically farther flung reaches of the network). The design can influence time-
lag issues, which in turn can influence participants’ time critical access to market 
opportunities that could, conceivably, have legal ramifications.   
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As mentioned in relation to control over transactions,867 contract execution on the 
DL network differs from existing third party payment systems. However, the current 
state of development of DLT means that electronic processing speed is not as fast, 
nor is the transaction processing capacity anywhere near as great as, those third 
party operated digital payment systems, such as MasterCard or Visa. This may be 
compensated, to some degree, by the end-to-end speed of the overall DLT-based 
transaction, since disintermediation of previously necessary central counterparties 
and other intermediaries can reduce overall transaction time and cost. Whether and 
to what degree such disintermediation is realised in any particular transactions, 
however, will be affected by how the relevant jurisdictions’ financial regulatory 
regimes apply.868 Overall transaction speed is contingent also on the ability of the 
DL platform to provide an interface with a system for fiat currency settlement – 
possibly by a central bank or banks developing tokenised fiat currency. In the 
absence of such developments, alternatives would include: firstly, settlement using 
a crypto-currency (thereby introducing other additional value-related risks); 
secondly, by the platform operating on a ‘centralised platform’ basis, whereby 
matching and execution of orders, and corresponding transfer of assets and 
payment, all takes place on the platform but not on the DL;869 or otherwise, 
transactions needing to wait for payment processing to happen, effectively negating 
any potential time-cost benefit. 
 
Other technical considerations that may give rise to legal issues include: 
interoperability with existing systems and between systems; the absence of a 
recourse mechanism for dealing with mistakes; and problems due to erroneous 
coding, either in the way the smart contract code operates, or in the general 
functioning of the trading platform. To some extent, these considerations devolve to 
a question of whether the functions proposed are technically feasible or not. 
Assuming they are, then liability for errors of an operational nature with the coding 
must reside with the party whose responsibility it is (presumably on a commercial 
                                                      
867 Chapter VI, Section B supra. 
868 This is considered in the illustration of the European Union in section C. 
869 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), ‘Advice on Initial Coin Offerings and 
Crypto-assets’, 2019, ESMA50-1391, 44. This off-chain platform approach is seen by ESMA 
as risk prone due to the platform being a single point of attack for hacking, but conversely 
has the benefit of reducing congestion and scalability issues by settlement not being 
dependent on the DL. Counterparty risk in relation to the platform, also flagged by ESMA, 
would not be relevant to the networked market proposed here since the platform is proposed 
to be owned and operated by the participating jurisdictions. A hybrid of this approach may 
prove effective in this context. 
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basis) to ensure that the coding is fit-for-purpose, irrespective of whether that 
question arises in the case of the code for a specific transaction or in the general 
operation and maintenance of the overall system. This will be a matter of the various 
contractual legal relationships between the technical contractors, the network entity 
running the platform and the jurisdictional participants and their authorised entities 
using the platform. It is noted, in relation to contract coding, that as proposed, the 
contract terms would be standardised in the networked market, thus for individual 
counterparties it would only be a matter of entering the specific details of the 
transaction they wish to carry out. If they were to get that wrong, then it is 
considered that would be a failure of their own business management system, for 
which they should have to bear the liability risk. 
 
As has been mentioned, system design has a major impact on technical matters 
that can give rise to legal issues. For instance, design as to holding and updating 
the ledger by individual trading entities (nodes) is one technical feature with 
implications for the legal framework. The numbers of nodes holding and updating 
the ledger, or the extent of ledger information they hold, has implications for 
computing capacity and network scalability. This may be addressed technically (for 
instance, limiting to only the most recent ledger entries, or limiting the nodes, or 
limiting nodes to information only relevant to themselves), however, any such 
technical arrangement will need to fit with the legal permissioning regime. The issue 
will arise also in respect of new entrants to the market. For instance, how much of 
the historic ledger they need to hold; how they go about uploading it to their 
systems; how long it takes; and whether there are implications for their access 
relative to other earlier participants. These will all be relevant design considerations 
that, in turn, need to fit with the permissioning regime of who can view what 
information on the ledger.  
 
Considerations of scalability and capacity of the ledger flag up another design issue, 
namely choke points, where the network may be susceptible to interruption from 
internal technical problems or malicious external actions. This raises legal questions 
of liability for network performance and implications for parts of the network that may 
be isolated, even if only temporarily, the recourse that affected parties may have 
and who should bear responsibility. A pragmatic approach would be for jurisdictions 
to have the opportunity to raise concerns and consider their risk exposure and that 
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of their authorised entities to such matters when deciding whether or not to join the 
network. Equally, the network entity operating the platform would then have the 
opportunity to take account of and act within its powers to address the concerns 
raised. Further liability issues arise in relation to trading entities whose actions, such 
as failing to safely maintain security of encryption keys, may precipitate 
interruptions. These issues, design affecting performance and participant actions 
that precipitate interruptions, could be provided for in the governance structure by 
appropriately framed rules: first, for jurisdictions that join the network; second, the 
conditions they impose on the entities they authorise to trade on the network; and 
third, the terms and conditions for transactions, built into the code for smart 
contracts. 
 
Two final legal issues pertaining to DLT relate firstly, to concerns over potential 
friction with participants’ protection of confidential information and data privacy 
rights; and secondly, given the facility for cross-jurisdictional transactions on a DL 
network (and, in particular, the intended inter-jurisdictional trading proposed on the 
network of carbon markets), issues of jurisdiction, governing law of contracts, and 
appropriate forums for dispute resolution.    
 
Concerns over the confidentiality of information held on the ledger, and how this 
might be balanced with, for instance, the Paris Agreement emphasis on 
transparency, relate to security and permissioning. As such, how this is addressed 
will be a function, again, of system design. The security aspect of design has been 
addressed earlier.870 Permissioning rights, both for access to information concerning 
transactions or registry holdings, and in terms of interoperability with the ledger, are 
a function of design and will be guided by the legal requirements, such as those 
applying in relation to transparency and also in relation to reporting. Data privacy 
issues arise in relation to the permanence of the record on a DL system. The issues 
stem from the protections afforded personal data under data privacy protection laws, 
such as in the EU, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),871 the objective 
of which is to lay down rules, inter alia, relating to the protection of natural persons 
                                                      
870 Chapter VI, Section B. 
871 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, 1.  
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with regard to the processing of personal data.872 The definition of ‘personal data’ in 
the GDPR, is: 
 
“‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can 
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier 
such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier 
or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;”   
 
Thus, in theory there is the possibility of ‘personal data’ being stored on the DL 
platform to the extent that a natural person from within the EU is authorised by the 
EU to trade on the networked market, in which case the network entity would need 
to take account of the GDPR requirements. In practical terms, however, the 
likelihood of this causing a problem is small given that the DL network is unlikely to 
deal with natural persons, but only business entities.  
 
The permissioned nature of the network platform proposed due to the fact that 
eligible participants will all need to have been authorised by their respective 
jurisdictions, means that questions of jurisdiction and governing law for resolving 
disputes should be addressed through design of the governance framework. To an 
extent, the potential for transactional legal disputes might be minimised by the fact 
that transactions cannot proceed unless all the preconditions have been satisfied 
and verified, at which point a contract should execute, settle and complete 
automatically. Nevertheless, there will always be the possibility for legal disputes to 
arise, in which case the constitutional documents for the network entity, to which 
participating jurisdictions subscribe, might provide guidance either by specifying the 
applicable jurisdiction, law and forum for dispute settlement, such as recourse to 
some form of international alternative dispute resolution, or by providing a formula 
for determining such matters in any particular circumstances.  
 
C Financial market regulation issues 
 
Determining when a transaction on the DL network platform might come within the 
ambit of the domestic financial regulatory framework of one or both jurisdictions of 
                                                      
872 Article 1, paragraph 1, GDPR. 
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the counterparties to that transaction has been considered in Section A above. This 
section elaborates briefly what that might mean, by making a high-level survey of 
the current situation under EU law, by way of illustration.873 In doing so, it is noted 
that the EU situation is complicated, in practice, by the differing national approaches 
transposing the provisions of EU law into national law. ESMA has expressed 
concern about the risks not covered by EU financial regulation posed by the growth 
in crypto-assets to investor protection and financial market integrity, most 
significantly through fraud, cyber attacks, money laundering and market 
manipulation. But where they are covered, ESMA found a lack of consistency of 
interpretation, and lack of clarity in matters such as custody services and concepts 
of settlement and settlement finality across the EU.874 At the same time, the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) has expressed the view that, even though 
crypto-assets and specific services such as custodian provision (that is, digital 
wallets) and trading platforms may typically fall outside the scope of EU financial 
regulation, divergent national approaches to regulating these activities are 
emerging, potentially giving rise not only to consumer protection, operational 
resilience, and market integrity issues, but also to level playing field issues.875  
 
Both these European supervisory bodies have recommended further actions at the 
EU level, not only in relation to situations where the EU financial regulatory regime 
applies, but also for consumer protection where it does not, as well as broader 
application of AML/CTF requirements.876 Nevertheless, the EU financial regulatory 
regime will apply when the token comes within the meaning of a financial 
instrument, as listed in Annex 1, Section C of MiFID II.877 This means ‘…a full set of 
EU financial rules, including the Prospectus Directive, the Transparency Directive, 
MiFID II, the Market Abuse Directive, the Short Selling Regulation, the Central 
Securities Depositories Regulation and the Settlement Finality Directive, are likely to 
                                                      
873 Given that the networked market and transaction unit tokens proposed for trading in it are 
only conceptual, it is impractical to consider the application of the laws reviewed in a greater 
level of detail at this stage. 
874 Fn.869 (ESMA/ICO).  




876 Fn.869 (ESMA/ICO) Section VIII; fn.875 (EBA).  
877 Fn.856 (MiFID II). 
 266 
apply to their issuer and/or firms providing investment services/activities to those 
instruments.’878  
 
Notwithstanding that the token may come within the meaning of a financial 
instrument as defined in MiFID II, the application of each of the mentioned laws to 
the networked carbon market would need to be considered specifically. For 
instance, the Prospectus Directive879 requires publication of a prospectus before a 
public offer of securities or admission of the securities to trading on a regulated 
market in the EU. The application of this Directive would depend on questions such 
as whether the tokens were securities (defined in Article 2(1)(a) as: ‘…transferable 
securities as defined by Article 1(4) of Directive 93/22/EEC with the exception of 
money market instruments…’) and whether the mechanism for the issue of tokens 
on the DL market platform could be considered to be ‘an offer of securities to the 
public’. If the tokens only provide a mechanism for transactions between 
heterogeneous carbon markets, as outlined in Section A, it is unlikely they would be 
considered transferable securities and thus the Prospectus Directive would not 
apply. Even were they to become objects for investment by parties holding them to 
take advantage of market price movements, the fact that there is no financial 
entitlement such as a share of profit (hence equity) or pre-determined cash flow (as 
in a debt instrument) suggests they would not be subject to the Prospectus 
Directive.880 Similar considerations relate to the Transparency Directive,881 which 
requires provision of information about issuers whose securities are traded on a 
                                                      
878 Fn.869 (ESMA/ICO) paragraph 7. 
879 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 
on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to 
trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, OJ L 345, 31.12.2003, p.64-89; amended by 
Directive 2010/73/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
amending Directives 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities are 
offered to the public or admitted to trading and 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market, OJ L327, 11.12.2010, 1-12.  
880 Fn.863 (ESMA/SMSG) paragraph 47. 
881 Directive 2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 
amending Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose 
securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, Directive 2003/71/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be published when securities 
are offered to the public or admitted to trading and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC laying 
down detailed rules for the implementation of certain provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC, 
OJ L 294, 6.11.2013, 13-27. 
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regulated market in the EU. It would not apply unless the tokens traded on the 
networked market were classified as transferable securities.882 
 
If the token were considered to be a financial instrument then MiFID II883 (the 
Directive) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (the Regulation)884 
would apply. The Directive applies to investment firms, market operators, data 
reporting services providers and third country firms providing investment services or 
performing investment activities in the EU and establishes requirements for 
authorization, as to operating conditions, and in relation to the provision of 
investment services or activities.885 As such, firms undertaking certain activities in 
relation to the tokens would need to be authorized. It is not necessary here to 
elaborate in detail the requirements under the Directive and Regulation, other than 
to observe that ESMA has expressed the view that where crypto-assets (and thus, 
potentially, tokens representing transaction units on the networked market) qualify 
as financial instruments, the trading platform may constitute a regulated market, or 
multilateral trading facility or organised trading facility thereunder.886 Hence, 
jurisdictions intending to set up the networked market would need to weigh potential 
regulatory implications such as this when considering jurisdiction and governing law 
issues for the constitution of the network entity and the rules applicable in the 
networked market.887 
 
The Market Abuse Regulation establishes a common regulatory framework on 
insider dealing, unlawful disclosure of inside information and market manipulation 
(market abuse) as well as measures to prevent market abuse to ensure the integrity 
of financial markets.888 The Regulation would apply to tokens were they to qualify as 
financial instruments being traded on a regulated market, or multilateral trading 
                                                      
882 Fn. 869 (ESMA/ICO) paragraph 101. 
883 Fn.856 (MiFID II). 
884 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 
173, 12.06.2014, 84-148. 
885 Article 1, MiFID II. 
886 Fn.869 (ESMA/ICO) paragraph 106. 
887 See Section B, last paragraph, supra. 
888 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 
2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, OJ L 173, 12.06.2014, 1-61, Article 1. 
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facility or organised trading facility.889 It is noted that as financial instruments, the 
Short Selling Regulation890 would also apply to the tokens. However, it is envisaged 
that the mechanism for transactions on the networked market would not allow scope 
for short selling anyway, since it is proposed that the transferring counterparty would 
be required to verify holding the mitigation outcome units to be traded before the 
transaction could proceed.  
 
The Settlement Finality Directive (SFD)891 and the Central Securities Depositories 
Regulation (CSDR)892 both have implications for settlement activities, if the DL 
platform were to be subject to their requirements. Most notably, this would be in 
terms of how settlement finality might be achieved on a DL platform, given the need 
for payment upon delivery and how a DL platform might interface with a system of 
fiat money for that purpose, and also whether the DL platform could satisfy 
requirements for a central securities depository.893 Another issue would be the 
extent to which central counterparties or clearinghouses might need to be 
interposed as part of the transaction process, by virtue of the SFD, countering the 
potential time and cost benefits that might otherwise be achieved by 
disintermediation of those roles as part of the transaction process. One approach to 
address these potential regulatory issues would be to build any prescribed 
regulatory roles into the trading platform itself, to create a hybrid structure.894   
 
Tokens may potentially fall also within the ambit of the Second Electronic Money 
Directive,895 which defines electronic money to mean ‘…electronically, including 
                                                      
889 Ibid, Article 2. 
890 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 
2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, OJ L 86, 24.03.2012, 1-24, 
Article 1. 
891 (Consolidated) Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 
May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems, OJ L 166, 
11.06.1998, 45-50. 
892 Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 
2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities 
depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) 
No 236/2012, OJ L 257, 28.08.2014, 1-72. 
893 The issue of the interface with the fiat money system discussed in Section B supra. 
894 This issue has been discussed in Chapter VI, Section B; see also: Stuart Davis and Julian 
Cunningham-Day, Linklaters LLP, ‘Blockchain – recalibrating the market infrastructure’, 
Going Digital Quarterly Breakfast Briefing, 14 October 2016, presentation Powerpoint slide 
deck.  
895 Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 
2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic 
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magnetically, stored monetary value as represented by a claim on the issuer which 
is issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of making payment transactions as 
defined in point 5 of Article 4 of Directive 2007/64/EC, and which is accepted by a 
natural or legal person other than the electronic money issuer;’896 However, while 
the transaction unit tokens envisaged for trading on the networked market will 
satisfy most of the elements of this definition, the token as proposed would not 
represent a claim on the issuer and for this reason be unlikely to constitute 
electronic money.897 Tokens may also come within the requirements of the Second 
Payment Services Directive898 were they determined to be electronic money. 
However, as noted, this is unlikely in relation to transaction unit tokens as proposed. 
Finally, the fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive899 includes exchange services 
between virtual currencies and fiat currencies as well as custodian wallet providers 
as obliged persons for the purposes of anti-money laundering and counter-financing 
of terrorism requirements.900 Given that both the European supervisory bodies 
mentioned, ESMA and the EBA, have recommended further actions at the EU level, 
these provisions are likely to be extended further, for example, to cover exchange 
services from one virtual currency to another.901 
 
The foregoing review of the European domestic regulatory framework illustrates that 
characterisation of tokens traded on the networked market as financial instruments 
may give rise a number of domestic financial regulatory implications. These range 
from prospectus requirements and disclosure of information about issuers, to 
operational rules for the providers of investment services and activities, to rules 
prohibiting insider trading, or unlawfully disclosing inside information, or 
manipulating markets; through to the end of the transaction process, and rules 
relating to clearing and settlement finality. Whether and to what extent similar such 
                                                                                                                                                         
money institutions amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 
2000/46/EC, OJ L 267, 10.10.2009, 7-17.  
896 Ibid, Article 2(2). 
897 See also Section A, penultimate paragraph, supra. 
898 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 
2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 
2007/64/EC, OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, 35-127. 
899 Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 
amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for 
the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 
2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU, PE/72/2017/REV/1, OJ L 156, 19.06.2018, 43-74. 
900 Ibid, Article 1(1)(c). 
901 Fn.869 (ESMA/ICO) Section VIII; fn.875 (EBA) chapter 3. 
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provisions might apply in the case of any particular domestic jurisdiction 
participating in the networked market, will depend not only on how the transaction 
process on the DL trading platform is designed and the function performed by the 
tokens, but also on how those domestic regulatory provisions are framed.  
   
D Climate change legal issues 
 
Climate law issues that will be relevant to the governance structure for the 
networked market principally arise from the developing rules for operationalizing 
cooperative approaches under Article 6, paragraph 2, Paris Agreement. These were 
to be set out in the form of guidance to be considered and adopted by the 
Conference of Parties serving as the Meeting of Parties to the Paris Agreement at 
its first session (CMA.1), however, the Parties were unable to reach agreement, as 
a result of which the aim is to forward a draft decision for consideration and adoption 
to CMA.2.902 
 
Notwithstanding that inconclusive outcome and continuing process, an indication of 
potential issues can be gleaned from the text that was before negotiators (the ‘Draft 
Text’), which comprises a draft decision and annex setting out the draft guidance.903 
The annex has sixteen sections, the seemingly most relevant of which for 
consideration here is Governance (section IV). This section provides that Parties 
must ensure their participation in cooperative approaches is consistent with the 
guidance, but also sets out three options for the body that might supervise and 
ensure that consistency: the Supervisory Body established pursuant to Article 6, 
paragraph 4;904 an Article 6 technical review;905 or the technical expert review 
pursuant to Article 13, paragraph 11.906 Additionally, the secretariat needs to carry 
                                                      
902 UNFCCC CMA.1: Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
Parties to the Paris Agreement on the third part of its first session, held at Katowice from 2 to 
15 December 2018, Addendum, FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1, 19 March 2019, Action taken 
by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of Parties to the Paris Agreement, 
Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of Parties to the 
Paris Agreement, Decision 8/CMA.1 
<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2018_3_add1_advance.pdf> accessed 
07/05/19. 
903 Fn.857 (UNFCCC/SBSTA49). 
904 Ibid paragraph 5. 
905 Ibid paragraph 6. 
906 Ibid paragraph 7. 
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out activities in relation to the guidance.907 There is also provision for participating 
Parties to authorise non-Party actors to participate in cooperative approaches.908 In 
terms of the governance structure for the proposed networked market, none of 
these provisions of the annex would be problematic. The governance structure 
proposed by this thesis provides for an overriding climate supervisory body, which 
might encompass any of the three options set out in the annex.    
 
Section V of the annex sets out responsibilities for Parties participating in 
cooperative approaches, listing matters including being a party to the Paris 
Agreement,909 having prepared, communicating and maintaining a nationally 
determined contribution (NDC),910 and having authorised and obtained authorisation 
from other participating Parties to use internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes (ITMOs), pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 3, Paris Agreement.911 In 
relation to the governance structure, these and other matters listed, or that may in 
future be listed in this section, could be seen as constituting pre-conditions to be 
satisfied by jurisdictions wishing to join the network.912 Thus, they complement the 
approach proposed.  
 
Similarly, tracking ITMOs (section VI) and infrastructure (section XII) fit with the 
governance structure proposed for the networked market. To ensure transparency, 
actions in relation to ITMOs, including creation, transfer, acquisition, and 
cancellation are required to be tracked.913 The options for tracking are through either 
a system, buffer registry, international registry or registry, any of which might be 
comprised by the DLT platform. Section XII contains more prescriptive provisions, 
such as requiring that each registry have national accounts including for issuance, 
holding, transfer, acquisition, cancellation, retirement and a cancellation account for 
overall mitigation in global emissions;914 while the secretariat is to implement a 
registry (options for which include, more problematically, a central registry) to 
perform consistency checking and related functions.915 Infrastructure might also 
                                                      
907 Ibid paragraph 8. 
908 Ibid paragraph 9. 
909 Ibid paragraph 10(a). 
910 Ibid paragraph 10(b). 
911 Ibid paragraph 10(c) and 10(d). 
912 See, in this respect, Chapter VII, Section B and the Appendix to this thesis. 
913 Fn.857 (UNFCCC/SBSTA49) paragraph 11. 
914 Ibid paragraph 45. 
915 Ibid paragraph 46. 
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include the secretariat establishing an international transaction log916 and a 
database,917 although there is nothing to suggest that the international registry, 
international transaction log and database could not all be part of the same digital 
infrastructure on a distributed ledger. 
 
Each Party participating must submit information about the cooperative approaches 
in which it cooperates, including how it ensures the ITMOs do not result in 
environmental harm;918 how it ensures environmental integrity through quality of the 
mitigation outcome;919 and robust governance.920 The reference to quality of the 
mitigation outcome is the first suggestion that not all ITMOs might be considered to 
be of the same value. Certainly, the current version of the definition of ‘ITMO’921 
gives no such indication, providing only that they are to be, inter alia: real, verified, 
additional, permanent (all currently square-bracketed); in the form of anthropogenic 
emissions, but possibly also removals by sinks, or avoidance, including mitigation 
co-benefits from adaptation and/or economic diversification plans; measured in 
tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). How the cooperative approach ensures 
environmental integrity is addressed in another of the matters about which 
information is to be provided, this time relating to how the cooperative approach 
ensures environmental integrity through: (i) setting conservative baselines below 
business-as-usual; (ii) taking account of all existing policies when setting baselines; 
(iii) having requirements to mitigate leakage risk; and (iv) having a system to ensure 
permanence, including to address reversals.922 There is nothing to indicate a link 
with the earlier item referring to quality of the mitigation outcome, and the fact that 
the two items are listed separately suggests they are not so linked. All the same, the 
matters listed in the latter item all seem to be related to determining the quality of 
the mitigation outcome. It is interesting also that, notwithstanding the fact that the 
information requirements are only qualitative, the four matters listed in the latter item 
would all be relevant considerations to an assessment of the MV of the mitigation 
outcome, were such a process to exist. A subsequent provision923 sets out 
quantitative information to be submitted as part of the reports, but there is nothing in 
                                                      
916 Ibid paragraphs 49, 50. 
917 Ibid paragraph 51. 
918 Ibid Section IX (Reporting), paragraph 28(d). 
919 Ibid paragraph 28(f). 
920 Ibid paragraph 28(g). 
921 Ibid paragraph 1(a). 
922 Ibid paragraph 28(h). 
923 Ibid paragraph 30. 
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it at present to suggest that information on a quantitative basis related to quality of 
the mitigation outcome, or the four matters listed, is required. 
 
The terms ‘environmental harm’ and ‘robust governance’ are not defined or 
elaborated, however, an indication of the meaning can be inferred from subsequent 
provisions. In particular, the information submitted must indicate how it is ensured 
that the cooperative approach, inter alia, does not increase global emissions; has 
not impeded the jurisdiction where the mitigation action occurs from reflecting the 
highest possible ambition in its NDC and progression in that over time; does not 
imply risks of conflicts with other environment-related aspects; has consistency with 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);924 does not threaten human rights; and 
avoids negative social or economic impacts.925 The inference is that elements listed 
in this provision suggest a broadening of the concept of environmental harm and 
thus, environmental integrity, since the items listed include mitigation-related 
considerations, specifically ‘other environment-related aspects’ and sustainable 
development references.  
 
Finally in this respect, information reported in accordance with the provisions 
outlined above is subject to review for consistency with the guidance (section X). 
The body that undertakes the review will depend on which of the Article 6.4 
Supervisory Body, Article 6 technical expert review, or the Article 13 technical expert 
review, is responsible for governance.926 So there is scope for information 
concerning, inter alia, quality of mitigation outcomes to be considered by the body 
charged with supervisory responsibility of this Article 6, paragraph 2 guidance, but 
no indication of where or to what that might lead.  
 
To conclude these considerations, the elements set out in the Draft Text do not 
appear to present issues for the governance structure envisaged. All the same, in 
making this observation it is noted that the Draft Text may not be the form of 
guidance to be considered and adopted by CMA.2, which ultimately, may be very 
different. Reports of the negotiations that led to an inconclusive outcome for CMA.1, 
                                                      
924 UN General Assembly (UNGA) 70/1. ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development’ Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 
2015, Seventieth session, Agenda items 15 and 116, A/RES/70/1/, 21 October 2015. 
925 Fn.857 (UNFCCC/SBSTA49) paragraph 28(i). It will be interesting to see how parties go 
about proving these negatives if this remains in the finally agreed text.  
926 Ibid paragraph 32. 
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point to an impasse over how to avoid double counting and to make adjustments for 
mitigation outcomes transferred internationally.927 This seems like a relatively simple 
matter to solve technically; certainly, it might be readily addressed on the networked 
market based on DL architecture proposed in this thesis. However, in the 
negotiating context, the nature of the problem – and, for that matter, most other 
issues that could potentially militate against the governance structure envisaged for 




                                                      
927 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin Vol.12 
No.747, Katowice Climate Change Conference, 18 December 2018, Summary & Analysis, 
32-33 <http://enb.iisd.org/climate/cop24/enb/> accessed 18/12/18.  
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PART 5 – Concluding matters 
 
The final chapter (chapter X) brings together the various elements of thesis, drawing 
out the themes that have been carried through the thesis and considering whether 
the objective and purpose have been reached and research questions answered. It 
notes also matters that are beyond the scope of the thesis. 
 
This Part also includes the following: 
• Table of Treaties 
• Table of Legislation 
• Table of Cases 
• Bibliography 








Chapter X Conclusions 
 
A Perceived problems and challenges and the proposed 
solution   
 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of international emissions trading (IET) under the 
Kyoto Protocol and its apparent lack of success in reducing overall levels of, or even 
rates of increases in emissions, a growing number of jurisdictions are implementing 
mechanisms that put a price on carbon emissions, whether by taxing activities that 
cause the release of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to the atmosphere, or by creating 
markets through which the cost of atmospheric release of GHGs is internalised to 
the relevant activities through emissions trading schemes (ETSs). While the 
heterogeneity of these mechanisms reflects local preferences, circumstances, 
capacities and requirements, to optimise their effectiveness they need to connect 
into larger, deeper, more liquid markets, which should be less susceptible to 
manipulation and more effective at generating a stable price for carbon emissions. 
At the same time, the structure for voluntary cooperative approaches to effect 
international transfer of mitigation outcomes under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
must be able to account for the global diversity and complexity now evident in 
national policies and schemes providing for carbon pricing. The corollary is that 
mitigation outcomes need to be valued, the obvious common metric being their 
mitigation value, measured in tonnes carbon dioxide equivalent greenhouse gas. 
 
This thesis has argued that, in the transition from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris 
Agreement, for emissions trading to achieve greater effectiveness it needs to be 
freed, to some extent, from its current framing in the climate regime. IET and the 
carbon market as it developed under the Kyoto Protocol was not designed, but an 
outcome of negotiations. It functions as both a climate policy measure and a 
financial market, operating at an international level. Examination of this duality of 
purpose indicates imbalances: at the macro level, its genesis resulted in IET, as a 
financial market, being functionally compartmentalized in the climate policy regime 
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as a result of which, this thesis argues, its effectiveness has been impaired (thus 
imbalanced to the climate purpose); whereas at the micro level, the focus has been 
on the property rights in what is traded and the entitlements attaching to those 
rights, rather than in their environmental value (thus, perhaps, imbalanced the other 
way). Going forward, it is posited that the carbon market should be framed with a 
clearer functional identity as a financial market, operating within an equally clearly 
defined boundary framework of climate change principles and rules. The networking 
approach proposed to achieve such inter-jurisdictional trading is not only a 
mechanism for implementing the policy of mitigating GHG emissions, but seen also 
as an opportunity for addressing the need to better integrate international climate 
change law and practice into the mainstream political-economy agenda. 
 
The market proposed can be viewed as not a single market, but rather as a trading 
platform connecting and facilitating transactions between individual, separate 
markets, each of which will continue as an autonomous operation in its own 
jurisdiction, while participating in the network. The proposal encompasses the digital 
infrastructure needed to provide the connection between these markets, as well as 
the legal and administrative structures that will operate, manage and oversee the 
network. The proposal consists, therefore, of two distinct elements: first, networking 
of carbon markets; and secondly, that networking being carried out using a specific 
type of digital information technology (IT) architecture, namely, distributed ledger 
technology (DLT).  
 
Networking is not current practice, presently being only conceptual in nature. The 
current approach for connecting carbon markets from different jurisdictions is for 
them to link, which involves alignment of schemes, policies, laws, processes and so 
on. This gives rise to political issues, stemming mostly from the perceived impact of 
system alignment on the sovereignty of the participant jurisdictions. It has been 
argued that networking better addresses these issues, as the inherent problem of 
imbalance of negotiating positions (and consequential implications for sovereignty of 
the disadvantaged party) is far less likely to arise. Networking also holds out a more 
time efficient process by avoiding the need to homogenise laws, systems, registries, 
policies and other elements of the respective participating jurisdictions’ systems, 
thus avoiding lengthy treaty negotiations.  
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The global recognition of technological developments occurring that fundamentally 
change how financial services are provided, how markets, business and 
government operate, leads to a conclusion that in proposing a model for networking 
carbon markets, it is necessary and desirable to specify the IT architecture on which 
the networked market platform could operate. Application of this distributed ledger 
technology is not without issues, yet at the same time, DLT holds out the promise of 
useful features, including permanence/immutability of data (supporting traceability, 
auditability, and robust accounting); decentralised participants (using smart 
contracting to facilitate transactions directly with reduced need for intermediaries); 
distributed information sharing and management (enabling balancing of 
transparency with privacy, and the permissioning mechanism); and security (based 
on hash cryptography, overall design and the consensus mechanism).  
 
While in some respects, issues addressed by its application might be addressed 
equally by a well-designed centralised database, DLT does hold out some 
significant advantages. For instance, while it may be difficult to discern one way or 
the other in terms of cryptography, DL network design, the permissioning and 
consensus mechanisms, together with the accumulative nature of the ledger entries, 
suggest a more effective overall security package. Part of that security package is 
the traceability of traded assets’ provenance. This facilitates accounting and audit 
processes, thereby helping address the Paris Agreement requirements. Removing 
some intermediaries from transactions, if achievable – taking into account financial 
regulations, introduces time and cost savings. Reducing overall end-to-end 
transaction time, if realisable, would mean that counterparties’ risk exposures are 
reduced, meaning that they would need to make less provision against potential 
default, consequently releasing more capital for other investment and thereby 
enhancing the overall efficiency of the market. Other, even more significant aspects 
are, firstly, the flexible and relatively simple accessibility that such a network could 
provide; and secondly, the facility to co-locate all relevant market and compliance 
information on the ledger. Realisation of these features and advantages is 
dependent on careful design, both in a technological sense and in terms of the legal 
and administrative structures that technology supports. 
 
B Governance structure 
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In proposing this market model, the objective is to arrive at a suitable design for 
regulatory and institutional frameworks (the governance structure) for trading 
emissions in the context of the Paris Agreement and wider governing structures, 
treating emissions trading as a financial market and using distributed ledger 
technology (DLT) architecture to connect different markets in a network. Thus, a 
framework for analysis of the regulatory and institutional frameworks for the market 
has been set out, then applied to analyse the proposed solution, including by 
mapping it against the current regulatory frameworks and identifying any issues 
around implementation arising from the context. 
 
The governance structure needs to account for the requirements of climate change 
law; financial markets regulation; and the legal requirements developing in relation 
to DLT and its applications, thus there are three essential elements. Each of these 
needs to be approached differently, as for example, in relation to climate change 
there is an existing global governance structure, which allows comparative analysis. 
On the other hand, financial regulation is principally a domestic law matter, although 
there is a developing global structure and, accordingly, the proposed market’s 
governance structure has been considered in terms of how it would fit with this 
developing architecture while acknowledging the role of domestic regulation. Thirdly, 
DLT and its applications are recent developments and jurisdictions are currently 
active in developing their approaches to the challenges posed by the technology 
and its applications: as such, the approach taken has been to examine the state of 
these developments and where they might be heading, to assess the compatibility 
of the proposed governance structure. Finally, the framework for analysis has 
examined specific legal issues that pertain, in turn, to the technology and its 
application, to financial market regulation; and to the rules that may relate to 
implementation of the Paris Agreement. 
 
The governance structure dissected vertically reveals three separate, but interacting 
functional pillars: the first relating to supervisory and regulatory elements; the 
second relating to the self-regulatory market operation; and the third relating to 
independently sourced market information, the self-contained mitigation value 
assessment process. The first pillar features two overriding supervisory bodies, one 
from the climate policy perspective and the other from the financial market 
perspective, acting conjointly, ultimately answerable to the Conference of Parties of 
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the UNFCCC acting as the Meeting of Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA). The 
self-regulatory market is, in essence, an example of co-regulation, or regulated self-
regulation, for although the market is operated and regulated by the participating 
jurisdictions, it would function within a broader regulatory framework, ultimately 
being answerable to the CMA. The third pillar separates the function of providing 
market sensitive information, with the aim of ensuring that sources of this 
information are independent, objective, credible and reliable, and the process 
secure and trustworthy. The governance structure viewed horizontally shows seven 
layers of governance, from the most specific, the rules imposed by jurisdictions on 
entities they authorise to access inter-jurisdictional trading, up to the broadest, the 
supervision exercised by the two supervisory bodies, acting conjointly.  
 
Comparing the governance structure for emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol 
with that proposed in this thesis, it is noted that first, the differences in approach 
under the Paris Agreement to that under the Kyoto Protocol mark a fundamental 
point of departure. For instance, at the most basic level the terminology under the 
Paris Agreement suggests a different, possibly less prescriptive approach; secondly, 
under the Paris Agreement, there is no developed and developing country party 
differentiation in terms of specific commitments/obligations and, consequently, the 
ability to access the trading mechanism; and compliance obligations are replaced by 
voluntary commitments. A third point of differentiation, reflecting changes in 
domestic markets such as the European Union, is that the proposed networked 
market places greater emphasis on the carbon market as a financial market, 
facilitating better investor protection in areas such as market manipulation or insider 
dealing, and better investor and market risk management. More significantly, under 
the Kyoto Protocol there has been no organised inter-jurisdictional trading platform, 
as such, whereas the establishment of such a trading platform is proposed: thus, the 
networked market would be largely self-contained and functionally separate from, 
but capable of feeding required information into, other jurisdictional requirements 
such as overall emissions accounting and reporting. Finally, the networked market 
proposed is based on continuing, autonomous operation of the carbon markets in 
the participating jurisdictions, thus compliance and enforcement will primarily remain 
a domestic jurisdictional matter thereby, it is anticipated, being both more likely and 
more effective. Thus, it is concluded that, notwithstanding the networked market 
being largely self-contained and functionally separate from the jurisdictions 
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participating, it would be only an adjunct, or supplement, to their domestic mitigation 
activities – a tool to which they may have recourse, as they see necessary, in 
fulfilling their nationally determined contributions.   
 
A key aspect of the approach for global financial market governance is that, as a 
supplement to sound micro-prudential and market integrity regulation, national 
financial regulatory frameworks be reinforced with a macro-prudential overlay to 
promote a system-wide approach to financial regulation and oversight and to 
mitigate the build-up of excess risks in the system. Thus, supervision over 
commercial actors in financial markets should be based on a two-tier system with 
national supervisors continuing to exercise micro-prudential oversight and a level of 
macro-prudential oversight introduced for financial markets as a whole, in order to 
provide early recognition of systemic risks. A similar two-level approach is proposed 
in the governance structure for the networked carbon market. 
 
In terms of the technology, the historical evolution of the use cases and application 
of DLT from an alternative payment system (bitcoin) to the present emphasis on 
initial coin offerings and investment, points to a changing and increasing array of 
risks for both users and regulators to countenance, while remaining focused on the 
potential and opportunities technological innovation can provide. As a consequence, 
regulatory approaches and responses cover the gamut from wait-and-see, through 
supportive measures and guidance vis-à-vis current laws, to sandboxing; innovator-
friendly regulatory frameworks, technology neutral risk-based application of anti-
money laundering/counter terrorism financing (AML/CTF), consumer protection and 
systemic risk management provisions. Surveys of jurisdictions indicate there are 
very divergent approaches to crypto-assets, making it difficult to discern any stand 
out direction that regulation might take apart from, perhaps, increasing in amount. 
All the same, the obvious starting point from a regulatory perspective has been for 
jurisdictions to consider whether the financial sector applications of DLT fall within 
the ambit of existing financial regulation. The analysis devolves into a question of 
the nature of the token issued, its economic purpose and function and the rights and 
entitlements, if any, attaching to it. 
 
The question of the nature of tokens, issued on distributed ledger platforms used in 
financial applications, is at the intersection between legal issues relating to 
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applications of DLT and financial market regulation. Furthermore, if the units traded 
on the network of markets – that is, as tokens traded on the DLT platform – 
represent units of mitigation value (MV), then the application of DLT and financial 
market regulation intersect also with climate law considerations. The nature of the 
mitigation outcome/financial instrument/token is germane to all three areas of law 
considered in this thesis and thus lies at its centre. Analysis of the mechanism by 
which transactions might take place inter-jurisdictionally on the networked market 
leads to a consideration of the need for a transaction unit, as a vehicle for effecting 
transactions. The assumption that a transaction unit is more than a notional step in 
the transaction process, and capable of having a separate legal identity as a store of 
value, leads to the conclusion that it would be of the same legal nature as the 
mitigation outcome from which it derives, but with a standardised value. As the legal 
nature of mitigation outcomes depends on their domestic source jurisdiction, an 
analysis tree for determining domestic regulatory treatment of a transaction unit is 
proposed. All the same, there would need also to be a way of determining the law 
applying to the transaction units on the network platform, for which various 
approaches are suggested, such as applying the governing law of the network 
platform, or as might be provided in the network platform’s constitutional document.  
 
While continuing research into potential design requirements for the application of 
distributed ledger technology to a network of carbon markets is needed and is on-
going, it is concluded that a market designed along the lines proposed as a 
mechanism for implementing GHG mitigation policy allows pursuit of climate policy 
objectives, giving effect to the elements of Article 6, Paris Agreement. It allows 
proper and efficient operation of the market by introducing appropriate elements of 
financial regulation and provides for and is responsive to technological 
developments. Thus, this thesis has arrived at a design for regulatory and 
institutional frameworks for trading emissions considered suitable in the context of 
the Paris Agreement and wider governing structures.  
 
The logic for this governance structure is separation and clarity of functions; 
flexibility; legal certainty, with independence and objectivity; and the self-reinforcing 
balancing of the dual functions of the carbon market – effective market operation 
promoting the climate objective and driving higher mitigation ambition, with market 
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self-regulation (co-regulation) promoting greater efficiency and more effective 
operation. The main elements are:  
 
• the functional separation into three pillars being regulatory/supervisory 
functions; self-regulatory (co-regulatory) market operation; and the 
independent provision of market information;  
• secondly, the flexibility of the networking structure on a distributed ledger 
platform fostering a level-playing field and that jurisdictions can join or leave, 
relatively easily, according to their assessment of the domestic economic 
needs and perceived benefits; and  
• finally, the use of the DLT architecture for the trading platform to promote 
robust accounting and as a way of ensuring environmental integrity.  
 
It has long been acknowledged that private sector engagement is essential for 
success of the UNFCCC processes, including constructive participation in carbon 
market mechanisms, as a way of driving investment in low-carbon technologies.928 
The scientific evidence is that limiting global warming to 1.5°C as opposed to 2°C 
will lower impacts, but necessitates more immediate and greater efforts to mitigate 
emissions.929 This is especially so given, on one hand, the investment timeframes 
for relevant critical infrastructure and, on the other, the time lags before climate 
impacts ameliorate. Engagement of the private sector at scale is essential if the 
process for cooperative approaches involving the international transfers of mitigation 
outcomes, under Article 6 Paris Agreement, is to achieve enhanced mitigation. As 
the IPCC notes with ever increasing frequency, time for action is running short if 
dangerous anthropogenic climate change is to be avoided. The approach outlined 
here holds out the potential of a shorter route to implementation. At the same time, 
while the application of DLT might disintermediate some financial transaction 
                                                      
928 For example: WBCSD Secretariat, Ecofys and Climate Focus, ‘Private Sector and the 
UNFCCC Options for Institutional Engagement’, Final Report 31/8/2010 
<https://www.wbcsd.org/Clusters/Climate-Energy/Resources/Options-for-institutional-
engagement-in-the-UNFCCC-process> accessed 11/04/18; European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Operationalising Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: 
Perspectives of developers and investors on scaling-up private sector investment, May 2017 
<www.ebrd.com> accessed 21/09/17. 
929 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Global Warming of 1.5°C, Special 
Report, Summary for Policymakers, 2018 <http://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf> 
accessed 09/11/18. 
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counterparties, it should not, of itself, alienate relevant climate stakeholders, such as 
the CMA, Secretariat/ITL, or subsidiary bodies, whose roles would be reinforced.   
 
C Matters beyond the scope of this thesis 
 
The reader of this thesis will appreciate the large breadth of subject matter, 
disciplines, laws, legal concepts and scope that needs to be spanned in order to 
deal with a subject matter such as climate change and, in particular, the 
construction of mechanisms to implement policies that address it. The multi-
disciplinary nature of climate change as a global problem, and of the measures to 
address it, mean that while it is necessary to touch on political, economic, scientific, 
technological, social, and developmental aspects, as well as legal, some of these 
are not dealt with in any detail. This is not an excuse, but an explanation for lack of 
depth in coverage in relation to some elements needing to be mentioned, but less 
directly related to the primary purpose of the thesis, than others.  
 
Nevertheless, it is appropriate to mention some matters that are specifically beyond 
the scope of the thesis. First, the mitigation value assessment process is briefly 
dealt with earlier930 as one of the operational mechanisms that will be required for 
the proposed networked market to operate. The importance of this process is 
reflected in the governance structure in the third pillar, the independent source of 
market information, described in chapter VIII.931 As noted, two possible approaches 
to how a mitigation value assessment methodology might be applied are through, 
first, a public, intergovernmental institution along the lines of the Clean Development 
Mechanism Executive Board (CDMEB), or secondly, by private sector entities under 
a regulatory model similar to that applied to credit reference agencies. While a 
preference for the latter model is expressed, it is not necessary to resolve this 
definitively for the purposes here. Even more so, it is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to propose or make recommendations as to an actual methodology that might be 
applied.    
 
Additionally, there are several matters of a technical nature, which while noting that 
they exist and may require attention in the course of further development of the 
                                                      
930 Chapter VII, section A, 3(i). 
931 At section A, 1(iii). 
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proposals set out in this thesis, do not need to be explored or resolved conclusively 
here. First, there is no need, nor is it possible at this point in time, to reach a 
definitive conclusion as to the technological advantages of a distributed IT 
architecture over a centralised approach. This depends to a significant degree on 
the particular use case under consideration and to design elements. Thus, while 
potential benefits and advantages of DLT over existing centralised models have 
been flagged, whether and how they would be realised will depend on the specific 
application. Secondly, issues of cybersecurity and the potential for human error are 
ever present. While the application of DLT to a networked carbon market includes a 
description of the perceived security benefits, it is recognised that this provides only 
a high-level coverage of what is both an intricately detailed and highly technical 
subject. Finally, the consideration of legal issues associated with the distributed 
ledger technology mentions liability for technical default issues, such as incorrect 
coding or systems failures. These have not been explored in any detail, as technical 
default liability can affect any system or technology and so are not particular to 
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(i) Rules governing market operation and jurisdictional participation 
 
In order for the distributed network to create the framework for an inter-jurisdictional 
emissions trading market that conforms to international (and national) climate 
change policy, certain fundamental rules and principles are of critical importance. 
These could include: 
a) a condition that, in all transactions, environmental integrity is protected and 
preserved, that is, not compromised or reduced;932 in other words, 
participation in the distributed network market must always contribute to an 
overall reduction, or at least no increase, in greenhouse gas  emissions for 
jurisdictions with which the counterparties to a transaction are connected, 
and for the networked market overall; 
b) application of the supplementarity principle,933 dictating that not more than, 
say, 25% of the units held on a domestic ETS registry may be sourced from 
the international market (that is, from sources outside the particular 
jurisdiction), although individual jurisdictions might be free to set limits even 
lower than this (which would then be enforced through smart contract code 
terms applicable to entities from that jurisdiction); 
c) the requirement that any individual trading actor (in effect, a trading entity 
within a given participant jurisdiction’s ETS) retain a compliance reserve of, 
say, 75% of its emissions-related obligations;934 it is noted that Parties in 
Annex B under the Kyoto Protocol had compliance reserve commitments 
under the rules for international emissions trading; (following a principle of 
economic/compliance risk management comparable with, for instance, the 
minimum capital deposits of banking institutions); 
d) application of an automatic and immediate block on all transactions 
involving entities from a jurisdiction, where that jurisdiction indicates an 
intention to withdraw from the distributed network; 
e) application by a jurisdiction of national rules of acceptance/exclusion 
prescribing ‘mitigation value’ (MV) limits in regard to other jurisdictions with 
which it would be willing to permit entities authorised by it to trade; for 
example, a refusal to permit transactions with a jurisdiction whose MV is 
below (or above) a specified level, or (whose MV) is outside a specified 
range; 
f) upon a jurisdiction joining the distributed network, the provision and 
maintenance of a surety in respect of its contribution to joint network costs, 
to be forfeited, for instance, if the jurisdiction were to withdraw without 
proper notice; transaction rules would correspondingly block transactions 
by entities from any jurisdiction not providing an adequate surety;  
                                                      
932 Such a rule is clearly necessary, and its enforcement a high priority, given the terms of the Paris Agreement.  
933  The supplementarity principle as stated for the purposes of the Kyoto Protocol is that ‘… the use of the mechanisms 
[International Emissions Trading, CDM, JI] shall be supplemental to domestic action and that domestic action shall thus 
constitute a significant effort made by each Party included in Annex I to meet its quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments under Article 3, Paragraph 1.’ (Article 1 Draft Decision -/CMP.1 (Mechanisms) contained in Decision 15/CP.7, 
Marrakech Accords). The 25% figure here is only for the purposes of indicating application of the principle in this context.  
934 Hence, this would apply only to those trading entities that have compliance obligations in the jurisdiction, so not to say, 
brokers or market makers. 
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g) the possibility of jurisdictional adjustment of trading maxima or minima 
under rules (b) and (c) (by respectively lowering or raising the figure) as 
they apply to a given jurisdiction’s own compliance entities (i.e., traders 
within its own domestic ETS), for the purpose of managing domestic market 
activity; and 
 
for those rules allowing for jurisdictions to make adjustments vis-à-vis trading activity 
of entities authorised by them (for example, rules (b) and (c) above), an appropriate 
notification procedure would need to apply. 
(ii) Rules governing transactions 
 
Trading within the market established through the distributed network could be 
possible only where the individual actors (traders) conform to a minimum set of 
standardised rules or principles. These might include, at least, the following: 
a) the seller must, in fact, hold the trading units offered for sale, evidenced by 
a registry/ledger entry;935 this requirement might be satisfied by the seller’s 
ability to convert the units offered into transaction units (TUs); 
b) the buyer must hold the funds necessary to complete the transaction, 
evidenced by bank records, automated bank confirmation, or deposit of the 
requisite amount into an account accessible to the seller on settlement;936 
c) automatic application of the conversion/discount rate, where relevant, 
between the jurisdictions concerned applicable at the time of the 
transaction or, in the case of TUs, conversion by the seller of its trading 
units into TUs (at the applicable rate), and, upon the price money being 
available/transferred, either the transfer of the TUs, or the conversion of the 
TUs into the buyer’s domestic units (at the applicable rate) and the transfer 
of these to the buyer’s account in its domestic ETS registry; and 
d) on settlement, as per (c), updating of all copies of the ledger. 
 
The ‘smart contract’ would operate on the basis that, if any term or condition 
essential for such a transaction were not met, the transaction would not proceed. 
Thus, unless all such requirements are satisfied within some predetermined period 
(say, within a specific number of hours of the initiation of the transaction), the 
transaction would fail and lapse. 
Essential terms and conditions might typically include the following information and 
specifications: 
• name and jurisdiction of seller; 
• domestic authorization, satisfactory KYC937 and AML938 checks on seller; 
• name and jurisdiction of buyer; 
• domestic authorization, satisfactory KYC and AML checks on buyer; 
• certification or proof that the transaction is accepted as not negatively 
impacting upon environmental integrity;939  
• certification that the transaction would not cause the buyer’s jurisdiction to 
breach the supplementarity principle (noting that either jurisdiction may 
                                                      
935 In other words, there would be no scope for short-selling. 
936 An alternative would be that the smart contract would not permit the transfer of the transaction units from seller to buyer 
until the money was either available for or, in fact, had been transferred to the seller’s bank account. 
937 Know-your-customer. 
938 Anti-money laundering. 
939 As noted earlier, most likely this would need to be part of the MV setting process. 
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have the level set lower than maximum applicable in the distributed system 
as a whole); 
• certification that the transaction would not cause either the seller or the 
seller’s jurisdiction to breach the compliance reserve (noting that the level 
may have been set higher than the minimum required for the distributed 
system as a whole); 
• that the conversion rate, where relevant, is acceptable to the buyer’s 
jurisdiction; 
• that both jurisdictions have provided and maintain an acceptable surety in 
regard to their financial obligations towards the operation of the distributed 
network; 
• confirmation that the seller holds and is entitled to sell the domestic units 
offered for sale; 
• confirmation that the buyer has funds to complete transaction; and 
• where relevant, the application of the correct conversion rate between 
jurisdictions or, for TUs, between each jurisdiction and a TU. 
Once all such terms and conditions are satisfied, the transaction would proceed 
automatically and irreversibly. 
 
 
